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Abstract 
Prime ministerial power resides in the institutions of government, and relies on 
complex interactions between the leader and the leadership environment. The 
party and the electorate can terminate a leader's tenure, and other institutions 
such as the media, parliament and sources of advice can all impact on the 
relative success of the prime minister. How these power sources are navigated is 
influenced by personal leadership styles. Because these styles vary, there is 
more than one path to effective leadership and political dominance. 
The Paul Keating Prime Ministership (1991-1996) tells us much about prime 
ministerial power and Australian political leadership. The lessons from his tenure 
are that prime ministers must maintain support in the electorate and the party 
room, because power is dependent on interaction with, and the support of, 
others. Prime Minister Keating was a dominant leader in relation to his 
colleagues in the caucus and the cabinet; his leadership was individual and 
authoritative. His downfall was the result of the ultimate power wielded by the 
Australian electorate used to devastating effect. 
Thus prime ministers are only ever as powerful as they are allowed to be; by the 
party room and by the people. The media and modern competitive electoral 
pressures provide increasing scope for individual leadership, but neglect of either 
of these domains still invites political oblivion. Australian prime ministers can act 
'presidentially', but only within the confines of public and party expectations. 
This thesis utilises new material and an interactionist framework to re-examine 
the prime ministerial power debate and conclude that powerful leadership relies 
heavily on a willingness of others to be led. Paul Keating's stores of immense 
authority and influence relied on his personal approach but also, most 
importantly, on the compliance of his colleagues in the cabinet and caucus. 
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Brawler Statesman 
Leadership is not about being popular; it's about being right and about being 
strong. It's not whether you go through some shopping centres, tripping over 
TV crew's cords. It's about doing what you think the nation requires, making 
profound judgements about profound issues1. 
Prime ministers are the focal point of Westminster governments and the subject 
of intense scrutiny and analysis. They occupy many roles at once, including: head 
of government; cabinet chairperson; leader of the parliament's majority party; 
chief spokesperson and media representative; focal point for election campaigns; 
strategist; policy advocate; manager of staff; and dispenser of patronage. The 
ultimate judgement of their political leadership rests on their ability to perform 
these roles more or less successfully. This, in turn, depends upon the prime 
minister's interactions with colleagues, the public, and the institutions of 
executive government. These interactions and relationships form the basis of any 
effective analysis of the prime ministership and, more specifically, of individual 
prime ministers. 
A robust debate over the relative power of prime ministers has been conducted in 
Westminster polities, in particular in Britain and Australia, since the 1960s2• This 
1 Paul Keating quoted in Mark Ryan, Advancing Australia: The Speeches of Paul Keating PM 
(Sydney, Big Picture Publications, 1995), p 6. 
2 See John P Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (London, Methuen, 1968); Introduction by RHS 
Crossman to Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (London, Fontana, 1963); Richard E 
Neustadt, 'White House and Whitehall' in Anthony King (ed), The British Prime Minister (London, 
Macmillan, 1985); George Jones, 'Presidentialization in a Parliamentary System?' in C Campbell 
and MJ Wyszomirski (eds), Executive Leadership in Anglo-American Systems (Pittsburgh, 
Pittsburgh University Press, 1991); Richard Rose, 'Government against Sub-governments: A 
European Perspective on Washington' in R Rose and EN Suleiman (eds), Presidents and Prime 
Ministers (Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982); Richard 
Rose, 'British Government: The Job at the Top' in R Rose and EN Suleiman (eds), Presidents and 
Prime Ministers, (Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982); 
Patrick Weller, First Among Equals: Prime Ministers in Westminster Systems (Sydney, Allen and 
Unwin, 1985); John Hart, 'President and Prime Minister: Convergence or Divergence?', 
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debate is concerned with collective authority, as represented by the cabinet and 
party room, versus the individual power exercised by the leader. Recent analysis 
has concentrated on the effect of increasing media attention, modern electoral 
pressures, and the growth and sophistication of prime ministerial support and 
advice mechanisms as factors contributing to a more individualised model of 
leadership. As a result of these pressures, the office has evolved to the point 
where cabinet government in its traditional form has given way to prime 
ministerial government. This trend towards individual power is largely restrained 
by two factors: the party room's power to replace prime ministers with an 
alternative from within its own ranks; and the electorate's ability to install the 
leader of the opposition party at election time. 
Paul Keating was an authoritative Prime Minister whose tenure in Australia's 
highest elected office from 1991 to 1996 reconfirms the thesis about prime 
ministerial government. His was a dominant, authoritarian brand of leadership. 
He exercised enormous influence over his caucus and cabinet, and his own 
private office became the key institution of the Government, dwarfing the others 
in power and responsibility. Keating thus governed from the centre, seeking and 
acting on the advice of a tiny circle of advisers and confidantes. However, his 
relationship with the media, and through it the electorate, was fraught with 
difficulty and led to his ultimate demise. Though his colleagues in the Party and 
the ministry remained compliant throughout Keating's tenure, the media and the 
voting public did not. 
Paul Keating is an intriguing subject of scholarly investigation because of the 
questions his prime ministership raises about prime ministerial power and 
Parliamentary Affairs, vol 44, no 2, 1991, pp 208-25; Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The 
Office and its Holders Since 1945 (Melbourne, Penguin Books, 2001); Peter Hennessy, The 
Importance of Being Tony: Two Years of the Blair Style (Lord Mayor's Lecture, 12 July 1999); 
Michael Foley, The British Presidency, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000); Michael 
Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993); 
Anthony Mughan, Media and the Presidentia/ization of Parliamentary Elections, (Hampshire, 
Palgrave, 2000); see also Ian McAllister, 'Political Leaders in Westminster Systems' in Hermann 
Schmitt (ed), The Changing Impact of Leaders, (Cambridge University Press, 2004, forthcoming). 
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leadership style. He remains a unique political figure, and the subject of much 
academic and journalistic inquiry. However, while biographers have done well to 
shed light on the Keating persona and on the events of the governments of 1991 
to 1996, and commentators have passed myriad judgements on the man 
himself, a systematic study of Keating's exercise of prime ministerial power and 
his distinct leadership style is conspicuously absent from the existing literature. 
This account fills that void by offering a new perspective on the Keating Prime 
Ministership which concentrates on the role itself; the office of the Australian PM. 
It draws upon a fresh set of interviews and a comprehensive re-analysis of the 
documentary and published record. It adds to the biographical literature by 
utilising an interactionist approach, and considers personal prime ministerial 
style in the context of the institutions and constraints of the office. 
The dissertation that follows provides a thorough examination of the Paul Keating 
Prime Ministership in relation to the debate over prime ministerial power. It 
draws lessons about Australian political leadership from a solid foundation of 
empirical evidence. It expands on a somewhat dated and incomplete literature 
and offers a fresh Australian perspective on the nature of the position and the 
interaction of prime ministers with the institutions of executive government in a 
Westminster system. 
The Paul Keating prime ministership is evidence of the trajectory towards 
increasingly powerful prime ministers. The concentration of influence in the 
Prime Minister's Office, Keating's ability to select his own ministry and announce 
policy unilaterally, his dominance of caucus and cabinet and his monopolisation 
of both election campaigns all point to an individualised prime ministership 
absolutely consistent with the prime ministerial power literature. 
Further, the interactionist approach relied on by this thesis leads us to the 
subservience of Keating's cabinet and caucus. The argument throughout is that 
prime ministers are only ever as powerful as they are allowed to be; by the Party 
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room, the cabinet, and the electorate. The job is one that exists on the basis of 
party and electoral support. Prime ministers who don't die or retire, or who aren't 
dismissed, are subject to two significant removal mechanisms - the election and 
the party room coup. 
Because prime ministers are subject to these constraints they can never be 
completely dominant; their tenure relies on others. But as the prime ministerial 
government thesis points out, and this dissertation reconfirms, there is 
nonetheless scope for the wielding of massive power. Prime ministers have 
enormous advantages over colleagues because they allocate patronage, chair 
cabinet, draw on sophisticated advisory and support mechanisms, and enjoy a 
privileged media and electoral position. The Paul Keating Prime Ministership 
demonstrates these possibilities, but is also a lesson in the electoral limits of 
prime ministerial power. When colleagues in the cabinet and caucus are 
subservient and submissive, the prime minister wields significant power. When 
they are not, or when the prime minister falls out of favour with the electorate, 
the opposite is true. Though the potential is great, prime ministerial power, in an 
interactionist political climate, is thus dependent on the compliance of colleagues 
and the support of the electorate. 
Keating, the ALP and Leadership 
When Paul Keating rose to address the National Press Club on the evening of 7 
December 1990 in Canberra, the assembled journalists could not have expected 
the rambling discussion of leadership that was to follow. 'We've got to be led and 
politics is about leading people', he declared, adding 'politicians change the world 
and politics and politicians are about leadership'. The 'great societies' were built 
upon leadership, he argued, but the problem was that Australia 'never had one 
such person, not one'. Keating saw leadership as 'about having a conversation 
with the public' rather than 'being popular'. 'It's about being right and about 
being strong' not 'whether you go through some shopping centre, tripping over 
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the TV crew's cords' but 'making profound judgements about profound issues'. 
Keating concluded with some now-familiar words: 'I walk on the stage, some 
performances might be better than others, but they will all be up there trying to 
stream the economics and the politics together. Out there on the stage doing the 
Placido Domingo'. He then added a warning to his political opponents: 'I'm still 
around after eight years and I'm still walking all over those bloody people 
opposite, and I'll keep doing it'3. 
In the context of the bitter and longstanding leadership feud between Keating 
and the then Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, the speech was seen as an attack on 
the latter's credentials, constituting one of the first shots fired in the battle for the 
Australian Labor Party leadership and, by extension, the prime ministership. This 
bloody conflict spanned two caucus ballots and all of 1991. Eventually Keating 
was installed as Australia's prime minister on 19 December 1991, one year after 
the now infamous 'Placido Domingo' speech4 . 
Paul John Keating was born 18 January 1944 in Bankstown, Sydney. His rise 
through the rough and tumble world of Australian Labor Party politics in New 
South Wales was initially meteoric, so much so that he was elected to the 
Commonwealth Parliament on 25 October 1969 as the representative of the 
rock-solid Labor seat of Blaxland at the age of only twenty-fives. His extraordinary 
career included stints as President of the New South Wales Youth Council, 
Minister for Northern Australia, President of the New South Wales Branch of the 
ALP, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia from 1983 until 1991 and a 
short tenure as Deputy Prime Minister in 1991. Along the way Keating became 
3 Paul Keating quoted in Michael Gordon, A True Believer: Paul Keating (Brisbane, University of 
Queensland Press, 1996), pp 3-11. For a slightly different transcript of Keating's unscripted 
comments see Mark Ryan 1995, op cit, pp 3-8. 
4 For a detailed, blow-by-blow account of the Keating-Hawke leadership challenges and associated 
events, see Stephen Mills, The Hawke Years: The Story From the Inside, (Melbourne, Viking, 
1993), pp 199-298. 
5 Once elected to Parliament, Keating reportedly refused to rest on his laurels. Alan Ramsey once 
wrote that Keating 'wasn't in the place five minutes before he was running in Caucus ballots, 
twisting arms, organising numbers, and generally operating like a political Sammy Glick who'd 
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the youngest Labor minister ever, Euromoney's Finance Minister of the Year 
(1984), and the longest serving federal Treasurer in Labor's long history. As 
Prime Minister, Paul Keating's legacy was a 'big picture', encompassing 
Aboriginal issues, Australian economic integration with Asia and the advancement 
of an Australian republic6. 
Keating's electoral record is mixed, featuring a largely unforeseen triumph in 
1993 and a widely-predicted defeat in 1996. The 1993 election saw him pitted 
against a then-considered formidable opponent - John Hewson - and a 
comprehensive and detailed reform package - fightback! The victory left him 
vindicated. After appealing to caucus to replace the ageing and under-performing 
Hawke in 1991, Keating was able to win an election in his own right, allowing him 
to salute the 'true believers', those who 'in difficult times kept the faith'7 • But 
1996 was to be a different story. Trailing in the opinion polls for the duration of 
the campaign and unable to make up ground against a resurgent Liberal Party led 
once again by John Howard, Keating's ALP suffered a heavy defeat. In the 
inevitable post-election analyses, commentators pointed to the perceived 
arrogance of the Prime Minister and electoral dissatisfaction with his pursuit of 
the big picture. Others convincingly argued that by 1996 the Australian 
electorate had simply had enough of Labor, and it was the Liberals' turn to 
govern8 . 
Before the heavy defeat of 1996, The Labor Party Keating led as Prime Minister 
had grown accustomed to the Treasury benches, having turned around an 
unimpressive electoral performance throughout the twentieth century to enjoy 
thirteen consecutive years in office, the longest stretch in the Party's history. The 
Labor administrations of Hawke (1983-1991) and then Keating (1991-1996) 
were reformist in nature. Much energy and political capital was spent on 
pick your pocket while he wheedled your vote'; quoted in David Day, 'Paul John Keating' in 
Michelle Grattan {ed), Australian Prime Ministers (Sydney, New Holland, 2000). 
6 See David Day 2000, op cit. 
7 The words used by the newly elected Prime Minister on election night, 13 March 1993. 
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reforming the economic infrastructure of Australia, preparing the nation for an 
international economic climate marked increasingly by globalisation. Not 
surprisingly, the pursuit of economically rationalist policies drew the ire of the 
Party's traditionalists9• The floating of the dollar, sale of the Commonwealth 
Bank, and other acts of the Government represented a transformation of the 
Party from the days of Curtin and Chifley, and accelerated the Party's move to the 
centre started by Gough Whitlam in the 1970s1o. Thus many of the Party's 
traditions were seemingly turned on their head, as Labor transformed itself into a 
pragmatic, electoral professional, centrist party. Keating's role in this 
transformation, as both Treasurer and as leader, was of paramount importance11. 
Keating could not have implemented the plethora of reforms which marked his 
Treasuryship without the electoral success and public popularity that his then 
leader, Bob Hawke, delivered for the Labor Party at the national level12. Indeed 
Hawke was the ALP's most electorally successful leader ever, winning federal 
elections in 1983, 1984, 1987 and 1990. The senior and accomplished minister 
Neal Blewett described Prime Minister Hawke as a charismatic politician with an 
uncanny attention to bureaucratic process13. He was 'corporatist and 
bureaucratic by instinct and presidential in style'14, and employed a style of 
'broker politics'15 that served him well. His Government contained many strong 
and successful ministers, including Keating, and Hawke allowed them to get on 
with their work without significant interference. He chaired cabinet inclusively 
a For a credible analysis of the 1996 federal election consult Clive Bean, et al (eds), The Politics of 
Retribution: The 1996 Australian Federal Election (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1997). 
9 See David Day, 'Hawke and the Labor Tradition' in Susan Ryan and Troy Bramston (eds), The 
Hawke Government: A Critical Retrospective, (Melbourne, Pluto Press, 2003). 
10 See John Warhurst, 'Transitional Hero: Gough Whitlam and the Australian Labor Party', 
Australian Journal of Political Science, vol 31, no 2, 1996, pp 243-52 and Paul Kelly, The End of 
Certainty: The Story of the 1980s (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992), pp 19-33. 
11 Paul Kelly 1992, op cit. 
12 For a comprehensive analysis of the Hawke years see Susan Ryan and Troy Bramston (eds}, 
The Hawke Government: A Critical Retrospective (Melbourne, Pluto Press, 2003). Many 
contributors to this collection highlight Hawke's electoral success and public popularity. 
13 Neal Blewett, 'Robert James Lee Hawke' in Michelle Grattan (ed) Australian Prime Ministers 
(Sydney, New Holland, 2000), p 390. 
14 Ibid, p 381. 
1s Colin Campbell and John Halligan, Political Leadership in an Age of Constraint: Bureaucratic 
Politics Under Hawke and Keating, (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992), p 14. 
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and without excessively stamping a prime ministerial view on his colleagues. 
Under these circumstances, Treasurer Keating and other ministers flourished16. 
Bob Hawke and Paul Keating can be seen as co-architects of Labor's longest 
federal reign, but their relationship, initially close and productive, became 
suspicious, then contemptuous, culminating with open warfare and the 
leadership battle. Personality differences and the clash of two egos, each 
convinced of their own leadership virtues and prime ministerial destiny, partly 
explains the degeneration of the relationship. Their initial success came from a 
valuable demarcation of roles; Hawke providing the public support which allowed 
Keating to indulge in his passion for bold policy. The high point of the 
relationship saw Hawke himself describe the double act as 'the most deadly 
combination in postwar politics'17, and Neal Blewett concurred, claiming it was 
'one of the great alliances in Australian politics•1s. That this relationship 
degenerated is not surprising, Blewett argues, given Keating regarded Hawke as 
an 'interloper', and Hawke thought his Treasurer an 'opinionated upstart•1e. The 
Kirribilli agreement, signed by Hawke and Keating in November 1988, saw Hawke 
promise to relinquish the leadership in Keating's favour in the parliamentary term 
following the 1990 election. That Hawke failed to keep his written promise to 
abdicate was a key reason for the fury with which the subsequent leadership 
battles were fought. With the announcement on 19 December 1991 that Keating 
had defeated Hawke by 56 votes to 52 came the formal end of a relationship that 
had, in reality, ceased to be effective some years prior to the ballot. 
Apart from a clash of ambitions, differences in style between the two men are 
also readily observed. To Hawke speechwriter Stephen Mills: 
The central feature of this combination was the fact that Hawke and Keating 
were such opposites, in their background, style and character... Hawke was 
the outsider, unrivalled in the electorate; Keating the insider, the master of 
Parliament. Hawke was the conciliatory, presidential 'good cop', always 
1s Paul Kelly 1992, op cit. 
17 Bob Hawke quoted in Neal Blewett 2000, op cit, p 400. 
1s Neal Blewett 2000, op cit, p 401. 
19 Ibid, p 402. 
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ready for patient negotiation; Keating was the abrasive, relentless, 'bad cop', 
willing to drive over the top of any opposition, and throw in a few choice 
epithets on the way. This is what made them such a deadly combination ... 20 
Hawke was the great conciliator, a consensus operator, risk averse, chairman of 
the cabinet, and immensely popular in the electorate. Keating, on the other 
hand, was publicly disliked, combative, confrontational, and risk taking, and 
believed the weight of the Government's success rested on his, rather than 
Hawke's, shoulders. Hawke was highly educated, a Rhodes scholar, whereas 
Keating left school at 15 to work in the basement of the Sydney City Council. 
Keating's spare time was spent cultivating an interest in music and the arts; 
Hawke's was spent maintaining his obsession with sport. The differences 
between the two men were stark. The conflict between these colossal figures 
marked not only the latter stages of the Hawke tenure, but coloured Keating's 
Prime Ministership after Hawke left the parliament. 
Throughout the Hawke and Keating prime ministerships comparisons were 
inevitably made with the brief tenure of the previous Labor PM, Edward Gough 
Whitlam, who governed from December 1972 until his dismissal by the Governor-
General in November 1975. The Whitlam Government is remembered for 
implementing its ambitious and wide-ranging social reform agenda, covering 
women's and indigenous affairs, as well as recognition of China and the 
reduction in tariff protection for local industries. Not unlike Hawke or Keating, 
Gough Whitlam was an immensely confident man with self belief befitting a 
leader. He was bold and authoritarian; an early example of a prime minister who 
acted 'presidentially'. His 1972 'It's Time' crusade set the standard for modern 
political campaigning, and saw him take the Prime Ministership from the 
Conservatives for the first time in 23 years. The Whitlam Government crashed 
down, however, after a lengthy stand-off in the Senate caused the Governor-
General, John Kerr, to dismiss the Prime Minister, forcing him to an election 
subsequently lost to the Liberal Party's Malcolm Fraser21. 
20 Stephen Mills 1993, op cit, p 199. 
21 For a useful and brief biography of Gough Whitlam see Clem Lloyd, 'Edward Gough Whitlam' in 
Michelle Grattan (ed) Australian Prime Ministers (Sydney, New Holland, 2000), p 390. See also 
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Comparing Labor prime ministers is a difficult task, made even more so by the 
smallness of their number (ten)22 and the years that passed between them, for 
example, 23 years expired between the governments of Chifley and Whitlam. The 
length of tenure also varies markedly, from the extremes of Forde's one week 
tenure to Hawke's record breaking 8 years. That Keating's prime ministerial term 
was four and one quarter years, roughly half that of Hawke's, makes comparisons 
between the two men more difficult. Similarly with any attempts at a Whitlam -
Hawke comparison. 
Nonetheless, we can draw lessons from each prime minister's navigation of the 
constraints of the extra-parliamentary influence and caucus democracy 
traditionally observed in the Labor Party. In Chifley and Curtin we observe the last 
of the traditional primus inter pares Labor leaders23. In Whitlam we see the first 
authoritarian ALP leader. Hawke offers us an example of a PM utilising cabinet in 
the traditional, democratic way, while acting in the public sphere like a type of 
president, appealing directly to the people for personal support in order for 
Labor's reform agenda to succeed. The Keating tenure, not unlike Whitlam's, 
represents a controlling approach to the Party and colleagues, without the 
appeals to electoral popularity observed under Hawke. Each Labor PM made his 
own mark on the Australian prime ministership, leaving a unique public and 
historical legacy, and participating in the evolution of the office over a century of 
political development. 
What then, of Paul Keating's public legacy, and how is his prime ministership 
remembered? He is either loved or loathed by political pundits and the electorate 
at large, even years after his defeat. Some point to his strong leadership on 
Gough Whitlam, The Whit/am Government 1972-1975 (Melbourne, Viking, 1985); Graham 
Freudenberg, A certain grandeur, Gough Whit/am in politics (South Melbourne, Macmillan, 1977); 
and James Walter, The Leader: A Political Biography of Gough Whit/am (Brisbane, University of 
Queensland Press, 1980). 
22 Watson, Fisher, Hughes, Scullin, Curtin, Forde, Chifley, Whitlam, Hawke, and Keating. 
23 See David Day, John Curtin: A Life (Sydney, Harper Collins, 1999) and David Day, Chif/ey 
(Sydney, Harper Collins, 2001). 
10 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
important issues such as indigenous affairs, Asian integration and the republic, 
and his mostly steady stewardship of the nation's economy24. Party diehards 
recall the 'Placido Domingo' and 'true believers' speeches and the dedication of 
the tomb of the Unknown Soldier as evidence of a thoughtful and forceful 
statesman, determined to advance his agenda and contribute to the economic 
and cultural modernisation of Australia. 
An apt description of the paradox at the heart of the public Keating comes from 
factional colossus, cabinet colleague and sometime Keating confidante, Graham 
Richardson, who described Keating as a 'brawler statesman'25. On the one hand 
was a prime minister who painted with a bold brush, building APEC, offering bold, 
courageous speeches on foreign policy and signing a defence pact with 
Indonesia. On the other, a street fighter without equal. As former Senator 
Richardson told this author in an interview, 'he was good in a fight, there weren't 
too many who were better. He could fight. If he was one on one giving someone 
a dressing down he was incredibly brutal. There was no one better at it. I'm not 
sure you'd want that as your legacy, but it's certainly true'26. 
A former ministerial colleague of both men, Neal Blewett, agrees, describing 
Keating as 'a bundle of contradictions - to some the prince of darkness, to others 
the inspired and inspiring leader. Courteous, except when crossed, persuasive, 
self-deprecatory in private, in public he could be vituperative, abrasive and 
arrogant. A politician of vision yet a political streetfighter of the cruder kind, he 
was an autodidact on many topics, with cultivated if narrow interests in music 
and the arts'27. Respected political journalist Paul Kelly described him as a 'born 
24 Ian McAllister, 'The End of a Labor Era in Australian Politics', Government and Opposition, vol 
31, no 3, 1996, p 289. 
25 Bob Ellis referred to this description of Paul Keating in his book Goodbye Jerusalem: Night 
Thoughts of a Labor Outsider (Sydney, Vintage, 1997), p 135, the relevant part of which reads: 
'the brawler-statesman, as Richo called him, the kid from the fibre suburb in the Armani suit'. 
Graham Richardson, in an interview conducted by this author on 24 June 2002, confirmed that he 
had first described Keating as a 'brawler statesman'. This provides the title of this dissertation. 
26 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
27 Neal Blewett, Cabinet Diaries: A Personal Record of the First Keating Government (Kent Town, 
Wakefield Press, 1999), p 16. 
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political statesman', 'an enthusiast, a talker, a schemer, a manipulator', 'street 
smart', and 'half hustler, half idealist•2a. To others he was 'a loner driven by little 
except self-interest'29, an egoist with a 'mesmerising arrogance'3o, who used 
language inappropriate for parliament, shunned important domestic issues, was 
out of touch, and who as Treasurer gave us the 'recession we had to have', 
warned of Australia becoming a 'banana republic' and who oversaw one million 
unemployed as PM. 
It has, therefore, become popular to describe Keating as suffering from some 
form of political schizophrenia. In this way David Adams draws a distinction 
between those who 'saw in him arrogance, conceit and contemptuousness -
even brutality' and those who 'admired the energy, the vision and the rhetorical 
power'31. Michelle Grattan observed 'old and new Labor, street-smart Sydney 
and the sort of sophistication you'd find in a merchant banker'32. Brett Evans 
argues 'whether tie-less in Bligh Street or sitting for his prime ministerial portrait, 
Keating is always the same contradiction: visionary street-fighter, inspiring prince, 
abrasive leader. You don't get one without the other'33. 
Of the published views of the Keating character, perhaps none is more valuable 
than that from an extremely close confidante who worked for Prime Minister 
Keating for the entire four and a half years; speechwriter Don Watson. He 
described Keating as 'an enigma, a paradox, an oxymoron on legs, a 
contradiction'34. The 'Prime Minister was as constant as the moon. He went into 
shadow and then he would shine'35. Keating was 'a cornered rat and a prowling 
2s Paul Kelly 1992, op cit, p 26. 
29 Peter Ryan, 'The Labor pantheon', Quadrant, vol 40, no 6, June 1996, p 88. 
30 Pamela Williams, 'Behind the Victory', Sydney Papers, vol 9, no 3, Winter 1997, p 99. 
3 1 David Adams, 'Prime Ministerial Style' in G Singleton (ed), The Second Keating Government: 
Australian Commonwealth Administration 1993-1996 (Canberra, Centre for Research in Public 
Sector ManagemenVlnstitute of Public Administration Australia, 1997) p 9. 
32 Michelle Grattan in David Day 2000, op cit, p 416. 
33 Brett Evans, The Life and Soul of the Party: A Portrait of Modern Labor (Sydney, UNSW Press, 
2001) pp 18-19. 
34 Don Watson, Recollections of a Bleeding Heart: A Portrait of Paul Keating PM (Sydney, Harper 
Collins Press, 2002), p 261. 
35 Ibid, p 400. 
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dog; he was feline; he was a spider skulking in a corner of the web, rushing out 
every now and then to furiously bind and paralyse his victims'36. 
An experienced journalist described Keating mid-term as 'a political enigma' 
whose 'political performance fluctuates from peaks of brilliance to troughs of 
political madness. He is a leader capable of great vision and bravery. But too 
often his achievements are undermined by his mistakes. Keating believes in the 
big picture and works at it with great sweeps of the brush. But he often gives too 
little attention to the smudges and spills which distract the electorate'37. Another 
journalist argued 'Paul Keating is undoubtedly the most complex and paradoxical 
figure in contemporary Australian politics: at once a skilful party-machine man 
with the acute political instincts of his working class background, and a leader 
who can parade the international stage with style and authority; a self-taught man 
who left school at 15 but who also possesses a formidable knowledge of history, 
art and music; a ferocious master of vernacular invective yet an orator who can 
canvass grand themes with flair and emotion•3s. 
These reflections on the man who led Australian in the early 1990s are 
indications of the complexity of Keating and his prime ministership. Whichever 
side of the Keating persona is emphasised, his tenure is noteworthy for the 
passion it evokes from both friend and foe. In short, 'Keating's is a complicated 
legacy - as complicated as the man himself'39. 
Just as complex were Keating's own views on the importance of leadership; Don 
Watson recalls Keating considering leadership to be unimportant, or 'largely 
bullshit'40. But the views expressed during the Placido Domingo speech extol the 
virtues of a capable, inspiring and transforming leader. In his own book, 
36 Ibid, p 469. 
37 Geoff Kitney, 'Paul's Sweet Year', Sydney Morning Herald, 12 March 1994, p 30. 
38 Mark Baker, 'The Perils of Paul Keating's Challenge', Age, 1 April 1995, p 17. 
39 Brett Evans 2001, op cit, p 20. 
40 Don Watson, op cit, p 238. 
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Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific41, he provides what is probably a 
more accurate description of his approach to power. Keating argued an 
important responsibility of a prime minister is 'setting the agenda: knowing why 
you want the job, knowing what to do with it. Above all, it is imagining something 
better and fashioning the policies to get there'42. This approach would not 
support the negative view of leadership he apparently offered to Watson in what 
that author has described as just one of many bouts of prime ministerial 
melancholy. 
Keating's view of his own prime ministership was provided to journalist Michael 
Gordon shortly after the 1996 election defeat. He argued he had achieved as 
much as was possible, he'd 'used up the political space' and 'tried to make every 
post a winner'. In this interview Keating somehow equated the prime 
ministership with a lemon. He continued: 
I tried to use up the authority of the prime minister in a progressive way, and 
use up the mandate, and one thing about the lemon, when I finally gave it to 
John Howard, there was no juice left in it. I'd squeezed it all out in the 1993-
96 Parliament. Now if the public had given us a new lemon, I'd have done 
the same again. I wasn't going to say, 'Oh, what a pity we didn't talk about 
the republic43. 
Clearly Keating saw the prime ministership as something which must be 
harnessed for change, rather than a role to be filled or time to be served. 
This view coincides closely with his view of power; that it is something which must 
be shaped to suit one's ends and directed towards reform. From Keating's 
recorded remarks, published views and the transcripts of interviews conducted 
for this thesis it is impossible to find any account which downplays the Prime 
Minister's pursuit and enjoyment of power. Indeed, as Watson has well-
articulated, 'Keating liked the clash of armies: he was a politician of the older 
kind, not embarrassed or frightened by power any more than a financier is 
41 Paul Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia Pacific (Sydney, Macmillan, 2000). 
42 Ibid, p 9. 
43 Paul Keating in Michael Gordon, A True Believer: Paul Keating (Brisbane, University of 
Queensland Press, 1996), pp 342-3. 
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embarrassed or frightened by money or a dentist by teeth. Power is the currency 
of politics, the reason for it, the stock in trade. Power was his creative medium. 
He was never more at home than in its company'44. 
Given this study's preoccupation with power, it is helpful that the man himself 
often ruminated on its use. In a speech at Melbourne University in 1994 he 
argued the 'best politicians want power because they know that, for all its 
imperfections, as a vehicle for turning ideas into reality, a political career has no 
equal'. He continued: 'the politics of reform is a grinding business, and I confess 
to wondering sometimes why we do it. I also confess, entirely without apologies, 
that power has a fair bit to do with it. I never met a good politician who didn't like 
using it, wrestling with it'45. In yet another speech, he argued 'power is for using. 
It is not to be wasted or feared or despised'46. 
Some have seen in Keating a lust for, and skilful use of, power unequalled in 
contemporary Australian politics. To Don Watson he was 'a political leader who 
more than any other in the last quarter century was determined to be master of 
his environment rather than the opportunist waiting for the times to suit him'47. 
Further, according to the same author, Keating 'practised politics precisely for the 
purpose of mastering events because politics was the only means by which he 
could turn this thing of his imagination into something real. Politics was power, it 
was the hunt, the game, a way to the unrivalled pleasure of destroying his 
enemies - but it was, as well, always an act of creation'48. A Party apparatchik 
who has worked for more than thirty years for Labor leaders believes Keating's 
utilisation of his own power resources was more effective than his predecessors 
Gough Whitlam and Bob Hawke49. 
44 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 75. 
45 Mark Baker, 'The Power Game Charges Keating', Age, 6 August 1994, p 17. 
46 Paul Keating, Believe in Yourselves, Speech to the University of Notre Dame graduation 
ceremony, 8 March 1994, quoted in Mark Ryan 1995, op cit, p 83. 
47 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p xi. An argument can be made that Gough Whitlam was a similar 
leader, though Watson's remark may refer to the period post-Whitlam. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Private conversation. 
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The Keating prime ministership is intriguing because of this raw appreciation for 
power and also due to the distinctive political style that he brought to the 
position. In his rhetoric, contemptuous treatment of opponents, his distinctive 
policy interests, and in the observable blend of 'brawler' and 'statesman', Keating 
offers political scientists a compelling subject of inquiry. Both the man himself 
and the roller-coaster ride that was the Keating prime ministership throw up 
significant opportunities for the scholarly analysis of prime ministerial power. 
Revisiting Prime Ministerial Power 
The debate over prime ministerial power in Westminster systems has been raging 
at least since the publication of work by Mackintosh and Crossman in Britain in 
the early 196Qs5o, and more recently in contributions from Richard E. Neustadt, 
George Jones, Richard Rose, Patrick Weller, John Hart, Peter Hennessy, Michael 
Foley, Anthony Mughan and Ian McAllister51. Central to the prime ministerial 
power debate is the resilience of the traditional Westminster model in the face of 
modern pressures driving executive government in countries such as Australia, 
Britain, Canada and New Zealand towards a quasi-presidential leadership model. 
The debate rests on questions of individual versus collective or cabinet power, 
and the extent to which the effect of the media and electoral pressures have 
given rise to the centralisation of influence and authority in the hands of a 
dominant prime minister. 
Recent studies of prime ministerial power come largely out of Britain, where the 
thesis is well-tested. Peter Hennessy, a noted scholar of Whitehall and Downing 
Street, as well as Michael Foley and Anthony Mughan, have all made substantial 
contributions to the debate in the last half-decade. Hennessy analyses British 
50 John P Mackintosh 1968, op cit; RHS Crossman 1963, op cit. 
51 See Richard E Neustadt 1985, op cit; George Jones 1991, op cit; Richard Rose 1982, op cit; 
Patrick Weller 1985, op cit; John Hart 1991, op cit; Peter Hennessy 2001, op cit; Peter Hennessy 
1999, op cit; Michael Foley 1993 and 2000, op cit; Anthony Mughan 2000, op cit; Ian McAllister 
2004/forthcoming, op cit. 
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Prime Ministers since 1945 through the prism of a job description he has 
compiled. The chapter on the incumbent PM, Tony Blair, paints the picture of a 
colossally dominant leader governing from the centre of government. Hennessy 
describes a situation where the enormous and increasing responsibilities of the 
office have 'stretched' the premiership in the years since World War Two. 
Michael Foley also centres his analysis of the British Prime Ministership on a 
notion of 'leadership stretch'. His publication The British Presidency (2000) 
examines prime ministerial influence and authority in the context of the Thatcher, 
Major and, in much more detail, Blair prime ministerships. Along the way Foley 
identifies an Americanisation of the British prime minister. Though without the 
institutional power structures available to the President of the United States, 
Foley argues, the British prime ministership under Blair has become presidential 
in nature because of the centralisation of power in the hands of the PM. This 
accumulation of authority and influence has been facilitated by the adaptation of 
American techniques, such as 'going public', in response to the pressures of 
modern executive governance. 
Anthony Mughan is another British contributor who stresses the changing nature 
of the Prime Ministership and, in particular, the phenomenon of individualisation. 
Mughan analyses the personalisation of election campaigns and concludes that 
there has been a 'presidentialisation' of print and television campaign coverage 
since World War Two, and that candidates for the prime ministership, that is the 
leaders of the Labour and Conservative parties in Britain, play a greater role in 
the decisions made by the electorate. The personalisation of presentation, and 
the central role of leaders in political campaigns, concludes Mughan, allows them 
to exercise greater power over their colleagues, for example in the appointment 
and dismissal of cabinet ministers. 
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In an Australian context, Patrick Weller's Malcolm Fraser PM: A Study in Prime 
Ministerial Power remains the most comprehensive contribution to the debate52. 
It takes a more conservative approach to the subject than the British 
contributions introduced above, but it was written a decade earlier, before the 
Paul Keating and John Howard prime ministerships. Weller asks 'how powerful 
was Malcolm Fraser and how real was the institution of cabinet government while 
he was prime minister?'53. Drawing on interviews, the public record, and 
personal papers and correspondence, Weller examines the Fraser Prime 
Ministership of 1975 - 1983 and analyses the personal and institutional 
relationships between Fraser and his sources of advice, the parliament, media, 
other ministers, the cabinet and his party. In the process, Weller provides a 
'portrait of the prime minister in action' and a 'study in the exercise of power and 
influence within the Australian political system'54. 
Malcolm Fraser PM draws on the experience of one prime ministership to provide 
insights into many of the questions central to the debate over prime ministerial 
power. Weller asks how Fraser 'organised the position, from whom he got advice 
and what use he made of it, how he ran the cabinet and the party, and how he 
presented the government through the parliament, the media and at elections'. 
Then, more broadly, he asks: 'how do prime ministers have an impact on the 
procedures and policies of a government?' and 'what does an appreciation of the 
working styles of, and limitations on, prime ministers tell us more generally about 
the difficulties of governing Australia?'55. Weller's Malcolm Fraser PM analyses 
one prime minister and the interactions between the leader and the institutional 
power centres of the Australian system of executive government, in the process 
emphasising the style and skills which allowed Prime Minister Fraser to navigate 
the constraints inherent to the position. 
52 Patrick Weller, Malcolm Fraser PM: A Study in Prime Ministerial Power in Australia (Melbourne, 
Penguin, 1989). 
53 Ibid, p xiii. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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The conclusions of Malcolm Fraser PM can be summarised thus: first, though 
there is scope for individual decision making, cabinet must be consulted if a 
prime minister is to retain the support of his or her senior colleagues. Second, 
cabinet is neither individualistic nor collective, but requires navigation and a 
strategic determination of where decisions will be made and by whom. Third, 
power in the Australian system is dispersed widely between parties, state 
governments, the media, interest groups and the electorate. Fourth, individual 
prime ministerial style and skill is important as it determines the extent to which 
the leader can persuade and manipulate. Finally, Weller argues, the 'fact that so 
powerful a leader saw the necessity to consult so often is a comment not just on 
the individual, but on the Australian political system'56. 
The thesis that follows is best seen as a re-examination of the prime ministerial 
power debate, begun by Mackintosh and Crossman and still conducted to the 
present day by contributors such as Hennessy, Foley, Mughan and Weller, among 
others. It relies, in particular, on the institutional approach provided by Weller in 
his Australian study, but draws heavily from the example set by the British prime 
ministerial scholars. The objective is to provide a more recent analysis of the 
Australian prime minister while taking into account the large academic strides 
that have been made internationally, most notably in the United Kingdom. A 
comprehensive examination of these works is undertaken in the literature review, 
provided in Chapter Two. There a detailed analysis of executive leadership, the 
Westminster prime ministership, the role of the Australian PM, and the influence 
of personality and style is conducted within the parameters of the debate over 
prime ministerial power. 
56 Ibid, pp 408-9. 
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Methodology and Sources 
This thesis relies on an interactionist model of leadership developed by Robert 
Elgie57 • Elgie's approach emphasises the key relationships of leadership, 
between leaders and followers and, also, between the prime minister and the key 
institutional actors and alternative centres of power which she or he must work 
with and through. In his words, the interactionist approach 'combines the 
personal and systemic aspects of the leadership process' and marries the 'great 
man' theory of leadership, where individuals are able to effect widespread 
change, and the cultural determinist school which asserts leaders represent the 
powerful forces of history and the context of the times58. The emphasis is 
therefore on the leadership environment, so that 
the extent to which political leaders are able to influence the decision-
making process is considered to be contingent upon the interaction between 
the leader and the leadership environment in which the leader operates. 
How political leadership is exercised depends on the nature of this 
interaction59. 
Further, in a similar vein, 'leadership is intimately related to the fabric of the 
leaders' relevant societies, to social and political organizations, to established 
institutions, and to leaders' relations with smaller and larger groups of 
followers'6o. 
Leaders must therefore navigate the institutional structures of the political 
system, including parliaments, parties, bureaucracies, cabinet and the media. 
Convincingly, Elgie argues these 'structures are the most important aspect of the 
leadership process, partly determining the ambitions and styles of political 
leaders and mediating the impact of societal needs upon the decision-making 
process'61. 
57 Robert Elgie, Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies (London, Macmillan, 1995). 
58 Ibid, pp 5-6. 
59 Ibid, p 7. 
60 Sheffer in ibid, p 7. 
61 Ibid, p 13. 
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The continuing debate about the relative power of presidents and prime ministers 
vis-a-vis institutions and competing centres of influence rests on the premise of 
important institutional and personal relationships impacting on the leadership 
task. The exercise of prime ministerial power necessarily involves others, which 
means it invites analysis of relationships. In Weller's words, 'power suggests a 
relationship'; 'resources and relationships must be at the centre of any 
discussion of prime ministerial power'62. This dissertation follows suit by 
analysing the Paul Keating prime ministership in Australia in the context of 
institutional interaction, allowing for the interplay of personality and the 
leadership environment. 
The thesis relies on a combination of eight major groups of sources. The first 
group comprises the literature dealing with prime ministerial power and the 
debate about the centralisation of influence and authority in Westminster 
systems. This literature is mentioned briefly above, and is made up of work from 
prime ministerial and presidential scholars from the Westminster world and the 
United States. In addition to this body of work, important studies of leadership 
and the interactions of leaders and their environments and constituencies will 
also be consulted. To round out the secondary literature, analyses of party 
leadership and the institutions of executive government will also be consulted. In 
the process, the theoretical and academic foundations of the study can be 
isolated and, subsequently, applied to the experiences of the early to mid 1990s 
in Australia. 
Biographical material provides another important insight into the Paul Keating 
prime ministership. In this domain the Keating scholar is blessed with more than 
one well-written account, coming from commentators63 , colleagues64 and 
62 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 12. 
63 See for example Michael Gordon 1996, op cit; David Day 2000, op cit; Edna Carew, Paul 
Keating: Prime Minister (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992) .. 
64 Consult Peter Walsh, Confessions of a Failed Finance Minister (Sydney, Random House, 1995) 
and Graham Richardson, Whatever It Takes (Sydney, Bantam Books, 1994) for some colourful 
accounts of the Keating Prime Ministership. 
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participants65 alike. Of these biographical works Don Watson's Recollections of a 
Bleeding Heart is without equal and will stand as one of the most substantial 
contributions to prime ministerial biography. John Edwards' Keating: The Inside 
Story and Michael Gordon's A True Believer: Paul Keating also provide valuable 
accounts. These rich sources are supplemented by other published work, 
including Pamela William's 1997 analysis of Keating's last election campaignee, 
David Day's short biography67 , and Gwynneth Singleton's collection of essays on 
Keating's second term68. These accounts, specific to Keating and the 
government he led, assist in the telling of the Keating story, provide important 
indications of the key players in the Government, and fill in the gaps where other 
sources may have failed to paint a more complete picture. 
The third group of sources comprises official documents and the record of the 
Government from 1991 to 1996, detailing, for example, Prime Minister Keating's 
trips overseas, and the make-up of the cabinet, caucus, and committees. This 
material includes the Cabinet Handbook published in 1994, Annual Reports of 
the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and other like sources. This 
material serves the useful purpose of supplementing other material and clarifying 
remarks made in interviews. It adds a factual and objective set of material to the 
other information gathered for the thesis. 
The fourth source of research for this thesis was the official record of parliament 
provided by Hansard. The parliamentary activity spanning the entirety of 
Keating's term was analysed in order to gain an appreciation for the Prime 
Minister's strategies and debating style, his treatment of the Opposition, and the 
rhetoric he used to inspire those on his own side of the House of 
Representatives. An examination of his favourite parliamentary topics and his 
65 John Edward's Keating: The Inside Story (Melbourne, Penguin, 1996) provides a view from one 
of the Prime Minister's advisers. 
66 Pamela Williams, The Victory: The Inside Story of the Takeover of Australia (Sydney, Allen and 
Unwin, 1997). 
67 David Day 2000, op cit. 
68 Gwynneth Singleton, The Second Keating Government: Australian Commonwealth 
Administration 1993-1996 (Canberra, Centre for Research in Public Sector Management, 1997). 
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responses to Questions Without Notice is also undertaken, in order to explore 
Keating's parliamentary persona. 
For similar reasons Keating's public speeches on a diverse range of topics are 
consulted. In this the Keating researcher is greatly assisted by the collection of 
speeches compiled by former prime ministerial adviser, Mark Ryan69. When 
taken together, Keating's rhetoric in parliament and in the wider public domain 
provide important insights into Keating as prime minister, and his performance as 
the Government's chief advocate. 
Published media commentary provides the sixth major group of sources 
consulted extensively in the research for this thesis. In particular, reports and 
analysis from credible, widely-circulating publications such as the Australian, the 
Sydney Morning Herald, the Age, the Australian Financial Review and the Sun 
Herald daily newspapers are used70. This provides chronological records of the 
events of the Keating Government as well as expert commentary on the operation 
of the Government, snapshots of Keating's leadership style and an indication of 
the reactions to significant initiatives, proposals and speeches. This material is 
also useful when determining Keating and his advisers' media strategies, and the 
relations between the Government and the media. 
The seventh group of sources is made up of opinion polling, the Australian 
Election Studies, and analyses of the 1993 and 1996 federal elections. This 
material provides insights into the electorate's perceptions of Prime Minister 
Keating, and sheds some light on his fraught relationship with the Australian 
people. An analysis of the election campaigns fought by Keating as PM is also 
made possible by the availability of this material, from which we can draw 
broader conclusions about the public and electoral aspects of his tenure. 
69 Mark Ryan 1995, op cit. 
70 These were selected on the basis of readership, geographical coverage, and varying format. 
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Finally, the most useful data utilised in this dissertation on the Keating prime 
ministership was obtained from many interviews with Keating's caucus and 
ministerial colleagues, members of the Press Gallery, advisers, bureaucrats, party 
officials and other interested participants11. The utilisation of the interactionist 
model demanded this. Paul Keating was also interviewed for three hours in 
Sydney, but his request that this conversation not be referred to in the body of 
the thesis has been honoured, perhaps at some unavoidable cost to the 
argument. Much effort was made to speak with as many other key players as 
possible. When taken together with the published sources and public record, the 
insights provided by those interviewed allow a wide-ranging study of the Keating 
prime ministership, its personalities, power relationships and institutional 
interactions. 
Outlines, Aims and Arguments 
This dissertation draws upon evidence from the Paul Keating prime ministership 
of December 1991 to March 1996 to test the prime ministerial power thesis. 
Relying on a framework supplied by earlier contributors to the debate, it will 
provide some insights into the authority, influence and power resources available 
to Keating as he occupied the nation's highest elected office. The aim of the 
dissertation, therefore, is to isolate the power relationships central to the 
governing task and to draw some conclusions about the levers of power available 
to Keating specifically and then, more broadly, to Australian prime ministers in 
general. Additionally, useful judgements can be made about the extent to which 
the power resources available to prime ministers have changed, and the extent to 
which personal style and the strategies of leaders can account for differences in 
the influence and authority enjoyed by occupants of the office. 
With these objectives in mind, a number of key questions can then be isolated. 
What are the boundaries of the debate over prime ministerial power? To what 
71 A complete list of the interviews conducted is provided at the end of this thesis. 
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extent does the prime ministerial power thesis accurately describe the 
centralisation of authority and influence in the hands of prime ministers? What 
influence do institutions, constituencies and competing power centres have on 
the prime ministership? How does the Keating experience challenge or support 
the prime ministerial government thesis? What are the tasks of party leadership 
and what were the relationships between Paul Keating, the Labor caucus, party 
organisation and the affiliated unions? How did Keating interact with his cabinet 
and the wider ministry? What was his parliamentary style and in what ways did 
he use parliament to his own advantage? From where did Keating get his advice, 
and what were the respective roles of his private office and the Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet? How did Keating use rhetoric and the media to 
paint his 'big picture' and how did he perform at election time? What is the 
potential and actual impact of the removal mechanisms wielded by the electorate 
and a prime minister's colleagues? Once these questions have been answered 
valuable insights can then be gained into the nature of the Australian prime 
ministership, the impact of individual style, and the ways in which the office has 
grown to accommodate a dominant prime minister with the will, the ability, and 
the support, to dominate Australian governance. 
To address these questions the dissertation is presented in the next eight 
chapters. Chapter Two comprises a review of the prime ministerial power 
literature and the leadership material more generally. Here the focus is on the 
differing arguments of key contributors to the debate and the varying emphases 
on collective or cabinet authority, or constraints, versus individual influence and 
authority. In particular, the findings and conclusions of Malcolm Fraser PM, 
Foley's British Presidency, Hennessy's The Prime Minister, and Mughan's Media 
and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections will be examined in more 
detail in order to provide a basis for a worthwhile study of prime ministerial 
leadership under Paul Keating. In addition, the literature that deals with the 
tasks of leadership, including party leadership, and the constituencies which 
leaders must navigate will be discussed. Finally, this chapter will address notions 
of prime ministerial style and the impact this has on the governing task. By 
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providing a coherent discussion of the secondary literature that deals with prime 
ministerial power and the demands and influences placed on leaders it is hoped 
that a useful platform for subsequent chapters' analysis of the Keating prime 
ministership can be built. 
Chapter Three begins the Keating-specific analysis with a detailed examination of 
his role as party leader. Here the tasks of party leadership are isolated in relation 
to the prime minister's interactions with his caucus colleagues, the Australian 
Labor Party organisation, and the unions. This involves the study of the access to 
Keating that members, senators and Party officials enjoyed, the conduct of 
caucus and other party meetings, Keating's relations with the Party's National 
Secretariat and with union leaders. As a result of numerous interviews with 
members of parliament, Labor identities and advisers, a view of Keating's 
distinctive brand of party leadership and the important relations between the 
prime minister and his Party is provided. This, in turn, will shed light on the power 
and influence enjoyed by Keating as Labor leader, and will serve as the first 
substantive component of this unique examination of the prime ministerial power 
thesis. 
Next, Paul Keating's relations with his senior colleagues - the cabinet and the 
wider ministry - will be analysed in Chapter Four. In this area the prime minister 
again has many roles and relationships. Keating was expected to chair and 
oversee the administration of cabinet, appoint ministers elected by the caucus 
(though with significant prime ministerial input) to specific portfolios, and handle 
reshuffles and resignations. All of this takes place among numerous ambitious 
individuals with their own significant power bases and with only a caucus ballot 
standing between them and Keating's job. Typically, this creates a need for the 
careful management of personalities, and some degree of consultation with other 
powerful figures. In this respect, the prime ministerial power thesis is well-tested. 
Central to the traditional model of Westminster government are notions of 
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collective, cabinet government with the prime minister as primus inter pares72• 
The extent to which the Keating tenure deviated from this ideal model is 
ascertained. 
The administrative arid political support on which Paul Keating relied throughout 
his prime ministership is the focus of Chapter Five. Here, the sources of advice 
provided by his own private office, staffed by political operatives, policy advisers, 
speech writers and other staff, as well as the bureaucracy - principally the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) - are examined. In the 
first instance, Keating's relations with key personnel in his private office, the 
degrees of trust he bestowed on individuals, the functions and processes of the 
private office, and the interaction and access between the prime minister and 
staff, and the prime minister's staff and others, are all examined in an attempt to 
determine the extent to which Keating governed 'from the centre', coordinating 
the gamut of the Government's activities from the Prime Minister's Office and 
relying on a trusted band of close advisers. The second component of this 
chapter is an analysis of the relationship between Keating and PM&C, the 
structures and services of the Department, the demands placed on it by the 
Prime Minister, and the demarcation of roles in relation to the PMO. The 
relationship between the alternative sources of advice and their competition for 
prime ministerial influence is another worthwhile subject of inquiry. Throughout 
the chapter, then, prime ministerial power is analysed in the context of the 
accumulation of sources of advice which allow for the subsequent garnering of 
authority and influence in the Office of the Prime Minister. A related concern, 
also addressed in this chapter, is the extent to which Australian federalism and 
the constraining influence of state governments impedes the prime minister73 . 
12 Primus inter pares (first among equals) describes a model of collective leadership that 
arguably, in the context of Westminster prime ministers, has not ever existed. It remains useful, 
however, as a shorthand way of describing an ideal form of cabinet government, with which 
comparisons with prime ministerial government can be made. 
73 Unfortunately the space available in Chapter Five, and this thesis' concentration on national 
politics, only allows for a brief analysis of the impact of federalism, though there is scope for a 
much broader study of state governments as alternative sources of power in a federal system. 
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Many of the more compelling moments in the Paul Keating prime ministership 
occurred in the House of Representatives. As Prime Minister, Keating continued 
the dominance of the parliament that he established as Treasurer, along the way 
destroying two leaders of the opposition - John Hewson and Alexander Downer74 
- and rallying his own side with his spirited invective and passionate advocacy. 
But there was a down side. Chapter Six deals explicitly with Keating in 
parliament, and analyses the language and strategies employed by the Prime 
Minister, what he sought to use parliament for, how his treatment of the 
opposition provides insights into his political style, and what impact parliamentary 
dominance and the rigours of combat had on his stores of prime ministerial 
power. 
Paul Keating has been both maligned and admired for his articulation of a 'big 
picture', extending from economic reform and Australian competitiveness to 
integration with Asia, an Australian republic, and indigenous affairs. But how did 
he 'paint' this big picture? Chapter Seven deals with Keating as a political 
advocate, salesman or statesman. It addresses in detail his media strategies 
and relationships with the 'fourth estate', and his speech making style, 
effectiveness and favourite topics. The analysis of these public aspects of 
Keating's prime ministerial task also sheds light on the relations with individual 
journalists, the importance attached to speeches, international statesmanship, 
and the strategies utilised by Keating in his capacity as the artist chiefly 
responsible for the big picture75. 
The broadest domestic constituency a Prime Minister must appeal to is the voting 
public. Chapter Eight deals exclusively with public opinion and election 
campaigns and, in the process, sheds light on the least favoured of Keating's 
prime ministerial tasks and those that he, it could be argued, performed the least 
74 Though it could be argued that Downer's leadership was so poor that he destroyed himself, with 
some help from the Prime Minister. 
75 Again, as with the earlier note about federalism, the section on international relations deals 
relatively briefly with this domain because of consideration of available space and the 
concentration on national, largely domestic, politics. 
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effectively. In this chapter his relations with the wider electorate illustrated by 
opinion polling, election outcomes and campaigning style are examined in order 
to determine the extent to which prime ministerial power is drawn primarily from 
the people, and to draw out the lessons from the tenure of an unpopular prime 
minister. 
Finally, the broader insights gained from this study into the Paul Keating Prime 
Ministership are drawn out and discussed in Chapter Nine. Judgements of 
Keating's leadership provided by those interviewed, and observations of the 
positive and negative aspects of the Keating style are made, and the effects 
determined. More broadly, how this prime ministership sits within the prime 
ministerial power thesis is discussed. Comparisons can be made with the 
conclusions reached by Patrick Weller in Malcolm Fraser PM about the nature of 
prime ministerial power in Australia, and broader judgements made about the 
relevance of the international literature. Most importantly, the effect of a decade 
of evolution of Australian governmental institutions and the impact of distinct 
personal leadership styles can be determined. Building on this analysis, some 
useful conclusions about the nature of Australian prime ministerial leadership are 
then drawn. 
The picture that emerges from the following study of Paul Keating, Australian 
Prime Minister from December 1991 to March 1996, is of a leader who 
dominated his caucus and cabinet. He isolated himself, governed from the 
centre, and relied on the advice of a small, handpicked coterie of key advisers 
and confidantes. His supremacy over colleagues was partially the result of his 
forceful style and the effects of the unexpected victory he engineered in the 1993 
election, but the major reason for his dominance was the subservience of the 
Federal Parliamentary Labor Party and the cabinet and their willingness to let the 
Prime Minister have his way. 
The electorate's relationship with the PM, however, was less tolerant and more 
fraught with pitfalls. That the Keating Prime Ministership was terminated by an 
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unimpressed electorate is, of itself, an important lesson in prime ministerial 
power. Observations of the Keating tenure demonstrate that there is much scope 
for prime ministerial power waiting to be utilised by a talented, dominant leader. 
This means they can be authoritative and powerful, but only within the 
constraints imposed by the prospect of the withdrawal of party room support or 
the reality of electoral defeat. Australian prime ministers are only as powerful as 
they are allowed to be; by their colleagues and by the electorate. Paul Keating 
was an immensely powerful leader who dominated colleagues but could not 
resist the final judgement of the Australian people. 
30 
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Prime Ministerial Leadership 
The image of prime ministers is one of great power. That picture is true if 
the individual has the powers of persuasion, the skills of manipulation, the 
vision to direct, the ambition to drive and the energy to work1e. 
Any worthwhile examination of prime ministerial leadership, and of political 
leadership more broadly, must take into account the important relationships 
between leaders and followers most accurately portrayed by the interactionist 
model introduced in Chapter One. Leadership is exercised when persons 
'mobilise, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, 
psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the 
motives of followers'77. It 'is the process by which one individual consistently 
exerts more impact than others on the nature and direction of group activity'78 
and 'an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real 
changes that reflect their mutual purposes'79. A situation exists where a 'leader's 
legitimacy depends on his or her standing with followers•so. For prime ministers, 
'followers' and other important groups of influential actors are located in 
institutions such as the political party, cabinet, caucus, parliament and the 
bureaucracy, and also in a broader sense in the electorate itself. Successful 
leadership thus requires the careful cultivation of these groups and followers in 
an atmosphere of institutional and political constraint. 
1s Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 409. 
77 James Macgregor Burns, Leadership (New York, Harper and Row, 1978 [see also reprint, 
1979]), p18. 
78 B Kellerman, 'Leadership as a Political Act' in B Kellerman (ed), Leadership: Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1984), p 70. 
79 JC Rost, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century (New York, Praeger, 1991), p 102. 
80 EP Hollander, 'Legitimacy, Power and Influence: A Perspective on Relational Features of 
Leadership' in MM Chemers and R Ayman (eds), Leadership Theory and Research (London, 
Academic Press, 1993), p 31. 
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The task at hand for political leaders is multi-dimensional and difficult. They must 
consider a multitude of factors, including both electoral appeal and good 
governance, two notions which are not always compatible. According to 
Gardner's idealistic list, leaders are responsible for: envisioning goals; affirming 
and regenerating values; motivating; managing; achieving workable unity; gaining 
trust; explaining; serving as a symbol; representing the group; and renewing 
agendas and objectivess1. Leaders must balance each of these important tasks 
in order to maintain the support of the group and of the wider constituency to 
which that group appeals. 
Much of the existing body of theoretical leadership literature largely stresses 
simplified typologies of leaders and the impact of factors such as historical 
circumstance, contexts, opportunity structures, ambition and luck, on the careers 
of leading political figures. In the first group of studies, emphasising leader types, 
we hear of strong versus weak82, democratic versus authoritarians3, mobilising 
and expressivea4, transformational and transactional85, charismatic86, active-
positive, active-negative, passive-positive and passive-negative leaderss1. Indeed 
it would appear that there are almost as many leadership types as there are 
political leaders. 
Another school conceptualises leadership in relation to a diversity of influences 
that impinge on the tasks of leadership and factors affecting the rise of 
individuals to high office. In this respect, some scholars have attempted to 
81 JW Gardner, On Leadership (New York, Free Press, 1990), pp 11-22. 
82 Graham Little, Strong Leadership: Thatcher, Reagan and An Eminent Person (Melbourne, 
Oxford University Press, 1988). 
83 Robert Elgie, Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies (London, Macmillan, 1995), p 11. 
84 D Kavanagh, Politics and Personalities (London, Macmillan, 1990), p 247. 
85 James Macgregor Burns 1978, op cit; EP Hollander 1993, op cit; BM Bass and BJ Avolio, 
'Transformational Leadership: A Response to Critiques' in MM Chemers and R Ayman (eds), 
Leadership Theory and Research (London, Academic Press, 1993). 
86 MR Lepsius, 'Charismatic Leadership: Max Weber's Model and its Applicability to the Rule of 
Hitler' in CF Graumann and S Moscovici (eds), Changing Conceptions of Leadership (New York, 
Springer-Verlag, 1986); K Klenke, 'Contemporary Leadership Theories: The Conceptual Thicket' in 
Woman and Leadership: A Contextual Perspective (New York, Springer Publishing Company, 
1996). 
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attach importance to inborn personal traits such as height, aggression, 
intelligence or energyss. Others have analysed the role of ambition, attributed to 
countless psychological factors and environmental stimuli89. In this they are 
joined by Niccolo Machiavelli, whose classic contribution The Prince stresses the 
importance of equal doses of both virtu9o and fortune91. Burns introduces 
notions of opportunity structures which impact on the ability of potential leaders 
to rise in the political world92. Yet another approach highlights historical 
circumstance and the leadership skills required under various situations93. 
It is a daunting task to navigate the myriad theoretical constructs presented by a 
vast, but inconsistent, body of leadership literature, and a detailed analysis of 
that work is not attempted here. Instead, to assist with this analysis of prime 
ministerial leadership, an alternative to typological, psychological and 
historical/situational approaches is taken. This study's 'interactionist' approach 
mirrors Elgie's, introduced in Chapter One. This emphasises the key relationships 
of leadership, between leaders and followers and, also, between the prime 
minister and the key institutional actors and alternative centres of power which 
she or he must work with and through. 
The interactionist model of political leadership as developed by Elgie isolates 
three ways in which institutions impact on the leadership task. First, leadership is 
affected by the structure of resources within the executive branch of government, 
such as the mechanisms for determining how leaders are elected or selected to 
occupy the highest office, and through the distribution of constitutional and 
8 7 JD Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall, 1992). 
88 See K Klenke 1996, op cit, pp 57-62 for a useful summary and discussion of the work of trait 
theory scholars such as Maslow, Dubin and Mann. 
8 9 JM Burns 1978, op cit; SA Renshon, High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of 
Ambition (New York, New York University Press, 1996). 
90 Virtu refers to the qualities of a leader, one of which is ambition. 
91 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Hertfordshire, Wordsworth Reference, 1993 (1513)); see also 
SJ Walker, The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p 
101. 
92 James Macgregor Burns 1978, op cit, p 120. 
93 JW Gardner 1990, op cit, p 38. 
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procedural authority, including the constraints placed on leaders' authority by 
dispersed institutions or formal rules limiting power. Second, the structure of, 
and interaction between, the executive branch of the central government and 
other jurisdictions or branches of the state impacts on the leadership 
environment. This involves the separation of powers inherent in liberal 
democratic polities, the relationship between legislative, judicial and executive 
arms of government, the extent to which federalism affects the powers available 
to leaders, and the authority granted to each branch of the state. Finally, in 
Elgie's estimation, relational leadership is affected by the structure of resources 
within and between political parties, their organisational structures, levels of 
popular support and the relative power of the party to select or dismiss leaderse4. 
The interactionist approach, though not specifically attributed, informs much of 
the system-specific and comparative literature on executive leadership in the 
polities of Washington and the Westminster world. The continuing debate about 
the relative power of presidents and prime ministers vis-a-vis institutions and 
competing centres of influence rests on the premise of important institutional 
and personal relationships impacting on the leadership task. This dissertation 
follows suit by analysing the Paul Keating prime ministership in Australia in the 
context of institutional interaction, allowing for the interplay of personality and the 
leadership environment. First, though, a thorough discussion of the prime 
ministership and the debate over the concept of prime ministerial government is 
required. 
The Prime Ministership 
Following Westminster conventions, the Australian prime minister is 
simultaneously the leader of the parliament's majority party, chair of cabinet and 
chief spokesperson for the government of the day. Though the office is not even 
94 Robert Elgie 1995, op cit, pp 15-20. 
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mentioned in the Australian Constitution - much is expected of the prime 
minister: 
They are national leaders, policy initiators, chairpersons of cabinet, leaders 
of parties, media figures, parliamentarians, electoral campaigners and 
administrative co-ordinators ... The diverse roles eventually are integrated 
into one: the position of prime minister. All of them have to be fulfilled, to a 
greater or lesser extent, at the same time.95. 
Prime ministerial leadership requires a leader with the capacity to perform many 
roles while maintaining their ascendency in relation to colleagues, the official 
opposition, the media, and the electorate at largee6• This is what led one 
authoritative commentator to equate the load on a prime minister with mercury 
because 'it shifts but is always heavy•e1. 
Descriptive lists such as the above are common. They detail either the tasks 
expected of the PM or the prerequisites for the job. One amusing attempt at the 
latter came from former Australian Prime Minister, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, who 
remarked that 'a prime minister needed a hide like a rhinoceros, an overpowering 
ambition and a mighty conceit of himself'98 . The more serious attempts at 
providing a job description have been provided by Patrick Weller (see above) in 
Australia, and by Britain's Peter Hennessy (below). Colin Seymour-Ure has also 
produced a useful description, which includes formal and informal, institutional 
and personal, and governing and non-governing rolesee. 
Hennessy's detailed list of prime ministerial tasks is comprehensive, and well-
illustrates the depth and breadth of leadership in Westminster polities. He 
provides seven major groups of tasks100• The first group encompasses the 
constitutional and procedural aspects of the role, including maintenance of the 
relationship between the government and the head of state, the opposition, and 
95 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 395. 
96 Ibid. 
91 Peter Hennessy 2001, op cit, p 551. 
98 Anne Henderson, 'Joseph Aloysius Lyons' in Michelle Grattan (ed), Australian Prime Ministers, 
(Sydney, New Holland, 2000) p 156. 
99 Colin Seymour-Ure, Prime Ministers and the Media: Issues of Power and Control, (Melbourne, 
Blackwell, 2003), p 15. 
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the civil service. The second and third groups of tasks include the making of 
crown and other public appointments, including the appointment of ministers to 
portfolios, ministerial dismissal, and other appointments to key military, judicial 
and public sector posts. The fourth group of prime ministerial tasks outlined by 
Hennessy is the conduct of cabinet and parliamentary business. Fifth, prime 
ministers are responsible for the organisation and staffing of the cabinet office 
and their own advisory structures. They are also called upon to make budget and 
market sensitive economic decisions and, finally, to take on primary responsibility 
for foreign and defence relationships. 
Patrick Weller offers another simplified and more politically-oriented list, in the 
process arguing prime ministers are responsible for managing the administrative 
and political processes, and for control of party policy101. In this context, he 
distinguishes between 
the roles that prime ministers must, should and choose to play. They must 
chair cabinet, prevent fragmentation, arbitrate; fight fires; meet media and 
international demands. They should be guardian of the strategy; focus 
priorities. They choose to run individual policy areas; keep control of/an eye 
on individual policies. Each category concerns political, policy and 
administrative problems102. 
More specifically, 
by convention prime ministers chair cabinet and select ministers. By 
parliamentary practice, they answer for the general performance of their 
government and their personal behaviour to the House of Representatives. 
By choice they may dominate the party's electoral campaigning, respond to 
the media and play a significant role in foreign affairs. How much time they 
spend on the different activities depends on their own priorities and on the 
political circumstances103. 
In the conduct of these roles, 'they sit at the centre of a political maelstrom, 
blown by forces they cannot entirely control, and calculate how best to use their 
limited capacities and resources'1o4. 
100 Peter Hennessy 2001, op cit, pp 60-90. 
101 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, pp 363-4. 
102 Ibid, p 207. 
103 Patrick Weller, 'The Development of the Australian Prime Ministership' in Patrick Weller (ed), 
Menzies to Keating: The Development of the Australian Prime Ministership (Melbourne, 
Melbourne University Press, 1992), p 204. 
104 Ibid, p 205. 
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Prime ministerial leadership inevitably involves relationships with other domains, 
each with their own sources of legitimacy and authority, and their own significant 
power bases bestowed by convention, constitution, popular will or by the 
competitive pressures fuelled by electoral competition and representative 
government. This is the lesson articulated by Elgie. The prime ministerial 
government literature stresses the centralisation of power, but with some 
important institutional and relational limits that prevent the full personalisation of 
authority in the hands of Westminster105 leaders. In this respect, important 
power relationships exist between prime ministers and: cabinet, both as an 
institution and as a collection of powerful and ambitious colleagues and rivals; 
caucus, with the need for continued party support; parliament; the media and the 
electorate; and the bureaucratic and political sources of advice available to 
leaders. These institutions comprise the prime ministerial leadership 
environment. 
Cabinet is the focal point of traditional conceptions of Westminster executive 
government, and much can be learned from the power relations flowing both 
ways between ministers and the leader. Cabinet's role is best described as a 
decision-making body, relying on collective effort, directed by the prime minister. 
Its task is to 
manage the unmanageable, routinise the extraordinary, systemise the 
disorderly, and co-ordinate the incoherent. Its agenda includes matters of 
detail too gritty to be dealt with elsewhere, and matters that appear 
retrospectively insignificant but were perceived to be politically sensitive at 
the time106. 
The prime minister's influence on, and control over, the collective decision-
making process central to cabinet's role is contentious. Recent analyses of 
cabinet argue power is skewed in favour of the prime minister because of their 
105 The term 'Westminster' is used here, and throughout the thesis, to describe political systems 
which are derived from the Westminster system of Britain. This allows for the inclusion of the 
Australian political system which is, of course, federalist in nature while retaining many of the 
characteristics of British political institutions. 
106 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 105. 
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control over the administration and running of cabinet107, the need for 
coordination of policy which cuts across portfolios, and the growth and 
sophistication of advisory structures which ensure prime ministers are the best 
informed member of the government10s. Peter Hennessy writes that a leader can 
'easily be tempted to steer in advance the result of a meeting' by deciding which 
ministers are involved in a decision, or indeed whether an issue is placed on the 
agenda at a11109. More specifically, 
Prime ministers set the agenda for cabinet meetings, decide which ministers 
will be cabinet members and determine what cabinet committees will be 
formed and what their authority will be. They chair the meetings of cabinet 
and their summary of discussions becomes the basis of the formal decisions 
... They shape the content and tone of debate in cabinet and provide the 
means by which prime ministers can determine the directions in which the 
government intends to go110. 
With these tools at the prime minister's disposal, it is tempting to conclude that 
they have sufficient power to tightly control the operation and outcomes of 
cabinet. However, while the 'rolling' of a prime minister may be a rare 
occurrence, much depends on the personality of the prime minister and the 
extent to which he or she is allowed to dominate proceedings by compliant 
ministers. Thus, while cabinet may restrain a prime minister, 'the advantages of 
controlling the system are considerable'111. The relationships between the prime 
minister and cabinet, both institutionally and in personal dealings with individual 
ministers, are all important. The potential for dominance exists for a prime 
minister willing and able to draw upon the substantial power resources that 
cabinet control presents. 
107 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit; Patrick Weller, 'Prime Ministers, Political Leadership and Cabinet 
Government', Australian Journal of Public Administration, 1991, vol 50, no 2, pp 131-44; Patrick 
Weller, Support for Prime Ministers: A Comparative Perspective' in C Campbell and MJ 
Wyszomirski (eds), Executive Leadership in Anglo-American Systems (Pittsburgh, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1991) 
108 Michael Keating and Patrick Weller, 'Cabinet Government: an institution under pressure' in 
Michael Keating, John Wanna and Patrick Weller (eds), Institutions on the Edge? Capacity for 
Governance, (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2000), pp 57-63. 
109 Peter Hennessy 2001, op cit, p 79. 
110 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 104. 
111 Patrick Weller 1991, 'Support for Prime Ministers: A Comparative Perspective', op cit, p 370. 
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A wider circle of supporters, critics, rivals and judges of prime ministerial 
performance comprise caucus; a body of parliamentarians from the prime 
minister's own party which meets formally at regular intervals but whose informal 
influence stretches far beyond participation in caucus discussions112. Of vital 
importance to the leader is the caucus' ability to essentially hire and fire prime 
ministers. While party rules differ on the selection of leaders between parties 
and political systems113, in all cases caucus plays a role. As such, relationships 
between leaders and the immediate followers comprising the caucus become a 
vital determinant of survival, making the caucus of primary value to a prime 
minister intent on retaining power. Leaders trade the prospect of electoral 
success for continued support in the party room. In this sense, the relationship is 
one of exchange, where 'leaders may lead only as long as they deliver•114. This is 
the basis of the 'leadership bargain' expounded by Glyn Davis115, in which the 
consequences for an under-performing leader may be politically fatal. 
The restrictive influence of the parliamentary party on leaders is counteracted by 
important powers of patronage, and other devices available to prime ministers in 
the maintenance of leadership support. Weller argues leaders 'have 
considerable political resources that can bolster their position'116, making 
removal from office a difficult proposition. Primary among the resources 
available to prime ministers is the power of patronage. For this reason, Hennessy 
argues that the appointment and dismissal of ministers is 'the true locus of prime 
112 See Glyn Davis, 'Prime Ministers and Parties' in Patrick Weller (ed), Menzies to Keating: The 
Development of the Australian Prime Ministership (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 
1992); John Faulkner and Stuart Macintyre, 'Introduction' in John Faulkner and Stuart Macintyre, 
True Believers: The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 
2001). 
113 Consult L LeDuc, 'Democratizing Party Leadership Selection', Party Politics, vol 7, no 3, 2001, 
pp 323-41; Patrick Weller, 'Party Rules and the Dismissal of Prime Ministers: Comparative 
Perspectives from Britain, Canada and Australia', Parliamentary Affairs, vol 47, no 1, 1994, pp 
133-44. 
114 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 45. 
115 See Glyn Davis 1992, op cit; Glyn Davis 2002, op cit; see also Chapter Three, below, for a 
more thorough discussion of the leadership bargain. 
116 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 45. 
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ministerial primacy in terms of the relative power of the primus over the pares•111. 
Patrick Weller agrees: 
the right of prime ministers to appoint, dismiss or shuffle ministers always 
looms large. So does the capacity to wield extensive patronage ... The power 
of patronage, it is argued, helps prime ministers to cement their position and 
to bring ministers or others into line on issues of policy11s. 
Important factors serve to limit the choices available to prime ministers in their 
allocation of political positions. However, though political, geographical and other 
considerations impinge on the freedom of choice available to the leader, 
patronage remains a powerful instrument. When coupled with the prestige of the 
prime ministership and the position of power she or he occupies, patronage is an 
important way to satisfy ambitious individuals, potential rivals and disparate 
constituencies, thus prolonging the leader's tenure. 
Parliament offers a still broader constituency for prime ministers, encompassing 
their own caucus but also, importantly, their electoral opponents and rivals for 
the position. Some recent contributors have observed a decline in the 
importance of parliament, partly due to strict party discipline and other factors 
such as the rise of television119. Despite these trends, parliament remains a 
potential determinant of the power relations between leaders and followers and 
thus a vital forum for leadership. Parliament is the 'formal arena in which all 
prime ministers must publicly perform ... their performance there is consistently 
being assessed' by both colleagues and opponents120. While other forums such 
as the media have usurped the power of parliament, the institution remains 
important for prime ministers and leadership aspirants because of its role as an 
indicator of standing amongst peers. A worthwhile view of this aspect of 
parliament argues that 
Reputations can be made, or at least maintained, in parliament. 
Backbenchers want the team leader to do well, and to be seen to be doing 
well. Parliamentary performance may be one of the first indications that a 
prime minister is slipping. Some opposition leaders ... have been 
117 Peter Hennessy 2001, op cit, p 68-9. 
11s Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 72. 
119 See Michael Foley 2000, op cit, for example. 
120 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 166. 
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undermined because they could not match rampant prime ministers. For 
prime ministers, who have so many more advantages, the correlation is less 
direct, but if they cannot deliver or perform well that intangible standing is 
likely to slip. Above all, in the arena of parliament that glare of publicity is on 
the prime minister, they must perform at least adequately to maintain their 
position121. 
Competitive pressures therefore turn parliament into a political boxing ring, in 
which heavyweights from the major parties are called upon to demonstrate their 
ability to outperform opponents, and legitimise their continuing claims for the 
prime ministership122. 
Much of this important combative role of parliament is shared by another forum 
of importance - the media - and, in particular, television123. Colin Seymour-Ure 
highlights the importance of media as a conduit for prime ministerial 
communication with followers when he argues 'television in particular can be 
shown to help a prime minister dominate his or her colleagues as a performer 
and to provide an informal base of popular authority independent of the 
legislature'124. The media can therefore be used as an instrument of a prime 
minister's own power125. Because of the importance of the media, 'public 
communication cannot avoid being relevant to, and thus an influence on, almost 
any of a contemporary prime minister's tasks•12e. 
The growing indispensability of the media to prime ministers is well 
documented121. In particular, the influence of the media on public perceptions of 
alternative leaders during elections is particularly strong, often defining the 
relations between prime ministers and their broadest constituency, the 
121 Ibid, p 179. 
122 See John Uhr, 'Prime Ministers and Parliament' in Patrick Weller (ed), Menzies to Keating: The 
Development of the Australian Prime Ministership, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 
1992). 
123 See Clem Lloyd, 'Prime Ministers and the Media' in Patrick Weller (ed), Menzies to Keating: 
The Development of the Australian Prime Ministership, (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 
1992). 
124 Colin Seymour-Ure, 'The Role of Press Secretaries on Chief Executive Staffs in Anglo-American 
Systems' in C Campbell and MJ Wyszomirski (eds), Executive Leadership in Anglo-American 
Systems (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), p 409. 
125 Colin Seymour-Ure 2003, op cit, p 3. 
126 Ibid, p 62. 
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electorate. In this respect, prime ministers and prime ministerial aspirants 
'appear frequently on the media, explaining and defending their actions, 
attacking their opponents and appealing to the voters for supporr12s. According 
to Anthony Mughan, the effect of media coverage is to further focus the attention 
of the public on the prime minister, creating a personal, individual battle between 
alternatives129. In this respect, the 
focus is on the leader, from the time that the calling of an election is 
contemplated until the results are known. Prime ministerial popularity is 
continually assessed, prime ministerial statements are examined, prime 
ministerial composure is analysed. Credit for victory or blame for defeat is 
given, in part at least, to the leader - after all, leaders are expected to win 
elections130. 
Though increased scrutiny makes prime ministerial action more open to criticism 
from all sides, the potential for influence arises out of the personalisation of 
executive government brought about by the media, thus improving the prime 
minister's position in relation to colleagues and providing a valuable platform 
from which to launch appeals for support. 
In dealing with each of the institutions and constituencies central to the prime 
ministerial position, leaders possess considerable advantages in the range of 
advice provided them131. Sophisticated advisory structures available to prime 
ministers run counter to notions of collective, cabinet government in the 
traditional Westminster mould. Thus the need for individualised prime ministerial 
support was once contested because ministers are supposed to be chief prime 
ministerial advisers, with cabinet the forum for important decisions132. But, 'as 
prime ministers become more active in more areas of policy, so the need for 
support for the individual, rather than the collectivity in cabinet, has become 
127 Ibid, Michael Foley 2000, op cit; Michael Foley 1993, op cit; Patrick Weller 1985, op cit. 
12s Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 180. 
129 See Anthony Mughan 2000, op cit. 
130 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, pp 185-6. 
131 James Walter, 'Prime Ministers and Their Staff' in Patrick Weller (ed), Menzies to Keating: The 
Development of the Australian Prime Ministership (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 
1992). 
132 Patrick Weller 1991, 'Support for Prime Ministers: A Comparative Perspective', op cit, p 361. 
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more obvious'133. The combined effect of sophisticated institutions such as 
cabinet offices or prime minister's departments and growing political offices as 
sources of advice has strengthened the hand of leaders and altered the 
institutional dynamics of the prime ministership. 
The above discussion of prime ministerial constituencies and relationships has 
introduced the dual contradictory influences of institutional and relational 
restraint coupled with an increasing personalisation of power in the hands of the 
prime minister134. Additional powers are bestowed upon the leader by the 
advantages inherent in the control of cabinet, superior media attention and the 
powers of patronage. However, the very notion that there exists a contest for 
power between prime ministers and their constituencies and colleagues 
highlights the importance of relationships to the prime ministerial task, and the 
requirements for leaders to maintain structures of support lest they be voted out 
by their party or the people and replaced by an alternative leader. Regardless, 
questions of prime ministerial power require more examination, a task 
undertaken below. For now it will suffice to say that executive government 
inevitably involves interactions with multiple constituencies which must be 
nurtured. Ignoring any of the constituencies of executive government under 
Westminster systems invites the use of the most important limitations on leaders 
- accountability to the party and the electorate. As we will discover, these remain 
the only substantial brakes on the power and authority of prime ministers. 
Prime Ministerial Power 
The traditional model of the Westminster prime ministership sits awkwardly 
among recent experience. The evolving constituencies of government, and the 
increasing power of the prime minister in relation to the actors central to the 
133 Ibid. 
134 See Bert A Rockman, 'The Leadership Question: Is There an Answer?' in C Campbell and MJ 
Wyszomirski (eds), Executive Leadership in Anglo-American Systems (Pittsburgh, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1991) p 62. 
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leadership task, the argument goes, create a situation where modern prime 
ministers enjoy significantly more authority and influence than their 
predecessors. This means contemporary experience contrasts with an arguably 
now-outdated conception of executive government in Westminster-based polities 
as collective and reliant upon the decision making processes of cabinet. 
The ongoing debate over the relative power of prime ministers in relation to the 
institutions of executive government is a fundamental concern of prime 
ministerial scholarship135. However, despite half a century of debate, the 
literature is patchy, inconsistent and inconclusive, though there is broad 
agreement that prime ministers have increasing scope for individual authority 
and influence. Some contributors to the debate stress the constraints on prime 
ministers, while others stress the opportunities for dominance over colleagues. 
The former group, including Richard Rose136 and George Jones137 point to the 
collective nature of cabinet government in Westminster systems, contrasting 
power relationships with an essentially individualised presidency. Patrick Weller 
reconciles increasing prime ministerial power with the constraints of cabinet and 
caucus by stressing that only skilful leaders can take advantage of the power 
resources of the office13s. Others, such as Michael Foley139 and Anthony 
Mughan14o, outline the similarities between executive leadership as exercised in 
both Washington and Westminster141, employing the unhelpful term 
'presidentialisation'. The notable American scholar, Richard Neustadt, stresses 
inherent weaknesses in the American leadership model, which converges with 
13s See, for example, Colin Campbell and John Halligan, 'The Prime Minister, Cabinet and Change' 
in Political Leadership in an Age of Constraint: Bureaucratic Politics Under Hawke and Keating, 
(Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992). 
13s Richard Rose 1982, 'Governments against Sub-governments: A European Perspective on 
Washington', op cit; Richard Rose 1982, 'British Government: The Job at the Top', op cit. 
131 George Jones 1991, op cit. 
13s Patrick Weller 1985, op cit; Patrick Weller 1989, op cit. 
139 Michael Foley 2000, op cit. 
140 Anthony Mughan 2000, op cit. 
141 For example Michael Foley 1993, op cit; and Michael Foley 2000, op cit. 
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the British system due to the constraints inherent to the American separation of 
powers142. 
A more comprehensive analysis of the literature follows, beginning with the 
earliest contributions before turning to a critique of recent preoccupation with the 
term 'presidentialisation' and a discussion of the more robust aspects of this 
recent work. The argument here is that the most worthy theoretical framework 
for later empirical analysis of the Paul Keating Prime Ministership is provided by 
the prime ministerial power literature that recognises the constraints of party and 
electorate while acknowledging that, despite this, some factors have contributed 
to the growing power of prime ministers over their colleagues, dramatically 
skewing the power relationship in favour of the PM. 
If we follow the debate chronologically, the first contribution is the work of RHS 
Crossman and his introduction to Bagehot's English Constitution143. He argues 
'the post-war epoch has seen the final transformation of Cabinet Government into 
Prime Ministerial Government'144. The increasing control over the party machine 
and a strong centralised bureaucracy has made obsolete 'a Cabinet behaving like 
a board of directors of an old-fashioned company'145. The central thrust of 
Crossman's thesis is that: 
In Bagehot's day, collective Cabinet responsibility meant the responsibility of 
a group of equal colleagues for decisions taken collectively, after full, free 
and secret discussion in which all could participate. It now means collective 
obedience by the whole administration, from the Foreign Secretary and the 
Chancellor downwards, to the will of the man at the apex of power146. 
Crucially, though, the ability of the parliamentary party to remove prime ministers 
from power acts as a key restraint on the presidentialisation of this 'man at the 
apex of power', a caveat returned to below. Nonetheless, 'in so far as ministers 
142 Richard Neustadt 'White House and Whitehall' in A King (ed}, The British Prime Minister, 
(London, Macmillan, 1985); see also Richard Neustadt 1990, op cit. 
143 RHS Crossman 1963, op cit. 
144 Ibid, p 162. 
145 Ibid, p 163. 
146 Ibid, p 164. 
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feel themselves to be agents of the Premier, the British Cabinet has now come to 
resemble the American Cabinet'147. 
Early contributors to the debate, including Crossman, pointed to the changing 
nature of the media, increased focus on leaders during election time, the central 
role of the prime minister in the operation of cabinet, powers of patronage, and 
centralised sources of prime ministerial advice and bureaucratic support. These 
can be seen 'as almost structural factors which work constantly in the direction of 
increasing prime ministerial power, largely irrespective of the personality 
element' 148. More recent incarnations of the prime ministerial power thesis have 
followed suit, pointing to the centrality of the leader on television and during 
elections, dominance of cabinet and caucus, and the sophistication of sources of 
advice allowing prime ministers to govern 'from the centre'. These factors, it is 
argued, have created a situation where the prime minister's 'influence is said to 
have increased to a level at which it cannot be checked; their control over 
government activities is regarded as excessive, and their accountability as far too 
limited'149. 
Peter Hennessy is a noted and authoritative scholar of prime ministerial 
leadership, and the only recent British contributor to steer clear of directly 
equating the Westminster prime ministership with the presidential model of the 
United States. His list of prime ministerial tasks, examined above, demonstrates 
the enormous gamut of duties prime ministers are expected to perform. That 
these are seen as prime ministerial roles not to be delegated is itself an 
indication of prime ministerial authority and influence; the leader is involved in all 
aspects of government activity. 
Hennessy's 2001 publication The Prime Minister turns in its final pages to the 
most individually powerful of all British leaders, Tony Blair. Hennessy is told by a 
147 Ibid, p 163. 
148 Peter Hennessy 2001, op cit, p 57. 
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senior Whitehall figure that Blair 'bestrides his world like a Colossus'15o. The 
Prime Minister, in Hennessy's estimation, is able to govern without serious 
resistance from colleagues in the cabinet or elsewhere, with decisions taken 
largely at the centre of the Government by Blair and his trusted advisers. 
Hennessy's portrait of Tony Blair therefore points to an individually powerful, 
dominant leader consistent with most contributions to the debate over prime 
ministerial government. 
But recent contributions from other British scholars, notably Michael Foley and 
Anthony Mughan, have encountered resistance because of the employment of 
the misleading label 'presidentialisation'. Their analyses focus on the overturning 
of notions of collective cabinet government in favour of a form of 'presidential' 
leadership observed in the United States, drawing criticism from those who point 
to glaring institutional incompatibilities between the leadership models of Britain 
and the US. 
The American presidency has traditionally been seen as an office with scope for 
individual leadership. Though this is limited by the separation of powers, and 
separate institutions sharing power, and also by changing relations with fractured 
constituencies and a more independent Congress, presidents operate as a 
central component of a system which is both constitutionally legitimised and 
historically powerful, and which provides a significant platform for leadership. 
This is the basis for Foley and Mughan's individual conception of the presidency, 
one that contrasts with traditional notions of collective decision making at the 
centre of the Westminster system but, they argue, seems increasingly appropriate 
when describing the modern prime ministership. 
There is much of value in the work of Michael Foley and Anthony Mughan, 
particularly in their analysis of what they call 'leadership stretch' and 'going 
public', and the changing focus of the media and election campaigns 
149 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 1. 
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respectively. Foley has conducted two rigorous studies of the rhetorical, electoral 
and behavioural aspects of the prime ministerial task altering the power relations 
of Westminster systems and driving the leadership model towards 
presidentialisation151. Drawing on American trends towards 'spatial politics', 
'getting personal' and 'going public'152, he argues British prime ministers have 
pursued similar tactics as their presidential counterparts, thus contributing to a 
convergence in the behavioural elements of executive leadership on both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
Central to Foley's analysis is the notion of 'leadership stretch' which refers to 'the 
way that party leaders have increasingly stretched away from their senior 
colleagues in terms of media attention and popular awareness'153 • More 
specifically, 
The propulsion of leaders into public arenas and the drive to commit party 
agendas and programmes to a process of public outreach through the 
agency of leadership projection has led party leaders to become increasingly 
differentiated from their colleagues. Leaders are no longer merely party 
spokespeople, but the ostentatious flagships of their respective fleets154. 
The increasing importance of the media to political competition created a need 
for prime ministers to have more discretion and independence from their party, 
and 'to attend to political strategies that have become increasingly leadership-
oriented in nature'155. In this respect, 'the publicisation of leaders has gone hand 
in hand with the personalisation of leadership'156. 
Foley relies on an explanation of dual strategies he believes to be central to Tony 
Blair's leadership politics. The first - spatial leadership - refers to 'the way in 
which political authority is protected and cultivated by the creation of a sense of 
150 Peter Hennessy 2001, op cit, p 4 76. 
151 Michael Foley 1993, op cit; Michael Foley 2000, op cit. 
152 See below for a more detailed explanation of these concepts. 
153 Michael Foley 2000, op cit, p 205; see also RJ Dalton, I McAllister and MP Wattenberg, 'The 
Consequences of Partisan Dealignment' in RJ Dalton and MP Wattenberg (eds), Parties Without 
Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001), p 51. 
154 Michael Foley 2000, op cit, p 205. 
155 Ibid, p 7 4. 
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distance, and, occasionally, detachment, from government'157 • For Blair, Foley 
argues, the distancing of leaders from public institutions took the form of running 
as a leader separate from even his own party. 'His objective was to use the 
distance between the leadership and the movement to push the party to the 
people, rather than pushing the people into the party'15s. 
The second 'presidential' leadership strategy identified by Foley, closely related to 
the first, is 'going public'. This is an expression popularised in the American 
context by Samuel Kernell, who argued in the mid 1980s that presidents can 
influence political elites in Washington by appealing directly to the electorate159. 
This means American leaders can 'generate a personal following in the country 
which displaces the traditional need for political negotiation and accommodation 
within Washington'160. Similarly in Britain, and arguably also in Australia, going 
public through the established media channels has become a prerequisite for 
leadership. In this respect, 'the publicisation of leaders has gone hand in hand 
with the personalisation of leadership' because the 'techniques, channels and 
dynamics of leadership projection have led inextricably to an increasing emphasis 
upon the exploitation of leadership politics'161. 
Foley argues these strategies serve to 'stretch' the leader away from their 
ministerial colleagues and the broader party. This is largely due to the electoral 
pressures brought to bear by changing media demands. Consequently, what 
'were once media opportunities to reach a wider audience have now been turned 
into overriding media obligations to publicise political positions through the 
effective projection of party leaders as national figures'162. That some bemoan 
the individualisation of British political leadership, Foley argues, 'is a reflection of 
156 Ibid,p177. 
157 Ibid, p 31. 
158 Ibid, p 91. 
1s9 Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, (Washington, CQ 
Press, 1986). 
160 Michael Foley 2000, op cit, p 116. 
161 Ibid, p 177. 
162 Ibid, p 205. 
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the unprecedented public projection and general salience of contemporary party 
leaders and, in particular, the prime minister'163. 
Michael Foley's conclusions can be summarised thus. First, 'the extraordinary 
dominance of Tony Blair in his party and in his government has given renewed 
vigour to the old debate concerning the power of the prime minister in relation to 
the cabinet'164• Second, while the executive and the legislature are still 
technically merged, 'the two are now increasingly distinct'165. Third, the changes 
to British leadership politics under Blair 'have been of an order and magnitude to 
make the comparison between the British prime minister's position and the 
American presidency far more pertinent now than it used to be'1ee. This is 
because, despite structural differences, 
the underlying points of resemblance are so exceptional that there is now 
evidence to support the contention that the similarities between the two 
offices are more revealing than their differences. Furthermore, it can be 
contended that these similarities are increasing in scale and importance all 
the time16 7• 
Presidentialised leadership, Foley continues, is not simply the result of individual 
idiosyncrasies but, rather, the result of the evolution of the British prime 
ministership 'away from what a prime minister used to do and used to be'168. He 
argues a British presidency has developed, rather than a British version of the 
American presidency. Thus the prime ministership is presidentia/ised because it 
is individualised. 
Anthony Mughan's book Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary 
Elections takes up this theme of individualisation, and argues that the political 
contest fought out in the media and at election time is increasingly a two-horse 
race between the leaders of the major parties. In this respect, he argues, 
'parliamentary elections generally have the appearance less and less of contests 
163 Ibid, p 236. 
164 Ibid, p 301. 
165 Ibid, p 309. 
166 Ibid, p 330. 
167 Ibid, p 331. 
168 Ibid, p 353. 
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between political parties vying for control of government and more and more 
presidential-style struggles between the leaders of these parties'169. The rise and 
rise of television, Mughan argues, is a key contributor to this trend, and to the 
'presidentialisation of presentation and impact' of leaders110. A consequence of 
this is that election outcomes are increasingly reliant on perceptions of leaders. 
Mughan, drawing on British experience, charts a gradual and inconsistent rise in 
'leader effects' from 1964 until 1983, and then a jump in the importance of the 
leader to the election outcome in 1987 and 1997111. This trend is closely linked 
with partisan dealignment; a phenomena of decreasing identification with, and 
long-standing ties to, political parties112. 
Mughan uses the term presidentialisation to describe a 'movement over time 
away from collective to personalized government, movement away from a pattern 
of governmental and electoral politics dominated by the political party towards 
one where the party leader becomes a more autonomous force'173. He concludes 
that prime ministers have become more like presidents for two main, related 
reasons: 'The first concerns their enhanced electoral role and the second their 
consequent greater autonomy in the appointment and dismissal of cabinet 
ministers'174. Thus, in a similar way to Foley, Mughan claims prime ministers are 
only weakly responsible to their colleagues because of their direct links with the 
electorate, through the media and during election campaigns. 
Foley and Mughan make compelling and robust arguments for the increasing 
power of prime ministers brought about by strategic attempts at going public. 
However, their preoccupation with notions of presidentialisation weakens their 
case. Simply by employing terms such as 'presidentialisation' or 
169 Anthony Mughan 2000, op cit, p 4. 
110 Ibid, see pp 23-50. 
171 Ibid, p 52. 
172 See Russell J Dalton, The Decline of Party Identifications', in RJ Dalton and MP Wattenberg 
(eds), Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 
(Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2000). 
113 Anthony Mughan, op cit, p 7. 
174 Ibid, p 134. 
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'Americanisation', which stress a literal comparison based on formal powers and 
institutions and deny a proper analysis of prime ministerial behaviour, relations 
and structures of influence, they are muddying a credible argument about the 
increasing power of prime ministers, who can nonetheless never be presidential 
because of the unique nature of prime ministerial constraints provided by the 
institutions of executive government. They describe a mad dash to one-man or 
one-woman rule in Westminster polities that denies reality because it neglects 
the anchoring effect of party and electorate. 
Prime ministers can never be presidential because of the importance of the 
parliamentary party to their continued leadership prospects. They serve at the 
pleasure of their party, their power is the direct result of a bargain that trades 
electoral success or other positives for continued support in the top job175. 
Because prime ministers are party leaders, 'they hold the former position only as 
long as they hold the latter' and they 'survive as long as they lead their party and 
maintain a parliamentary majority'176. A prime minister's authority and 
legitimacy, therefore, spring from electoral performance and party support. 
'Effectively, the parliamentary party makes a running judgement on his 
performance as a potential winner of elections•171_ Thus, according to Rose, a 
'Prime Minister manages a party as one manages a horse: by giving sufficient rein 
to avoid a straight test of will between horse and rider in which the latter might be 
overthrown•11s. The power possessed by parliamentary parties to dismiss prime 
ministers varies, but is nonetheless potent179. The prime minister's need for the 
support of party and cabinet colleagues, the argument goes, is the most 
important way of ensuring government remains collective in nature. 
175 Glyn Davis 1992, op cit. 
11s Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 11. 
177 Richard Rose 1982, 'Governments against Sub-governments: A European Perspective on 
Washington', op cit, p 7. 
178 Ibid, p 4. 
119 See Patrick Weller 1994, op cit. 
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George Jones1so is perhaps the most forceful of authors arguing that constraints 
such as powerful ministers prevent individual (and certainly presidential) 
leadership. He compares the office of prime minister to a piece of elastic which 
can stretch 'to accommodate an active, interventionist prime minister' but which 
also contracts 'to contain a more passive prime minister•1s1. Jones stresses the 
existence of a team of ministers whose 'activities have a bearing on the 
reputation of the government more than in a presidential system'182. Each 
minister is said to have their own significant power resources, and scope to win 
support from backbenchers and from the public at large. Jones' argument, best 
summed up in his own words, is that commentators 'who proclaim that there has 
been a shift to prime ministerial predominance neglect the constraints on the 
holder of that office, both structural and - more important - political'183. 
John Edwards, biographer and former Keating economics and industrial relations 
adviser, concurs. Edwards argues power is essentially 'communal and 
cooperative'1B4• He continues: 'from the perspective of being inside the 
government, and particularly from the perspective by [sic] the record of advice 
and decisions, the Prime Minister really is more the committee chairman of 
Westminster constitutional theory than a chief executive'185. His conclusion: 'The 
government as a whole has more power than a US president, but the Prime 
Minister has less•1s6. 
The political constraints inherent to the prime ministership are also at the centre 
of Weller's analyses of prime ministerial power1B7, though his work points 
rightfully to increasing scope for powerful leaders with sufficient personal skill. 
180 George Jones 1991, op cit. 
181 Ibid, p 134. 
182 Ibid, p 124. 
183 Ibid, p 112. 
184 John Edwards, Writing About Paul Keating: Inside the Inside Story (Sydney Papers, Summer 
1997), p 12. 
185 Ibid, p 17. 
186 Ibid. 
1s7 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit; Patrick Weller 1989, op cit; Patrick Weller 1992, op cit. See also 
Michael Keating and Patrick Weller 2000, op cit, pp 57-63. 
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He argues prime ministerial power must be studied in relation to cabinet, rather 
than as if cabinet and prime ministerial power are mutually exclusive. In this 
respect, 
cabinet government need not be contrasted to prime ministerial 
government, as too often it is. The latter is seen as individualistic, the 
former collective. In practice a skilful prime minister may operate through 
the cabinet system, by determining who will decide and where decisions will 
be taken188. 
Drawing parallels with Neustadt's analysis of the American president's 'power to 
persuade'189, Weller argues the collectivity of government means prime ministers 
must 'persuade and manipulate where they cannot command'19o, but prime 
ministerial power is concentrated and collective rather than dispersed and 
individua1191. Prime ministers in Westminster systems 
must constantly negotiate and usually compromise. They are not the only 
actors in the political game; other ministers, business and union leaders, 
backbenchers, the media, all have to be taken into account. Political 
support must be gained and then painstakingly retained; it cannot just be 
demanded and then taken for granted. Governing is for prime ministers a 
continuous estimation of how others will react to the use of power, and how 
much effort is needed to achieve a desired end. Prime ministers' power and 
time are not infinite192. 
The concept of a prime minister working with and through cabinet, though with 
considerable advantages in terms of resources and prestige, is Weller's way of 
reconciling an unnecessarily polarised debate about individual/presidential and 
collective/prime ministerial power. 
Essentially, prime ministers' persuasive tasks originate from the involvement of 
the parliamentary party in some shape or form in the selection of leaders which, 
taken to extreme, means that an under performing or unpopular leader, or one 
who fails to attend to ambitious competitors or dissatisfied colleagues, can be 
removed from office and replaced with a more popular alternative. This is the key 
difference between prime ministers and presidents and, though not often utilised, 
188 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 408. 
189 Richard E Neustadt 1990, op cit. 
190 Patrick Weller 1992, op cit, p 205. 
191 Ibid, p 202. 
192 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 3. 
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represents the dichotomy between a leader who serves at the pleasure of 
colleagues and one who enjoys a popular mandate and may only be removed 
from office in extraordinary circumstances. Hart argues the 'necessity to 
maintain the support of party colleagues does constrain what prime ministers can 
do, and prevents them being presidential'193. For this reason, prime ministers 
'cannot ignore the wishes of their party colleagues, at least not for long'194 • Davis 
concurs, arguing that prime ministers, unlike presidents, have no guarantee of 
tenure. 'Prime ministers serve at the pleasure of the Parliament, and may be 
removed at any time'. Thus, 'prime ministers govern on the sufferance of their 
colleagues'195. 
Constraints on prime ministers do not prevent the wielding of massive, individual 
power, but they do prevent presidentialisation in the literal sense. This thesis 
recognises that the debate over prime ministerial power is sometimes 
unnecessarily portrayed as a contest between two ideal types - the collective 
Westminster model and the individual American presidency. Dunleavy and 
Rhodes argue the 'apparent polarization of the debate into two camps, one 
asserting the continuing reality of collegial decision-making amongst cabinet 
ministers and the other emphasizing the premier's overwhelming predominance, 
has artificially limited the debate'196. Neustadt concurs, adding that prime 
ministerial and presidential leadership models are 'not now at opposite poles' but 
instead 'located near the spectrum stretching between two ideal types, from 
collective-leadership to one-man rule'197. To this Weller adds 'the distinctions in 
reality are never so clear-cut' because it may 'be possible for every decision to be 
taken by cabinet and yet for the prime minister still to dominate'198. 
193 John Hart 1992, op cit, p 195. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Glyn Davis 2002, op cit, p 51. 
196 In Patrick Weller 1991, 'Prime Ministers, Political Leadership and Cabinet Government', op cit, 
p 131. 
191 Richard E Neustadt 1985, op cit, p 131. 
19s Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 3. 
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This thesis concludes from the existing literature dealing with prime ministerial 
power that prime ministers are indeed seeking to be more independent from their 
colleagues, and are benefiting in an authoritative way from factors such as 
increasing media attention and more sophisticated sources of advice. It places 
itself in the tradition of those who have identified an increasingly powerful prime 
minister but, unlike the work of presidentialisation scholars, it acknowledges the 
political constraints on the PM imposed by the caucus and the electorate. The 
thesis also avoids equating the prime minister's job with the American 
president's, though some behavioural aspects of the roles have undoubtedly 
converged199. 
While the powers of leadership selection possessed in some form or another by a 
prime minister's colleagues and the electorate are significant, they do not 
necessarily prevent strong centralised leadership and the usurpation of the 
cabinet. Rather, the constraints inherent to the prime ministership represent the 
barrier to the presidentialisation that Foley, in particular, is quick to describe. The 
advantages of leadership provide for a form of prime ministerial government and 
account for dominant leaders in Westminster systems including, in this case, the 
quasi-dictatorial Prime Minister Keating nonetheless felled by an unimpressed 
electorate. 
The thesis that follows draws on the theoretical framework supplied by the prime 
ministerial power debate. The interactionist approach leads to a conclusion that 
prime ministers such as Paul Keating are only ever as powerful as they're allowed 
to be, by the institutions that can constrain them. The increasing power and 
influence of Westminster leaders is therefore the result of an increasing 
willingness on the part of the parliamentary party to be led authoritatively, as well 
as a consequence of the employment of strategies articulated by the presidential 
school. Prime ministers are therefore subject to age-old constraints, but are 
199 See C Campbell and MJ Wyszomirski 1991, op cit, p 10; John Hart 1991, op cit, p 208. 
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maximising their power with a complex blend of leadership strategy, modern 
electoral pressures, and the compliance of their peers. 
A Framework for Analysis 
Having laid down the theoretical foundation for this examination of the Paul 
Keating Prime Ministership, this chapter will now turn to the analytical framework 
through which the Keating experience will be viewed. This framework builds on 
the prime ministerial power debate discussed above, and allows for personal and 
party differences. It relies heavily and primarily on a template provided by 
Weller's Malcolm Fraser PM, and incorporates some of the emphases of more 
recent work by Mughan and Foley. The intended result is a thesis firmly in the 
traditions of recent prime ministerial literature, but which provides much-needed 
empirical data on the most recent Australian PM not still in office, and updates a 
literature that has become either dated, in the Australian context, or 
unnecessarily preoccupied with presidentialisation, as is the case with the recent 
British contributions. 
Foundational Studies 
This dissertation builds on the foundation provided by Weller, Foley and Mughan 
to comprehensively examine Australian prime ministerial leadership under Paul 
Keating. The choice of framework reflects a willingness to consider 
simultaneously both the institutional (Weller) and behavioural (Foley, Mughan) 
aspects of the prime ministership, and the ways in which Keating went about 
leading nation and party in an atmosphere of institutional and political constraint. 
The Fraser study provides us with an impressive look at the institutional 
relationships of the Australian prime ministership and the leader's interactions 
with them, and offers a basis from which to analyse the Keating prime 
ministership. Because of its importance to the Australian debate, and the 
concerns it shares with this dissertation, it is examined in some detail below. 
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Foley's recent work points the way towards a comprehensive analysis of prime 
ministerial strategies, leadership stretch and the changing character of 
Westminster institutions. Mughan's analysis centres upon leaders' effects on 
elections, mediated by the media. These studies provide this dissertation with a 
framework that allows for a behavioural and institutional analysis of the Keating 
prime ministership that takes into account personal prime ministerial style. 
The concerns of Malcolm Fraser PM and the conclusions reached by Patrick 
Weller have already been introduced above. From this earlier discussion we 
know that Weller concerned himself with the relative power of the prime minister 
and the cabinet, the limitations on Australian prime ministers, the organisation of 
the position, and the presentational roles of leadership. The book begins with a 
'close examination of the man and the position he held' before expanding to 
include advisory structures, ministerial relationships, party influence and 
relations with the media and the electorate200. This is largely the structure 
utilised for the following Keating-specific study. Further, the conclusions reached 
by Weller offer valuable benchmarks for comparisons of the Fraser and Keating 
prime ministerships and judgements about the importance of personality and 
party. To provide the basis for such comparisons, the lessons from each of the 
institutional relationships examined in Malcolm Fraser PM are discussed here. 
Patrick Weller argues prime ministerial influence is determined by 'personal, 
institutional and intellectual factors·201. Leaders are called upon to navigate the 
numerous alternative power centres of prime ministerial institutions. In this 
regard, 
Prime ministers must constantly negotiate and usually compromise. They 
are not the only actors in the political game; other ministers, business and 
union leaders, backbenchers, the media, all have to be taken into account. 
Political support must be gained and then painstakingly retained; it cannot 
just be demanded and then taken for granted. Governing is for prime 
200 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p xvi. 
201 Ibid, p 3. 
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ministers a continuous estimation of how others will react to the use of 
power, and how much effort is needed to achieve a desired end202. 
In addition to the political management of institutions and personalities is the all-
important task of electoral politics. 'Leaders must both interact with their 
immediate environment - with their colleagues, with officials, with pressure 
groups - and meet the broad wishes and expectations of society•203. 
Prime ministers' most immediate environment is the staff of their private office 
and then, more broadly, the bureaucrats of the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet (PMC). The systems of advice made available to Malcolm Fraser, 
Weller reports, reflected the individual requirements and personal style of the 
Prime Minister. Because 'Fraser was constantly the source of policy initiatives, 
derived from his experience, from his own ideas and from his conversations 
outside government' he 'needed machinery that would react quickly and would 
thrive on the pressures he created'204. Thus the Prime Minister's leadership 
style, reliant on information and a hands-on approach to governing, coloured the 
structure and relationships of his sources of advice and resulted in advisory 
arrangements that provided for Fraser's constant demands for more detail. 
The interaction between the prime minister and other ministers over policy 
direction and portfolio interests, and in the context of resignations, dismissals, 
reshuffles and as a tool of patronage, are all vital components of prime 
ministerial leadership. The relationships are affected by ministers' own 
significant sources of authority and influence. Weller argues ministers 'have the 
potential to wield power' and can 'limit the prime minister's power - if they 
choose to try, if they have the capacity, if they have the support'205. For Malcolm 
Fraser, a Liberal prime minister with the final say on the ministry, the powers of 
patronage can be used to reward supporters and punish detractors. This, 
however, is tempered by the authority of other ministers, and forces the leader 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid, p 7. 
204 Ibid, p 21. 
205 Ibid, p 59. 
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into consultation with powerful individuals over the make up of the senior ranks 
of the government and the courses of action taken when creating or filling 
vacancies. Weller identifies a willingness on the part of Fraser to consult 
extensively in the process of making such decisions, hinting at the significant 
power resources held by his senior colleagues. 
These considerations are magnified in relation to the cabinet. In Weller's 
estimation, Malcolm Fraser was an active and well-briefed chairperson, the 
atmosphere was formal, and votes were not taken or recorded206. Cabinet was 
consulted extensively but Fraser nonetheless dominated. In Weller's estimation, 
Everything went to cabinet; everything important was decided collectively; 
everyone was consulted - frequently and exhaustively. The cabinet process 
was used; the cabinet form adopted. Even decisions normally taken in the 
prime minister's office were brought within the cabinet system. Yet Fraser 
was still able to run the system... He used the levers of power through 
consultation and cabinet discussion. His success depended on the 
willingness and capacity of his colleagues to argue and sustain a case. 
Because Fraser's capacity was greater, his view prevailed most often201 . 
Fraser's 'government by exhaustion' and his established supremacy in terms of 
information allowed him to dominate the cabinet, but traditions of collective 
decision making saw him respect the formal processes of cabinet rather than 
bypass them. This is in recognition of the 'powerful and ambitious individuals' 
who make up the cabinet and need to be 'managed and handled with care•2os. 
Party leadership represents yet anoth.er domain in which prime ministers come 
up against competing power blocs and influential personalities. Prime ministerial 
relationships with the caucus, party organisation, state branches and wider 
membership require constant attention. Malcolm Fraser sought to carefully 
manage the Liberal Party, consult key party figures when necessary, and remain 
accessible to his parliamentary colleagues209. Caucus meetings were conducted 
with significant input from backbenchers who, on occasion, could shift the Prime 
206 Ibid, pp 133-44. 
207 Ibid, p 147. 
20s Ibid, p 108. 
209 Ibid, pp 149-54. 
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Minister's position, gain his ear for further consultation or invite the intervention 
of another senior colleague210. The party organisation enjoyed strong ties to the 
leader, was consulted on the probable party reaction to policy initiatives, and 
even assisted with Fraser's preparation for Question Time in parliament211. His 
efforts to include caucus and the broader Liberal Party organisation in the 
running of the Government demonstrate the Party's own significant power 
resources. 
As a political salesman in the media, parliament and at election time, Fraser was 
not, according to Weller, an impressive performer. He 'was not comfortable in 
these larger arenas•212, though he was an aggressive parliamentary debater213. A 
prime minister's performances on the larger stages of the political system are 
important to their stores of power and their relative position among colleagues 
and prime ministerial institutions. In this respect, 'every occasion is a 
performance, with backbenchers needing to be impressed, and with the leader 
on display•214. This is the case for other constituencies too, with a running 
evaluation of a leader's performance being made by the cabinet and wider 
ministry, the media and the Australian electorate. This evaluation takes on its 
most intensive character during an election campaign, where the increasing 
focus on the leader results in presidential contests between two alternative prime 
ministers. 
Weller concludes with some valuable observations of both Malcolm Fraser and 
the nature of the Australian prime ministership. The former he describes as a 
powerful and persuasive leader who nonetheless saw a 'necessity to consult'215. 
The lesson from the Fraser experience is that prime ministers can be 
authoritative if 'the individual has the powers of persuasion, the skills of 
manipulation, the vision to direct, the ambition to drive and the energy to 
210 Ibid, pp 154-61. 
211 Ibid, pp 164-8. 
212 Ibid, p 177. 
213 Ibid, p 179. 
214 Ibid, p 178. 
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work'216. This lesson can be tested now on another recent Australian prime 
minister. While judgements on the skills of Keating as prime minister must await 
subsequent chapters, we take from this discussion of Patrick Weller's Malcolm 
Fraser PM a valuable template for institutional analysis and a foundation for 
Australian prime ministerial comparison. 
The earlier discussion of the prime ministerial power debate revealed a schism 
between Weller's concentration on prime ministerial constraints, and Michael 
Foley's focus on prime ministers largely unhindered by the institutions of 
executive government. Despite this, both studies provide valuable precursory 
work for this thesis because of their reliance on institutional as well as 
behavioural analysis. The latter's The British Presidency: Tony Blair and the 
Politics of Public Leadership provides an examination of the strategies employed 
by Blair and the effect these have on his stores of authority and influence. These 
conclusions are valuable for the following study of Paul Keating and prime 
ministerial leadership because they are made in the context of a Westminster 
system, describe a more recent PM and, most importantly, because the lessons 
from The British Presidency about tensions between strategic individualisation 
and traditional and institutional constraint apply equally to recent Australian 
experience. 
Anthony Mughan is another British scholar whose concentration on the 
presidentialisation of the prime ministership is discussed above, and criticised for 
its neglect of prime ministerial constraints. Nonetheless, similar to Foley's work, 
Mughan's study offers a valuable example of prime ministerial analysis of the 
pressures providing modern leaders with opportunities for individual power. His 
comprehensive examination of electoral and media strategies is of particular 
value, and this approach is utilised in Chapters Seven and Eight, below. 
21s Ibid, p 409. 
216 Ibid. 
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In summary, this thesis is built on the template provided by Patrick Weller in his 
seminal 1989 analysis of Malcolm Fraser. Further, it shares the concerns and 
research foci of Michael Foley's examination of prime ministerial strategies and 
Anthony Mughan's analysis of media and electoral aspects of the position. That 
these three foundational studies do not concur in their conclusions about prime 
ministerial power does not necessarily prevent their providing a coherent 
research framework for this dissertation. Indeed, it is hoped that the analysis of 
Paul Keating that follows draws on all the strengths of these studies, but offers a 
fresh and empirically-based argument about prime ministerial power in Australia. 
Allowing for Difference 
It is also worthwhile, before embarking on the empirical discussion of the Keating 
Prime Ministership, to consider here some deviations from the model provided by 
Weller, Foley and Mughan, and important additional concerns of this dissertation. 
Firstly, in contrast with Malcolm Fraser PM, this thesis will not consider policy 
debates separate from the analysis of institutional relationships. Here, rather, 
key events and policy or personnel decisions will be analysed in the context of 
these relationships and, as such, will be situated among the chapters on 
institutional interaction. This largely reflects a consideration of available space. 
Second, differences in the emphasis on various institutions will be found as a 
result of the varied interests of the two prime ministers. Finally, this dissertation 
asks some additional questions which, necessarily, deviate from the framework 
and concerns developed by Weller. Namely, it will be asked here what 
differences in the structures of prime ministerial power are evidenced in the 
prime ministership of Paul Keating compared to that of other prime ministers, to 
what extent Paul Keating's own personal style of leadership impacted on the 
power resources available to him and accounts for disparities of influence and 
authority, and what implications Labor leadership has on the prime ministerial 
task. These additional questions enhance the value of the thesis by stressing 
difference without sacrificing the central questions of the prime ministerial power 
debate. The result, it is hoped, is a re-examination of the power of prime 
63 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
ministers in Australia taking into account these additional concerns and the 
provision of supplementary insights into the job. 
Much of the prime ministerial power and leadership literature is system, rather 
than personality, specific. Though some have argued a prime minister's stores of 
authority and influence are related to their own ability to garner power211, 
individual leadership styles are not often taken into account. If they are, it is in a 
biographical way rather than utilising a more targeted approach. Similarly with 
the differences between the parties from which prime ministers spring. A 
legitimate case can be made that the leadership structures of conservative and 
social democratic parties differ, thus providing alternative leadership 
environments for prime ministers to navigate. This dissertation, building on the 
literature discussed above, allows for personal and party differences when 
examining Paul Keating in the context of Australian prime ministerial leadership. 
Another analytical difference is the ideology of the leader's party. Prime ministers 
are necessarily party leaders. This dissertation's reliance on an interactionist 
model of prime ministerial leadership thus invites some consideration of the 
power structures central to the organisation of their political party. If, as has 
been argued, conservative parties exhibit a more authoritarian structure of leader 
influence, it can then be demonstrated that the structures of authority and 
influence unique to social democratic parties compel leaders to navigate 
institutional and cultural influences in ways different to their political 
opponents218. 
Here the leadership differences between major parties in Britain and Australia 
are discussed, drawing on a debate taking place in British literature since the 
1960s. This allows for party differences between, for example, the Coalition led 
by Malcolm Fraser and Keating's Australian Labor Party. Though this argument is 
not without its detractors, the concept of a specific form of 'labour' democracy is 
217 See, for example, George Jones 1991, op cit; Patrick Weller, 1989, op cit. 
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discussed here with an eye to later analysis of party leadership and comparisons 
with the benchmarks provided by Weller's Fraser publication. 
Two protagonists in the party leadership debate are R.T. McKenzie219 and Samuel 
Beer220. McKenzie's thesis, broadly stated, is that leader-follower relations are 
essentially the same in both the Conservative and Labour parties in Britain. 
Despite formal differences in rules or organisational structure, he argues, the 
leader is similarly powerful across the party spectrum because of his or her 
position as an alternative or actual prime minister, armed with the power 
resources that such a position brings. More specifically, describing the formal 
structure of the parties, McKenzie writes: 
the formal description of the powers of the Conservative Leader would 
suggest that, once elected, he can play the autocrat with impunity; in 
contrast, the Labour Leader appears to be hemmed round with restrictions 
which ensure his subservience both to the party in Parliament and to the 
mass party organization outside221. 
Despite this, however, and aside from the different power resources available to 
individual leaders of both parties, 'there is no significant difference ... between 
Labour Prime Ministers and Conservative Prime Ministers'. In this respect, 'the 
variations depend on the personality, temperament and ability of the individual 
concerned rather than on his party affiliation•222. 
The central theme of McKenzie's work - party leadership similarity - is not 
accepted by Beer223 and others224. To demonstrate a divergence in leadership 
models, Beer describes 'socialist' democracy, which is able to reconcile strict 
party discipline with democratic participation as a result of a reliance on class 
21s Colin Campbell and John Halligan, op cit, p 16. 
219 RT McKenzie, British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and 
Labour Parties (London, Heinemann, 1963). 
220 Samuel Beer, Modern British Politics (London, Faber and Faber, 1982). 
221 RT McKenzie 1963, op cit, p 297. 
222 Ibid, p 298. 
223 Samuel Beer 1982, op cit. 
224 For example Michael Foley 2000, op cit; Jean Blonde!, Voters, Parties and Leaders (London, 
Penguin, 1966). 
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theory225. This contrasts with the Tory view of democracy; that 'Order requires 
Hierarchy'226. The difference in democratic views is that 'one sees, and 
approves, horizontal division' whilst the 'other sees, and approves, vertical 
integration•221. As a consequence of alternative democratic views, Labour 
emphasises programs, according to Beer, whilst the Tories stress leadership. 
Labour exhibits 'a degree of pluralist democracy that is worlds apart from the 
elitism of the Conservatives•22a. Beer's thesis, in contrast to that of McKenzie, is 
that 'in practice as in theory, in the actual distribution of power as in their reigning 
conceptions of authority, the two parties were deeply opposed'229. 
Jean Blonde! agrees, arguing 'things are different in the Conservative party' 
because 'that organization is an 'autocratic' one in the sense that decisions are 
taken by the leader of the party and by the leader of the party alone, at least in 
theory'23o. More recently, Foley has argued the 'Labour Party has long been 
considered immune from the sort of free-wheeling improvisation that has 
traditionally marked the Conservative Party and led to the idiosyncratic 
individualism of its leaders'231. In this respect, 
Labour leaders are almost invariably placed in a predicament where they 
have to compete with the Conservative party's traditions of strong leadership 
and loyal followship, and the need to accommodate Labour's roots as a 
participatory organisation originally developed outside parliament232. 
Proponents of the difference in leadership structure between parties point to a 
uniqueness in Labour's conception of party democracy, and the importance 
placed upon participation from members, in contrast to the authoritarian 
structure of power inherent to the Conservative's leadership authority based upon 
individualised and dictatorial leadership. 
22s Samuel Beer 1982, op cit, p 86. 
226 Ibid, p 92. 
227 Ibid. 
22s Ibid, p 388. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Jean Blondel 1966, op cit, p 115. 
231 Michael Foley 2000, op cit, pp 76-7. 
232 Ibid, p 77. 
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James MacGregor Burns joins the debate by arguing that, essentially, the 
difference between the power structures of Labour and Conservative parties in 
Britain can be attributed to their origins233. Labour's trade union beginnings 
outside of parliament would ensure that extra-parliamentary structures would 
retain some influence over the party's representatives in the Commons. Thus, 'it 
became an article of faith in the Labour Party that the ultimate subservience of 
the Parliamentary Labour Party to the Party outside Parliament was proof of the 
democratic structure of "the Movement'"234. 
The distinctions drawn by this group of scholars can apply equally to Australian 
experience. Australian Labor's concept of extra-parliamentary participation, like 
the Party itself, has a long history. Contributing to a recently published and Party-
sanctioned history of the ALP caucus, Frank Bongiorno argued that by 
1901 the Party had already introduced into Australian politics a new 
understanding of democracy. In theory at least, working-class electors were 
not only to have an opportunity to select candidates prior to elections and 
vote for Labor candidates at election time, but also to have a hand in 
framing Party policy between elections235. 
Consequently, Labor developed mechanisms such as the Party pledge, state and 
national executives and a regular policy conference to ensure extra-parliamentary 
input into the affairs and decisions of the elected parliamentary 
representatives236. A demarcation existed, whereby 'Federal Conference formed 
the policy, Federal Executive supervised it, and the Parliamentary Party 
implemented it'237. The effect of this, according to Gordon Childe, was to make 
Labor politicians representatives of the labour movement rather than the 
233 James MacGregor Burns 1979, op cit, pp 316-22. 
234 Ibid, p 318. 
235 Frank Bongiorno, 'The Origins of Caucus: 1856-1901' in John Faulkner and Stuart Macintyre 
(eds}, True Believers: The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (Sydney, Allen and 
Unwin, 2001), p 3. 
236 Ibid, p 4. 
237 Sean Scalmer, 'Crisis to Crisis: 1950-66' in John Faulkner and Stuart Macintyre (eds}, True 
Believers: The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2001), pp 
91-2. 
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electorate238. A famous illustration of extra-parliamentary influence within the 
Labor Party came in 1963, when the Daily Telegraph published a photo of the 
Leader and Deputy Leader of the Opposition standing outside a Canberra hotel 
while '36 faceless men' - the Party's executive - were inside deciding Labor's 
policy on a 'matter of international importance'239. 'This stubborn thing called 
"Labor democracy"'24o has therefore been important to the development and 
traditional participatory ethos of Australian Labor. 
Though much recent work has stressed the growing power of the labour leader in 
the contest for influence engaged with extra-parliamentary organisations and the 
grass roots, there remains a weakening tradition of limited leadership within 
labour parties of the centre-left. The degree of power enjoyed by leaders of major 
parties is converging, but the types and character of constituencies dealt with by 
alternative leaders remains remarkably different. Recognition of this allows for 
more telling conclusions about the requirements of the position and the nature of 
political leadership in Australia, as does an understanding of the impact of 
personal and political style. 
Paul Keating and the Prime Ministerial Power Debate 
The final and most obvious difference for which any analysis of prime ministerial 
leadership must allow is personal leadership style. In David Adams' brief analysis 
of Paul Keating he discusses the behaviour, speech making, perceptions of 
strength, strategic political positioning and language of the prime minister241. 
Personality, in his and Graham Little's estimation, is a valuable way to 
understand leadership. But, as Weller highlights, there are difficulties associated 
with determining a prime minister's style because of the many considerations this 
entails. Style 
238 In Terry Irving, 'The Growth pf Federal Authority: 1929-40' in John Faulkner and Stuart 
Macintyre (eds), True Believers: The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (Sydney, Allen 
and Unwin, 2001), p 61. 
239 Sean Scalmer 2001, op cit, pp 100-1. 
240 Terry Irving 2001, op cit, p 60. 
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Relates not only to behaviour in crises but also to the daily running of 
government business. Style refers to the skilful manipulation of others, the 
capacity of a leader to inspire or persuade, the way in which decisions are 
made, the techniques that the leader uses242. 
These considerations comprise a vital component of leadership inquiry, and allow 
for variations in the power resources available to prime ministers from the same 
political system. 
Paul Keating had a unique manner that colours any analysis of his leadership. 
Paul Kelly, senior journalist and author, commented in an interview for this thesis 
that with Keating, 'personality is important'. Because 'Keating was a very 
passionate prime minister', who 'brought his own stamp to bear on the 
Government'. Further, he 
defined the agenda of his government, he presented his agenda to the 
people. He determined the chemistry of the relationship between his 
Government and the people. These days people tend to see the Government 
and interpret the Government through the prime minister, and I think in 
Keating's prime ministership in particular, they interpreted it through his 
values and through his mannerisms, through his moods. So if the prime 
minister was witty or charming, they were interested and enthralled. If he 
was indulgent and petty and angry then they got turned off. So I think the 
mood and personality of the prime minister became all-important243. 
Don Watson's biography concurs with this notion of the people reacting to the 
ebbs and flows of the Keating prime ministerial persona244. 
Personal style and leadership are topics to which Graham Little has devoted 
much scholarly attention245. Little highlights popular perceptions of Keating as 
brutal, arrogant, proud, ambitious and strong246, and sees in him a narcissistic 
pride which leads to a self-driven pursuit of reform247. The Keating style was thus 
characterised by 'an image of sharpness', a 'capacity for spoken aggression and 
241 David Adams 1997, op cit. 
242 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 7. 
243 Interview with Paul Kelly, 4 November 2002. 
244 See Don Watson 2002, op cit. 
245 See, for example, Graham Little, Political ensembles: a psychosocial approach to politics and 
leadership (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1985); or Graham Little, Politics and Personal 
Style (Melbourne, Thomas Nelson, 1973). See also Chapter Eight, 'Pressing the Flesh', below. 
246 Graham Little, 'Leading Change', St Mark's Review, no 171, Spring 1997, p 12. 
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contempt' and a 'user's knowledge of the richest language of the street'248. 
Though little is mentioned here of the statesmanlike side to the Keating persona, 
the brawler aspect is highlighted. 
Paul Keating was essentially an adversarial, risk taking politician in the 'crash 
through or crash style'249. Watson has argued that in 'Australia's adversarial 
political system Keating was the most adversarial of all. He refused to give his 
opponent anything, ever'250. Geoff Kitney of the Sydney Morning Herald agreed 
in an interview with this author. His view was that Keating 'had a winner takes all 
approach, you go into the fight and you fight until the last man standing, and this 
applied to colleagues as well as the opposition. On most things that style meant 
that he won the battles'. Further, the way he wielded power was to be savagely 
insistent that his views were right and his opponents wrong251. 
Paul Keating was thus an archetypal conviction politician, who held firm beliefs 
and was combative in his promotion of them. The American political scientist 
Patricia Lee Sykes argues that conviction politicians see parties as a 'nuisance' to 
a leader who seeks fundamental change, and sells a message through the 
media252. Keating fits this description, and was known for taking public stands 
without consulting first with caucus and cabinet. Consistent with Sykes' thesis, 
sometimes the issues upon which Keating showed conviction ran counter to what 
was considered good politics. 
Another related trait commonly associated with Keating was political courage. 
Alan Ramsey wrote in a column for the Sydney Morning Herald in August 1993: 
'Paul Keating is never more dangerous than when he's in trouble. If his judgment 
is erratic, his courage is not. The one with the other can be lethal. ... Keating 
247 Graham Little, 'The two narcissisms: comparing Hawke and Keating' in J Brett (ed.), Political 
Lives (St Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1997). 
248 Ibid, p 20. 
249 This is an expression also used to describe one of Keating's predecessors, Gough Whitlam. 
250 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 446. 
251 Interview with Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
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fights hard and he often doesn't fight fair'253. Don Watson believed 'Courage was 
Keating's hallmark and his stock in trade, as for some good politicians it is nous, 
charm or practicality. Keating had these other attributes, but they did not define 
him in the way that courage did'254. 
These views of Keating relate closely to his own assessment of the political style 
he took to the prime ministership. The oft-quoted 'down hill, one ski, no poles'255 
is an apt description of this approach. More than one former Keating staffer 
raised these words, unprompted, when talking about his style and the nature of 
the prime ministerial operation. An extension of this theme was provided by 
Keating to an Irish television interviewer when he said 'I'm a punter ... I tend to 
take political risks and I don't mind risking my own hide from time to time 
because I've always said to my colleagues, the worst thing that can happen to you 
in this game is to lose your job. So why be a mouse?'256. 
Importantly, Paul Keating also exhibited melancholic behaviour, manifested in his 
periodic disengagement from some of the tasks of the prime ministership, and 
his almost depressive outlook. Medical and psychological characteristics of 
leaders are subjects infrequently analysed in academic literature, with some rare 
exceptions257. But, in Keating's case, his depressive behaviour in office is a key 
factor in his ability to perform the role. Part of this can be attributed to the family 
or personal problems he experienced during his tenure, a sensitive issue raised 
by Watson and confirmed by other interviewees for this thesis25s. Melancholy 
remains the most appropriate word to describe Keating's personality during his 
252 Patricia Lee Sykes, Presidents and Prime Ministers: Conviction Politics in the Anglo-American 
Tradition (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2000), pp 219-20. 
253 Alan Ramsey, 'Deals, Not Elections, in the Air', Sydney Morning Herald, 21August1993, p 31. 
254 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 432. 
255 See Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 193. 
25s David Day 2000, op cit, p 429. 
257 See, for example, the American literature on presidential health, including: Robert E Gilbert, 
The Mortal Presidency: Illness and Anguish in the White House, (New York, Basic Books, 1992); 
Robert H Ferrell, I/I-Advised: Presidential Health and Public Trust, (Columbia, University of Missouri 
Press, 1992). See also Jerrold M Post and Robert S Robins, When illness strikes the leader: the 
dilemma of the captive king, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993). 
25s Private conversations. 
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years as PM. It has been depicted as 'a gloomy state of mind', 'sober 
thoughtfulness' and 'pensiveness'259. Don Watson sees it 'leaving the sufferer 
feeling worthless and abandoned', equating it with 'struggling through a thick fog 
in lead boots'260. He believes melancholic behaviour 'was frequently the way with 
Paul Keating and sometimes it became like this for those who served him'261. 
The remainder of Watson's book is consistent with this assessment of Keating's 
personality, and we see from the analysis in this thesis that follows that 
disengagement from, for example, electoral politics can be viewed as an 
extension of the Prime Minister's periodic descent into a state of mind not 
conducive to the public and labour-intensive aspects of prime ministerial 
leadership. 
Keating's personal style is the final component of a framework that incorporates 
precursory work by Weller, Foley and Mughan and takes into account party 
difference. The intersection of prime ministerial institutions and personality, in 
the context of the constraints forced on a leader by party and electorate, it is 
argued here, provides the most appropriate lens through which to examine in 
detail the recent Australian prime ministership of Paul Keating. This approach 
marries the institutional approach of Weller and the strategic and behavioural 
emphases of Foley and Mughan, and takes into account personal and party 
differences. Thus, while the chapters are organised institutionally, at all times 
consideration of personality will be intertwined with analysis of the institutional 
constraints imposed by parliament, the media, caucus, bureaucracy and 
electorate. This approach mirrors that of the interactionist school of leadership 
inquiry represented by Elgie and focussed on the intersection of the leader with 
his or her leadership environment. The result is a more complete analysis of Paul 
259 According to the Macquarie Dictionary online: www.macquariedictionary.com.au . 
260 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 63. 
261 Ibid. 
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Keating and prime ministerial leadership in Australia and a fresh perspective on 
the prime ministerial power debate. 
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Leading Labor 
Prime Ministers govern on the sufferance of their colleagues262. 
The Australian parliamentary system ensures prime ministers are also, 
simultaneously, party leaders. Paul Keating, as leader of the Australian Labor 
Party, was required to carefully maintain relationships with the parliamentary 
caucus, the organisational wing of the Party, trade union leaders and the 
organised factions. Generally, how leaders navigate their way through these 
alternative institutional power bases is vital to the health of their prime 
ministership and to the maintenance of the position. A prime minister's very 
existence is predicated on party support which can, at any time in Australia, be 
withdrawn. 
Keating's tenure as Labor leader was characterised by a complete dominance of 
the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party; a politically close and productive 
relationship with Bill Kelty, Secretary of the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
and the industrial labour movement's key figure; poisonous relations with the ALP 
National Secretariat, and stable management of the Party's well-entrenched 
factional system. The lack of an alternative leader and the timidity of a 
parliamentary caucus firmly under Keating's spell ensured there was no 
likelihood of a challenge to his leadership. This provided the preconditions for a 
detached form of Party leadership where there was little need for constant 
cultivation of backbenchers or extensive consultation. Important preconditions 
for Party dominance delivered Keating a confidence of tenure, which meant he 
262 Glyn Davis 2002, op cit, p 51. 
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could afford to be 'more intent on reaching decisions and then driving them 
through the Party processes'263. 
The circumstances by which Paul Keating reached the prime ministership would 
seem to suggest that caucus would require constant attention and demand 
frequent consultation. The Party was split evenly between the two leadership 
protagonists, as the tight 56-51 result of the second Keating challenge 
illustrated264, and the fault lines after at least a year of manoeuvring ran 
extremely deep. Mike Steketee wrote only days after the change of leadership 
that Keating had 'clawed his way to the top of his party's pile after a pitched 
battle of six months which has left the road to political revival littered with the 
corpses of almost half the members of the Caucus'265. Keating's willingness to 
depose a sitting prime minister also created a precedent that could have worked 
against the stability of his leadership tenure. 
The likelihood that Keating faced an uphill battle in gaining and maintaining the 
confidence and support of a fractured Party led him to make some promises at 
the outset regarding caucus consultation and input. Two such post-transition 
pledges were recorded in the print media at the time: 'from now on, he solemnly 
assured the assembled acolytes from the Canberra press corps, he would always 
keep in touch with the ordinary backbenchers, consult them regularly and inject 
their views into policy-making'266. In another press conference he again 
promised to listen, and spoke of the presence of 'a lot of wisdom in the 
caucus'267 . For various reasons, argued below, Paul Keating was never 
compelled to make good on his pledges to regularly consult the Parliamentary 
Party. He enjoyed the preconditions of Party dominance, skewing the power 
263 Mike Steketee 'Labor in Power: 1983-96' in J Faulkner and S Macintyre (eds), True Believers: 
The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2001) p 156. 
264 The first challenge saw Hawke hold off Keating by winning 66 votes to Keating's 44. 
265 Mike Steketee, 'Keating's Crown of Thorns', Sydney Morning Herald, 21 December 1991, p 
41; see also Michelle Grattan, 'One Vote Down, But the Real One's Still to Come', Age, 20 
December, 1991, p 1. 
266 Peter Robinson, 'Humbug, This Humility', Sun Herald, 22 December 1991, p 24. 
267 Peter Hartcher, 'Keating Scrapes In', Sydney Morning Herald, 20 December 1991, p 1. 
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relationship between Prime Minister and Party drastically in his favour. This 
remained the case throughout Keating's relatively brief four and a quarter year 
tenure268. 
The relationship between prime minister and party is effectively conceptualised 
by Glyn Davis as a 'leadership bargain'269. This is 'a compact between leaders 
and led, a social exchange in the interests of collective success, a transaction 
between a party room which wants leadership and a prime minister who needs a 
majority'270. The basis of the bargain is that backbenchers rely on the skills and 
popularity of the leader in order to retain office, which means a 'leader who can 
deliver office thus exerts a powerful attraction'; 'the leader does not have to be 
good, or even popular, just successfur211. In return, the caucus makes a running 
judgement on the prospects for continued success and provides or withdraws 
support accordingly. 
To observe the consequences of prime ministerial under-performance we need 
look no further than the experiences of Bob Hawke in Australia in 1991 and 
Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom in 1990, both removed from office by 
dissatisfied colleagues. The substantial weapon wielded by the Party room is the 
ability to withdraw support at any time and hand the job to an alternative leader. 
This, correctly, is seen as the most significant brake on prime ministerial power in 
Westminster systems212. In Australia this is particularly so; both major parties 
require only a 'spill' motion and a caucus ballot. This contrasts with practice in 
the UK, for example, where the process is more complex. Indeed 'in few other 
places is the contract between leader and led so distinct and so easy to call to 
accounr213. While a prime minister is rarely removed, the threat of removal 
inevitably colours prime ministerial behaviour. 
268 Whether he could have sustained this if he had won another term is a worthwhile question, but 
one that we cannot, nonetheless, answer. 
259 Glyn Davis 1992, op cit. 
270 Ibid, p 79. 
271 Ibid, p 68. 
212 See John Hart 1992, op cit, p 194; Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 18. 
213 Patrick Weller 1992, op cit, p 206. 
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What, then, is the effect of the ever-present threat of the withdrawal of party 
support? Davis argues the situation results in 'continuous and exhaustive' 
contact with 'parliamentary accomplices', where the prime minister is reminded 
at times of conflict that 'substantive political authority rests with the party 
room'274. In more detail, the leader must 'embody the values of the party' and 
'win the support of a small, individually ambitious but collectively nervous and 
risk-averse collective known as the parliamentary caucus ... by offering the 
prospect of spoils, unity or direction'. Davis argues that 'party leaders may 
indeed have to give more than they take' because 'the party can withdraw 
support, and with it office, at any time'275. 
The relationship with the parliamentary party, because of the removal 
mechanism, is the most important aspect of the prime minister - party 
relationship. The leadership bargain sums up the exchange of support for the 
promise of continued success and patronage. In reality, of course, relationships 
of party support and dependence are much more complicated because the party 
comprises more than just the parliamentary caucus, it incorporates diverse and 
overlapping power structures and institutions. The broader party is made up of 
state and federal branches, factions, unions (in the case of labour parties) and 
various sub-groupings and personal fiefdoms. While members 'share a common 
ambition to see their party in office', 'the structures they work through are 
voluntary, complex and often lacking neat boundaries'276. With several 
competing power centres comes an onus on the prime minister to consult with 
other key actors in the broader party277; 'The structure of the party outside 
parliament determines the number of independent centres of power that exist 
within the party and therefore the number of bodies with whom the prime 
minister may need to maintain a direct relationship'21s. 
214 Glyn Davis 1992, op cit, p 67. 
275 Ibid, p 66. 
276 Ibid, p 66. 
211 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 20. 
278 Ibid, p 19. 
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The party organisation, in Australia comprising a national office as well as state 
branches, is an alternative power source which has significant responsibilities 
such as the running of election campaigns and control of the party's finances. 
This creates a relationship of interdependence which is vital to the prospects of 
electoral success. The office of the prime minister and the party's organisational 
structure are both 'part of the same web of relationships, a web which links the 
aspirations of local branches, the interests of state divisions and the hopes of 
those in parliament'279. Again, electoral considerations are vital; 'the 
organisation values success; anything less and the leaders are not keeping their 
side of the bargain'2ao. 
Labor prime ministers face additional constituencies such as the trade union 
movement and a more sophisticated and developed factional system. There is 
also a lingering, though admittedly decreasingly influential, tradition of policy and 
platform development taking place at National Conferences and other forums of 
the broader party, outside the walls of the caucus or cabinet room. This adds 
layers of complexity to the Labor leader's maintenance of key constituencies. 
It is an extremely significant act for caucus to replace a sitting prime minister. It 
doesn't happen often but it has happened, and the threat can be enough to 
compel leaders to consult or give way on particular issues. Prime ministers are 
not presidential because their tenure is not guaranteed, it depends on continuing 
party support. But leaders also enjoy considerable scope in the course of their 
stewardship of the party leadership. A skilful leader can dominate her or his party 
through the use of patronage, by force of personality, or by demonstrating 
electoral prowess. 
This chapter deals exclusively with Prime Minister Keating's relationships with the 
various constituencies of the Australian Labor Party. Examined in turn are his 
219 Glyn Davis 1992, op cit, p 75. 
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interactions with the Parliamentary Labor Party, the organised factional system, 
the Party organisation and the trade union movement. These relationships are 
examined here in the context of the leadership bargain outlined by Glyn Davis and 
introduced above. 
The argument of this chapter is that Paul Keating comprehensively dominated his 
Party for several reasons. First, Labor's unexpected election victory in 1993, 
largely attributed to Keating's own contribution, earned for the Prime Minister 
unprecedented authority and influence, more even than that afforded Whitlam in 
1972 and Hawke in 1983. Second, his own personality and alternately forceful 
or charming approach to his dealings with caucus was a factor in their 
subservience. Third, the rigid factional system, under development since the 
outset of the Hawke Government, provided Keating with a continuing base of 
support from which to operate and through which the Party could solve disputes 
and allocate patronage. Fourth, his close personal and professional relationship 
with Bill Kelty ensured the unions were in step with the Prime Minister's agenda. 
Fifth, the active policy agenda encompassing traditional Labor concerns such as 
economic stimulus, republicanism, and indigenous affairs satisfied supporters 
and the Party's left. The recent history of the dumping of Prime Minister Hawke 
left few caucus members with the will to go through the debilitating process 
again. Finally, at no stage of the Keating prime ministership was there a credible 
and willing leadership alternative. The only potentially viable alternative, Kim 
Beazley Junior2s1, was not actively seeking the leadership and remained loyal to 
Keating throughout. The Prime Minister, as a result of these factors, remained 
absolutely authoritative for the entire period of his leadership. According to 
Pamela Williams, 'no-one in the party had the courage to take Keating on. Not 
Beazley, not the machine, not the caucus·2s2. 
280 Ibid. 
281 From now on Kim Beazley Junior will be referred to simply as Kim Beazley. 
282 Pamela Williams 1997, 'Behind the Victory', op cit, p 105. 
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Paul Keating led the Australian Labor Party on his terms. The leadership bargain 
greatly favoured the Prime Minister because the one significant weapon at 
caucus' disposal - the removal mechanism - was never likely to be unsheathed. 
Because caucus rarely challenged the PM and couldn't realistically dump him, 
especially after the heroics of the 1993 poll, and because of generally favourable 
relationships with factional and labour movement leaders, Keating could afford to 
place less emphasis on caucus, organisational and other forms of Party 
consultation. As a result, his was a detached or arms-length form of party 
leadership, contingent on continuing caucus compliance. 
The Federal Parliamentary Labor Party 
This analysis of Prime Minister Keating's relationship with the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party (FPLP) examines caucus meetings, the degree of 
access available to backbenchers, and the extent to which they were consulted 
by Keating in the course of his leadership of the Party. Also examined in some 
detail are criticisms of his style of caucus interaction, the issues upon which the 
FPLP and the Prime Minister clashed, and the somewhat rare instances where 
caucus openly showed dissent against Keating's policy direction or took 
exception to his style. Next, the factors which contributed to the Prime Minister's 
dominance of the Labor caucus will be examined. The argument is that the 
absence of any credible attempt to replace Keating, the authority and influence 
granted by the 1993 election victory, the timidity of caucus, and his own 
approach to caucus relations were the key factors that explain his ability to 
govern without significant restraint from the views and sentiments of the FPLP. 
The make-up of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (caucus) is provided in 
Appendix One. It remained relatively stable in size, though a handful of personnel 
changes took place, particularly at the 1993 election and at subsequent by-
elections during the second Keating term. Caucus under Paul Keating met 
regularly during parliamentary sitting periods to discuss the political and policy 
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issues of the day, to receive a briefing from the Prime Minister and be given the 
opportunity to ask him questions. From the available accounts it would seem 
that Keating took these speeches to caucus seriously, impressing backbenchers 
such as Les Scott, Jim Snow and Mark Latham2s3. The latter found them 
particularly helpful, relating in an interview with this author that Keating would 
give his reports, and they were enriching, nourishing reports. They were 
reports about issues and plans for the nation. So intellectually I found those 
reports very engaging. He'd give his report, and there were some questions 
about policy issues new and old - not really challenging him but trying to add 
some value to the things that he was trying to progress. So I wouldn't say 
there was any personal challenge or criticism of him, but with his high level 
intellectual engagement with the caucus there were people trying to grapple 
with the big issues, trying to add a bit of value to the process2s4. 
Mike Steketee has argued that the 'Leader's reports to Caucus, like his 
performances in Parliament, became rhetorical tours de force, reviving the spirit 
of a party consistently trailing in the opinion polls'285. 
Despite the seriousness with which Keating approached his reports to caucus, he 
did not dedicate himself wholeheartedly to consultation with his colleagues286. In 
his dealings with caucus he could be forced into greater dialogue with 
backbenchers only rarely, and only on issues of particular importance or 
attracting unusually high levels of angst (see below). By midway through his term, 
the pattern of prime ministerial consultation with caucus was set, though at times 
Keating could show a softer, more consultative side. After productive and well-
received discussions with the FPLP over the 1994 budget, for example, one Labor 
MP was quoted as saying that the 'direction of change', towards a more 
consultative PM, 'has been good', though 'Keating is never going to be a 
consulter'. The caucus critic continued: 'there is still too much, when he 
addresses Caucus, of giving out the line which people are supposed to accept 
uncritically'287• 
283 Interviews with Jim Snow (4 April 2002), Les Scott (4 April 2002) and Mark Latham (3 June 
2002). 
284 Interview with Mark Latham, 3 June 2002. 
28s Mike Steketee 2001, op cit, p 155. 
286 See, in particular, Chapter Four on Keating's relationship with Cabinet. 
287 Bruce Jones, 'Voice of a Listening Leader', Sun Herald, 11 September 1994, p 29. 
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So if Prime Minister Keating only rarely consulted with his parliamentary 
colleagues, and then largely only when forced to do so, what scope was there for 
backbenchers to have access to the PM, to voice their concerns? Accounts vary, 
from the critical line taken by author and journalist Pamela Williams to the neutral 
account provided by Labor MP Darryl Melham. The former argued shortly after 
Labor's election defeat that 'no-one beyond the inner circle ever got in to see 
Keating'288. Melham disagrees, describing caucus access as conducted with an 
open door policy, where members could drop in to the Prime Minister, but this 
rarely happened because backbench MPs were intimidated by Keating2B9. Either 
way, there was little observable conversation between the PM and his 
colleagues290. 
Mark Latham offers a perceptive summary of caucus access to Prime Minister 
Keating. The first factor determining access, according to the Werriwa MP, was 
length of tenure and familiarity to Keating. Latham explained to this author that 
he: 
was elected at the beginning of 1994 and as a greenhorn backbencher and 
the newest addition to the caucus I've got to say I didn't think it was my 
station in life to be rocking around to the PM's office, knocking on the door 
and saying 'g'day Paul', you know, crack open a tinnie and let's chew the fat! 
But obviously there were some in the caucus who knew him a lot longer and 
were more familiar with him personally, and would have felt that access to 
him was quite easy291. 
Another factor, in a similar vein to that expressed above by Daryl Melham, was 
the preparedness of members of the caucus to go and see the PM. Latham 
expressed his surprise, after reading the Don Watson biography of Keating, that 
Robert Ray had complained about access but was rarely seen near the Prime 
Minister's Office. 'You get no access if you don't turn up', Latham remarked, and 
'if you don't turn up you shouldn't complain about it'292. 
288 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 124. 
289 See Peter Fitzsimons 1998, op cit, p 396. 
290 Interview with Bruce Childs, 16 January 2003. 
291 Interview with Mark Latham, 3 June 2002. 
292 Ibid. 
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Mark Latham also usefully categorised Labor MPs into three groups, with varying 
access to Prime Minister Keating. The first group comprises 'the newcomers who 
would be feeling their way and who wouldn't think it was their role to be buzzing 
around the PM's office'. The second group is made up of those 'people who'd 
known Paul and would have been allies of his'. The final category were 
backbenchers 'who probably didn't get along with him all that well and who 
weren't that comfortable trying to access his operation either'. This 
categorisation suggests there was no blanket rule for access; it depended largely 
on personality and individual relationships rather than factional or other 
considerations. Latham's conclusions regarding access are that Keating 'had a 
strong personality, and by and large didn't get along that well with certain people 
in the caucus' whereas 'others thought the world of him and he thought the world 
of them'. Interpersonal factors such as these are what 'determines access rather 
than an across-the-board judgement as to the openness of his office'293. 
Backbenchers would also, from time to time, put their thoughts on the 
Government's direction to paper. John Langmore, a Canberra MP, and 
occasional Keating critic, for example, was prompted by a deteriorating set of 
employment figures to write to the Prime Minister about the problem. One 
Sydney Morning Herald journalist described such a letter as the kind 'from an 
uppity Labor backbencher that makes' the Prime Minister's 'lips curl'294. It 
seems, though, from available accounts, that letters such as these were not a 
regular occurrence. For the Parliamentary Party, access to Keating was limited to 
regular caucus meeting reports and an occasional visit to his office by either the 
bravest MPs or those closest and most familiar to the Prime Minister. 
293 Ibid. 
29 4 Bernard Lagan, 'An Appeal to Middle-Class Goodwill', Sydney Morning Herald, 16 April 1993, p 
11. 
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Caucus Criticism, Conflict, Clashes 
Paul Keating's relationship with the Parliamentary Labor Party was often criticised 
because of the absence of real, meaningful dialogue, especially in contrast to the 
largely accessible and fraternal Hawke. Though, as former Deputy Prime Minister 
Brian Howe recounted in an interview for this thesis, 'there were few occasions 
where there was any real revolt in caucus and any atmosphere that really 
threatened the authority of the Prime Minister'295, caucus members did 
occasionally publicly criticise the Keating approach. One anonymous 
backbencher commented in 1995 that the Prime Minister 'seemed to be on a 
transcendental high, cruising in his mind and remote from the government'296. 
Another, Victorian MP Peter Cleeland, argued that the 'problem was the complete 
gulf between some very good backbenchers and ministers and what they thought 
about political issues, and what the prime minister thought'297. Laurie Ferguson 
was another critic, whose comment that Keating represented an 'electoral dead 
loss' was seen by one journalist as a declaration representing 'the bristling 
hostility of perhaps a quarter of the Caucus'298. 
Despite these criticisms, Prime Minister Paul Keating was largely unchallenged by 
the Labor caucus, with some rare, but nonetheless significant, exceptions relating 
to specific Government policy decisions. For example, Keating's 1995 decision to 
allow Ros Kelly to resign from parliament and bring on a disastrous by-election 
which saw the previously safe seat of Canberra fall to the Liberal Party was taken 
without any reference to caucus or cabinet, drawing considerable ire299. Another 
example of caucus policy dissent came in May of the same year with the 
discovery that the Government was participating in a US-led initiative to bug the 
Chinese embassy in Canberra3oo. Examined here in more detail are, in 
29s Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002. 
296 Quoted in Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 29. 
291 Ibid, pp 113-14. 
298 Peter Hartcher, 'Keating May Yet Return to Life', Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1992, p 
11. 
299 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 30. 
300 Bruce Jones, 'Keating Faces Backbench Blast', Sun Herald, 28 May 1995, p 3. 
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chronological order, the illustrative cases of caucus revolts over pay television 
policy, the 1993 budget, woodchipping, and the Carmen Lawrence affair. 
The first clash between Prime Minister Keating and the Labor caucus came mid 
way through 1992. The issue was pay television, and specifically giving existing 
commercial networks a stake of up to 45 percent in the new regime. Labor MPs 
certainly had problems with the policy - they saw alternative opportunities to 
diversify the concentrated media market - but also with the style of Keating's 
announcement of the policy, unilaterally, on Sunday morning television. Mike 
Steketee wrote, in this context, that 
In one sense, Keating 's pre-emptive strike on Sunday was not unusual. It 
was a classic way of asserting political leadership. What was different and 
what is causing intense frustration in the Caucus is that it overthrew an 
extensive process of consultation on a complex subject on the day before it 
was to go to Cabinet. As one Government MP put it yesterday, 'it is the 
antithesis of good government'301. 
Steketee saw the policy announcement as the end of the 'conciliatory Keating of 
the early days of his prime ministership' and the return of the 'combination of 
argument, bluff and intimidation which achieved so much for him as 
Treasurer'302 • The same commentator opined that Keating had offered 'doubters 
in the Labor Caucus' a 'shit sandwich'3o3. 
The lesson from the pay television episode was that caucus was wary of 
provoking the Prime Minister into a debilitating brawl over the policy. The choice 
for backbenchers was to either endorse the PM's 'attempt to present it with a fait 
accompli' and 'damage Keating's leadership', or to 'succumb to what seems to 
many to be bad policy'304. The Labor caucus was torn between saving face for 
the Prime Minister less than a year from the upcoming election, and 
demonstrating the will of the Party room. 
301 Mike Steketee, 'Keating Says Like It Or Lump It', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 June 1992, p 14. 
3o2 Ibid. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Jbid. 
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Having survived the heat of the pay television policy conflict and then winning the 
1993 election, Prime Minister Keating was faced with a more substantial and 
more damaging row with caucus over the make up of the 1993 budget. This 
represented a direct caucus challenge to the authority of the PM and his policy-
making style. One caucus meeting3o5 in particular - the 'Monday Night 
Massacre'306 - was a brutal exchange of views that saw Keating get 'a smack in 
the face from the Labor Caucus'307. According to one credible commentator, 
the Monday night Caucus meeting was the Government's most openly hostile 
of its leader's behaviour since Labor came to office almost 11 years ago ... 
the very fact that as many as 66 Labor backbenchers turned up at the 
meeting, and 28 actually voiced their concerns, none in flattering terms, 
makes it obvious the meeting was much more than just a few malcontents 
letting off steam3os. 
Labor MPs had challenged directly 'the Keating style of leadership and his 
management of the Government'309. 
The politics of the Government's 1993 budget were terrible, and created sharp 
divisions within the broader labour movement. But aside from the policy 
components of the budget, it was the process and lack of consultation 'that 
annoyed them most - the fact that the Caucus had been ignored and was still 
being ignored'31o. The Sun Herald's Bruce Jones wrote, during the conflict, that 
Through all the discussion about changes which the Caucus wanted made to 
the Budget there was a consistent sub-text: the fact that relations between 
the Government leadership and the rest of the Government had reached 
such a sorry state was Mr Keating's fault. He was governing almost as a 
political loner, taking advice from bureaucrats and a small group of advisers 
with little consultation with the wider ministry and virtually no consultation 
with the Caucus311. 
305 The meeting referred to here was actually a meeting of the caucus economic policy committee, 
heavily attended by Labor MPs. Keating had a speaking engagement at the ACTU at the same 
time as the next day's regular caucus meeting and so fronted the economic policy meeting to 
allow backbenchers the opportunity to discuss the budget with him. 
306 Bruce Jones, 'Keating's Style Upsets His Team', Sun Herald, 5 September 1993, p 30. 
3o7 Geoff Kitney, 'Keating Must Face Reality', Sydney Morning Herald, 31 August 1993, p 4. 
3os Alan Ramsey, 'Bullets From a Wounded Soldier', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 1993, p 
31. 
309 Geoff Kitney, 'Keating Must Face Reality', Sydney Morning Herald, 31August1993, p 4. 
310 Alan Ramsey, 'Bullets From a Wounded Soldier', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 1993, p 
31. 
311 Bruce Jones, 'Keating's Style Upsets His Team', Sun Herald, 5 September 1993, p 30. 
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Graham Richardson concurs that 'the caucus just went into a total revolt' 
because there wasn't a 'process that's involved everyone•312. Jones, after 
speaking with some caucus members, concluded that it was 'not just a question 
of [caucus] having more access to the Prime Minister, but of being taken 
seriously by him'313. There was some criticism that a group of backbenchers who 
presented Keating with 'at least a dozen recommendations for the Budget were 
listened to politely, but made virtually no impact'314. Adding insult to injury was 
the Prime Minister's insistence on praising crossbench senators for their role in 
the negotiation of the budget through the Senate, while caucus was largely 
ignored, at least before it protested loudly315. 
Prime Minister Keating's instinctive response to caucus dissent over the budget 
was to take backbenchers head on and publicly belittle their input. One ABC 
radio exchange, chronicled by Alan Ramsey, is illustrative of Keating's initial 
response. Commenting on the concerns raised by some backbenchers at the 
previous day's meeting of the economic policy committee meeting, the 
conversation went as follows: 
Those (MPs) who had sharp comments (to make to me at the meeting),' he 
went on, still speaking quietly and without rancour, 'either wanted to be in 
the ministry and missed out, or had been in the ministry and had been 
dropped out and had an axe to grind. Well, that is all right,' he said, getting 
to his feet and getting ready to leave. 'We all know about them. 'They are 
wounded soldiers. But,' he said, smiling for the first time, 'we will try and 
bind them up and make them happy.' And, with that, he gathered up his 
papers and strolled out, as unhurried and as languidly as ever. It was a 
wonderfully arrogant exit. Pure Keating. Two fingers, and up yours! I wouldn't 
have been a bit surprised if he'd turned at the door and added, 'And you can 
all get f-d!' because that's what I felt he'd really have liked to have told the 
press and his Caucus, too. Instead, he did so metaphorically316. 
312 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
313 Bruce Jones, 'Keating's Style Upsets His Team', Sun Herald, 5 September 1993, p 30. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Geoff Kitney, 'Keating Must Face Reality', Sydney Morning Herald, 31 August 1993, p 4. This 
criticism was often made in conjunction with a related concern that Keating listened to interest 
groups at the expense of the Labor caucus. For an elaboration of this argument see David 
Burchell and Race Matthews, 'Introduction' in David Burchell and Race Matthews (eds) Labor's 
Troubled Times (Sydney, Pluto Press, 1991), pp 7-8; see also Stuart Macintyre, 'Decline and Fall?' 
in David Burchell and Race Matthews (eds) Labor's Troubled Times (Sydney, Pluto Press, 1991). 
316 Alan Ramsey, 'Bullets From a Wounded Soldier', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 1993, p 
31. 
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In the context of caucus' legitimate concerns about the contents of the budget, 
Keating's response was extraordinary. But other acrimonious exchanges had 
also taken place at the Monday night meeting. In the midst of the battle, Peter 
Cleeland, a backbencher from Victoria, suggested Hewson had lost the 1993 
election rather than Keating having won it. The Prime Minister reportedly 
responded with 'Pig's arse!' and then, according to Ramsey, that if 'Cleeland 
really believed the Opposition had lost the election rather than Labor having won 
it ... he had no business being a Labor member of Parliament'317. 
After these heated words inside the Party room and out, the Prime Minister was 
forced to make some changes to the original budget. It seems that Keating saw 
the changes as the result of Senate negotiations318, rather than caucus pressure, 
with the exception of a rethink of the policy on pensioner's shareholdings319. 
There were, however, broader implications; one post-meeting report had Keating 
acknowledging 'the need to draw more people into the decision-making 
processes of government' and giving 'assurances about greater involvement for 
the Caucus•320. The episode, according to one anonymous Government 
backbencher, 'makes it possible for things to be said that were only said before in 
dark corners•321. Though the budget process of 1993 may have done little to 
change Keating, it nonetheless represents one of the most significant episodes 
where the caucus took Keating on, reminding him that some power resides within 
the walls of the Party room. 
317 Ibid. 
318 See Liz Young, 'Minor Parties in the Legislative Process in the Australian Senate: A Study of the 
1993 Budget', Australian Journal of Political Science, vol 34, no 1, 1999, pp 7-27, for a thorough 
examination of the role of the minor parties in the negotiation of Labor's 1993 budget. This 
article is returned to in Chapter Six, below. 
319 Ibid. 
3 20 Geoff Kitney, 'Keating Must Face Reality', Sydney Morning Herald, 31August1993, p 4. 
321 Bruce Jones, 'Keating's Style Upsets His Team', Sun Herald, 5 September 1993, p 30. 
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More than a year passed before caucus again flexed its muscles, this time over 
forestry policy and the issue of woodchipping licenses322. The fight apparently 
erupted publicly after Keating had ignored the more than 40 FPLP members who 
had written to him asking that caucus discuss the issue323. The issue reached its 
head when Lindsay Tanner, a Victorian MP and senior member of the 
parliamentary Left, foreshadowed a caucus motion heavily criticising the actions 
of David Beddall, the minister responsible for the decision, and calling for a 
tighter regime of forest protection. Tellingly, the motion also called for the 
reconstitution of the decision-making process so that future decisions on 
woodchip licences are made by Cabinet after consultation with Caucus'324. 
While caucus' ire was, in this instance, directed towards Minister Beddall, the 
fallout nonetheless involved repeated calls for greater caucus input into policy 
making, an issue that had been raised in the pay TV and 1993 budget cases 
examined above. Keating averted any further anger over woodchipping by 
making a conciliatory statement before the caucus meeting which was scheduled 
to discuss the issue325. This again demonstrated that caucus, carefully choosing 
when to take issue with the Prime Minister, could occasionally impact on the 
policy of the Government. 
The final significant caucus clash with the Prime Minister took place over 
Keating's refusal to demand Carmen Lawrence stand aside during the damaging 
Royal Commission into the Penny Easton Affair. Caucus dissent, in this case, 
however, had absolutely no effect on the Prime Minister's steadfast 
determination to stand by the Health Minister326. Apparently many Labor MPs 
'believed that Keating should have pulled rank and instructed Lawrence to stand 
322 For a dispassionate and useful analysis of the issue see Department of the Parliamentary 
Library, The woodchip licensing issue, (Canberra, 1995); Maria Maley 2002, op cit, pp264-72 also 
analyses the fiasco, in some depth, from the adviser's point of view. 
323 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 131. 
324 Bruce Jones and Heath Gilmore, 'Chips Are Down as Beddall Faces Axe', Sun Herald, 15 
January 1995, p 21. 
325 Caroline Milburn, 'Woodchip Statement Rekindles The Rage', Age, 28 January 1995, p 8. 
326 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 107. 
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aside until the royal commission was over'327. His refusal to do so, according to 
Pamela Williams, 'badly shook the confidence of many backbenchers'32s. 
Nonetheless, Keating stood firm, inviting some extremely rare leadership 
speculation329. 
The conclusions we can draw from these examples of clashes between Prime 
Minister Keating and the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party are as follows: first, 
such occasions were extremely rare. This is illustrated by the fact that only a 
handful of issues were openly contested. Second, it appears that the problems 
related as much to a lack of caucus consultation as to the actual policy content, 
though this played a role. Third, and related to point two, is that issues of 
consultation and process arose more frequently after the 1993 election, and 
were more prominent in the final year of the Government. 
Why Keating Dominated Caucus 
Despite these occasional clashes, and rare opportunities for caucus to force a 
Prime Ministerial back down, Keating dominated and controlled the FPLP for four 
major reasons: there was never a significant threat of a leadership challenge, 
which may have softened his approach; the corporate timidity of the caucus in its 
dealings with the PM; the effect of Keating's role in winning the 'unwinnable' 
election of 1993; and the force of the Prime Minister's personality. These factors 
are examined here in turn and provide an explanation of Keating's ability to get 
away with an essentially isolated relationship with his parliamentary colleagues. 
Only rarely did speculation over Keating's leadership tenure appear publicly. This 
is largely because the only viable alternative - Kim Beazley - was steadfast in his 
loyalty to the Prime Minister, and often ruled out categorically any challenge to his 
leader. This despite a short period late in 1995 where a Beazley challenge was 
321 Ibid, p 109. 
32s Ibid, p 113. 
329 Ibid, p 114. 
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speculated upon, largely due to the result of the Canberra by-election and 
Keating's subsequent nonchalance. At about this time Don Watson was told that 
the PM 'would soon be toppled to make way for Beazley; that Barron was in 
league with Hawke on this and if Richo did not soon find some influence in our 
office he would join the putsch'33o. John O'Callaghan, Beazley's senior adviser, 
recounted how 'there was a visit by some factional colleagues of Paul's from 
Sydney' who 'were concerned about their future'. The gist of the conversation, 
according to O'Callaghan, was that 'most of them could see it was going to be 
pretty difficult to win in 96' so they suggested 'Kim consider running against Paul. 
But Kim just scoffed at that. His loyalty to the leader was paramount to him'331. 
Kim Beazley's own words back this up; in September 1995 he declared 'the 
paramount chief' was 'completely secure'332 • 
Aside from this brief period in 1995, which seems not to have been taken 
seriously by any of the major figures, Keating was remarkably secure in the 
leadership of the ALP333. Michael Lavarch, when asked if caucus ever really 
considered dumping Keating for Beazley or another alternative, told the author: 
'no, not anything beyond five drinks in on a Thursday night, an end of session 
type conversation. He'd won an election that nobody thought we'd really win. So 
we gave him a go. And the trauma of the leadership spill to get him there, people 
weren't going to readily revisit that'334. Further, according to Geoff Walsh, 
caucus' judgement in the dying days of the Government was that challenging 
Keating was essentially counterproductive; that 'it was best to let him, as the 
leader, take the chances'335. 
33o Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 431. 
331 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
332 Quoted in 'Sayings of the Week', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 September 1995, p 24. 
333 The lack of any challenge to Keating was remarked upon by many of those consulted in the 
research for this thesis, including, for example, respected political commentator Paul Kelly and 
MPs Michael Lavarch and Mark Latham. 
334 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
335 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
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The second factor contributing to the Prime Minister's dominance of the 
Parliamentary Labor Party was the observable timidity of his colleagues. 
Episodes like the 1993 clash over the budget were rare, and had little lasting 
effect on the PM's mode of operation. Graham Richardson, in this context, felt 
that the 'real mistake that was made was that caucus flexed its muscles, bared 
its teeth, stared the cabinet down, and then retreated into its corner and never 
really did it again. It seems to me the timidity of the caucus, the cabinet and the 
Labor Party over the course of the next couple of years contributed to the result in 
1996, because no one actually tried to stop Paul carrying on the way he was 
carrying on'336. 
A stark example of the timidity of the Labor caucus came in the dark aftermath of 
the Canberra by-election. Numerous sources testify that caucus was almost 
silent in Party forums on the need for a change in direction, while happy to 
anonymously background journalists on the need for change. Mark Baker, writing 
in the Age in April 1995, related how 'the argument that Keating is becoming 
more isolated is illustrated by the fact that while a clutch of MPs spoke publicly 
early this week about the need for a change of direction after the Canberra 
byelection result, only one spoke out during Tuesday's caucus meeting'337. Mark 
Latham MP concurs, telling the author that 'after the devastating Canberra by-
election loss ... there probably was a bit of muttering that the show was out of 
touch and Paul's got to do something to reconnect the average person and break 
down some of the negative images that had built up about him. But nobody was 
standing up and saying that in the caucus'33s. Caucus reluctance to challenge 
Keating other than on a handful of sporadic occasions created some problems for 
the Government, particularly in its final year. Ramsey argued in September 1995 
that Keating 
is a prisoner of his own authority. So is the whole of the Government. Yet his 
colleagues sat by and let it happen. Nobody in the Caucus, the Cabinet or 
the full ministry denied him. They were content to leave Keating run the 
33s In Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 270. 
337 Mark Baker, 'The Perils of Paul Keating's Challenge', Age, 1 April 1995, p 17. 
338 Interview with Mark Latham, 3 June 2002. 
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agenda however he saw fit. Now things have gone wrong they heap all the 
blame on him. Well, the responsibility is their's as much as his. And sneaking 
around the corridors, blowing in each other's ears and those of the vacuum 
cleaners in the Press Gallery, their usual lack of spine stiffened by the public 
aggrandising of political blowflies like Graham Richardson, isn't going to fix 
the problems .... Caucus had its chance to say its piece on Tuesday. Yet while 
Keating spoke for a full 40 minutes, dampening down members' concerns, 
not a soul said anything to his face except NSW backbencher Bob Horne -
and he was fairly circumspect. Everybody else went missing. So much for 
political courage, even against a leader wounded as Keating was a week 
ago339. 
In a separate article the same author commented that no one in the caucus 
'challenges the Prime Minister to his face, even though they may shuffle their feet 
and make discreet rude noises behind his back'34o. 
Like many aspects of the Paul Keating Prime Ministership, his relations with 
caucus were altered dramatically by the PM's stunning victory in the 1993 
election341, which left him with immense authority and influence over the Labor 
Party342. Latham commented that 
in those days Paul really had the great legitimising strength of winning the 
93 election. He had a lot of the ideas of the 80s, early 90s the Government 
is on its knees, he gets the job, and wins the unwinnable election. So he 
was to some extent beyond challenge because of the greatness that he'd 
achieved electorally. To some extent this was a weakness of the 
Government, because I don't think it's healthy that someone's beyond 
challenge. But I'd say in the caucus Paul had as exalted position as any 
Labor leader has had. 
Michelle Grattan agrees, writing that Keating was given unprecedented powers 
after the 1993 election343. And according to cabinet colleague Michael Lavarch, 
the 1993 election 'put a lot of authority with him, that win, additional 
authority'344. 
339 Alan Ramsey, 'Friend or Foe, PM Pays Out In Full', Sydney Morning Herald, 1April1995, p 39. 
340 Alan Ramsey, 'Bald Priorities of the Keating Regime', Sydney Morning Herald, 20 September 
1995, p 15. 
341 See Chapter Eight 'Pressing the Flesh'. 
342 Interview with Paul Kelly, 4 November 2002. 
343 Powers to choose his ministry, for example. See 'Picking Winners' in Chapter Four; see also 
Michelle Grattan, 'Caucus and the Factions' in J Faulkner and S Macintyre (eds), True Believers: 
The Story of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2001), p 261; and 
Geoff Kitney, 'Change of Watch on Ship of State', Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1993, p 15. 
344 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
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The final factor in Prime Minister Keating's dominance of the FPLP came simply 
with his own forceful approach to governing. Though this effect is hard to 
quantify, as is the view that Keating could at times 'charm' caucus into following 
him, a convincing argument can be made that he bludgeoned caucus into 
submission. This view is supported by Geoff Kitney, who expressed the opinion in 
an interview that what made Keating 'powerful amongst colleagues was the force 
of his personality, the force of his intellect and his willingness to be quite brutal in 
the way he dealt with his colleagues'345. 
Prime ministerial power is relative to the influence and authority maintained by 
alternative sources of power such as the caucus. The Federal Parliamentary 
Labor Party, under Prime Minister Keating, was largely bereft of power because it 
ceded the removal threat, was slow to voice its concerns, rewarded Keating after 
the 1993 election victory with unprecedented influence, including the almost 
unhindered selection of the ministry, and allowed itself to be put under Keating's 
spell. The leadership bargain in the Government's ranks for more than four years 
was thus heavily skewed in the Prime Minister's favour. Caucus became a largely 
irrelevant cheer squad, nullifying the key brake on prime ministerial power. 
Factions 
Factions are essentially parties within parties; groups of people who gather to 
pursue power, manipulate a party's democratic process, or pursue set policy 
objectives. Many alternative definitions of factions exist, though each describes 
groups that seek to gain influence or control over party processes, leadership 
selection and strategy346. 
345 Interview with Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
346 See, for example, Zariski in BD Graham, Representation and Party Politics, (Oxford, Blackwell, 
1993), p 147; NK Nicholson, 'The Factional Model and the Study of Politics', Comparative Political 
Studies, vol. 3, 1972, p 292; FP Belloni and DC Beller (eds), Faction Politics: Political Parties and 
Factionalism in Comparative Perspective, (Santa Barbara, ABC-Clio, 1978), p 419. 
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The Australian Labor Party has a well-developed factional system, permeating 
from the Parliamentary Party right down into the local sub-branch structures and 
unions347. Contributors to two detailed studies of the Labor Party, edited in 1983 
and 2000 by John Warhurst and Andrew Parkin, take into account the negative 
and positive aspects of factionalism, recognising their existence as both a 
potentially corrosive aspect of Party life as well as a valuable tool for 
institutionalised conflict resolution and healthy competition34s. 
An excellent description of the factional system operating during the Keating 
Prime Ministership has been provided by senior cabinet minister Neal Blewett. In 
his acclaimed Cabinet Diaries, he writes: 
The factions are better seen as clans or tribes, grouped around factional 
leaders, with long histories of internal political co-operation, rather than as 
ideological groupings. Of course, the tribal leaders had to pay obeisance to 
certain shibboleths within each tribe, for example opposition to uranium 
mining within the left. But provided the leaders could secure offices and 
perks for the members of the tribe, the tribe would acquiesce in most 
ideological accommodations reached by the leaders of the factions349. 
A similarly realistic view of Labor factions describes a system where the 'primary 
focus is on the obligations of kinship. You look after your mates and allies, and 
smash your enemies'35o. 
At the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party level, Rodney Cavalier has argued, 
factional leaders under Hawke and then Keating 
put in place a new form of Labor governance - a troika of Prime Minister, 
Cabinet and faction. The Prime Minister and Cabinet were going to be able 
to get on with running the country. In exchange the factions took it upon 
themselves to manage many of the issues of potential conflict and assumed 
the monopoly right to provide and to select every position from the Cabinet 
to a trip to Western Samoa351. 
347 See Andrew Parkin and John Warhurst (eds) Machine Politics in the Australian Labor Party 
(Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1983); and John Warhurst and Andrew Parkin (eds) The Machine: Labor 
Confronts the Future (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2000). 
34s See, in particular, Andrew Parkin and John Warhurst, 'The Labor Party: Image, History and 
Structure' in John Warhurst and Andrew Parkin (eds) 2000, op cit, pp 37-9. 
349 Neal Blewett 1999, op cit, p 66. 
350 Geoffrey Barker, 'An Example of Labor's Decline Into Tribalism', Age, 19 May 1992, p 13. 
351 Michelle Grattan 2001, op cit, p 252. 
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The FPLP factional system during Paul Keating's tenure as leader comprised: the 
Right (the largest grouping, with 45 members in 1992); the Left (35 members in 
1992); the Centre-Left (20 members) and a group of factional independents (10-
strong in 1992). These numbers changed only slightly over the coming years. 
The factional system was a key factor in the stability Paul Keating enjoyed as 
leader. This was a trend that began with Prime Minister Hawke and continued 
after the 1991 leadership change. John O'Callaghan argues that to understand 
the discipline of the Hawke and Keating governments you have to understand 
that factions were central to if352. Though factions are often recognised as 
agents of conflict, an important and often-neglected aspect of their role is that of 
conflict resolution. Labor under Keating had perfected the use of factions to 
determine the positions and spoils of government. 
While Hawke was by nature more consultative with the factions353, Keating 
nonetheless paid some attention to keeping them content. For example, it was 
standard practice for Keating to ask senior factional operators within the FPLP for 
feedback on the Government's progress354 . The factional system maintained a 
high level of importance, according to Graham Richardson, because, 'when you're 
dealing with cabinets and caucuses it's not just your average faction fight'355. 
However, the argument that Keating maintained a relationship with factional 
leaders is not accepted by all commentators. Ramsey, for example, argued that, 
by his appointment of adviser Tom Wheelright to a consultative role with the 
factions, Keating was diminishing their role in his Government. He wrote in 1994 
that the 'factional organisers meet Wheelright every couple of weeks' whereas 
'Hawke used to do this himself. It kept him in touch with backbench thinking and 
352 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
353 See Mike Steketee 2001, op cit, p 156. 
354 Shaun Carney, 'Swooping Into Action', Age, 21 February 1995, p 9. 
355 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
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concerns. Keating is less interested'356. Though whether or not Keating himself 
consulted factions or appointed a senior adviser to fill the role is somewhat 
insignificant. Appointing a key staffer to liaise with the factions can also be seen 
as Keating's way of attaching importance to the system, recognising the stability 
provided by the entrenched factional system. Indeed veteran MP Gordon Scholes 
even complained that Keating consulted the factions too much357. 
Paul Keating's relations with the caucus, like other aspects of the Prime 
Ministership, nonetheless went through ebbs and flows. Keating's deputy and 
senior Left operative, Brian Howe, recounts how the PM went 'through the stage 
of the one big faction, you know they're a drag on the Party and there are no real 
differences, it's all personalities, and we all ought to get rid of them and have one 
big faction'358. Later, again according to Howe, 'he's into the management of the 
factions, in a similar role to Hawke in that he talks to faction leaders. Prior to 93 
he was more than reasonable'359. 
Prime Minister Keating's relationships with each of the major factions never 
reached a stage of open warfare, indeed the Government was bereft of any major 
factional clashes over policy or strategy. Nonetheless, and predictably, Keating's 
relationship with his own faction, the Right, was of the most significance. The 
PM's close working relationship with Graham Richardson, leader of the 
Parliamentary Right, and Richardson's effective partnership with Victorian Right 
faction heavyweight Robert Ray, ensured the Right maintained its dominance 
over strategy, input and positions allocated by caucus36o. 
More particularly, the New South Wales component of the FPLP Right, counting 
Keating, Brereton and Richardson among its number, enjoyed a critical political 
356 Alan Ramsey, 'Women Are Not Yet Equal To Mates',.Sydney Morning Herald, 15October1994, 
p39. 
351 Quoted in Blewett 1999, op cit, p 55. 
358 Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
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ascendancy361. Evidence of this ascendency was provided by Mike Steketee, who 
wrote in 1992 that the 'rewards of membership' of the Right 
at senior levels have never been greater than at present: Keating is Prime 
Minister, Graham Richardson a senior minister, Laurie Brereton an assistant 
minister, Stephen Loosley a senator and national ALP president, Leo 
McLeay, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Kerry Sibraa 
President of the Senate. It is a mix of talent, toughness and tribal loyalty 
which has got them theres62. 
Though there was a significant degree of factional accommodation afforded the 
two other major groups, the Right maintained this ascendancy throughout. 
Keating's relations with the Parliamentary Left, on the other hand, can be seen 
two ways: as the PM accommodating the Left; or as Left subjugation. Brian 
Howe, himself of the Parliamentary Left, related in an interview how Keating had 
significantly softened his relationship with that group, and had dropped the 
aggressive and combative approach he took to the pre-prime ministerial years of 
his political career363. Further, the Keating Government's policy stances were 
much more acceptable to the Left than those pursued (largely by Treasurer 
Keating) in the 1980s under Hawke. A quotation from a senior Left figure, 
explaining the situation, was that 'Paul used to urinate on us [the Left] from a 
great height in the past, dismissing the ideas he is now embracing'364. However, 
this is where the point about subjugation can be made. The pursuit of 'Left' 
policy did not mean that faction was necessarily more powerful. In this context, 
Grattan explained early in the Prime Ministership how 'For the Left, life under 
Paul Keating is a paradox. The Government is moving more strongly towards the 
Left's economic agenda than probably at any time in the last nine years. Yet the 
Left's leaders are less powerful than they were a few months ago'365. The 
argument about diminished Left influence was also made in an article composed 
mid-1995, with Keating's appointment of the Right's Kim Beazley as the 
361 Alan Ramsey, 'The Mates Don't Win All The Time', Sydney Morning Herald, 14 March 1992, p 
21. 
362 Mike Steketee, 'Sicilian Defence Backfires', Sydney Morning Herald, 7 April 1992, p 10. 
363 Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002. 
364 Michelle Grattan, 'Keating's Pragmatism Overlaps Left Heartland', Age, 8 February 1992, p 2. 
365 Ibid. 
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replacement for the Left's Brian Howe as Deputy Prime Minister, without 
consultation with the Left366. 
The Centre-Left was a smaller faction represented by significant players in the 
first Keating Government such as senior ministers Neal Blewett (Health), John 
Dawkins (Treasury) and John Button (Industry). Traditionally their influence 
extended beyond what pure 'numbers' would provide. During the Keating tenure, 
the Prime Minister's relationship with key Centre-Left figures was reasonable, 
according to Button, because 'after all they got him up as prime minister, he 
wouldn't have got up without them'367. In another interview, Blewett agrees: 
He didn't take us too seriously as factional operators, we were too amateur 
at factional politics. But he was close to the centre-left intellectually and the 
centre-left shared his policy perspectives. Dawkins was intellectually his 
closest colleague and he admired the policy skills of most of the centre-left 
ministers, and had an intellectual respect for them36s. 
The significant cabinet input of the Centre-Left represented another aspect of 
Keating's accommodation of other groups, and the lessening of combative 
factional tension. 
Conflict between the established factional groups within the Keating Government 
was relatively minor369, largely because there was a policy convergence between 
Right and Left, and because some effort went into the management of the 
factional system. This provided Keating with a degree of caucus stability and a 
mechanism for resolving conflict when it did arise. With Keating's Right faction 
dominant but not domineering, the Prime Minister could get on with governing 
less hindered by factional machinations. 
366 Padraic P. McGuinness, 'Keating's Domination Over The Left Is Now Complete', Age, 22 June 
1995, p 12. 
367 Interview with John Button, 25 June 2002. 
368 Interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 2002. 
369 Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002. 
99 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
The Party Organisation 
The relationship between a prime minister and the party organisation outside 
parliament can be advantageous or it can be fraught with difficulty and conflict. 
The organisation occupies it's own 'turf' and enjoys some autonomy within it's 
own spheres of influence, but is linked to, and shares with, the leader and the 
parliamentary party the aim of winning and maintaining government37o. Both the 
party organisation and the leader possess important tools in the battle for 
influence. The prime minister's authority as leader of a government is balanced 
by the size and sophistication of the party organisation, which can exert influence 
on the caucus, and by its responsibility for campaigns and fund raising. In simple 
terms competition between the two wings of the party occurs over the exertion of 
relative influence over the entire party structure. 
The Australian Labor Party is a federal structure headed by the National 
Secretariat, which houses the National Secretary (who is, simultaneously, 
Campaign Director) of the Party, and comprising branches in every state and 
territory. The relationship between Prime Minister Keating and the Labor 
machine, particularly the National Secretariat, was absolutely poisonous. There 
were no formal consultative mechanisms between the Office of the PM and the 
Party headquarters outside of campaign times, though there were some attempts 
at improving informal relations between staff371. The late Ian Henderson, 
Assistant National Secretary in the early years of the Keating Prime Ministership, 
told this author that 'Paul Keating had very little to do with the National 
Secretariat' and 'showed little interest in official Party activity'. The relationship 
was 'antagonistic as a whole because, in his view I suspect, the Party was 
backward-looking and hadn't been elected to Government like he'd been'312. 
Another explanation is that Keating's reliance on close, trusted advisers meant 
310 See Glyn Davis 1992, op cit, p 75. 
311 Interview with Ian Henderson, 19 June 2002. 
372 Ibid. 
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those in the Secretariat, with their own power bases and independence, were 
treated with suspicion373. 
The relationship between Keating and the ALP National Secretariat was 
particularly fraught during the 1993 and 1996 federal election campaigns. In 
simple terms the problem on both occasions was that Keating wanted his office 
to run the campaign, and had little regard for the Secretariat or successive 
National Secretaries Bob Hogg and Gary Gray. Hogg was National Secretary in 
1993 and the campaign director for that year's March election374. The clashes 
between Hogg and Keating were significant, and continued right throughout the 
campaign period. Michael Gordon attributes this to a personality clash between 
Keating the 'confidence player who kept information tight within his inner 
sanctum' and Hogg the 'realist who tended to be far more open and 
accessible'375. Don Watson's biography further describes the situation in 1993 
thus: 
from the first day the relationship with the national secretariat turned dirty. 
There were bitter arguments and accusations of incompetence. The 
hard heads of the party like to get together with the hard heads of the press 
and nod sagely and mutter great oaths about what is Realpolitik - and so it 
was inevitable that the disputes would find their way into the newspapers. It 
was said that the Prime Minister's Office was trying to run the campaign as 
no campaign had ever been run, and yet the office was inexperienced; 
incompetent, arrogant and lacking battle-hardness, according to some 
'senior cabinet members', one report said376. 
An event that seemingly constituted the final straw between the two men came 
when Hogg briefed the media days from the election, in collaboration with 
Queensland Premier Wayne Goss, that Keating was likely to lose311. Keating was 
furious, and the act represented the low point in an already distrusting 
373 Interview with Michael Keating, 26 November 2002; see also Chapter Five 'Governing from the 
Centre'. 
374 Note that Chapter Eight 'Pressing the Flesh' deals in detail with the 1993 and 1996 elections. 
The concern here is with the relationship with the Party organisation, so broader campaign issues 
are left for that subsequent chapter. 
375 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 235; see also p 250. 
376 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 319. 
377 Interview with Bob Hogg, 4 September 2002. 
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relationship. Despite this, however, Bob Hogg still felt he enjoyed a more 
effective relationship with Keating than did his successor, Gary Gray31s. 
Pamela Williams' book The Victory379 is a valuable account of the disastrous 
relationship between Keating and Gray3so. Relying primarily on detailed briefings 
from Gray himself, Williams concludes that their personalities and styles clashed 
heavily, and that the Prime Minister had an extremely low opinion of the 
capabilities of the Party organisation381. The theme of the entire campaign 
became 'the disintegration of the relationship between the Prime Minister and 
the party machine'382. One spectacular clash is recorded by Williams, where 
Keating reportedly told the National Secretary: 
I'll tell you what I'm going to do, Gary, I'll tell you what we'll do. I'm going to 
take the $12 million for the campaign and my office will spend it. That's 
what we'll do. And if you want to be part of this campaign, Gary, you'll do 
what we want you to do, and if you don't, you know what you can do? You 
know what you can do? I'll tell you what you can do. You can go to fucking 
Cooma and you can hand out fucking how-to-vote cards for Jim Snow in 
Cooma. That's what you can do, Gary'383. 
In this climate of two-way frustration during the 1996 campaign, and with the 
obviously looming defeat, it is clear that the friction between Gray and Keating 
prevented a more effective Labor campaign384. 
Though the relationship between Keating and the Party organisation was never 
optimal, it deteriorated badly after the 1993 election and with the promotion of 
Gary Gray to the primary organisational post of National Secretary, despite the 
suggestion that the Prime Minister preferred Ian Henderson to fill the role. 
Apparently there 'there was nothing Keating could have done to stop' Gray 
winning the role, 'even had he sought to do so'385. Bob Hogg suggests Gray 
378 Ibid. 
379 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit. 
380 Gary Gray was approached for an interview on multiple occasions but declined, so we rely on 
the detailed account he provided Pamela Williams. 
381 See, for example, Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, pp 31-2. 
382 Williams 1997, 'Behind the Victory', op cit, p 102. 
383 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 146. 
384 See Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 700. 
385 Alan Ramsay, 'Number Cruncher's Colourful Rise', Sydney Morning Herald, 1May1993, p 25. 
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found it difficult to 'get to a status where he could be listened to', and that he 
'sometimes could have reacted a bit more subtly to things', though 'in the main 
he was the aggrieved party'386. All of these factors no doubt contributed to the 
poor PM-Secretary relationship, though two more significant factors - the effect 
of the 1993 election win and the systemic problem of campaign organisation -
warrant further consideration. 
It can be argued that Paul Keating's election victory in 1993 gave him additional 
authority and influence over the Party, but it also damaged relationships with the 
National Secretariat for a number of reasons. First, according to Williams, the PM 
'would never trust the party machine again, and he busied himself settling scores 
with those who had doubted his ability to win'387 • Further, the 'result of 1993 
was that the prime minister would have nothing to do with the Labor Party 
machine in the 1996 election. He was not interested in advice, strategy or co-
operation. In 1996 he planned to do it all himself, trusting very few in the party 
outside his office'3ss. On the other side of the ledger, Party staff were angered 
when the Prime Minister pointedly refused to thank the National Secretariat in his 
victory speech on the night of the 1993 poll389. According to one Party officer, 
'Keating's take-out from it all was that he and his advisers were right and the 
machine people were dickheads'39o. 
Mark Ryan recalls in the aftermath of the 1993 election a problem relating to 
Gary Gray's clout with the Labor leader, and the Party organisation's willingness 
to articulate problems without necessarily offering solutions. He believes 
'Keating became frustrated at hearing the mantra from head office that we had 
to do this or we had to do that, Keating had to suddenly become more lovable or 
386 Bob Hogg interviews, 4 and 5 September 2002. 
387 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 33. Ian Henderson, a key National Secretariat 
staffer in 1993, related to this author how there was a range of views in the Party organisation 
about whether Keating could win that election. If Henderson's recollection is correct, Keating's 
belief that the officers had written him off is unfounded. Interview with Ian Henderson, 19 June 
2002. 
388 Pamela Williams 1997, 'Behind the Victory', op cit, p 104. 
389 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 32. 
39o In ibid, p 37. 
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whatever' but the 'advice or the ideas were pretty thin on the ground coming from 
the national office, frankly, in those days'. Further, while 'the office was highly 
regarded in terms of its organisational and campaigning on the ground skills', 
'Gary walking up the hill to have a discussion with Keating about how to blend the 
economic imperatives with the political strategy was just never going to happen'. 
The source of the problem was that 'trying to pretend that Gary Gray and Paul 
Keating were on a level, were equals, discussing and debating high strategy, was 
never going to happen'391• A status problem existed between a recently 
legitimised and dominant Prime Minister, and a National Secretary, new in the 
job, who Keating did not really want appointed in the first place. 
The primary factor, however, in the woeful Keating-Gray and, by extension, the 
PMO-National Secretariat relationship, was the fundamental issue of who actually 
ran the election campaign. This issue was neatly summed up by the Prime 
Minister in a letter he wrote to Gray in the dying days of the 1996 campaign. 
Keating wrote 'I cannot have a position where my instincts as party leader run for 
three years but not the last week of the election campaign, to be held back by an 
ad agency or focus group advice'392• This view is confirmed by comments made 
by the most senior Keating staffer, Don Russell, who told this author that 
There is a fundamental structural problem in the way the campaign is set up, 
because you have a situation where the prime minister, or basically the 
leader, runs the debate, runs the relationship with the media, runs the 
strategy, runs everything, nine-tenths of the three years that you're there. 
And there's a strange situation that happens during the election campaign, 
where the leader continues to be the leader, and the whole focus of the 
campaign is on him or her, but the actual advertising is suddenly, and the 
structured message making and control, suddenly devolves to the Party 
Secretary393. 
Then specifically, in relation to Gray, 
We have a Party Secretary who doesn't really, whose strengths and abilities 
aren't necessarily those to run an advertising campaign. But then suddenly 
the most fun they ever have is when they spend something like 15 million 
dollars. This is the high point of their life, and they have total control over 
391 Interview with Mark Ryan, 12 September 2002. 
392 Quoted in Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 327. 
393 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
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everything. They pay the cheques, they've spent the last nine months 
working very closely with whoever is putting the ads together, putting 
together the strategy and thinking it all through. Then you have a prime 
minister who is trying to tell a story to the nation, and who would like to think 
that the paid advertising is actually in sync with what he's trying to say. 
Common sense suggests there should be some link between the message 
that's coming out of the paid advertising and what's actually being said by 
the Party leader. But we have this very strange situation with two heads394. 
Russell's final point was that, given the circumstances, where 'it was pretty clear 
that Keating was going to lose', 'he was entitled to say look, if we're going to have 
a go, let's do it my way'395. 
Though there were attempts to rectify and circumvent the poisonous relationship 
between the two main protagonists, little was achieved. Gray began inviting the 
entire cabinet to briefings at the National Secretariat396, trusted Keating 
confidante Seamus Dawes acted as a liaison between the two men397 , and Gray 
attended some meetings with Russell at Parliament House398. Little headway 
was made, and the aftermath of the 1996 election saw much finger pointing in 
both directions. 
Other relationships with Party units pale in significance compared to the poor 
interactions between Keating and the Party Secretariat. Even National 
Conference, traditionally an important forum for policy development outside of 
the Parliamentary Party room, was greatly diminished during the Keating Prime 
Ministership. The event was largely stage-managed and free of significant policy 
brawls399. Even the defeat in 1994 of Keating's preferred uranium mining policy 
was greeted with a shrug by the PM, who declared that 'if he'd really wanted a 
change, he could have got it, but there was no great need, economically or 
politically, to really fight'4o0 . Thus even a rare Prime Ministerial defeat at the 
394 Ibid. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 71. 
397 Ibid, pp 77-8. 
398 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
399 See Mike Seccombe, 'A Passionless Stage-Managed Event', Sydney Morning Herald, 27 
September 1994, p 8. 
400 Mark Baker, 'Twas a Time to Stand Firm', Age, 1October1994, p 6. 
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hands of the Party did not attract great interest40 1. So, rather than representing 
the power of the Party to make policy, the episode instead demonstrated the 
irrelevance of the Party organisation to Keating's operation. 
What are the consequences for a Prime Minister such as Paul Keating who 
endured such terrible relations with his Labor Party's chief campaign and 
fundraising unit? For Keating, the costs were probably electoral, though the 
number of seats sacrificed to the rivalry is impossible to quantify. But the 
conclusion that can be drawn is that, because the National Secretariat has its 
own power resources, not least of which is the spending of campaign dollars on 
advertising, for example, a Prime Minister can not call all of the shots, and must 
be willing to work with the Party organisation. That Keating was not prepared to 
do this is a reflection of personality clashes and the fallout after the 1993 
election he was expected to lose. Much stress was spent on the relationship, and 
there were few rewards. Keating's dominance of Party did not extend to the 
National Secretariat, and no method of avoiding the continuing conflict was ever 
found. 
The Trade Union Movement 
Trade unions are an integral component of the existence and operation of labour 
parties. The institutional arrangement is such that unions and their leaders 
possess significant power resources within parties with which they are affiliated. 
To Pelinka, 'unions were and are the most important economic association, the 
most important organization of any kind with which it shares a relationship of 
reciprocal sustenance and influence'402• The divide between the unions and 
labour parties can also be blurred, so that personnel, finances and policies are 
shared. The relationship can be constructive, with benefits for both sides, though 
401 See Geoff Kitney, 'PM's Ambush in the Pokies Sets Bill Right', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 
September 1994, p 8. 
402 A Pelinka Social Democratic Parties in Europe (New York, Praeger, 1999), p 105. 
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tensions inevitably arise 'between two institutions dealing in power and 
influence'403. 
In the Australian Labor Party trade unions have always had a strong, 
institutionalised presence. Through the provision of funds, advice and foot 
soldiers, and participation in factional activity and policy development, unions 
and the ALP are closely inter-linked. In the 1980s and early 1990s, throughout 
the Hawke and Keating governments, the central tenet of the relationship was 
the Accord, an agreement reached between the Government and the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) trading wage restraint for improvements in the 
'social wage'. Personal linkages between the ALP and the unions such as the 
close rapport struck up by Paul Keating and the ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty, plus 
the number of political representatives drawn from the union movement itself404, 
create important ties that bind industrial labour and political Labor in Australia. 
All of this means ALP leaders must accommodate the wishes of the trade union 
movement or find ways to persuade. 
Paul Keating's relationship with the unions is best viewed through the prism of 
his close relationship with the Secretary of the ACTU, Bill Kelty. Kelty was a 
colossal figure in the Australian labour movement, a close friend of the Prime 
Minister, and a key contributor to the policy architecture of the Keating 
Government (see below). Though this relationship eventually soured in 1995, it 
remained the key organisational influence on the Government's interaction with 
the ACTU. Here the role and influence of the unions on the Keating Prime 
Ministership is addressed in the context of campaign support in 1993, fall-outs 
and perceived betrayals, and the Keating-Kelty relationship. 
Labor and Paul Keating were assisted greatly by the union movement during the 
1993 campaign. Though unions can always be expected to assist their political 
40 3 J Piazza, 'De-Linking Labor: Labor Unions and Social Democratic Parties under Globalization', 
Party Politics, vol 7, no 4, 2001, pp 413-35. 
404 Shaun Carney, 'Industrial Mates System Tests Friends', Age, 21December1994, p 6. 
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colleagues during election time, the extent of the assistance in 1993, from 
available accounts, was greater than usual. This was spurred on by the very real 
prospect of a Coalition Government whose policies, such as a Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) and a union-diminishing industrial relations agenda, would be 
detrimental to union members4o5. For senior unionist and member of the ACTU 
and ALP National Executives, Helen Creed, The thing that stands out in 1993 is 
the closeness of the strategy of Labor and the trade union movement'406. This 
closeness, and role of the unions in the election victory, is summed up neatly by 
Shaun Carney, who wrote 
When hardly anyone believed that Labor could win last year's federal 
election, it was the union movement that refused to give up, spending more 
than $2 million on a campaign against the coalition's industrial policy. The 
union campaign, coordinated by an ACTU official and now Labor Senate 
candidate, Ms Jennie George, played a crucial role in not only returning the 
ALP but restoring its previously crumbling support in working-class areas401. 
It was reasonable to expect, given this degree of cooperation and assistance, that 
newly re-elected Prime Minister Keating had accumulated a substantial debt to 
Australian unions. 
However, very soon after the 1993 victory, Keating delivered a speech to the 
Institute of Directors that would send shockwaves through the union movement. 
The speech was penned by PMO adviser John Edwards and dealt with the 
Government's proposals regarding the expansion of enterprise bargaining, a 
policy not conducive to the objectives of the ACTU. One of Edwards' colleagues 
called it 'basically as close a statement you could get to Coalition policy•4os. The 
announcement marked 'the death of nearly a century of centralised wage-fixing' 
and the 'dawn of the era of decentralised enterprise bargaining•4o9. One result 
was that 
ACTU vice-president, Mr George Campbell, was moved to warn last Sunday 
that non-union enterprise bargaining could badly fracture the unity of 
4os Interview with Helen Creed, 20 September 2002. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Shaun Carney, 'Industrial Mates System Tests Friends', Age, 21December1994, p 6. 
4os Off the record conversation with a senior PMO adviser. 
409 Geoffrey Barker, 'ALP, Unions Contemplate Life After Separation', Age, 31 July 1993, p 1. 
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political and industrial labor. Mr Campbell's view followed more cautious 
expressions of concern by the ACTU president, Mr Martin Ferguson and the 
secretary, Mr Bill Kelty, and the ACTU executive decision opposing the 
opening of enterprise bargaining for non-unionists. Their concerns are now 
so widely spread across the Labor Party and the union movement that the 
potential consequences of a breach between political and industrial labor 
are being quietly canvassed by people in all industrial and political Labor 
factions410. 
The conflict over enterprise bargaining represented the first of a series of clashes 
which characterised the Labor-labour relationship under Keating, but also the 
most enduring source of disaffection. Don Watson called the speech a 'slow-
acting poison: for the next three years it sat there like an abscess on the brain of 
the old alliance, draining it of vigour and erupting every now and then with awful 
consequences'411. Other policy issues with which unions took exception, recalls 
Helen Creed, were privatisation and deregulation, agendas to which Keating was 
inextricably linked412. 
The sense of betrayal felt by union leaders after the monumental campaign effort 
of early 1993 was also exhibited during the waterfront strike of 1994 over the 
issue of Government policy on the Australian National [shipping] Line (ANL). 
Capturing the sentiment of the clash, one journalist was prompted to write that 
members of the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) 
were the foot soldiers of the campaign, doing the tedious work of letter-
boxing the electorates and revving up their mates to put Labor back in 
power. It was something Paul Keating was bluntly reminded of on Monday 
night as he convened a round-table meeting in his prime ministerial 
conference rooms at Parliament House with his senior Cabinet ministers, 
MUA officials and the ACTU, to thrash out an agreement to put an end to the 
crippling, five-day waterfront strike. The MUA had called an indefinite strike 
over the Government's policy on the Australian national shipping line, ANL 
Ltd, which it believed left open the way for the line to be dismantled and sold 
off to foreign interests. The union had done Mr Keating a favour at the last 
election and now they expected one in return. Instead, they believed, they 
had been given a kick in the guts413. 
410 Ibid; see also Brad Norington, 'Paul Isn't Playing Us Like a Symphony', Sydney Morning Herald, 
1 September 1993, p 5. 
411 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 369. 
412 Interview with Helen Creed, 20 September 2002. 
413 Mark Riley, 'Unions Steer Their Ship Back On Course', Sydney Morning Herald, 17 September 
1994, p34. 
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This clash is illustrative of the difficult relationship Keating and the unions 
shared; one which the words suspicion and betrayal were often used to 
describe414. 
Another source of friction was Keating's choice of long-time friend and political 
accomplice, Laurie Brereton, as Minister for Industrial Relations. Brereton was 
never popular with the ACTU or with the broader union movement415, which 
placed great strains on the Prime Minister's already testy relationship with the 
unions. The combined effect of policy decisions such as enterprise bargaining, 
the waterfront strike, privatisation and deregulation, the 1993 campaign debt the 
unions felt wasn't repaid by the PM, and the appointment of Brereton combined 
to ensure Keating-union relations were never smooth sailing. 
The Labor Government's relationship with the trade union movement endured 
these conflicts largely because of the close relationship between the leaders of 
the two wings of the labour movement; Keating and Bill Kelty. In this context Don 
Watson wrote that the Kelty 'relationship with Keating was built on hard-earned 
mutual respect and genuine affection. There were times when they seemed to 
delight in each other's company - they had nothing in common except the big 
picture and the ideas that comprised it416. Three other senior advisers and a key 
union official confirmed to this author the closeness of the relationship. Bruce 
Chapman described it as a 'two-part harmony'417; Mark Ryan called them 
'intellectual equals' with a 'sense of the shared mission between the two of 
them'41B; Don Russell remembered how Kelty could always get hold of Keating, 
and would always have an input into policy419. Various other commentators saw 
Kelty as the closest thing Australia has had to an unelected cabinet minister420. 
414 See, for example, Brad Norington, 'Keating and Unions: Cracks in Labor Unity', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 5 October 1994, p 20. 
4 15 Interview with Helen Creed, 20 November 2002; see also Shaun Carney, 'Industrial Mates 
System Tests Friends', Age, 21December1994, p 6. 
416 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 163. 
417 Interview with Bruce Chapman, 4 December 2002. 
41s Interview with Mark Ryan, 12 September 2002. 
419 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
420 See Shaun Carney, 'A Testing Time For Mates in the ALP', Age, 18 January 1992, p 1. 
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The Keating-Kelty relationship afforded both men great power, but was built first 
and foremost on their individual dominance of their own domains. Both enjoyed 
strong control; Keating over the Labor Government; Kelty over the ACTU. 
Because each could speak authoritatively for their sphere of influence, the 
relationship could afford to be top-down and deals could be stitched up at the 
highest level, free from long consultative pressures. Therefore, the Prime 
Minister profited from Kelty's dominance of the unions, which led one interviewee 
to comment that the latter 'was such a prominent and dominant figure within the 
union movement... if you got on the wrong side of Kelty you suffered'421• In some 
cases the closeness of the relationship and the bi-lateral approach to decision 
making attracted some criticism, for example from Brad Norington, who wrote 
that 'it had become too obvious lately that private phone calls and secret deals in 
backrooms - chiefly between these two men - have become the norm'. The Accord 
had reached the point where 'deals intended originally to reflect a democratic 
style of wide consultation are routinely tied up ahead of official negotiations by 
Paul Keating and Bill Kelty with little outside input', and then Kelty 'sells the deal 
to senior trade union officials as a fait accompli'. Norington continued: 
The problem for the political process of the Accord is that it no longer has 
any proper checks and balances as Mr Kelty increasingly gets his own way 
and Mr Keating relies on his mate to deliver. From all this, Mr Kelty has 
emerged foremost a politician, a man caught between looking after his union 
constituency and doing whatever is necessary to retain Labor's hold on 
office .... His inner circle of union lieutenants is ever narrowing. He often 
works without need for them when he has direct access to Mr Keating , now 
as Prime Minister422. 
The relationship between Labor Government and peak union body became, in 
effect, a two-man show in which the leaders, Keating and Kelty, wielded 
enormous power. 
42 1 Interview with Helen Creed, November 2002. 
422 Brad Norington, 'When Kelty Speaks, Keating Listens', Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 
1992, p 11; see also Brad Norington, Jennie George (St Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1999). 
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The close relationship between the two men was not to endure beyond a fiery 
dispute, originally between the union movement and the mining giant CRA, which 
became a watershed moment in the deterioration of relations between the 
Government and the ACTU. Keating intervened in the original dispute in order to 
head off a costly strike on the country's waterfront on the eve of his keynote 
speech to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) on free trade423. 
After intense negotiation, much from telephones in Tokyo, Keating twice arrived 
at what he had been led to believe was acceptable to employers and the ACTU, 
only to have the conditions for a settlement altered substantially by Kelty. Then 
came the bitter blow to Keating and the final act of the relationship with Kelty's 
appointment of Keating's mortal enemy, former PM Bob Hawke, as union 
advocate. Commenting on the shocking development, Don Watson wrote that 
'No greater violence could have been done to the world as we understood it an 
hour before', and 'It was like watching an earthquake or a divorce'424. Another 
senior adviser said the incident 'broke Keating's heart'425. That Keating was kept 
in the dark about the impending appointment made things even more difficult for 
Keating to accept426. Other issues were also at play in the fallout427 between 
Keating and Kelty, but the appointment of Hawke signalled the end of a 
remarkable double act, with far reaching consequences for the Government, the 
ALP and the unions. 
Labor prime ministers are forced to negotiate and occasionally compromise with 
a union movement which enjoys such a privileged position of power in the 
Australian Labor Party. A long history of coexistence - encompassing cooperation 
and conflict - gives unions enormous influence in the activities of the Party and 
423 For a more complete chronology of the dispute and its fallout see Don Watson 2002, op cit, pp 
655-61. 
424 Ibid, p 661. 
425 Off the record conversation with senior Keating aide. 
426 For further analysis of the issue see Shaun Carney, 'State of the Union - Dispute Puts the 
Spotlight on Kelty-Keating Double Act', Age, 21November1995, p 11; Alan Ramsey, 'When Two 
Faces Are Better Than One', Sydney Morning Herald, 22 November 1995, p 17; Alan Ramsey, 
'Beazley Buoys a Leaden Labor', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 December 1995, p 33. 
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the policies of the Government. Keating was frequently at odds with the unions, 
but could get away with this because of his unusually close professional 
relationship with Bill Kelty, a dominant leader of the ACTU who could guarantee 
outcomes conducive to the agendas the two men agreed upon. With the bitter 
end to this relationship came a breakdown in the Government's links to the 
unions, and the 1996 election campaign saw only shadows of the unions' 
contribution to the 1993 poll. Keating controlled the unions largely by the grace 
of Kelty. When it was over, the policy tensions were all the more likely to damage 
this key industrial-political partnership. 
Leading Labor 
The leadership bargain struck between Prime Minister Paul Keating, the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party and the broader ALP, including the trade unions and 
the Labor organisation, was skewed dramatically in the Prime Minister's favour. 
His lack of consultation was mostly tolerated, with some rare exceptions, and he 
was granted the freedom to choose his own ministry in 1993428. Keating's 
relationship with the National Secretariat was more complicated, though; the 
contest for influence and authority ended in a stalemate detrimental to both 
parties but did not directly threaten Keating's tenure. 
Malcolm Fraser, as analysed by Patrick Weller, was a similarly powerful party 
leader, but one who dominated through inclusion and consultation. He was a 
careful cultivator of an effective relationship with his Liberal Party. Weller records 
how Fraser consulted the party because he thought a united party would be 
important to his success as Prime Minister429. His caucus colleagues could 
usually see the Prime Minister with one or two days notice, confidential written 
notes were tolerated, and groups of backbenchers were occasionally invited to 
427 For example the lingering effects of the enterprise bargaining speech in 1993 and the 
Government's refusal to actively promote Kelty's regional policy Developing Australia. In relation 
to the latter see Don Watson 2002, op cit, pp 438-9. 
42s See Chapter Four 'Managing the Ministry'. 
429 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 149. 
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dine at the Lodge43o. The caucus could force a rethink of cabinet decisions, 
Fraser always attended party meetings when available, and a system of policy 
committees gave backbenchers some say in policy development431. The Liberal 
Party machine also enjoyed significant influence, based primarily on Fraser's 
close relationship with Tony Eggleton, which included input into Question Time 
briefings432• All of this effort, though time consuming, meant Fraser could keep 
the party reasonably united behind his leadership. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, Keating's brand of party leadership could hardly have been more 
different to Fraser's approach. 
The lessons from this comparison are that there is more than one way to control 
and lead a party as prime minister. Part of the explanation for this comes from 
personal style; Keating was never likely to be a consultative PM so his dominance 
of the ALP had to come from alternative approaches to leadership. The basic 
task confronted by the two prime ministers was also different because of the 
different types of parties they led. Fraser, for example, never had to deal with an 
affiliated trade union movement. 
Within the Labor Party, Keating's approach to Party leadership also differed 
markedly from that of Bob Hawke, who enjoyed a more open and accessible 
relationship with his caucus, and a friendlier alliance with the Party organisation. 
His power arose from his electoral success and the warm approval of the 
electorate, as well as his willingness to mix socially with colleagues and make 
himself available for discussions with backbenchers. Hawke's Party leadership 
was different again to Keating's and, also, dissimilar to the approach taken by 
Malcolm Fraser. Party leadership thus depends on personal style and the 
utilisation of the various power resources a political party makes available to 
prime ministers. 
430 Ibid, pp 149--54. 
431 Ibid, pp 154-61. 
432 Ibid, pp 164-8. 
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This chapter has demonstrated that Prime Minister Keating dominated his Party 
due to a number of interrelated factors. Winning the 1993 election against the 
odds gave him unprecedented powers and left his leadership safe and, largely, 
unquestioned by caucus. His personal take-no-prisoners approach also 
contributed to his dominance of the Party, as did the stability and conflict 
resolution prowess of the organised factional system, within which the groups 
had ceased fighting to the death over policy and position. Caucus never really 
considered an alternative to Keating, which negated the potential power of the 
removal mechanism. Finally, the Prime Minister's relationship with Bill Kelty, who 
could guarantee outcomes from the Australian Council of Trade Unions, was close 
enough to ensure the unions were kept on side for the majority of the Prime 
Ministership. In all of these respects, Keating enjoyed the necessary 
preconditions for successful party leadership. Most notably for this dissertation, 
interactions with the Labor caucus were coloured by a significant amount of 
collective subservience and the granting of much Prime Ministerial latitude. As a 
result, the leadership bargain, for four and a quarter years, was skewed 
remarkably in his favour, with positive and negative consequences. 
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Controlling Cabinet 
I don't believe in aimless meetings where I sit mum trying to let a consensus 
develop for fear of showing my hand. That I reject as a style of leadership433. 
Cabinet is the focal point of traditional conceptions of Westminster executive 
government. Its role is best described as a decision-making body relying on 
collective effort, chaired and guided by the prime minister. In Bagehot's famous 
words, it is 'a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of 
the State to the executive part of the State'434. Successful cabinets give 
coherence and legitimacy to decisions taken by the executive as a group, or a 
prime minister alone. Much can be learned from the power relations flowing both 
ways between ministers and the leader. Prime ministers cannot operate far 
removed from cabinet though they can dominate and direct its proceedings. In 
this sense, Weller describes a cabinet system in which the actions of a prime 
minister are 'overlaid on a cabinet system, not discrete from it'435. Keating and 
Weller similarly describe cabinet government rather than the institution of cabinet 
'because, while many of the crucial decisions are taken around the cabinet table, 
others are made in its environs as part of the cabinet process: by the prime 
minister alone or with a group of senior ministers; in bilaterals between the 
minister and the prime minister; or by cabinet committees'436. Prime ministers 
navigate cabinet colleagues, inside the cabinet room and outside it, but enjoy the 
substantial power resources that leadership brings. 
433 Paul Keating quoted by Geoffrey Barker, 'A Juggler in Full Flight', Age, 4 June 1993, p 17. 
434 Quoted in Michael Keating and Patrick Weller 2000, op cit, p 45. 
435 Patrick Weller, 'Prime Ministers, Political Leadership and Cabinet Government', Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, vol 50, no 2, 1991, pp 131-44; see also Patrick Weller, 'Prime 
Ministers in Cabinet' in Patrick Weller (ed), Menzies to Keating: The Development of the 
Australian Prime Ministership (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1992). 
436 Michael Keating and Patrick Weller, 2000, op cit, p 45. 
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Cabinet government is the ideal type to which presidential or individual 
leadership is often contrasted. In Australia the formal rules for cabinet are set 
out in the Cabinet Handbook, which outlines in detail the organisation of cabinet, 
conventions and principles, consultation, preparation of documents, minutes, and 
security437. Within these formal frameworks prime ministers determine how 
cabinet actually operates. They can consult cabinet, they can dominate it, or they 
can do both43s. PMs possess significant power resources which make 
dominance over cabinet possible: they set the agenda for cabinet, chair the 
meetings and have final say on the matters considered by the group. More 
broadly, they have input into the make-up of the cabinet and the wider ministry. 
In addition, it is increasingly rare for a leader to be rebuffed on a specific issue, 
because the rebuttal of a PM effectively represents a show of no confidence in 
her or his leadership. 
Some aspects of collective cabinet government, however, remain. Most major 
issues still go to cabinet, even if only for a decision to be legitimated by the group. 
Ministers, and particularly senior cabinet ministers, have their own significant 
power bases, scope for patronage, policy domains and interests. As Weller 
argues, they have 'the potential to wield power', and can 'limit the prime 
minister's power - if they choose to try, if they have the capacity, if they have the 
support'439. Cabinet comprises 'powerful and ambitious individuals' who 'need to 
be managed and handled with care'44o, so a prime minister must be skilful at 
directing the process without offending key colleagues and rivals. 
When Paul Keating took the prime ministership in December 1991 he promised a 
greater esprit de corps among cabinet ministers and meaningful opportunities for 
cabinet discussion and debate441. Early in his tenure, he described himself as a 
437 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Cabinet Handbook, (Canberra, AGPS, 1994). 
438 See Patrick Weller 1989, op cit. 
439 Ibid, p 59. 
440 Ibid, p 108. 
441 This sentiment appeared publicly after Keating's early press conferences, and private 
conversations with ministers such as Graham Richardson and Brian Howe reaffirmed the PM's 
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traditional 'first among equals' type of leader. He argued that, because he had 
been part of the cabinet since 1983, his colleagues felt they could engage him 
more comfortably in that forum, in contrast to the situation under Bob Hawke. 
Keating saw himself as a 'rank and file, parliamentarian cabinet minister'442. 
From the outset, it seems, the Prime Minister attached great importance to the 
cabinet process, and appeared willing to include his senior colleagues in the 
major policy decisions of the Labor Government. 
Paul Keating delivered on aspects of this promise; for example ministers describe 
an initially less domineering and more tolerant cabinet chair then they could have 
expected after Keating's forceful Treasury days. His relationship with cabinet and 
the wider ministry, however, largely reflected his personal avoidance of extensive 
consultation, though senior ministers could access the Prime Minister when 
circumstance and policy prerogatives allowed. Various aspects of Keating's 
relationships are examined in this chapter: input into the election of the ministry; 
the management of resignations and dismissals; his chairing style and 
performance in cabinet meetings; criticisms of his commitment to the cabinet 
process; the degree of access bestowed on senior colleagues; and prime 
ministerial incursions into the policy domains of other ministers. The emphasis 
throughout is on determining whether or not Keating dominated the process, and 
the extent to which he was forced to consult with, and defer to, ministerial 
colleagues. From this analysis we will get a valuable and recent assessment of 
the prime ministerial power debate. 
Prime Minister Keating was an accommodating cabinet chair but never a 
consultative leader in the context of the broader cabinet system. This is 
especially so after the 1993 election victory, which gave him unprecedented 
authority to essentially choose his ministry, a development that ran counter to the 
traditions of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. Cabinet discussion could be 
objective to restore cabinet camaraderie; interviews with Richardson (24 June 2002) and Howe 
(12 June 2002). 
442 Quoted in Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 223. 
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robust, but the leader's view in meetings prevailed. Continuing criticism of 
Keating's commitment to the process was aired publicly and privately. His 
chairing style was inclusive, though long-winded discussions were not tolerated. 
The Prime Minister did not convene semi-formal kitchen cabinets, though a small 
handful of privileged cabinet ministers could access Keating and were listened to 
when the political situation or policy direction warranted it. Finally, there was 
some intrusion into ministerial policy domains, but only in those areas in which 
the Prime Minister had a strong personal interest443. 
Paul Keating dominated cabinet because to publicly repudiate him would be an 
unthinkable course of action given the ramifications for his leadership, and 
because he was given enormous latitude after the 1993 election. In this respect, 
the preconditions for caucus domination, analysed in detail in the previous 
chapter, carry over into his control of the cabinet process. Prime Minister Keating 
dominated colleagues; in the context of cabinet's operation he did so as a result 
of personal force and a compliant, handpicked ministry who tolerated his 
propensity to occasionally bypass the cabinet process and announce initiatives 
unilaterally. Cabinet consultation occurred during the Keating Prime Ministership 
at the behest of the leader, it was not forced upon an authoritative leader by a 
powerful ministry. Cabinet government was not an approach encouraged under 
his tenure; it was a Keating Government firmly in the evolving tradition of prime 
ministerial power. 
Picking Winners 
Relations between the prime minister and her or his cabinet and broader ministry 
are personal as well as institutional, which makes the composition of the 
executive vital to the functioning of the government and to the effort leaders are 
required to exert in order to maintain effective relationships. The composition of 
the Keating ministries is provided in Appendix Two. From this list we see that 
443 For example communications policy, the republic, the Accord. 
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Paul Keating initially inherited many of the ministers who had reached cabinet 
status during the Hawke Governments. This group included powerful men 
accustomed to the influence that ministerial rank provides, for example John 
Button and Neal Blewett. Once this long-serving cast started to retire, Prime 
Minister Keating was presented with frequent opportunities to reshuffle the 
cabinet and broader ministry, and bring in new talent loyal to the leader but 
without the collective experience of the cabinets of the 1980s. With the 
accumulation of loyalty through patronage came a more subservient and less 
questioning cabinet. In this context, the constraints and opportunities for 
influence afforded the Prime Minister over the selection of his ministry are 
analysed. 
Prime ministers cannot unilaterally impose their will on the selection of a ministry; 
even Liberal Party leaders who formally appoint their own ministries at least 
informally take into account a number of factors such as gender, geography and 
seniority. Labor prime ministers are traditionally provided with a ministry elected 
by caucus, to which the leader allocates portfolios, making unilateral 
appointment even more difficult. Other impinging factors include previous deals 
done and the accommodation of the ALP's rigid factional system. People with 
significant power bases must be consulted; in Keating's case he usually 
consulted figures such as Brian Howe, Nick Bolkus and John Faulkner from the 
Left444, Peter Cook and John Dawkins from the Centre-Left, and Robert Ray, 
Laurie Brereton and Graham Richardson from the Right445. 
The constraints of consultation and other considerations are examined here in 
more detail in the context of the ministerial reshuffles of the Keating Prime 
Ministership, namely the major opportunities presented by the change of 
leadership in 1991, the first resignation of Graham Richardson in 1992, the 
election victory of 1993, the replacement of Treasurer Dawkins early in 1994, 
and the appointment of a new Deputy Prime Minister in 1995. From this analysis 
444 Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002. 
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we see significant scope for Keating to influence appointments to the ministry 
and cabinet, still inhibited by deals, factions, and other factors, but nonetheless 
increasingly able to surround himself with a handpicked selection of colleagues. 
The first Keating ministry represented stability, rather than change, after the 
tumult of the leadership challenge. John Dawkins replaced Ralph Willis as 
Treasurer, the latter returning to Finance. Alan Griffiths and Bob Collins were 
elevated to a cabinet enlarged by one446, and John Kerin was made Minister for 
Trade and demoted from cabinet. Graham Richardson moved from Social 
Security to Transport and Communications; Kim Beazley from Finance to 
Employment, Education and Training; and Neal Blewett from Trade to Social 
Security. John Button remained, despite Prime Ministerial enquiries into whether 
he would be prepared to stand aside to make way for a new cabinet minister447. 
As a result there were no new ministers, so Keating appointed additional 
parliamentary secretaries to reward supporters from the challenge against 
Hawke. This meant Laurie Brereton, Gary Johns, Stephen Martin and Peter 
Duncan all found themselves only one step away from the outer ministry44s. 
Referring to the composition of the group little changed from the Hawke era, 
Keating called his first ministry 'old dogs for a hard road'449. 
The cabinet and the outer ministry remained largely unchanged in an attempt to 
restore some sense of unity, or at least prevent large-scale ongoing disunity on 
behalf of former supporters of deposed Prime Minister Hawke. Keating talked at 
his first press conference as leader about how there would be 'no recriminations 
whatsoever, no raking over old ground, but only a commitment to get on with the 
task of governing this country'45o. In this context he later said that 'It was 
445 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
446 From 17 to 18. 
447 John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 458. 
448 Michelle Grattan, 'Jobs The Target - Dawkins', Age, 28 December 1991, p 1; see also Michelle 
Grattan, 'PM Assembles His Cart - Now For The Bumpy Road', Age, 28 December 1991, p 2, for a 
summary of the 1991 ministerial reshuffle. 
449 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 185. 
450 1991, 'Reshuffle Within Days', Sun Herald, 22 December, p 2. 
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important to me ... that anyone who had been on the Hawke side of the fight 
never had any hint or feel of demotion or of distance from me, let alone any 
notion of retribution'451. Keating's purported graciousness, however, was also 
coloured by the deals and compromises he was forced to make in the lead-up to 
his ascension to the Prime Ministership. According to Mike Steketee, in order to 
beat Hawke, Keating 'had to agree to a series of deals and compromises which 
leaves him with Bob Hawke's Cabinet intact. He had to promise ministers they 
would retain their jobs in return for voting for him', which meant that he was only 
able to 'reshuffle the Hawke deck'452. 
One of the major aspects of the 1991 ministerial reshuffle, and an effective 
illustration of the constraints on a prime minister even with the formal authority to 
allocate portfolios, came with the choice between Ralph Willis and John Dawkins 
for the Treasury453. Willis was the incumbent, appointed by Hawke only weeks 
earlier, but Dawkins was a supporter of the Keating for PM push as early as 
1988, and a key backer in the 1991 challenges, so both had a reasonable 
expectation of filling the role. Keating's colleagues and advisers had differing 
views on the appointment and, to make matters more difficult for Keating, the 
unions were backing Dawkins while business was sticking with Willis454 . In the 
end loyalty to Dawkins won through, but not without extensive negotiations and 
some consternation over the most effective resolution between loyalty to a 
supporter and adherence to the principle of stability after the leadership 
change455. 
The 1991 reshuffle took place in unusual circumstances; mid-way through the life 
of a government but with a new leader. However, some lessons can still be 
451 Peter FitzSimons 1998, op cit, p 367; see also John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 458. 
452 Mike Steketee, 'Keating's Crown of Thorns', Sydney Morning Herald, 21 December 1991, p 
41. 
453 See Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, pp 187-9. 
454 Michelle Grattan, 'Keating's Treasurer - The First Hard Choice', Age, 23 December 1991, p 
11. 
455 See John Edwards 1996, op cit, pp 460-1; Michelle Grattan, 'One Vote Down, But the Real 
One's Still to Come', Age, 20 December 1991, p 1. 
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drawn from the experience for this examination of prime ministerial power. First, 
key individuals such as Graham Richardson, on the basis of factional and 
personal influence in the Government, were given significant latitude. In 
Richardson's case he was largely allowed to pick his own ministry, taking 
Transport and Communications, and then having significant input into the 
allocation of the remaining portfolios456. Aside from this type of informal 
conversations with senior Government figures, there was little of the factional 
manoeuvring for position that characterises the remaining reshuffles. This led 
Neal Blewett to comment to this author that there 'was a recognition by all 
factions that given the bruising struggle the party had just been through it would 
simply destabilise the government further to have a set of ministerial 
sackings'457 • There are lessons, too, to be gained from the few cabinet ministers 
who were demoted in December 1991, namely Kerin, Willis and Beazley. As 
Peter Hartcher described it at the time, the 'pain of the changes is being borne by 
people with little avenue for retaliation and no heart for it'458. Willis and Kerin 
could not rely on power bases of their own, and Beazley was, for whatever reason, 
reluctant to retaliate459. This meant the new PM could get away with promoting 
others into their place. 
An opportunity for a further minor reshuffle came in May 1992 with the 
resignation from cabinet of Graham Richardson after the damaging 'Marshall 
Islands Affair'46o. In this case the Prime Minister's hands were tied by a number 
of factional, gender and historical considerations that prevented him having a 
free hand in selecting Richardson's replacement. Keating was expected to 
honour a deal made by his predecessor, Hawke, in 1990, that the next ministerial 
vacancy would go to the Left, despite the vacancy coming from the Right of the 
FPLP. Jeanette McHugh was sworn in as the new minister, though Keating 
456 Marian Wilkinson, The Fixer: The Untold Story of Graham Richardson (Melbourne, William 
Heinemann, 1996), p 344; see also Graham Richardson 1994, op cit, p 339. 
457 Interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 2002. 
458 Peter Hartcher, 'Softly, Softly Does It', 28 December 1991, p 1. 
459 Ibid. 
460 See below. 
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preferred Warren Snowdon461. In this instance Keating allowed his hands to be 
tied by other considerations, but this was a situation that would not endure long. 
The experience after the 1993 election was dramatically different from the horse-
trading and constraints on the Prime Minister seen in the two previous reshuffles. 
The ministry was largely one appointed directly by Keating, with factional 
acquiesce, and so bore the Prime Minister's mark. To begin with, the 1993 
reshuffle saw a significant degree of renewal, with less than a third of the 
appointees having occupied frontbench positions in 1987462• On top of this, 
Keating was given the authority to appoint ten parliamentary secretaries. Notable 
changes were: Michael Lavarch's catapulting from the backbench straight into 
cabinet; the elevation of Michael Lee from the outer ministry into the cabinet; and 
Frank Walker and Rosemary Crowley's inclusion in the outer ministry. Factionally, 
the ministry also shifted markedly to the Right, and at cabinet rank the 
representation of that group increased from nine out of 18 to 13 out of 19463• 
Michelle Grattan wrote, after the composition of the ministry was made public 
that, 
With this week's reshuffle, Keating has signalled that he wants to gather 
power into his own hands, or at least to be able to feel very comfortable with 
the other hands that wield power. Key areas regarded as important by 
Keating have gone to intimates (eg, Laurie Brereton in Industrial Relations; 
Graham Richardson, Health - although some on Keating 's staff doubted the 
wisdom of bringing Richardson back), proteges (Alan Griffiths, Industry; 
Michael Lee, Resources) or people that he can supervise (David Beddall, 
Communications; Robert Tickner, who stays in Aboriginal Affairs)464. 
Grattan then quoted a senior colleague of Keating's saying that the Prime 
Minister wanted to be able to implement policy easily, consequently he didn't 
'want a Cabinet, or a system, full of spikes'465• This notion will be returned to in 
subsequent pages of this chapter. 
46 1 See Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 193; see also Alan Ramsey, 'Poll Focuses PM's Mind Ever So 
Sharply', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 1992, p 25. 
462 9 out of 30; see Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 259. 
463 See Appendix One; Geoff Kitney, 'New Team Shows the Right Way as the Victor Sees It', 
Sydney Morning Herald, 25 March 1993, p 4; see also Geoffrey Barker, 'Keating's Ministry to 
Stamp His Style on Government', Age, 23 March 1993, p 4. 
464 Michelle Grattan, 'The People Who Advise Paul Keating', Age, 27 March 1993, p 18. 
465 Ibid. 
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Under Keating's predecessors, Whitlam and Hawke, the caucus (and increasingly 
the factions) exercised their right to select the executive. Why, then, did a Labor 
Party caucus, with a tradition and legitimate expectation of electing the ministry, 
allow Keating unprecedented authority to put together a cabinet and an outer 
ministry of his own making? The immense authority and influence that came 
from Keating's personal triumph over John Hewson and the Liberal and National 
Parties in the 1993 campaign led to this remarkable situation. Graham 
Richardson has written that a 'measure of the status that victory gave Paul 
Keating was the way in which the ministry was elected', in this case 'the Labor 
Caucus simply endorsed a slate of candidates nominated by the Prime 
Minister'466. Peter Walsh adds: 'So unexpected was Keating's victory that the 
Caucus, or more accurately the factional negotiators, agreed to suspend its own 
rules and allow him to pick the Ministry'467. The 1993 election therefore gave 
Keating 'a special standing perhaps not enjoyed by any other federal leader in 
Labor's history'468, giving the newly legitimised Prime Minister the opportunity to 
drastically overhaul the ministry. This led Michelle Grattan to write that Keating 
'will never be so powerful as now'469. Bruce Jones from the Sun Herald agreed: 
'Paul Keating's astonishing electoral victory has given him unrivalled power -
including virtual carte blanche to choose his own ministry' which means he 'has 
an unprecedented opportunity to put his personal stamp on government'470. 
The final composition of the cabinet and outer ministry says much about how 
Prime Minister Keating harnessed this newfound power, and the extent to which 
the final make-up of the group reflected his own priorities. Prime ministerial 
intervention saw the Right's Lavarch and Lee elevated to cabinet rank, and 
Walker and Crowley were included in the ministry despite not being supported by 
466 Graham Richardson 1994, op cit, p 356. 
467 Peter Walsh 1995, op cit, p 254; a view supported by John O'Callaghan, interviewed 20 March 
2002. 
468 Michelle Grattan, 'Unwinnable Victory Gives PM New Clout', Age, 15 March 1993, p 9. 
469 Ibid. 
470 Bruce Jones, 'Keating's Clan', Sun Herald, 21 March 1993, p 12. 
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their own faction, the Left471. In this respect 'prime ministerial intervention 
brought significant change'472. Two of the appointments, in particular - Lavarch 
and Walker - are particularly illustrative of the post-1993 election landscape and 
the power enjoyed by Keating over the selection of his senior colleagues. 
Michael Lavarch was sworn in as Attorney-General without any previous 
ministerial experience, and without significant factional backing from his 
Queensland Right faction. Indeed he had even attracted that group's ire by 
supporting Keating over Hawke in 1991. Despite the former, and perhaps 
because of the latter, the Prime Minister ignored factional considerations and 
appointed him anyway. In an interview, Michael Lavarch recalled that Keating 
had 'quite substantial influence' in his promotion, and that 'l wouldn't have 
become a minister had it not been for his personal decision to want me to 
become a minister'. In this respect he 'could be a promoter of people who 
wouldn't have otherwise gotten in through the factional system'473. Graham 
Richardson saw the episode as 'an example of Paul being able to use the power 
that comes with winning when you're not supposed to win'474. 
Another illustrative example comes from the appointment of New South Wales 
Leftwinger Frank Walker to the outer ministry over considerable resistance from 
the Left, who had not elected him to their ministerial 'ticket'475. Keating was 
insistent that incumbent minister Peter Staples be dropped in favour of Walker, a 
key supporter476. This caused a showdown with the Parliamentary Left, and with 
Peter Walsh, who told a Centre-Left factional gathering that 'We should not allow 
whatever megalomaniac who happens to be incumbent to have that power'477. In 
the end Keating and Walker narrowly triumphed when caucus voted with a 
471 Interview with Bruce Childs, 16 January 2003. 
472 Graham Richardson 1994, op cit, p 356. 
473 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
474 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
47 5 See Michelle Grattan, 'PM Earns Freedom of Choice', Age, 22 March 1993, p 11 for a credible 
summary of the showdown. 
476 He was prepared to accept Peter Duncan or Frank Walker, both Keating supporters, to replace 
Staples. 
477 Quoted in Bruce Jones, 'Left Stubborn on Keating Cabinet', Sun Herald, 21 March 1993, p 7. 
126 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
margin of only six votes for the Prime Ministerial preference. Though one 
commentator described it as 'a close-run thing for a Prime Minister whose 
personal authority is supposed to be at such a premium'478, the counter-view is 
that Keating won a substantial battle against significant resistance. 
Though Keating had to take into account some factional manoeuvring, reward 
supporters, and give key figures such as Graham Richardson a say in their 
portfolio allocation479, the 1993 reshuffle was one in which little consultation was 
needed. As Brian Howe recounted in an interview, 'consultation can mean 
different things but on the 93 ministry Keating was pretty well unmoveable ... he 
basically wanted to reward people that had been loyal to him as he saw it'4ao. 
The result was that the 1993 cabinet and outer ministry bore Keating's indelible 
stamp, giving the Prime Minister the 'opportunity to run the Government on his 
own terms and with a minimum of obstruction' and creating the risk 'that 
ministers will err on the side of doing what they believe is good for retaining his 
favour•4a1. This is an important and apt observation, returned to below. 
With the resignation of Treasurer Dawkins in December 1993 came the 
opportunity for Keating to again exercise power over the reshuffling of 
portfolios482. On this occasion Keating went for experience and competence, 
moving senior ministers sideways into important portfolios. Willis, as expected, 
was moved to Treasury; Simon Crean became employment minister; and Kim 
Beazley was shifted to Finance. Two under-performing ministers - Bob Collins 
and David Beddall - were moved to less demanding portfolios. Keating 
supporters and factional colleagues Michael Lee (Communications) and Laurie 
Brereton (Transport) were given additional responsibilities. Also, surprisingly, Ros 
478 Alan Ramsey, 'Richo's Back, Right Where He Left Off', Sydney Morning Herald, 27 March 
1993, p29. 
479 See Geoff Kitney, 'When One Mate Inquires After Another's Health', Sydney Morning Herald, 3 
December 1993, p 13. 
480 Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002; also interview with Bruce Childs, 16 January 2003. 
481 Geoff Kitney, 'New Team Shows the Right Way as the Victor Sees It', Sydney Morning Herald, 
25 March 1993, p 4. 
482 Bruce Jones, 'PM to Axe Weak Links', Sun Herald, 19 December 1993, p 1. 
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Kelly remained Minister for the Environment, Sport and Territories and also 
became Minister assisting the Prime Minister on the Status of Women. The 
cabinet was reduced by one, and 'the Right and Centre Left factions still [held] 
about 70 per cent of the ministerial posts in the Cabinet'483. Within the limited 
scope of the reshuffle afforded by Dawkins' resignation, the Prime Minister was 
able to ensure the ministry remained unmistakably a Keating ministry. 
By mid-1995 Paul Keating had established over his senior colleagues a 
dominance over the process of ministerial appointment. What was an unusual 
case of factional and caucus acquiescence in 1993 became the norm, as seen in 
the process of replacing Brian Howe as Deputy Prime Minister (DPM)484. From 
start to finish the appointment was effectively made by Keating; after some 
limited consultation he called Kim Beazley and offered him the position. As Peter 
Fitzsimons recounts in his Beazley biography, 'If Keating was asking him, it 
meant that he had his support, and with the Prime Minister's support it was likely 
to be his for the taking if Howe did indeed step down ... so he put his hand up'485. 
Despite an expectation that the Left might retain the Deputy's role, Beazley was 
appointed DPM, completely at the behest of the Prime Minister. 
Prime ministerial power over the selection of ministries and the allocation of 
portfolios is never absolute. Paul Keating, however, on the strength of the 1993 
election win, was able to exercise a dominance over the process not observed on 
the Labor side of politics before. After promoting stability and continuity in 1991 
he then moved to a more obviously personal selection of supporters, those he 
held in high regard, and factional accomplices. These cases, analysed above, 
show that though he consulted on some selections, the circle was often small 
and the Prime Minister's view prevailed. The cabinet and broader ministry under 
483 Geoffrey Barker, 'Mates and Merit Shape Keating's New Ministry', Age, 24 December 1993, p 
4. 
484 See Geoff Kitney and Tony Wright, 1995, 'Decision Forced By Tired Image', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 21 June, p 4 for a description of the events leading up to Beazley's appointment. 
485 Peter Fitzsimons 1998, op cit, p392. 
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Keating were unmistakably his own creation, with important ramifications for the 
performance of the Government. 
Managing Dismissals and Resignations 
Providing portfolios and having a say in who is (s)elected to the ministry is only 
part of the task. Prime Ministers must also manage ministerial resignations and 
dismissals. Prime Minister Keating also exercised considerable power over the 
political management of the crises that surrounded the ministerial resignations of 
Graham Richardson in 1992 and Ros Kelly in 1994486, and in Carmen 
Lawrence's refusal to quit in 1995. From these occasions we can determine the 
extent to which Keating was, effectively, judge and jury in relation to ministerial 
resignations arising from allegations of impropriety, corruption or incompetence. 
The first ministerial crisis of the Keating Government came with Senator Graham 
Richardson's resignation from the ministry on 18 May 1992. The event was to 
prove indicative of the Keating approach to such episodes; he initially showed 
great loyalty to the Minister before political imperatives compelled him to accept 
the resignation. In Richardson's case the scandal revolved around his role in 
what became known as the Marshall Islands Affair487 , and his representation of a 
somewhat dubious associate. Significant public and internal pressure was 
brought to bear on Keating; the media and some in the Government urged he be 
sacked, while other colleagues urged he stay on. Keating was called upon to 
weigh up 'mateship, the solidarity of the Government and fine judgments about 
what would follow the sacking or backing course•4ss. At first Keating leaned 
towards toughing the situation out, reportedly counseling Richardson in a private 
meeting: 'mate, tell 'em all to get fucked!'489 In the end Keating asked for a 
report on the affair from Richardson, who provided it and then fell on his 
486 The resignation of Industry Minister Alan Griffiths over what became the 'sandwich shop affair' 
is not addressed here because the Minister resigned before the news even became public. 
48 7 See Michelle Grattan, 'Mate Leaves Keating in Dark', Age, 14 May 1992, p 1 for a description 
of events; ; see also Marian Wilkinson 1996, op cit, pp 354-8. 
488 Michelle Grattan, 'Richardson's Fate Tests Keating', Age, 18 May 1992, p 13. 
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sword490. Much time had passed and damage was done to the Government. 
Keating, the sole prosecutor of his Minister's fate, was loyal until the situation 
became untenable. 
A similar sequence of events marked the lead-up to Ros Kelly's resignation on 28 
February 1994. Kelly, Minister for Sport, had been accused of improperly 
distributing $30 million of grants for local sporting associations491• The situation 
was complicated because the Minster was a close personal friend of Keating's, 
and the Prime Minister was known for his loyalty to 'mates'. While Kelly hung on 
amidst enormous public and internal pressure to resign or be sacked, the 
Government was in deep trouble492• Alan Ramsey described the situation thus: 
The hand of God guards Ros and Keating isn't taking it away, not yet ... 
Howard might think Kelly is dead meat, and a lot of the rest of us might 
agree, but if Keating wants her to survive, irrespective of what his Cabinet or 
his Caucus or anyone else thinks, then survive she will. Keating 's power to 
make and unmake is absolute. He is as loyal as he is courageous, however 
foolishly at times493. 
The end result, however, as it was with Richardson, was that the Prime Minister 
reluctantly accepted the minister's resignation. Although the choice whether to 
stick with each minister was Keating's alone, the pressure brought to bear on the 
Government by the media and internal critics was enough to force a retreat from 
the original Prime Ministerial position of support. 
This was not the case in 1995 with the scandal that erupted after Health Minister 
Carmen Lawrence became embroiled in the 'Penny Easton Affair' and the 
consequent Royal Commission. This time Keating would not budge, he refused to 
countenance Lawrence's resignation despite the looming political reality that she 
489 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
490 See Graham Richardson 1994, op cit, pp 343, 346. 
491 For a detailed case study of the 'sports rorts' affair see Rodney Smith, 'Visible and Invisible 
Cultures of Parliamentary Ethics: The "Sports Rorts" Affair Revisited' in Australian Journal of 
Political Science, vol 34, no 1, March 1999, pp 47-62; see also Geoffrey Barker, 'Friend Who 
Should be Told to Go', Age, 7 February 1994, p 13. 
492 Mark Baker, 'Keating's Pride and the Fall of Kelly', Age, 26 February 1994, p 21. 
493 Alan Ramsey, 'Emperor Paul Naked But For Noise', Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1994, 
p 33; see also Alan Ramsey, 'When a Mighty Ally Is Not Enough', Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 
1994, p 31. 
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should go. Geoff Kitney remembers how, 'during the Carmen Lawrence thing, he 
lost all sense of reality, partly because of his sense of loyalty; he saw it as the 
establishment lining up against him; he thought it the worst of the conservatives 
to use this thing against Carmen Lawrence; and he was savagely critical of the 
Gallery who said he shouldn't stick with Carmen'494. On top of the media 
pressure for the Prime Minister to sack the Health Minister, key aides were also 
urging she be removed. John O'Callaghan remembers a conversation among 
senior advisers where 
on balance we all agreed that Carmen should have resigned or Paul should 
have forced her too. But Paul decided he was going to stick with her through 
thick and thin. It was like he'd decided to hang on to the rusty gate. He 
wasn't going to let go of her. Paul had decided he was going to stick with her 
and that was all there was to that. In political terms it was probably an 
unwise call495. 
Regardless, Keating was able to hold off those calling for resignation. The 
caucus, media and Party organisation, committed to Lawrence's removal, could 
not in this case move a resolute Prime Minister from his chosen course of action. 
The general observation about Prime Minister Keating's management of 
resignations and dismissals was that 'you stick by people and defend them [and] 
you don't show weakness'496. It could be argued that Keating's personal loyalty 
and political stubbornness was detrimental to his ability to manage ministerial 
scandals and resignations. What is more important to this study, though, is the 
extent to which his personal view prevailed amidst growing discomfort at his 
approach. In the first two cases examined here, the PM's preference endured 
only until the pressures became too great. Keating was loyal to Richardson and 
Kelly until the weight of the arguments and the political pressures exerted by 
other sources of power became too great. During the Carmen Lawrence episode, 
however, Keating remained resolute, and prime ministerial power and preference 
prevailed. 
49 4 Interview with Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
495 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
496 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
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Patronage 
Prime ministers make numerous public appointments; to boards, high level public 
service and diplomatic posts, and to the ministry. One aspect of this power is the 
significant scope afforded prime ministers to reward supporters from the 
Parliamentary Party through patronage, the subject of this section. For example 
Paul Keating rewarded his backers through an enlarged system of parliamentary 
secretaryships. To reward 'loyalists, he doubled the number of parliamentary 
secretaries to eight when he became Prime Minister in December 1991 and then 
added two more after the last election, thus lifting the Size of his executive to 
40'497 • The allocation of portfolios and the insistence on the inclusion in the 
ministry of figures such as Michael Lavarch and Frank Walker, discussed above, 
are other ways of exerting influence and stockpiling favours. 
A related aspect of the power of patronage involves prime ministerial intervention 
in the jockeying for position that takes place among the leader's potential 
successors. During Keating's tenure, a number of names were floated as 
possible successors, though Kim Beazley was the most often mentioned498• 
Other possibilities were Simon Crean, Carmen Lawrence and John Dawkins499• 
The next generation of Labor leader was widely regarded to comprise Michael Lee 
and Michael Lavarch, both of whom enjoyed considerable Prime Ministerial 
support, particularly in Lee's case5oo. Despite the jockeying for post-Keating 
position, however, there is little evidence of the Prime Minister playing one 
497 Alan Ramsey, 'Lean Machines? The Reality is Ministerial Bloat', Sydney Morning Herald, 11 
June 1994, p 33. 
498 See, for example, Michelle Grattan, 'Right Time For Rise Of Lieutenant', Age, 21 June 1995, p 
9. 
499 See Tim Colebatch, 'More Voters Want a New Liberal Leader, Says Poll', Age, 21 December 
1992, p 14; and Brian Toohey, 'After the Vote, a Battle', Sun Herald, 7 February 1993, p 32; Don 
Watson recounts how at one point Keating favoured Dawkins as his successor, 2002, op cit, p 
303, though most accounts had Keating accepting Beazley as his natural successor. 
50° For Lee see Geoff Kitney, 'First Hints of Caesar's Abdication', Sydney Morning Herald, 21 
October 1994, p 13; Geoff Kitney, 'Living in the Ringmaster's Shadow', Sydney Morning Herald, 
24 February 1995, p 11. For Lavarch consult Bruce Jones, 'Labor's Young-Blood Reformer', Sun 
Herald, 9 October 1994, p 38. 
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contender or up and comer off against another5o1. Keating's patronage powers 
were exercised with his input into the composition of the ministry and the cabinet. 
That he was granted unprecedented powers in this respect is an important factor 
contributing to his dominance of cabinet. 
The Keating Cabinets 
Because cabinet is the focal point of traditional Westminster government, and the 
primary concern of prime ministerial power scholars to date, we learn much from 
an analysis of the prime minister working through, within, or above the system to 
guarantee the implementation of personal priorities and policies. Here the Paul 
Keating Prime Ministership is examined in relation to cabinet meetings. As Table 
4.1 illustrates, there were 225 cabinet meetings under Keating, an average of 45 
per year. 
Table 4.1: Keating Cabinet Meetings 
Full Ministry 
1991-92502 4 
1992-93 4 
1993-94 2 
1994-95 2 
1995-96 2 
Total 14 
Avg.peryear 3 
Cabinet 
Committees 
111 
80 
123 
82 
63 
459 
92 
Sources: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Annual Reports 1991-1996. 
501 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
502 Note this figure includes meetings chaired by Prime Minister Hawke prior to the leadership 
change. 
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This analysis of cabinet, however, does not suggest that the cabinet process 
comprises only that which goes on within the walls of the cabinet room, indeed 
the next section deals more broadly with the system of committees503, kitchen 
cabinets, ministerial access to the PM, and other related concerns5o4. The 
immediate focus is on: the degree wide-ranging discussion was tolerated by 
Keating; his chairing style; the extent to which he appeared first among equals in 
that forum; issue advocacy; how often he got his way in cabinet and why; some 
examples of issues upon which the cabinet clashed and Keating prevailed; 
criticisms of the PM's commitment to cabinet meetings; and, finally, the evolution 
of Keating's cabinet style over the course of his prime ministership. We can then 
determine Paul Keating's stores of power relative to the cabinet, before 
considering broader issues pertaining to his relationship with cabinet ministers. 
Prime Minister Keating surprised his colleagues from the outset with the degree 
to which he was prepared to oversee wide-ranging discussions of the general 
political situation in the first year of his Government. Michael Gordon wrote that 
a 'common reflection of cabinet ministers, whether they were original Keating 
supporters or not, was that there had been more political discussion in cabinet in 
Keating's first year than there was during the whole of Hawke's record term as a 
Labor prime minister'505, a development greeted warmly by the cabinet506. Neal 
Blewett, for example, recounts how 
cabinet was a much happier place than it had been under the last years of 
Hawke, partly, of course, because the leadership boil had been lanced. And 
there was a kind of unity formed out of desperation with all minds focused 
on how to win the unwinnable election. Keating encouraged far more 
general political discussions than Hawke had ever countenanced and this 
was good for cabinet morale501. 
503 There were 459 meetings of cabinet committees during Keating's leadership. See Table 4.1. 
504 Michael Keating and Patrick Weller 2000, op cit. 
505 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, pp 222-3. 
506 Michelle Grattan, The People Who Advise Paul Keating', Age, 27 March 1993, p 18. 
507 Interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 2002. 
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Importantly, after the wounds of the leadership challenges, Watson recalls that 
'Cabinet members were said to appreciate the degree of political discussion he 
encouraged, the esprit de corps he called up from the decades of experience'5os. 
For a politician as forceful and dominant as Paul Keating it is remarkable to 
consider that his approach to chairing cabinet was low-key and tolerant of 
opposing views. But, according to a number of interviews conducted for this 
thesis, as well as some published accounts, this was indeed the case, at least 
initially. From Neal Blewett we hear that the Prime Minister spoke quietly in 
cabinet509, and Graham Richardson remembers debate taking place 'pretty free 
under Keating, even encouraged'. The latter adds: 'I don't recall him ever strong-
arming people in the cabinet - he did that as a Treasurer but not as prime 
minister510. John Button describes Keating as 'pretty low-key in cabinet' and 'not 
an authoritarian figure in the cabinet room. There was no doubt who was prime 
minister but he didn't use that in a way that was inconsiderate'511. Neal Blewett 
offers this description: 
Keating generally chaired cabinet in a low-key way and did little to curtail 
discussion, even if irrelevant, so that discussions often became woefully 
discursive. I cannot recall any occasion in those fifteen months on which he 
savaged a minister in cabinet though occasionally, particularly when tired, he 
could show irritability. He could get excitable on particular topics and 
intervene excessively but was mostly good-humoured and frequently self-
deprecatory. There was plenty of dissent but only if it touched on a prime 
ministerial nerve was there much reaction and then mostly a sardonic or 
sarcastic quip512. 
But in general, according to Michael Lavarch, Keating led off on each agenda 
item, expressed his view and then allowed the matter to be discussed513. This is 
backed up by press commentary; one piece spoke of how Keating 'often starts 
discussions with his view, then says "that's my view, but I'm open to persuasion", 
5os Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 200. 
509 Neal Blewett 1999, op cit, p 32. 
5io Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
511 Interview with John Button, 25 June 2002. 
512 Interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 2002. It is worth noting, however, that Blewett was not a 
cabinet minister in the period 1993-96, the years where Keating's commitment to cabinet was 
more often questioned. 
513 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
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and he listens'514. His passive and inclusive approach differed markedly in this 
respect from his cabinet performances as Treasurer515. 
It is perhaps a stretch to describe Paul Keating, in any domain, as first among 
equals. But in his chairing of cabinet in that first year of leadership we find the 
closest match to the traditional type. Graham Richardson told the author that he 
doesn't 'recall Paul seeking to dominate discussion in the cabinet; he allowed 
debate pretty freely'516. Don Russell's view on this is interesting: 
Neal Blewett expressed the view to me that Keating actually took the cabinet 
more seriously than Hawke. Not necessarily in the sense of all the rigmarole 
and due process but in actually being interested in what they had to say, and 
encouraging them to talk. He didn't pre-cook cabinet meetings. He tended 
to let any cabinet minister who had some standing have their say and he 
would attempt to accommodate the views of cabinet ministers or ministers 
with standing. He would try and pull things together. He expected them to 
actually participate. He didn't go into the room with a preconceived view. He 
actually respected and had an interest in what they were going to say. And I 
did get feedback from ministers that they were actually a bit surprised at the 
dignity that he gave to cabinet discussions511. 
The Secretary to the cabinet throughout the Paul Keating tenure, Dr Michael 
Keating, expressed the opinion that Keating was less domineering over cabinet 
than Malcolm Fraser, and went into meetings with his mind made up less 
frequently than was the case with Bob Hawke51s. In Neal Blewett's estimation, 
Keating, like Hawke, 'strove for consensual outcomes rather than riding 
roughshod over opposition, though unlike Hawke he made it much clearer the 
consensual outcome he desired'519. 
When roused to fight for a cause in cabinet, though, Keating could be a 
passionate advocate. In this respect, and when the policy debate required a 
Prime Ministerial intervention, he 'saw leading as not a matter of trying to 
persuade everyone, it was a matter of getting a position and then making it clear 
514 Mike Seccombe and Bernard Lagan, 'Alone', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 1993, p 1. 
515 John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 467. 
516 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
51 7 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
51s Interview with Michael Keating, 26 November 2002. 
519 Interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 2002. 
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to people that that was the position'52o. Button concurs, telling this author that 
people would expect Keating to speak out if the discussion was not going to plan, 
and that he could be a persuasive advocate521. Geoff Kitney recalls how 'cabinet 
ministers would come out of meetings in awe at the way he would take on 
complicated issues and reduce them to very simple propositions that were just 
compelling'522. Prime Minister Keating appeared to have dropped the hectoring 
and haranguing style of cabinet debate he had perfected as Treasurer. 
The general rule for recent prime ministers is that to get 'rolled' in cabinet 
represents a direct threat to their position523. Paul Keating was never defeated in 
a cabinet debate, nor did he expect to be, given the authority and influence of the 
PM in that forum. There were, however, opportunities to change Keating's view of 
specific details of various policies, rather than the general policy thrust of an 
initiative524. According to Don Russell, 'there were some things which were 
fundamental, but if it was just a policy thing - whether you had two channels of 
this or four - he was always willing to listen to anyone who had a legitimate 
opinion525. On specific issues a decision could be slightly altered or delayed for 
further consideration, as in the case of communication and media policy, though 
this was rare526. Lavarch recalls the Prime Minister wasn't 'utterly dogmatic' 
about his view, but would usually get his way if the policy being discussed was 
within his sphere of interest or expertise527 • 
Two examples of Prime Ministerial intervention on significant policy debates in 
cabinet can be found in relation to the issue of media ownership legislation and 
compact disc imports. In the first instance: 
520 According to Brian Howe, interview conducted 12 June 2002. 
521 Interview with John Button, 25 June 2002. 
522 Interview with Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
523 For example, cabinet's disagreement with Bob Hawke over the issue of mining and Coronation 
Hill is widely regarded as sounding the death knell for his leadership. See the ABC documentary 
series Labor in Power 1993, op cit. 
524 According to Don Russell (25 November 2002), Michael Lavarch (26 June 2002), and John 
Button (25 June 2002). 
525 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
526 Interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 2002. 
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The Prime Minister demonstrated his hegemony this week when Cabinet, in 
its first big decision since the election, agreed to allow the Canadian media 
owner, Mr Conrad Black, to acquire 25 per cent of the John Fairfax 
newspaper group. Despite opposition from the ACTU and media unions, the 
ALP federal president, Mr Barry Jones, former treasurers John Kerin and 
Ralph Willis, and significant sections of the caucus, Cabinet approved Mr 
Black's application with apparently minimal debate on the merits of the 
issue. Apart from token opposition from Mr Willis, now the Finance Minister, 
Cabinet focused mostly on technical details of the decision. Cabinet 
members apparently accepted they had been presented with a fait 
accompus2s. 
Apparently the media ownership issue, despite opposition, required little debate. 
This was not the case when an evenly split cabinet discussed music imports in 
1995. In this case: 
One group of three ministers wanted to break the six companies' Australian 
monopoly. Another group of three did not, arguing support for local artists. 
Then Paul Keating spoke. Ministers would say later the Prime Minister spoke 
for probably 15 minutes, no more. When he'd finished, the debate was all 
over. The six companies had won. This Cabinet takes its lead from Keating . 
It is his creation, and his authority is utterly dominants29. 
Michael Lavarch, when asked why Keating's view prevailed in cabinet with 
regularity, believed the weight of the prime ministerial office; the notion that 
ministers who opposed Keating would be wasting political capital with him; and 
that he was a 'strong and persuasive arguer' were the key factors in Keating's 
dominance of cabinet colleagues53o. 
Despite Keating's tolerant chairing style, his willingness to include colleagues in 
policy discussions around the cabinet table, and the exalted position the 
leadership affords a prime minister, he was publicly and privately criticised for his 
decreasing commitment to the institution as time wore on. Numerous sources 
spoke at the time and subsequently that the PM did not take the scheduling of 
meetings seriously, and was often late. John Button said 'there was a bit of 
resentment' that 'cabinet would be kept waiting'. Bob Hogg recalled how 
'Cabinet would be called for 10am and then cancelled for some capricious 
527 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
528 Geoffrey Barker, 'PM Now a Ruthless King of the Road Two Decks', Age, 24 April 1993, p 17. 
529 Alan Ramsey, 'Keating Sings To His Mates' Tune', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 April 1995, p 
33. 
53o Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
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reason, then you'd find out Paul was fucking around at the Lodge until 3 in the 
afternoon'531. Another talked of how the cabinet members 'were all busy people 
and he'd be out with his two singlets and an overcoat on listening to bloody 
Mahler'532• Adviser John Edwards puts this down to the PM having 
never been a punctual, meticulous person. Some of the requirements of his 
new job annoyed him. It was important that he be on time for Cabinet, for 
example, because he chaired it and it couldn't begin without him. But he 
was often late, and often changed the meeting times. In his mind, he was 
putting substance before procedure. In the minds of his ministers he was 
simply disorganised533. 
After the 1993 election the irregularity of meetings had also became a source of 
disquiet534. 
Like other aspects of the Paul Keating Prime Ministership535, the commitment to 
formal cabinet meetings began waning after the 1993 election and reached a low 
point by 1995. In this vein, Brian Howe makes the following observations: 
Keating was less concerned to build the collective cabinet, particularly after 
93, by then he was pretty much running his own race. Prior to 93 I think he 
put a lot of effort into trying to build camaraderie and trying to take the 
cabinet very seriously, involve people much more. So there was a big 
difference between 91-93 and 93-96. In that period he's become much 
more withdrawn, much more focussed on his own agenda and much less 
interested in canvassing the views of the ministry as such536. 
Though Keating's commitment to formal cabinet meetings varied throughout the 
Prime Ministership, he was on the whole a tolerant chair who could switch into 
advocacy mode on issues that warranted his attention. When this happened the 
PM would carry the day. Within the walls of the cabinet room, Paul Keating was a 
dominant Prime Minister, but not always a domineering one. 
531 Interview with Bob Hogg, 4 September 2002. 
532 Private conversation with senior minister in the Government. 
533 John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 466. 
534 See Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 220; Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, pp 29-30. 
535 In particular the Prime Minister's maintenance of key media and electoral relationships; see 
Chapters Seven and Eight, below. 
536 Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002. 
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Keating and Kitchen Cabinets 
This chapter recognises that cabinet is more than just a meeting; it is a system of 
relationships between cabinet ministers which overlaps into formal institutions 
such as committees, as well as informal webs of interaction, kitchen cabinets, 
and bilateral interaction. Policy and strategy can be determined in these sectors 
of the cabinet system rather than in the formal cabinet meeting which endorses a 
course of action. Prime ministers navigate this broader cabinet system, and must 
take into account relationships of power and influence flowing both ways 
between leader and colleague. This more expansive notion of cabinet's operation 
is a more effective forum through which to examine prime ministerial power. If a 
skilful prime minister gets their way, it is likely to be because they have 
determined where the decision is to be made - in a committee, kitchen cabinet 
of senior ministers, or in a one-on-one discussion - and have the power to 
guarantee the outcome. 
Recognising the potential for influence, Paul Keating was more committed to the 
broader cabinet system than he was to formal cabinet meetings. He revamped 
the committee system in order to concentrate power in his hands and in those of 
a smaller number of colleagues. He relied on the advice of only a handful of 
cabinet ministers537 , the closest he came to forming a kitchen cabinet, though 
the contemporary importance of a policy issue often saw him develop a close but 
transitory relationship with a particular minister. Cabinet ministers found access 
to the PM difficult, but not prohibited, and again determined by portfolio and 
policy climate. 
Cabinet committees were newly empowered under Keating, becoming smaller de 
facto cabinets whose decisions were later ticked off by the larger group. This was 
particularly so from the outset of Keating's second term in office; committees 
became 'smaller and fewer than those that grew up under Bob Hawke, and 
537 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
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Keating chairs each of them'538. In more detail, the authoritative Geoff Kitney 
wrote: 
After the election, in consultation with the secretary of his department, Dr 
Michael Keating, the Prime Minister radically restructured the Cabinet 
process. He established a new system under which most of the Cabinet 
business was re-routed to Cabinet committees; he halved the size of the 
committees by excluding all the junior ministers and he dramatically reduced 
the involvement of the full Cabinet in the deliberative process. These days 
weekly Cabinet meetings have only one or two items on the agenda and are 
short539. 
A detailed list of cabinet committees, chairs and members is provided in 
Appendix Three. The effect of this revamping of the committee system to favour 
decision making in smaller forums had the effect of concentrating the 
Government's decision-making into a few hands540, including, of course, the 
Prime Minister's. 
The most powerful of the cabinet committees remained, as was the case under 
Hawke, the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC). It met most regularly out of all 
the committees541, and took on most of the difficult spending and revenue 
decisions. Brian Howe described the ERC as a 'kind of inner cabinet'542, 
comprising the PM, economic ministers and a couple of other cabinet ministers 
with significant clout to warrant inclusion. Ramsey called it the 'budgetary razor 
gang'543, because of its role in the determination of the Government's spending. 
On policy initiatives such as One Nation in 1992 the ERC played a dominant role, 
though even within the Committee Keating and John Dawkins, working together, 
were dominant544. 
538 Geoffrey Barker, 'A Juggler in Full Flight', Age, 4 June 1993, p 17; see also Appendix Three. 
539 Geoff Kitney, 'Small Fuse, Big Row', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 June 1993, p 17. 
540 Ibid. 
541 Alan Ramsey, 'Poll Focuses PM's Mind Ever So Sharply', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 
1992, p 25. 
542 Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002. 
543 Alan Ramsey, 'It's Too Soon For Hewson to Scoff', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 February 1992, 
p21. 
544 Interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 2002. 
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The committee system became increasingly important to the broader cabinet 
process as time wore on. Pamela Williams argued the growing power of 
committees, and hence the cabinet's most senior ministers, meant that by 1995 
the Prime Minister 
changed the way Cabinet operated, telling senior ministers he didn't want 
arguments in meetings. Instead, important issues were to be sorted out in 
Cabinet committees before being endorsed by Cabinet ... The effect of it was 
to give portfolio ministers a lot more authority and they would be checked 
against a small committee which was Treasury, Finance and Prime Minister 
and Cabinet. Then the PM would give it a tick545. 
The situation led to a system where cabinet committees became essentially 
decision making bodies led by Keating and a small clique of very senior 
colleagues such as Treasurers Dawkins and then Willis. Power was effectively 
concentrated into fewer hands, which made the Prime Minister's influence 
greater than what could be possible if decisions were taken in meetings of a full 
cabinet of 18 or 19 ministers. 
Apart from the formal cabinet committees, there was little in the way of 'kitchen 
cabinets'; small, informal gatherings of trusted cabinet colleagues who advised 
the Prime Minister on matters of importance. Keating relied on a fairly fluid group 
of senior colleagues, though the presence of Brereton was constant, as was 
Richardson's and Dawkins' until their respective retirements. Various accounts 
of the ministers closest to Keating vary. Howe, stressing the ad hoc nature of any 
group, nonetheless includes Brereton, Richardson and perhaps Ros Kelly546 as 
constant advisers. Geoff Walsh remembers much consultation with Dawkins, 
Willis and Brereton547. Mark Latham recalls Brereton, Dawkins and Kelly forming 
a tight group54B; Blewett lists Dawkins, Richardson and Brereton549. Don Russell, 
Keating's most trusted personal adviser, remembers Richardson, Dawkins, 
Button and Blewett as the inner core of any group resembling an inner cabinet, 
545 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 30. 
546 Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002. 
547 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
548 Interview with Mark Latham, 3 June 2002. 
549 Interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 2002. 
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and also at times Gareth Evans, Bob Collins and Michael Lee were included in 
deliberations55o. 
Graham Richardson, John Dawkins and Laurie Brereton's closeness to Keating 
was based on portfolio interest and passion for policy (Dawkins), and factional 
and personal allegiance (Richardson and Brereton). Above all it was determined 
by the extent to which the Prime Minister trusted the advice provided. Mark 
Ryan, in this context, described in an interview a 'virtuous cycle' where 'Keating 
gets the advice he needs and the access gets easier when that's been proven'551. 
Graham Richardson (in the cabinet for two stints until 1994) and Laurie Brereton 
(a cabinet minister from 1993) 'were serious contributors because of the length 
of time they'd known Keating' and as 'a natural consequence of them being old 
political allies'. They knew Keating intimately and knew how to get advice to him, 
when to get advice to him, how to put the advice to him in a way that would get 
the result'552• Brereton, in particular, maintained a very close relationship with 
Keating, which led one commentator to write that it was 'a fact of Caucus and 
Cabinet life that Brereton has considerable influence with the Prime Minister'553. 
Brereton, Richardson and Dawkins comprised the inner core of Prime Minister 
Keating's group of cabinet confidantes, but they were supplemented according to 
ministerial portfolios and the pressing policy issues of the day. Further, these 
policy-based relationships tended to be bilateral rather than a conglomeration of 
an inner cabinet plus the minister responsible for the pressing issue. John Button 
recalls a situation where there 'was less a kitchen cabinet than individual 
relationships, and issues Keating would talk to people about. For example him 
and Gareth in relation to foreign policy, APEC and things like that, and me, 
separately, in relation to industry'554. Keating's relationship with his Deputy, 
Brian Howe, was also only close when portfolio issues attracted the PM's 
550 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
551 Interview with Mark Ryan, 12 September 2002. 
552 Ibid. 
553 Sally Loane, 'Laurie Brereton', Sydney Morning Herald, 7 March 1992, p 39. 
554 Interview with John Button, 25 June 2002. 
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attention, or when discussion of the political management of issues such as 
reshuffles was required555. Attorney General Michael Lavarch was close to 
Keating sporadically, when legal issues arose556. Two important policy 
relationships were maintained with Gareth Evans, who had carriage of foreign 
policy as well as the steering of the Mabo legislation through the Senate557; and 
Treasurer Dawkins, who 'made a point of visiting Keating frequently, sometimes 
without staff' and 'Keating would often see him alone, or with Don Russell 
only'55s. 
Prime Minister Keating was often criticised for not having what other cabinet 
ministers would regard as an open door policy. That some did not enjoy access to 
Keating was therefore a significant source of cabinet anguish. John O'Callaghan 
argues that while ministers had become accustomed to walking into Bob Hawke's 
office to 'chew the fat', Keating did not operate that way. Instead, 'if he was 
having a discussion with a colleague it was for a specific reason'559. John 
Edwards argues it took some cabinet ministers 
a long while to learn that Keating wanted to be involved only in 
circumstances that were truly important or where the minister could not 
resolve it himself. He loathed it when ministers came around to tell him 
something merely to have an audience and receive his blessing. He loathed 
it when ministers would come back again and again seeking a decision they 
had at first been denied. Sometimes Keating hid in his dressing room and 
told the staff to say he was out ... Not even the tirades of Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans, who sometimes suspected that Keating was hiding from him 
in his dressing room, would really trouble Robinson [the appointments 
secretary )560. 
Others have since confirmed Keating used to hide in his private bathroom from 
ministers, often Gareth Evans, when he didn't want to speak with them561. Those 
who could access the Prime Minister were largely those included in the above 
discussion of closest prime ministerial confidantes. Richardson, Brereton and 
555 Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002. 
556 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
551 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
55s John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 467. 
559 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
560 John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 466. 
561 Two senior PMO aides confirmed this in private conversations. 
144 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
Dawkins remained the key beneficiaries of prime ministerial access who could 
see Keating at short notice5s2. 
The exclusivity of the Prime Minister's office when it came to consultation with 
cabinet colleagues largely came down to Keating's style and his lack of close 
working relationships with many in cabinet. Some commentary published in 
1995 talked of how Keating was 'isolated from his own people'. Further, with the 
resignation of Richardson, and Brereton's preoccupation with his own portfolio 
responsibilities, no-one 'comes barrelling into Keating's office with advice, to lay 
down the law, or to just chew the fat'563. The effect of this was to create a 
perception of an isolated Prime Minister relying principally on personal staff. This 
is a subject returned to in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
Cabinet was vital to the functioning of the Keating Government but much of the 
detailed policy deliberation took place outside the walls of the cabinet room. 
Prime Minister Keating revamped and personalised the committee system to give 
himself and a small coterie of ministers a greater say in the debates, and cabinet 
was in many cases expected to sign off on the committee outcomes. An informal 
kitchen cabinet comprised only a tiny handful of cabinet colleagues, though 
periodically others were drawn into the circle when policy issues required it. 
Access was limited largely to these key confidantes. The effect of all of this was 
to centralise power in the hands of the Prime Minister and marginalise the full 
cabinet. Though this was not absolute - full cabinet could at times be taken very 
seriously (see above) - the Keating Government's major decisions were taken by 
the leader in conjunction with a select few from the cabinet. 
562 Interview with Graham Richardson,24 June 2002; See also interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 
2002. 
563 Sally Loane and Tony Wright, 'Inside Keating's Magic Circle', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April 
1995, p31. 
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Pre-empting Cabinet 
There were occasions where Prime Minister Keating's dominance of cabinet 
reached the point where he could and would announce major policy initiatives 
before they had even reached cabinet for discussion or debate. John Button 
believes Keating 'didn't have a relationship with cabinet', instead he was 'into 
dreaming up ideas, in his office, and quite often they were announced without full 
cabinet consideration'564• Neal Blewett concurs, despite being largely impressed 
with Keating's approach565, arguing that the 'most presidential aspect of 
Keating's style was his tendency to gazump ministers - and cabinet - by pre-
emption through public statements'566. A number of examples of where the 
Prime Minister largely ignored cabinet can be found. The fiasco that occurred 
over the granting of woodchip licenses567 was largely attributable to a lack of 
cabinet discussion or coordination56a. Measures included in the 1993 budget 
were another example of the diminished importance of the cabinet process; 
'Aside from Dawkins, Willis and Keating, the first cabinet knew of them was at the 
6.15pm briefing on budget night'569. Similarly with the release of the Republic 
Green Paper following the report authored by Malcolm Turnbull's Republic 
Advisory Committee. Don Watson's recollection was that 'Keating said if he had 
to take it to cabinet, cabinet would leak'570, so he announced it unilaterally. This, 
it appears, was a common trait of Keating's leadership. The three most 
illustrative examples are provided by: the Government's decision to privatise 
Qantas; pay television policy; and the signing of the Indonesian treaty. 
On 31 May 1992 the Prime Minister announced on commercial television major 
shifts in policy, including the sale of Qantas and a detailed plan for the 
564 Interview with John Button, 25 June 2002. 
565 See above. 
566 Interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 2002. 
567 See Chapter Three 'Leading Labor'. 
568 See Alan Ramsey, 'A Question of Where the Weight Falls', Sydney Morning Herald, 24 
December 1994, p 15; Shaun Carney, 'Swooping Into Action', Age, 21February1995, p 9. 
569 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, pp 267-8. 
570 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 223. 
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introduction of pay television networks. On both issues he was largely ignoring 
cabinet by announcing the policy initiatives without taking them first to that 
forum. According to Michael Gordon, Keating 'announced the decision to merge 
Australian Airlines and Qantas before the issue had even been discussed in 
cabinet's11. Once announced, Keating then took the matter to cabinet for sign-
off, though by pre-empting his senior colleagues the outcome of the discussions 
was all but assured572. In this respect cabinet was presented with a fait 
accompli, it had 'little option but to endorse the broad proposals' because 
'anything else would be a severe rebuff to the PM'573. 
Labor's pay television policy was announced by Keating on the same day, again 
without cabinet consideration or approval. The thrust of the policy was to allow 
'45 percent ownership of the entire system by existing TV networks with a limit of 
20 percent per network'574, a contentious decision that eventually attracted the 
displeasure of some in the cabinet and the parliamentary caucus. One editorial 
from the Sydney Morning Herald described a situation where 'Cabinet is simply 
sitting back and watching which way Keating takes them. Cabinet remains a 
bemused bystander'575. Again, we can conclude, the fact that the Keating policy 
was eventually signed off by cabinet is a demonstration of the power of the Prime 
Minister and the propensity for cabinet to acquiesce to the Prime Minister's 
publicly declared policy preference. 
A slightly different case, but one where cabinet and cabinet committees were 
largely ignored, came in 1995 with the signing of the defence treaty between 
Australia and Indonesia. It is important to make the point here that individual 
ministers as well as the cabinet as a collective were not informed of the 
negotiations, only discovering the presence and structure of the agreement once 
511 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 204. 
572 See Don Watson 2002, op cit, pp 199-200. 
573 Michelle Grattan, 'Keating Grabs the Policy Levers to Stop the Dive', Age, 1 June 1992, p 13. 
574 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 198. 
575 'A Question of Question Time', Sydney Morning Herald, 17 October 1992, p 22. 
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it had been reached576. Though cabinet ministers were reportedly satisfied that 
this was a matter most appropriately dealt with between national leaders, that it 
was not discussed in cabinet and that key ministers were not kept up to date on 
the progress of the negotiations is nonetheless illustrative of the Keating 
approach. 
These examples of Prime Minister Keating bypassing cabinet and announcing, 
unilaterally, significant policy initiatives of the Labor Government, represent an 
extension of the argument developed in this chapter that while cabinet was 
tolerated and listened to once convened, some policy areas were nonetheless 
regarded as part of Keating's personal domain. An Age editorial called it Keating 
in 'presidential mode', 'a flourish of leadership with a capital L' and a 'bold 
attempt by the Prime Minister to regain the political initiative for a Government 
wracked with damaging problems and dwindling public support, and to forestall 
internal wrangling by asserting his personal authority as the key to the 
Government's electoral survival'577. 
The most important factor in Keating's bypassing of cabinet, as with other 
aspects of his leadership of the ministry addressed above, is the willingness of 
senior colleagues to tolerate a situation where policy could be announced 
unilaterally, with minimal consultation and without cabinet approval. Peter Smark 
places the blame for this situation firmly at the feet of cabinet ministers who 
complain 'privately to reporters, to backbenchers and to party intimates, that Paul 
Keating is so determined to have colour and movement to distract attention from 
the appalling unemployment figures and the general economic shambles, that 
the Cabinet has been reduced to the status of a baggage train'. He continues: 
So there's a low drone of complaint about the Keating style, as though the 
tea and coffee in the Cabinet room had been spiked with some mysterious 
New Guinea poison which takes away the power of speech. If they are to be 
believed, they found themselves incapable of saying "no" or even "hang on a 
minute". Cabinet Government is being reduced to rubber-stamping, they 
576 See Paul Keating 2000, op cit, p 12; and interviews with Don Russell (25 November 2002) 
and Michael Keating (26 November 2002). 
577 'Keating Opts for High Risks, and Good Sense', Age, 2 June 1992, p 13. 
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whisper, as though their complaisance were not crucial to the process. When 
Paul Keating was Treasurer, they complained that he maneuvered matters 
so that real debates on economic policy seldom surfaced in Cabinet. Now, 
they whinge that he keeps them waiting for hours on Cabinet days, surfaces 
policy issues with turbo-chargers tied to their tails, and the decisions are 
whisked away with the "agreed" stamp plastered on before they've had time 
to arrange their thoughtss1s. 
That this situation was allowed to arise is indicative of the Prime Minister's 
dominance over colleagues, their propensity to be by-passed, the dependence on 
the leader for electoral success, which might be jeopardised by publicly 
conducted disputes, and the lack of alternative centres of power to which 
dissenters might turn. In short, Keating's hand-picked ministries and cabinets 
provided little resistance to a powerful Prime Minister with a passion for policy 
developed among intimates in his private office and the bureaucracy and often 
announced unilaterally579. 
Controlling Cabinet 
Prime ministers enjoy a privileged position in the cabinet process. They decide if, 
when and where matters are discussed58°, they enjoy advantages in the amount 
of advice they receive on cabinet submissions, they play a role in the selection of 
ministers and the allocation of portfolios, their view is given significant weight in 
the cabinet room, and it's rare that they are 'rolled' by their senior colleagues. 
The seriousness of a prime ministerial defeat in cabinet means it is a weapon 
rarely unsheathed. Indeed, as Graham Richardson observed in an interview for 
this thesis, 'if you roll the prime minister in the cabinet then his leadership is 
going to be in some danger, so you find a way to compromise'581. Sometimes, as 
Geoff Walsh observed, 'prime ministers spend their whole lives feeling they have 
to consult with people who don't feel the same obligation - sometimes they look 
at an issue and think "this is the course we'll have to go", and just go that 
578 Peter Smark, 'Tuned Into the Static of Cabinet', Sydney Morning Herald, 20 June 1992, p 41. 
579 See Chapter Five, below. 
580 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit. 
581 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
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way'582. All of these factors ensure a prime minister is more first and less equal 
when it comes to the operation of executive government and the decisions which 
spring from its processes. 
Malcolm Fraser, the comparison to which this study of Paul Keating will 
periodically return, dominated his ministers and the cabinet process. He 
managed this by making sure he was exceedingly well prepared and briefed, and 
that he was on top of all the issues before the group. He was an active and 
formal chair of cabinet meetings, seeking views rather than votes, and always 
making sure his view prevailed. The Fraser Government 'was collective; cabinet 
was involved in all important issues. But the collective purpose was imposed by 
the leader, the only person to stretch across the whole government in an active 
way'583. His management of ministers was an exhaustive process that saw him 
garner superior information, which in turn, along with the usual prime ministerial 
advantages, provided him a superiority over his colleagues. 
Another stark contrast with Keating's approach to cabinet is provided by a 
comparison with the Hawke era. Simply, 'Bob had a more chairman of the board 
approach to cabinets. He used to trade heavily on his ability to resolve conflicts, 
and ... actually liked chairing cabinet, whereas Paul was a more insular type of 
personality, who'd rather put things through quickly'584. Hawke tolerated long 
discussions and fruitful contributions from individual ministers, a luxury afforded 
him by the talent and intellectual rigour of his early cabinets5s5. According to 
Stephen Bradbury, 'Hawke would rarely exert his will or dominate debate, but 
effectively and efficiently presided over robust discussion among some of the 
most brilliant minds to lend their talents to the development of public policy at 
582 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
583 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 147; see also pp 133-44. 
584 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
585 Neal Blewett, 'The Hawke Cabinets' in Susan Ryan and Troy Bramston (eds), The Hawke 
Government: A Critical Retrospective (Melbourne, Pluto Press, 2003); see also David Bradbury, 
'The institutions of governance: Parliament, the executive, the judiciary and law reform' in Susan 
Ryan and Troy Bramston (eds), The Hawke Government: A Critical Retrospective (Melbourne, 
Pluto Press, 2003), p391. 
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the Cabinet table in this country'586. Though he was less willing to explicitly 
stamp his authority on the decisions taken by cabinet, like all prime ministers, he 
was able to bypass the forum when it suited his ends, for example when he 
decreed that Chinese students in Australia at the time of the Tiananmen Square 
massacre would be allowed to stay in Australia. On the whole, though, Hawke 
allowed decisions to be taken in cabinet by ministers granted autonomy in their 
own ministerial domains. Unlike Fraser, whose influence and knowledge reached 
every corner of his Government, and unlike Keating, whose forceful approach and 
dominance ensured compliant outcomes, Prime Minister Hawke took a more 
traditional approach to chairing cabinet. 
Paul Keating paid less attention to the cabinet process than Fraser and Hawke, 
despite an impressive beginning, but dominated his ministerial colleagues 
nonetheless. According to one advisor, there 'are some pretty good examples of 
things that happened under his Prime Ministership which weren't what you'd call 
models of a consultative process'587. His dominance arose from a number of 
factors. Most significantly, the authority he earned from winning the 1993 
election and the consequent power he was granted to choose his ministerial 
colleagues meant that he could surround himself with accomplices, supporters, 
factional colleagues, and like-minded policy architects. The Prime Minister's 
policy dynamism, and well cultivated interests in key policy domains such as 
communications and the economy, was another factor; ministers accepted his 
intervention in these areas and the policy announcements made unilaterally and 
without going to cabinet. 
That cabinet became a rubber stamp in such areas is indicative of Keating's 
dominance over colleagues. Though the cabinet process was initially regarded as 
important to the rebuilding of ministerial esprit de corps, and Keating was an 
accommodating chair, it evolved into a forum in which decisions taken elsewhere 
were signed off. Committees and bi-lateral decisions filled part of the void, the 
ss6 Stephen Bradbury 2003, op cit, p 392. 
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rest was filled by a confident and powerful Prime Minister surrounded by 
acquiescent colleagues. In this respect, Paul Keating's alleged wish for a cabinet 
system 'not full of spikes' was fulfilled, creating as power vacuum filled by the 
Prime Minister and a powerful coterie of advisers. 
5s7 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
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Governing From the Centre 
From where I sat he was the government - or sometimes we were. It 
was not that anyone thought the PMO had an absolute monopoly on 
wisdom. In fact much that was attempted or done was driven by or 
drawn down from the perceptions and advice of people outside. But it 
remains true that the leader who has to lead can't if he listens to every 
voice he hears588. 
Prime ministers are bestowed with enormous responsibility and perform a 
myriad of tasks in the course of their duties589. To assist them, they rely on 
institutional and personal sources of advice. In this context, there is an 
observable trend away from the traditional conception of prime ministerial 
advice - that resources are provided to the leader as a consequence of their 
role as head of government - towards large-scale and personal support for 
the leader which allows them to spread themselves right over the breadth of 
the government's activities. Accordingly, Patrick Weller writes: 
While all agree that they require assistance in their role as head of 
government, their need for support as an individual is not so readily 
accepted. Constitutionally their chief advisers are meant to be their 
ministers. Parliamentary government is collective; ministers are 
supposed to be responsible for the development and implementation of 
policy; cabinet is regarded as the proper forum of crucial decisions. Yet 
as prime ministers become more active in more areas of policy, so the 
need for support for the individual, rather than the collectivity in cabinet, 
has become more obvious and its wisdom more strongly debated59o. 
In a recent dissertation, Maria Maley analysed in depth the role of the 
ministerial adviser, and convincingly argued that the role has grown 
exponentially since 1972, providing prime ministers in particular with an army 
of minders to supply personal and political support, perform key 
communicative, policy steering and coordination roles, guard their interests 
588 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 43. 
589 Patrick Weller 1991, 'Support for Prime Ministers: A Comparative Perspective', op cit, p 
370. 
590 Ibid, p 361. 
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and assist them with their myriad tasks591. Campbell and Halligan add that 
'prime ministers have reshaped the institutional resources and frameworks of 
cabinet government to enhance the responsiveness of these to their own 
agendas and leadership'592. 
Individual support for the prime minister is required when a leader attempts to 
govern from the centre, which inevitably requires sources of advice separate 
from ministers and the bureaucracy. In this situation 'Prime ministers must 
always appear to know what is happening; their supporting and advisory units 
must reflect this need'593. Sophisticated support mechanisms and large 
private offices therefore facilitate prime ministerial dominance over 
colleagues and allow for a more individualised approach to leadership. The 
result is that 'the advantages of the office' are 'without measure'594 . 
Prime Minister Paul Keating relied heavily on a close circle of advisers housed 
primarily in his own private office and also, to a lesser extent, in the key 
bureaucratic agencies such as the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (PM&C) and the Treasury. The Keating approach to the prime 
ministership was to 'govern from the centre' by making key decisions, with the 
advice of a small number of confidantes, and then driving them through the 
Party and Government's processes. This is a practice that has been 
discussed in the previous two chapters, and one that is confirmed and 
strengthened by the arguments developed here. 
Paul Keating's interest in the machinery for the provision of advice - the 
structure of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the bureaucracy for 
example - was limited. Here was an outcome driven leader, a policy architect, 
rather than a process leader, as one could describe his predecessor. John 
Halligan has argued that Keating's 'well-known concern with the "big picture" 
591 See Maria Maley, Partisans at the centre of government: The role of ministerial advisers in 
the Keating government 1991-96, (Canberra, 2002); see also Colin Campbell and John 
Halligan 1992, op cit, p 7. 
592 Colin Campbell and John Halligan 1992, op cit, p 8. 
593 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 20. 
594 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 152. 
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precluded attention to the mechanics and the machinery' of Government595. 
His interest lay in getting the best advice from those near and loyal to him, 
which meant senior PMO staff exercised significant clout. This also meant 
that his approach to the organisation of advice provision varied according to 
circumstance. At times there was a greater reliance on the bureaucracy, at 
others on the ministry, sometimes on outside advisers in the business and 
trade union spheres, but mostly on the resources of the PMO. John Halligan 
observed in the Prime Minister 'a desire to relocate power from the 
bureaucracy to the executive wing of the parliament as indicated by the 
tendency to shrink from reliance on the public service in favour of his private 
office; to draw on what he knew'596. The make-up of the Keating office, then, 
was vital to the fortunes of the Government. In general, the PM surrounded 
himself with highly educated, intelligent, sharp policy minds and political 
operators, and rewarded their loyalty with vast opportunities for influence. 
This chapter examines in detail the advisory mechanisms upon which Prime 
Minister Paul Keating drew in the course of his leadership. It deals first with 
the structure, composition and character of the Prime Minister's Office before 
analysing the criticisms that the PMO was an arrogant, insular and 
inaccessible institution which guarded its power tightly and kept the Prime 
Minister isolated even from senior Government figures. Next, the relationship 
between the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and especially its 
Secretary, Dr Michael Keating, and the PM and his office is discussed. 
Important to this discussion is the demarcation between what duties the 
Department performed and those which were carried out by the PMO. Central 
to this is the question of whether or not advisers in the personal office were 
carrying an unusually large policy development load. Another related concern, 
examined next, is the extent to which the activities of the Government were 
coordinated; whether there were regular and formal meetings of key advisers 
for example, or whether other ministerial offices and departments operated as 
individual policy fiefdoms occasionally intruded upon by the Prime Minister 
when circumstances arose. Also analysed is the advisory process; how 
595 John Halligan 1997, op cit, p 55. 
596 Ibid, p 54. 
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Keating received advice and how it was generally tested on other sources 
before it was utilised. The latter stages of this chapter then deal with some 
policy cases and are concerned with the extent to which Paul Keating let 
ministers develop, administer and implement policies, and the type of issues 
that would invite Prime Ministerial intervention. Finally, the important issue 
related to governing from the centre - Australian federalism and the role of 
states and stakeholders - is analysed generally and then in the context of the 
Mabo debate. 
Paul Keating accumulated power at the centre of his Government so required 
the advisory resources that could facilitate the dominance he sought. 
Coordination mechanisms were shunned in favour of small, transitory advisory 
structures and taskforces formed to deal with particular policy development 
work. His loyal personal staff and key bureaucrats sympathetic to his agenda 
provided the advice and the policy creativity that allowed him to intervene in 
areas which interested him, driving the agenda from his office and governing 
from the centre. The result was an Office of the Prime Minister which 
exercised immense power and usurped cabinet as the engine room of the 
Keating Government. 
The Office of Paul Keating PM 
Maley's dissertation provides the most comprehensive study of the role of 
ministerial advisers available, describing their many functions and the 
relationships between advisers, ministers, and departments597. These 
relationships are complex, and help determine the relative success of a 
minister. 
Under Paul Keating, the Prime Minister's Office was a close-knit, fiercely loyal, 
and active unit dedicated to the PM's agenda and skilful in exercising power 
within the system. Further, they were given much responsibility under a 
centralist regime, indeed one senior public servant described a situation 
591 Maria Maley 2002, op cit. 
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where 'under Keating, the advisers were the Prime Minister - and they had a 
very strong role in directing ministers'59s. 
Broadly, the PMO employed administrators, and media, political and policy 
advisers. Accounts of the number of advisers working in the private office vary 
according to the definition applied, from a low of 30599 to a high of 50600 staff. 
What is certain, however, is that when Keating was sworn in as Prime Minister 
he increased the size of his office; according to one account it swelled from 
24 staff under Hawke to 30 under the new PM601. Staff were divided into a 
policy and an administrative group, the former comprising 11 or 12 advisers 
who enjoyed special access to the Prime Minister through a custom built602 
back entrance to his personal office6o3. Keating placed great trust in his 
advisers, the result, according to Michelle Grattan, of their shared experiences 
during the leadership battle and the Prime Minister's 'tribal' and 'family 
oriented' approach to politics6o4. The loyalty that flowed both ways between 
leader and staff created 'a sense of camaraderie and common purpose that 
few offices could emulate' and a system 'whereby Keating employed good 
people, treated them well and thereby made the office even more attractive to 
outsiders'605. 
Keating himself spoke of the familial and close-knit nature of the PMO, and at 
times lavished praise on the team he had assembled. On the eve of the 1993 
poll he called them 'the best prime ministerial office in the history of our 
land'606. Warming up, he continued: 
We have achieved quite a lot, our little group ... We're going to give it a 
run for our money. We have as a group - and we are a disparate group as 
Don (Russell) said - put together a pretty canny little story ... I'm only the 
598 Quoted in Maria Maley 2002, op cit, p 258. 
599 Ian Holland, Accountability of Ministerial Staff, (Canberra, Parliamentary Library, 2002) p 
10. 
600 This is the number used by Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 36. 
601 Ian Holland 2002, op cit. 
602 A new back entrance to the office was built on the Prime Minister's instruction. 
603 See Alan Ramsey, 'Poll Focuses PM's Mind Ever So Sharply', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 
May 1992, p 25. 
604 Michelle Grattan, 'The People Who Advise Paul Keating', Age, 27 March 1993, p 18; see 
also Edna Carew 1992, op cit, p 307. 
605 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 191. 
606 Quoted in Ibid, p 253. 
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mouthpiece for most of you, as you know. I get in there and do the 
gabbing when I have to601. 
He spoke further of the office 'family' comprising 'a pretty powerful 
combination•Gos. Some years later Don Watson recalled that the office 'could 
be as fractious and dysfunctional as a family too'609. 
The key advisers in the PMO during the Keating Prime Ministership were Don 
Russell, Mark Ryan and Don Watson, though only Watson remained 
throughout. These three enjoyed the closest relationships with the PM, and 
Russell was universally regarded as the most favoured of all the advisers610, 
with Watson filling the void left by Russell when the latter left the Office to be 
Australian Ambassador to the United States611. Keating is reported to have 
said that 'In the five years we've worked together he [Russell] and I have seen 
eye-to-eye on every single issue'612. One commentator labelled Russell 
'without question the most influential person in Parliament House next to the 
Prime Minister himself' and 'the principal point of contact in Keating's office 
for ministers who generally will take a decision from Russell as equivalent to 
one from the Prime Minister'613. Don Watson was an academic historian and 
writer who became the guardian of the Prime Minister's conscience and a 
special confidante. A colleague of Watson's commented that 'Keating trusts 
his [Watson's] perception and consults him on all sorts of issues. He is more 
than a speechwriter'614, he was 'a sort of spiritual adviser to Keating, 
responsible for formulating and focusing many of the "big picture" issues that 
are the pride of the Keating repertoire'615. The third of this trio, Mark Ryan, 
was press secretary to Treasurer Keating, staying on as a key adviser until 
1994. Ryan was a tough and courageous operator with the job of presenting 
607 Reported in Michelle Grattan, 'Russell To The Rescue', Age, 21October1995, p 17. The 
speech was widely reported after a tape of it was released to the Independent Monthly. 
5os Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 254. 
609 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 38. 
610 Don Watson has written that 'Keating loved Russell if not as a son then as a younger 
sibling', 2002, op cit, p 215. 
611 Russell loyally returned late in 1995 to run Keating's office in the lead up to the 1996 
election. 
612 Quoted in Alex Mitchell, 'The Man, The Power And The Passion', Sun Herald, 28 January 
1996, p 9. 
613 Bruce Jones, 'Keating's Clan', Sun Herald, 21 March 1993, p 12. 
614 Ibid. 
6 15 Sally Loane and Tony Wright, 'Inside Keating's Magic Circle', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 
April 1995, p 31. 
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unpalatable information to the Prime Minister616. He was said to be an early 
convert to 'the Keating code: never give in, and attack is the best form of 
defence'617. Together, these three provided the backbone of the PMO during 
the Keating Prime Ministership. 
A number of other important figures came and went during Keating's 
leadership. Among them were a succession of principal advisers who 
replaced Don Russell; in turn Allan Hawke, Geoff Walsh and John Bowan. 
Political advisers included Tom Wheelright, Bill Bowtell and Stephen Smith. In 
the international arena Ashton Calvert, who became Ambassador to Tokyo, 
made way for Allan Gyngell. Economic advisers Ric Simes, John Edwards, 
Nigel Ray and Bruce Chapman rotated through the role. Simon Balderstone 
was responsible for indigenous affairs, the environment and sport and was 
eventually replaced by Mark O'Neill; Anne de Salis advised on immigration and 
other general policy; Mary Ann O'Loughlin oversaw social policy and Craddock 
Morton took care of the arts. Anne Summers advised on women's issues until 
shortly after the 1993 election, and Sam Mostyn oversaw communications. 
Press secretaries Greg Turnbull and John Miner handled the spin operation618. 
Maria Maley's reputational analysis of ministerial advisers during Keating's 
leadership offers an intriguing insight into the perceived relative power of PMO 
advisers. In the sphere of political strategy, all respondents to her survey 
(themselves ministerial advisers from across the Government) named Don 
Russell as the most influential adviser, with Watson, Bowtell and Bowan also 
making the top six. Among policy advisers, Russell again topped the list, and 
was joined by other PMO advisers O'Loughlin, Simes, Chapman, Gyngell, 
Mostyn, and O'Neill in the list of the nine most influential. This poll underlines 
two important factors: one, that influence was concentrated in the Prime 
616 Bruce Jones, 'All the President's Mien', Sun Herald, 12 September 1993, p 33. 
617 Tony Wright, 'Pulling the Levers to Become a Republic', Sydney Morning Herald, 20 June 
1994, p 11. 
618 For more detailed discussions of the composition of Keating's private office see Bruce 
Jones, 'All the President's Mien', Sun Herald, 12 September 1993, p 33; Michael Millett, 'The 
Heavy Teams Roll Up For Poll', Sydney Morning Herald, 21October1995, p 29; Bruce Jones, 
'Voice of a Listening Leader', Sun Herald, 11 September 1994, p 29; David McKenzie and 
Jane Hutchinson, 'Key Influences Behind the Power in Canberra', Age, 28 April 1993, p 25; 
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Minister's Office; and two, that other advisers recognised the power and 
authority of the PMO and its key staff. 
Though membership of the inner circle of Keating advisers rotated frequently, 
and longevity in the various roles was rare, an office character nonetheless 
remained. One aspect of this is what Don Watson explained at some length in 
his recent Keating biography, the battle between 'bleeding hearts', 
emphasising social policy and a bigger role for government, and the 'pointy 
heads' who were economic rationalists. The predominance of 'pointy heads' 
can be attributed to Keating's reliance on advice from former Treasury 
bureaucrats who had joined his personal staff, including the most senior 
adviser, Don Russell. Indeed even his appointments secretary, Peter 
Robinson, was an economist619. The second most employed group had a 
foreign affairs background, a group including Geoff Walsh, John Bowan, 
Ashton Calvert and Kim Gyngell. Another common trait for PMO advisers in 
that period was the holding of a doctorate62o. Bruce Chapman believes this is 
because Keating 'liked academic, evidence based characters' around him621. 
Bruce Jones tells one amusing story about this group: 
Keating, who left school at 15 and has no formal tertiary education, has 
a talent for attracting highly qualified, committed and loyal staff 
including, over the years, a large contingent of PhDs known as The 
Eggheads. Soon after he joined Keating 's staff Gyngell took another staff 
member aside who had been calling him 'Doctor' to explain that he didn't 
have a PhD. 'Well, what the hell are you doing here?' was the staffer's 
joking response622. 
The narrow field from which advisers were hired led some to criticise the 
range of advice reaching Keating. 
Despite the perceptions, an argument can be made that Keating attempted to 
include in his office a diverse range of views that would challenge the 
prevailing economic sentiment of the PMO. The appointment of Anne 
Summers is an example of this; her feminist views are unlikely to have fit 
Don Watson 2002, especially p 37; John Edwards 1996, especially p 526; Pamela Williams 
1997, The Victory, op cit. 
619 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 191. 
620 Russell, Calvert, Simes, Chapman, Edwards, Watson, Hawke all had PhDs, to name a few. 
621 Interview with Bruce Chapman, 4 December 2002. 
622 Bruce Jones, 'Voice of a Listening Leader', Sun Herald, 11September1994, p 29. 
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perfectly with the socially conservative Prime Minister though she came to 
occupy a very senior role in the Office623. Similarly, Bruce Chapman did not 
share Keating's and the other economists' degree of faith in markets, but was 
hired and listened to anyway624. Aside from some attempts to encourage a 
diversity of views represented in the PMO, two other factors which appear to 
have influenced Keating's hiring of advisers can be identified. The first factor 
is Keating's preference for creative thinkers rather than administrators, the 
'politically clever and policy smart'625 who could effectively brief him orally626. 
The second factor is a theory expounded at some length by a very senior 
figure interviewed for this thesis. This source argued that the Prime Minister 
developed very close relationships with those people around him who had no 
power bases of their own, and so owed him a significant degree of loyalty. 
This meant he could work with them because they were only there through his 
grace and favour and their influence was entirely dependent on him627. 
Though the battle between alternative points of view raged within the walls of 
the PMO, advisers nonetheless seemed to adopt common mannerisms and a 
style directly from their boss. John Edwards recalls how 'everyone on his staff 
spoke the same kind of language'628. Others wrote how 'those around him 
even take on the same dress habits and deportment: the dark, sleek tailored 
suit and the haughty straight-back prance'629. In more detail, Gordon 
recounted how 'Throughout Parliament House, the Keating staff tended to be 
identified by dark, well tailored, double-breasted suits, and a confident 
manner that was easy to interpret as arrogant. They even acquired a certain 
swagger, which other staffers were prone to imitate'630. Beazley staffer John 
O'Callaghan remembers, laughing, that PMO staff would 'dress like Paul; it 
used to amuse Kim and I waiting for these jokers to arrive and they'd all be 
623 See Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 199. 
624 Interview with Bruce Chapman, 4 December 2002. 
625 Interview with Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
626 Geoff Kitney, 'Change of Watch on Ship of State', Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 1993, p 
15. 
627 Private conversation with senior bureaucrat. 
628 John Edwards, 'Writing About Paul Keating: Inside the Inside Story', Sydney Papers, vol 9, 
no 1, 1997, p 13. 
629 David McKenzie, 'Keating's Steady and Eager Climb to the Top', Age, 20 December 1991, 
p 11. 
630 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 191. 
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clones of Keating'631. The similarity in style and the swagger adopted by the 
Prime Minister's advisers became a superficial representation of the isolation 
and insularity of the Keating office. 
The Prime Minister's Office, we can conclude from this brief discussion, was a 
forum for tough political operators and intelligent policy architects to earn and 
maintain the loyalty of the PM and be rewarded with loyalty and responsibility 
in return. A succession of senior advisers enjoyed Keating's respect and thus 
exercised enormous clout throughout the Government. The closeness of the 
PMO, despite internal policy differences, saw it perceived as an exclusive club 
impenetrable to outsiders. With a lack of familiarity came suspicion and 
criticism. 
Organised Chaos 
The Keating Office was criticised often, mostly for a perceived lack of 
administrative competence; for the composition of its staff; and, most 
significantly, for restricting access to the Prime Minister. That the PMO 
attracted so much criticism is a reflection of the secretive and isolated nature 
of the Keating operation, and his reliance on close, trusted advisers in his own 
private office. Governing from the centre, therefore, created widely-held 
sentiments of distrust and dislike. 
The Office has been described as one where organised chaos reigned. This is 
the impression garnered from Don Watson's work632, and from the interviews 
conducted for this thesis. Watson writes how in 'airport lounges chief 
executives and their secretaries asked me what the hell was going on in the 
Prime Minister's Office - they don't answer letters, they don't return calls'633. 
He also described how letters to the Prime Minister could go six months 
without a response, and 'invitations sent in February were not responded to by 
April'634. Another very senior figure told the author that 'the office was a 
531 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
532 Don Watson 2002, op cit. 
633 Ibid, p 153. 
634 Ibid. 
162 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
shambles', and 'was difficult to deal with'. There was a 'sloppiness' in the 
PMO operation, an 'ill-disciplined process', it 'was just amateur hour' and they 
couldn't organise their own work patterns635. John Della Bosca, then a senior 
Party figure from the New South Wales Branch, recalls how 
There would be a huge creative effort every now and then. But you 
wouldn't know what would come out of it, or even what the gestation 
period would be, or if whatever it was might change form before the birth. 
It was creative but chaotic. It gave you a bit of vertigo dealing with them. 
It was a bit like being in a mad movie. There were always doors 
slamming and people wandering in and out and pieces of paper floating 
around636. 
Labor MPs reportedly even took to calling Keating's PMO the 'black hole', 
where their submissions and proposals were lost forever637 • Mark Ryan 
attributed the perceptions of disorganisation to the realities of political 
management. Agreeing that the Office could appear chaotic, he argued 'life in 
a political office was not always an orderly exercise' because 'what you agree 
is going to be the strategy on the Monday morning is not what it ends up being 
by Tuesday afternoon'63s. Despite this rationalisation Ryan and Don Watson 
did put some effort into reforming the administrative processes of the PMO. 
Criticism of individual staff in the Prime Minister's Office was also common 
during Keating's leadership. Some believed the staff were arrogant and out of 
touch, and that they were Canberra-centric and removed from any 
appreciation of middle Australia639. The exalted policy influence enjoyed by 
the PM's advisers also attracted the criticism that ' you had all these egos in 
there writing policy'64o. Individual staff were criticised for pushing specific 
agendas. Don Watson and Anne Summers attracted the most criticism. The 
predictably scathing Peter Walsh, for example, wrote that Keating had 
'recycled Anne Summers who had been appointed head of the Office of the 
Status of Women by Hawke in 1983' and who 'quickly set about inflicting 
policy damage on the Government'. Watson, he commented 'formerly wrote 
635 Private conversation with senior ALP Official. 
636 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 45. 
637 Bruce Jones, 'All the President's Mien', Sun Herald, 12 September 1993, p 33. 
638 Interview with Mark Ryan, 12 September 2002. 
639 Interviews with John Button, 25 June 2002 and Bob Hogg, 4 and 5 September 2002. 
640 Private conversation with senior ALP Official. 
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jokes for Max Gillies and then commenced writing them for Keating' but 
Keating 'took them seriously'641. 
However, aside from derogatory remarks made privately and publicly about 
the disorganisation and staffing of the PMO, by far the most often heard 
criticism was that the Office isolated the Prime Minister and restricted access, 
even by senior players in the Government642. One minister, for example, 
found it 'near impossible to get into the prime minister's office; you were lucky 
if you got to see senior people in his office, it was very hard'643. The same 
source remembers that 'people were saying "oh, we thought it was hard to see 
Hawkey, now it's impossible to see Keating'"644. John Button, stressing he 
himself could get in to see the PM, told this author that 'the office was 
regarded as arrogant' and that 'ministers had a hard time getting in to talk to 
Keating'645. 
Despite the perceptions of isolation, however, it seems that figures in the 
Government were reluctant to even try to access the PM or have some input 
into the operation of the Office646. Predictably, PMO advisers such as Watson, 
Russell, Chapman, Walsh and Ryan defend the regime, pointing out that 
access was never denied, and that people with standing could see the Prime 
Minister when the circumstances demanded; there 'was nothing to stop 
anyone coming in and I never heard of anyone being asked to leave'647, wrote 
Watson, for example. Bruce Chapman believes there was a perception that 
the PMO was isolated, which differed from the reality. He expressed the 
opinion to this author that people may have been given signals that Keating 
was only interested in the views of a handful of people, so they stayed 
awaye4s. This view is backed up by Don Russell, who believes a 'lot of the 
attitudes were self-inflicted; people just thought it was impossible ... because 
641 Peter Walsh 1995, op cit, p 248. 
642 See David Day 2000, op cit, p 428. 
643 Private conversation. 
644 Ibid. 
645 Interview with John Button, 25 June 2002. 
646 Don Watson 2002, op cit, 544. 
647 Ibid, p 42. 
64s Interview with Bruce Chapman, 4 December 2002. 
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they were intimidated I guess'649. Mark Ryan is more dismissive of the 
criticism: 
A lot of comments that were made about the office were self-serving. 
can assure you the office door was wide open for anyone with ideas. 
Anybody with practical, sensible, real world solutions, got access. I think 
it's a bit childish for people to run around saying the office was 
inaccessible. Most of the cabinet was very experienced, cabinet 
meetings get held, ministers have access. People trying to seriously 
suggest that people like Gareth Evans or anybody, Beazley, any of the 
cabinet, if they wanted to get to Keating they would get to Keating. A lot 
of it I think came from the hangers-on and the apparatchiks. They were 
quite happy to sit on the sidelines and sort of bleat about whatever they 
thought the problem was on the day. But we weren't interested in the 
bleating we were interested in the people who had a solution65o. 
In a different vein, Geoff Walsh argues 'Paul came to the office with an 
enormous amount of parliamentary and ministerial experience. This is a bloke 
who had a highly-tuned sense of what the political issues would be, where the 
political questions would come from. So, there'd be a lot of people anxious 
about things that he'd given thought to and anticipated'651. Don Russell adds 
that 'anyone of standing could always get through', and that 'every minister 
knew they could just pick up the phone and I'd talk to them; you'd always take 
a call from any of the ministers and key principal advisers, and you'd always 
take a call from a senior staffer you knew'652. 
Criticism of the PMO reflected a frustration throughout the Keating 
Government that the Prime Minister and his staff were bunkered away in the 
Office, oblivious to the views of colleagues and operating in a vacuum. That 
Keating relied predominantly on the advice of Russell, Ryan, Watson, and 
other senior PMO figures exacerbated the perception that the remainder of 
the Government was secondary to Keating's advisory needs. Even if the 
criticisms can be justified and rationalised by PMO figures, the fact that 
disquiet abounded is significant to Keating's Prime Ministership. If the 
perception that only a handful of advisers were listened to created a situation 
were people stopped trying to access the PM, then consultation becomes 
even less likely. In this respect, Keating's actual reliance on close advisers, 
649 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
550 Interview with Mark Ryan, 12 September 2002. 
651 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
652 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
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and his senior colleagues' recognition of this, further isolated the Prime 
Minister from the rest of the Government. 
The Prime Minister's Department 
The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet is responsible for 
coordinating the activities of the agencies of government, developing policy in 
select areas, organising key events, and supporting cabinet. The 
Department's role has strengthened over time, and particularly over the past 
three decades, in response to a number of pressures including the wider 
public sector reform agenda, the demands of managing a diverse public 
sector and increased expectations of coordination and coherence in 
government. Beginning in the 1970s, it had by the 1990s added policy and 
coordinating roles to its traditional administrative, representative and protocol 
responsibilities. PM&C provides a prime minister with the capacity to set the 
direction for the whole government. It is a powerful resource available to be 
tapped by a leader wanting to exert influence right across the government653. 
According to Mike Keating, former Secretary of PM&C, and Patrick Weller, 
'This capacity has allowed, and possibly even encouraged, the prime minister 
to take over the driving seat in a limited number of policy areas .... Where the 
prime minister seeks to drive policy, the department will provide the policy 
ca pacity'654. 
Annual Reports released by the Prime Minister's Department during Keating's 
leadership tenure provide valuable insights into the roles and objectives of 
PM&C. Of particular utility is a detailed chapter in the 1992-93 report titled 
Understanding the role and functions of the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, which matches the Department's roles with the Prime Minister's, 
namely: setting strategic direction, staying informed of activity across 
government, concentrating on some selected key policy areas, maintaining 
the machinery of government, managing cabinet processes and the legislative 
agenda, dealing with the states and territories as well as other nations, 
653 For a history of the development of PM&C consult Colin Campbell and John Halligan 1992, 
op cit, pp 45-6. 
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monitoring national security, and helping to draft speeches and 
correspondence and prepare the PM for numerous meetings and other 
engagements655. Other duties include coordination (maintaining links with 
departments and agencies; advance warning of issues; long term directions); 
briefing work (detailed papers, advice, policy work); implementation of policy 
(COAG, microeconomic reform); government support services (cabinet and 
parliament; electoral matters; public service); special policy and program 
functions (key issues and some program delivery); corporate services (finance, 
personnel, technology, training, visits)656. 
To perform these roles, the Department maintained a similar structure 
throughout the Keating Prime Ministership657 . Key divisions typically included: 
Government Support Services (Cabinet Operations; Government 
Business; Official Establishments; Ceremonial and Hospitality); 
Special Policy and Program Functions (Multicultural Affairs; Status of 
Women; Science and Technology Policy; Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs); 
Corporate Services (Executive; Support Services; Program Support); 
Governor General; 
Portfolio Policy Advising Agencies; (Australian Science and Technology 
Council; Office of National Assessments; Office of Economic Planning 
Advisory Council; Office of the Resource Assessment Commission); and 
Public Administration and Accountability (Public Service Commission; 
Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman; Merit Protection and Review 
Agency; Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security). 
Departmental Policy Advising (Economic; Industries, Resources and 
Environment; Social; International; Commonwealth-State relations; 
Northern Development). 
From figures provided in Annual Reports, PM&C outlays during the Keating 
period ranged from $73.7m in 1991-92 to $99.2m in 1992-3. Throughout 
this time, the total staff numbered approximately 500. 
654 Michael Keating and Patrick Weller 2000, op cit, p 62. 
655 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Annual Report 1992-93, (Canberra, AGPS, 
1992), pp 24-5. 
656 Ibid, pp 26-40. 
657 Consult PM&C Annual Reports from 1991-92 to 1995-96 for detailed organisation charts. 
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Under Prime Minister Paul Keating the Department drove key policy initiatives 
such as, for example, One Nation, Working Nation658, Mabo, APEC, and 
forestry policy659. Reading John Edwards' biography of the PM, it seems policy 
work was the primary function of the Department - in this it played a central 
role - though 'Keating did not encourage the department to dictate to other 
departments, and very few policy initiatives from his department could get far 
without the cooperation of his personal office advisers'66o. It also provided a 
research and support function for the Prime Minister's Private Office, housed 
specialist policy experts across the main areas of government, and supplied 
corporate memory. Don Watson called it the 'great privilege of office', where 
'the PMO went for all information and advice of substance - for policy, for 
anything requiring a sophisticated argument or documentation or for drafts or 
notes for speeches'661. The role of Keating's PM&C varied according to policy 
priority and Prime Ministerial requirements. Don Russell comments that, 
because 'it's main role is to service the prime minister', its activities are driven 
by the leader rather than by a separate or independent agenda. Under 
Keating, 'the resources of the Department got channelled towards those 
functions and those policy areas that the prime minister wanted, particularly 
in the areas which cut across a couple of ministers'662. The Department's role 
and influence thus varied according to the priorities of the Prime Minister 
which, in Keating's case, meant concentrating on a small selection of key 
policy initiatives. 
An understanding of Paul Keating's relationship with the Secretary of his 
Department, Dr Michael Keating, is central to any analysis of the PMO-PM&C 
link. Michael Keating has been described as 'the explosively tempered, 
single-minded professional economist with little time for Public Service 
politics. He doesn't play the game, just his own game. Nor does he come from 
the mainstream of the Public Service, where he is as intensely disliked by 
658 Commonwealth of Australia, Working Nation: Policies and Programs, (Canberra, AGPS, 
1994). 
659 See Michael Keating and Patrick Weller 2000, op cit, p 62. 
660 John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 467. 
66 1 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 46. 
662 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
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many as much as he is admired by some'663. He was appointed immediately 
following Paul Keating's ascension, replacing Mike Codd 'because he had an 
activist approach and could be hugely influential in the policy sphere'664. The 
Keating to Keating relationship was formal, but very close. The Secretary was 
given significant scope in the policy fields which interested him, for example 
labour market reform. He was a trusted adviser on issues upon which he had 
specialised knowledge, and made himself indispensable to the Prime 
Minister. Don Russell explains that the PMO would 'always make sure he 
[Mike Keating) got in if he had a list of things he wanted to talk to the Prime 
Minister about'. Further, the Secretary 'would work closely with the advisers in 
the office' and 'would often be around because the Secretary of the 
Department would be the note taker in the cabinet room'. This proximity, as 
well as his policy nous, rather than his position at the head of the Australian 
Public Service empire, according to Russell, brought Mike Keating access and 
influence665. 
Despite the close working relationship the Prime Minister established with the 
Secretary of his Department, PM&C's role and influence diminished somewhat 
in the transition from Hawke to Keating. One commentator wrote early in the 
Prime Ministership that the 'department, with a staff of 500, has lost the 
place in the sun it enjoyed under Hawke and Codd. Unlike Hawke, Keating has 
no departmental people on his personal staff'666. John Halligan concurs with 
the second point, arguing that Paul Keating's 'view of PM&C was reflected in 
the staffing of Keating's private office, the upper echelons of which were 
dominated by trusted former Treasury advisers'667 . Further, most likely 
because of Keating's long association with the Treasury, the balance of power 
between that Department, PM&C and Finance was altered, leaving the 
Treasury with an exalted advisory status not enjoyed under Bob Hawkeees. 
663 Alan Ramsey, 'The Keating Duo: Harmony at Last', Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 
1992, p 23;; see also Michelle Grattan, 'PM Assembles His Cart - Now For The Bumpy Road', 
28 December 1991, p 2. 
664 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
665 Ibid. 
666 Alan Ramsey, 'The Keating Duo: Harmony at Last', Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 
1992, p 23. 
667 John Halligan 1997, op cit, p 54. 
668 Ibid, pp 53-4. 
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The operation of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet under 
Paul Keating was coloured significantly by his reliance on a handful of trusted 
advisers within his own private office. In this respect, according to a Deputy 
Secretary from PM&C, Meredith Edwards, 'mandarins didn't rule the day'669 , 
advisers did. Further, Keating did not intervene in the structure or 
management of the Department67o. The most important relationship was a 
personal one - between the two Keatings - rather than an institutional one. 
As Alan Ramsey explained, Paul 
Keating has always been wary of the bureaucracy as an institution. As in 
politics, his ministerial style of using it is cemented in personal 
relationships. He keeps the real power in his own office. Departments are 
there as an administrative adjunct, no more. The public servants he likes 
are those he cultivates as committed to what he wants to do671• 
Consistent with the Prime Minister's general approach to receiving advice 
from a trusted inner circle, Michael Keating enjoyed a special status. His 
Department, however, was used to varying degrees depending upon the policy 
expertise and coordination required. It operated less as a monolithic 
centralising force in the Australian Public Service and more as a reactive, 
supporting institution for the Prime Minister and the PMO's agenda. 
Demarcation and Coordination 
Maley has argued elsewhere that 'in the Keating period, ministerial offices 
could be significant 'policy powerhouses' in their own right, often sharing roles 
with the department in policy initiation, policy development and policy 
implementation, and working in close partnership with departments in these 
traditional policy making functions' 672. The Keating office was itself a policy-
oriented one, exercising much clout in its relationships with departments. 
Indeed the PMO exercised much power over the entire public service, and 
669 Interview with Meredith Edwards, 4 March 2002. 
670 Ibid. 
671 Alan Ramsey, The Keating Duo: Harmony at Last', Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 
1992, p 23; see also David McKenzie and Jane Hutchinson, 'Key Influences Behind the Power 
in Canberra', Age, 28 April 1993, p 25. 
672 Maria Maley 2002, op cit, p 162; see also pp 162-200 (for advisers' policy roles) and pp 
201-239 (for advisers' coordination roles). 
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advisers could, and were known to, act against the advice of PM&C and other 
agencies673. 
With such a powerful and policy-active private office operating in a highly 
centralised environment it's important to consider where the demarcation 
between what the PMO and the Department did, lay674. A popular perception 
is that Prime Ministerial advisers shouldered an unusually large policy 
development load, a view backed up by memoirs from Don Watson and John 
Edwards, admittedly themselves advisers. In reality, though, the Department 
was at various times called upon to develop policy, coordinate a process of 
policy development, or provide research and technical support for PMO 
advisers. Here the demarcation between PM&C and the private office is 
examined before an analysis of the lack of formal coordination mechanisms is 
conducted. From this discussion we learn that the relationships between 
Prime Minister Keating's sources of advice were symbiotic, transitory and ad 
hoc. There was little in the way of systems of coordination and there was no 
rigid allocation of responsibilities. This can be seen as evidence of a 
disorganised Government or of a flexible, policy oriented set of institutions, 
responsive to the needs of a creative leader. At different times in the 
Keating's Government's lifetime it could be either. 
The demarcation of work carried out by advisory institutions was, therefore, 
not absolute. It was a symbiotic relationship between Office and Department. 
Though one rare clear-cut cleavage was provided by issues deemed too 
'political' for the Department. For example, PM&C did not participate in the 
Question Time briefing, as it had under Malcolm Fraser675. This aside, there 
was no clear demarcation; duplication and symbiosis of institution and staff 
reigned. Michael Keating explains the situation thus: 
There's obviously a degree of duplication, because each is responsible 
for policy. The PMO was more inclined to second guess on policy, partly 
prompted by asking questions in the first place. But usually a good office 
doesn't waste its quite scarce capacity to answer questions, they use it 
673 Ibid, p 260. 
674 For an analysis of political-bureaucratic relationships in general, consult Maria Maley 
2002, op cit, pp 115-61. 
675 Interview with Michael Keating, 26 November 2002. 
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to ask questions. The Department has more capacity, so it should, to 
develop policy, though the Prime Minister's Department, once it's 
established that it's fair dinkum about a policy, would either hand it over 
to a line department or involve the line department and coordinate the 
work676. 
This allusion to the PMO raising policy questions but lacking the capacity to 
answer them is a theme repeated by Don Russell, who argued that 
the PM's office has a lot of staff but doesn't have much depth ... At the 
moment it's still one clever person with an overall understanding of the 
area. The smart ones and the ones who've worked for a while can write 
cabinet submissions and briefings and all that sort of stuff. But it's hard 
to do detailed research. So, the practice has always been that the 
adviser needs some sort of secretariat and some sort of support, and 
that'll either be PM&C or it will be in the department of the minister that 
the adviser is following ... And they would probably give the Prime 
Minister's Department the role of coordinating and probably providing 
advice and there's enough depth in PM&C to create a PM&C view, 
because in any area you'd be relying on the expertise of PM&C677 . 
John Edwards adds that 'advisers drew on the Department for policy work, and 
rarely intruded into the department's job of coordinating views, managing 
work committees and executing and overseeing decisions'678. 
In the absence of a more sophisticated or formal system, the separation 
between who raised issues and who explored them in more detail is a useful 
way to view the demarcation between Departmental and PMO responsibilities. 
It neglects, however, the fact that there were occasions when advisers did 
undertake the bulk of policy development, just as there were times when 
PM&C set the agenda and drove the process. Mark Ryan nominates arts 
policy, specifically Creative Nation, and women's policy as two examples of 
where the PMO carried the policy load, but notes that the Department was 
usually responsible for the detailed work in other areas679. Illustrations of 
significant policy work from the Department, overseen by advisers, abound. 
Native Title, Working Nation, and competition policy are areas nominated by 
Michael Keating where the bureaucracy took the lead6so. In respect to placing 
issues on the agenda, this was a more mixed approach. Some matters were 
given prominence by the Prime Minister, notably, for example, the republic. 
676 Interview with Michael Keating, 26 November 2002. 
677 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
678 John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 469. 
679 Interview with Mark Ryan, 12 September 2002. 
680 Interview with Michael Keating, 26 November 2002. 
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Others were placed on the agenda by external influences such as the High 
Court's ruling on Mabo. At times, however, the Department could initiate the 
process of policy development, as was the case with Working Nation and 
National Competition Policy681. The demarcation between Departmental and 
PMO responsibilities was, therefore, an ad hoc relationship based on the 
location of expertise and other factors. 
This ad hoc and transitory approach to governing carried over into the 
coordination of the Keating Government's activities682 . In this context, little 
additional effort was put into ongoing, formal coordination mechanisms 
between the PMO and Departments683. Bruce Chapman recalls how 
It didn't have the structure of process that you might have expected. It's 
not like someone said let's do a cost-benefit analysis of the following six 
areas of policy, with evidence coming from the various departments and 
being looked at closely by Prime Minister and Cabinet, costed with 
Finance. It wasn't like that6s4. 
More specifically, there was a notable absence of regular meetings between 
key advisers from the Department and the Prime Minister's Office. We get a 
small hint from the Prime Minister why this did not occur in his 2000 
publication Engagement, in which he writes that 'the pressure is always on for 
as many officials as possible to be present at meetings, so no-one's nose gets 
out of joint. I resisted this rule as often as I could'685. This is illustrative of the 
Prime Minister's approach to receiving advice, that is that it comes from a 
small group of confidantes rather than as a result of exhaustive meetings and 
bureaucratic processes. Michael Keating, on the other hand, thought the 
institution of regular coordinating meetings would have been beneficial. He 
told this author in an interview that 'we did it occasionally but not regularly'. 
Further, it wasn't PM&C's role to participate in private office meetings 
because of their political nature686. Periodic attempts to impose formality 
681 Ibid. 
682 The following paragraphs refer largely to coordination at the ministerial office level. For a 
detailed look at coordination across government agencies consult Colin Campbell and John 
Halligan 1992, op cit, pp 59-91. 
683 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between private offices and departments see 
Maria Maley 2002, op cit, particularly pp 84-7. 
684 Interview with Bruce Chapman, 4 December 2002. 
685 Paul Keating 2000, op cit, p 29. 
686 Interview with Michael Keating, 26 November 2002. 
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ultimately failed687. Coordination therefore became reliant on individual 
relationships between advisers in the two principal advisory institutions. 
Coordination of the activities of the PMO and other ministerial offices was 
similarly lacking structured formality, though some attempts were made to 
rectify this. Greg Turnbull, the Prime Minister's long-serving Press Secretary, 
recalls being 
surprised, and horrified in fact, when I came to the Prime Minister's 
Office in 1992, by the separateness of the operation that existed 
between all of the ministerial offices. This was characterised by the 
enemies of the Keating office as our arrogance and our failure to 
communicate. I think it was just a sort of corporate arthritis that had set 
in after so many years in government. I would rarely see or speak to 
other ministers. You would fax things to their offices even though they 
were forty metres away. There was that sense of separate empiresBss. 
The ultimate costs of paying insufficient attention to the coordination of the 
ministerial offices became obvious. The debacle over forestry policy which 
blew up over the granting of licenses and the blurred lines between the 
responsibilities of two ministers is one example of this689. Another came late 
in 1995 when Don Russell, meeting ministers individually in the lead-up to the 
1996 election, 'discovered there was something like 19 ministerial 
statements all planning to be made before the end of 95' which demonstrated 
'a lack of coordination going on at that time'69o. Some attempts at 
coordination were, however, made. For example Don Russell would chair a 
Monday morning meeting of senior advisers to plan for the coming week and 
coordinate ministerial activities. Mark Ryan and Stephen Smith from the PMO 
would also conduct strategy meetings with ministerial offices, ostensibly to 
plan for Question Time in Parliament but also to clear the air on other pressing 
political issues691. These attempts at coordination remained the exception 
rather than the rule throughout the Keating Prime Ministership. 
The advisory arrangements under Paul Keating were driven by policy priorities 
and political pressures, rather than by formal and ongoing processes of 
687 Interview with Meredith Edwards, 4 March 2002. 
688 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
689 Interview with Bruce Chapman, 4 December 2002. 
690 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
691 Interview with Mark Ryan, 12 September 2002. 
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bureaucratic coordination and planning. Don Russell describes this process 
as 'driven by the moment'692 • Consistent demarcations of responsibility were 
largely non-existent, instead driven by expertise and administrative and 
research capacity. The Government lacked formal coordination mechanisms 
and worked instead on the basis of individual relationships and the formation 
of transitory working groups and committees directed towards specific policy 
initiatives. The advisory process therefore reflected the personality of the 
Prime Minister; they were policy, rather than process, driven. 
Advising the Prime Minister 
This emphasis on substance over process carried over into the ways Paul 
Keating preferred to be briefed and advised. He relied heavily on oral advice 
from his private office and brainstorming sessions within it, largely shunning 
the extensive written material supplied by the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. He tested pieces of advice extensively, running ideas 
past other advisers and also on key players external to the PMO. He was an 
attentive listener who, on issues where he had not formed a view or 
possessed insufficient knowledge, respected expertise and valued specialist 
advice. On their part, advisers within the Prime Minister's Office tried, mostly 
in vain, to soften the extreme edges of the PM. If mistakes were made by 
advisers Keating would not rant and rave at them; their loyalty to the leader 
and feelings they may have let him down was punishment enough. In short, 
the manner in which Prime Minister Keating was advised was a reflection of 
his personal style. He went for advice where the expertise or the political nous 
was, testing ideas verbally before making a decision. 
Keating rarely took advice without running it past another advisory group, 
often made up of former staffers who had moved to the private sector. He 
'instinctively seeks advice from many sources'693, wrote biographer Michael 
Gordon. His method of obtaining advice was to 'get political or policy advice 
from one of the group, then run it past the others, wrapping it up with his own 
692 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
693 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 190. 
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ideas along the way'; it 'was an intimate, informal process'694 . It could also be 
a secretive process, where PMO minders were left in the dark on who the 
Prime Minister had consulted. This principle could apply within the Office also; 
advisers often knew little about the extent to which others had been consulted 
on policy issues. John Edwards explains how it was 'difficult to keep informed 
about things that Keating himself was up to. Often he would tell his advisers 
only what and when he needed them to know. Sometimes he would forget to 
tell them at all. Don Russell's freedom of action relied on his having superior 
information, so he would not keep the advisers informed either'695. 
Prime Ministerial advisers in the PMO competed daily with the advice Keating 
took from trusted confidantes outside the office, a group that included, among 
others, former adviser Peter Barron and ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty. The Prime 
Minister is said to have phoned Barron 'several times a day if he was 
grappling with difficult issues'696. When Don Russell left the PMO to take up 
the role as Australian Ambassador in Washington he retained his trusted 
status and was consulted regularly. This was also the case when Mark Ryan, 
Seamus Dawes and Tom Mockridge left for the private sector. In effect 
'Keating simply continued the relationships by phone'697. The provision of 
advice became a competitive process where PMO advisers contended with the 
outcomes of discussions Keating had with trusted confidantes outside the 
office. Don Watson summed up the situation when he wrote that it 'was 
strange to hear the office described as a bunker, impenetrable to outside 
influence, when those inside knew that they competed every day with advice 
he took on the telephone'69s. 
Prime ministers receive a vast amount of written briefing material, mostly from 
the Department, some of which is solicited whereas most is not. The 
Secretary of the PM&C, Michael Keating, recounted in an interview how 
the vast bulk of advice just comes whether he wants it or not. I think 
that's true of all prime ministers, the Department's just preparing advice 
694 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, pp 44-5. 
695 John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 468. 
696 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 27. 
697 Ibid, p 44. 
69a Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 210. 
176 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
so it comes over, it doesn't have to be asked for. Sometimes the Office 
would ring and ask if we were covering something, an issue that was 
running hot in the day's press. Just reassuring themselves that we had 
the information over there. That happened without me getting involved 
as Secretary699. 
The unsolicited material from the Department was read selectively, if at all. Of 
most value to the Prime Minister was the key factual information on 
international relations and the economy, and the advisory notes on cabinet 
submissions. According to Michael Keating 'he was attracted by that sort of 
immediate, factual stuff'700. Sometimes the material would be edited down 
further by the PMO, making it more accessible and adding political lines that 
Keating could utilise. At times he would also ask for papers on longer-term or 
more analytical issues, such as the operation of other federations, for 
example701. 
On the whole, however, Prime Minister Keating shunned the volumes of 
written advice provided by PM&C. According to John Edwards, 
The Prime Minister himself would rarely read PM&C material, except 
rapid reviews of a Cabinet submission, briefing books for foreign visits, 
briefings for Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meetings and so 
forth. Much less than a tenth of the material ostensibly generated by the 
department for the Prime Minister was read by the Prime Minister. He 
saved himself a lot of time and lost very little by this selectivity702 • 
Paul Keating's style was not, therefore, to spend countless hours reading 
written briefs, in contrast with his two immediate predecessors. His approach 
to Question Time, for example, required that he only learn a small selection of 
key statistics, and then let his hectoring and combative debating style do the 
rest. That meant that the Department's Question Time brief was often passed 
over for the oral rehearsal of key lines in the PM0703. 
This practice of discussion, rehearsal and brainstorming was observable 
throughout the Keating Prime Ministership. Meredith Edwards spoke of how 
Keating 'thought in pictures' and was 'not an avid reader of briefs', preferring 
699 Interview with Michael Keating, 26 November 2002. 
7oo Ibid. 
701 ibid. 
102 John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 469. 
703 Ibid. 
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'two hours of discussion about something rather than reading the brief'704. 
Mike Seccombe wrote of this in more detail in 1992: 
Some people remember things better if they see them written. Some 
recall better what they hear. Paul Keating, apparently, is one of the latter. 
Not that he's illiterate. He reads and writes as well as the next person. 
But when it comes to briefings from staff and bureaucrats, he would 
rather be told than be presented with masses of paper. That is one of the 
reasons he is such a consummate politician. A lot of the really choice bits 
of politics are hard to track down in writing. The sledges, the allegations, 
the insults, are passed down orally. On his feet and without papers the 
PM can call to mind not only facts and figures, but ancient slights and 
hatreds, sleazy deals done and broken - in short, all the dirt which is so 
much his stock in trade7o5. 
This preference for oral advice and discussion is a subject picked up in 
interviews for this thesis. Geoff Kitney argued the PM 'was a very oral person' 
who 'preferred to have conversations rather than read briefs', making 
'judgements based on what he heard orally' after 'brainstorming sessions with 
people for who he had high regard'7D6 • A contemporary concurs, adding that 
Keating 'got people around him that he could bounce ideas off and absorb 
verbal information•101. 
Though the Prime Minister was well-known for his forceful views on a range of 
policy areas such as international relations, the economy, industrial relations, 
communications and the arts, he would consult extensively with advisers and 
external experts when he had not yet formed a view or when his own technical 
knowledge was insufficient to make a decision. In these instances he was an 
attentive listener. Despite the perception that he had little respect for 
university education, he valued expertise and relied on it heavily1os. Bruce 
Chapman agrees, providing the decision on interest rates in the first quarter of 
1995 as an example. In this case the Prime Minister 'genuinely had an open 
mind', 'he said I don't know, help me on this'7oe. His reported disdain for 
academics and specialists is inaccurate. The Prime Minister respected 
academic expertise and relied on it often. 
704 Interview with Meredith Edwards, 4 March 2002. 
705 Mike Seccombe, 'The Heat of the Kitchen Puts Keating on the Boil', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 20 August 1992, p 6. 
706 Interview with Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
101 Private conversation. 
708 Interview with Meredith Edwards, 4 March 2002. 
709 Interview with Bruce Chapman, 4 December 2002. 
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Within the PMO, advisers worked assiduously at controlling the advice 
reaching Keating, and unsuccessfully at preventing outbursts directed towards 
the media. In the first respect, before advice reached the Prime Minister it 
was first tested rigorously within the advisory group. Don Russell put in place 
a system where 'no adviser would put a proposition to Keating unless it was 
tested first on others in the office'710. The second task was more difficult, 
sometimes requiring physical force to prevent Keating taking a course of 
action which the Office thought counterproductive! In this context, reportedly 
Long-suffering media adviser Greg Turnbull once told Keating , after he 
had griped about his 'back of the plane comments' providing headline 
fodder, that he could rid himself of the problem by not venturing down 
the aisle of the RAAF 707. Keating ignored the advice. Principal adviser 
Geoff Walsh took even more desperate measures, trying physically to 
block Keating's path. That didn't work either. If Keating has something to 
say, he will say it, regardless of consequences1 11 . 
Efforts to control and modify Keating's behaviour, therefore, ultimately failed. 
Though, as Don Watson has commented, the PM could be herded into a 
course of action, but it took some skill and guile. In a somewhat comical, 
patronising way, Watson believed Keating 'was like a sheep. We'd always try 
and get him through the gate. It was a case of, if you hurry him, rush him, you 
won't get him through at all. You have to move a bit this way. A bit that way. 
Then you rush him when his feet are in the right position and he's looking the 
other way. That's the way you get him through. And once he's through he has 
a lovely time•112. 
If an adviser's attempt to coral Keating failed, if advice was not well received, 
or if mistakes were made, the Prime Minister was uncharacteristically gentle 
in his reprimanding of staff. An illustrative and somewhat surprising account 
came from a senior PMO adviser, reproduced here: 
I can remember once being curled up in the foetal position on the floor 
once when he'd ticked me off about something. A mistake I'd made. But 
he did it so gently. The paradox of Paul is that people in the public - and 
everyone's got a view about Paul Keating - thought it must have been 
710 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 190. 
711 Michael Millett, 'The Heavy Teams Roll Up For Poll', Sydney Morning Herald, 21 October 
1995, p 29. 
712 Speechwriter and senior adviser, Don Watson, quoted here in Maxine McKew, 'Don 
Watson', Bulletin, 16 April 2002, p 44. 
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very tough to work for such a vicious street fighter, but that couldn't be 
further from the truth. As an employer and as a friend he was a very 
gentle and civil person. I don't think he ever raised his voice to me in a 
belligerent way. But, he did tell me when I did things wrong, as I did 
frequently. And it was much more powerful because he would just gently 
say 'mate, we didn't really pull the right rein there'. That would be 
enough to make me think oh god I've let him down, why can't I be as 
smart as him713. 
Others also raised in interviews the gentle nature of Keating's relationship 
with advisers. Though mistakes did not go unmentioned, Prime Ministerial 
reprimands were delivered with dignity. Keating expected loyalty and respect 
from staff and reciprocated in spades. 
Consistent with the approach to advisory institutions and the coordination of 
their activities analysed earlier, Prime Minister Keating did not rely on a strict 
advisory regime or excessive process. He simply went for advice where he 
determined he could get the most value. This could mean relying on PMO 
advisers, as he often did, or it could mean getting on the phone to former 
advisers or external confidantes. It could just as likely mean consulting with 
academics or experts, or specialists in Treasury, PM&C, or elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth Public Service. He concentrated his effort only on discussions 
that would contribute to policy development or political survival. In the words 
of John Edwards, 'Keating guarded his energy by focusing on substance and 
neglecting procedure. He often ignored aspects of the job unrelated to 
winning the forthcoming election or coping with the recession'. Whereas 
'Hawke's days had been filled with an orderly procession of appointments', 
'Keating refused'714. Consultation with advisers and the receipt of advice took 
place according to Prime Ministerial prerogative. To use a Keating-ism, he 
went 'where the weight was'. This was the key organising principle for the 
provision of advice from all available sources. 
Policy Fiefdoms 
The second component of this chapter's analysis of centralised government 
involves the extent to which Prime Minister Keating involved himself in policy 
713 Private conversation with senior PMO adviser. 
714 John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 467. 
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development. In the policy domain Keating was an active and interventionist 
Prime Minister, but only in relation to a handful of pet policy issues. On the 
whole he allowed ministers free reign to administer their departments and 
develop and implement policy. The exceptions came in areas such as 
communications and media policy, the republic, economic policy, international 
relations, and management of the Accord. By intervening only in a limited 
number of policy domains the Prime Minister was, paradoxically, maximising 
his influence. Michael Keating argues that Paul Keating 'always had a view 
that Hawke had spread himself very thin over everything and had as a result 
influenced nothing, and was determined to do the complete opposite. He 
would pick a few things were he could be absolutely dominant'715 . Here the 
notion that the Prime Minister gave other ministers significant operational 
scope is examined before the areas which attracted Keating's interests are 
isolated and analysed. Finally, a study of the Mabo issue is undertaken in an 
attempt to draw out some lessons for Keating's Prime Ministerial power in the 
policy sphere, and to examine in more detail the importance of 
commonwealth-state relations in the Australian federal system of government. 
Letting Ministers Administer 
Popular perceptions of a one-man Keating Government leave little scope for 
the observation that ministers were largely left to their own devices. But with 
specific exceptions, policy development and implementation was undertaken 
by Keating's ministerial colleagues. This led David Adams to write that the 
Prime Minister 'rarely second-guessed his ministers. They and their 
departments were usually given the responsibility to carry out their portfolio 
tasks'716. Apparently Keating 'would consult with his ministers, discuss broad 
objectives, offer his own ideas but then send ministers off to do the job of 
developing policy and pushing it through the government decision making 
processes'717. 
715 Interview with Michael Keating, 26 November 2002. 
716 David Adams 1997, op cit, p 16; see also John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 467; Interview with 
Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
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This appears to have been a conscious Prime Ministerial strategy rather than 
a ceding of ground based on other pressures. Keating himself wrote in 2000 
that 'the core dynamics for Labor when I became prime minister were the 
quality and experience of our ministers. They needed no prime ministerial 
micro-management of their portfolios'718. Immediately after the 1993 election 
he expressed a similar view to staff at a meeting held 5 April in Canberra. He 
told advisers that 'he wanted to encourage ministers to do their own thing -
so long as they had reached agreement with him and Cabinet on what "their 
own thing" was'719. For better or worse, this was an approach that carried 
right through the remainder of the Keating Government. 
The component of the policy cycle least interfered with by the Prime Minister 
was the implementation phase. In this respect Keating has reverted to the 
Hawke model. Even when the development and debate of a policy was 
handled close to Keating, it's ultimate implementation was then handed over 
to ministers to oversee. Edwards writes that the PM 'could and did 
occasionally use his prestige and influence to initiate major new policies, the 
execution of which would then be returned to ministers'720. An example of 
this came with the delivery of the various components of the One Nation policy 
statement in 1992; 'after it was delivered responsibility went back to 
ministers and their departments'721. This was indicative of the Prime 
Minister's approach to policy implementation. Working Nation was similarly 
implemented in ministers' offices, in this case primarily the office of Simon 
Crean, and he was given significant latitude in which to operate122. This 
approach had some costs, for example Keating's hands-off approach to 
forestry policy, until it was too late, can be partially blamed on the intense 
caucus conflict over that issue723. 
717 Geoff Kitney, 'Hands-Off PM Curbs Those Holding Levers of Power', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 23 April 1993, p 11. 
11s Paul Keating 2000, op cit, p 11. 
719 John Edwards 1996, op cit, pp 514-15. 
720 Ibid, p 446. 
721 Ibid, p 467. 
722 Interview with Bruce Chapman, 4 December 2002. 
723 Interview with Michael Gordon, 19 September 2002. 
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The day to day running of departments was also, predictably, left to individual 
ministers. Prime Minister Keating had no desire to impose himself on the 
processes of Government, just the key outcomes. John Button remembers 
being left largely to his own devices in the industry portfolio, for example724. 
Michael Lavarch has a similar recollection of heading the Attorney-General's 
Department. He believes 'it would have been more difficult to be minister for 
the arts or something because he would have his bloody size nines all over it! 
If he wasn't interested in your portfolio areas he gave you a pretty clear run to 
pursue your own endeavours'725. 
Policy Interventions 
Paul Keating had always been a politician driven by policy, and this remained 
little changed after his ascension to the leadership late in 1991. He narrowed 
his focus, however, to a handful of specific policy areas, notably 
communications, media, the republic, industrial relations, Mabo, foreign policy 
and economic management726. In these areas Keating 'wielded the Prime 
Minister's authority like a sword'727. His personal style ensured that Prime 
Ministerial intervention brought the desired result. To Kitney, writing in 1993, 
Keating 's involvement in the nuts and bolts of policy would be confined 
to particular, strategically important areas. Maybe. But no-one in the 
Federal ministry really believes that this means they are all going to have 
the luxury that ministers had in the Hawke years of almost unfettered 
control of their portfolios and policy priorities. The qualities which most 
distinguish Keating are a passionate interest in new ideas, his tendency 
to embrace them unequivocally, and his determination to get what he 
wants. Underlying this is an acute sense of the possibilities of power. 
When he gets into an issue he throws his weight around. Those who 
resist him - even if it is to try to head off wrongheaded policy - do it at 
their own peri112s. 
The policy issues which invited such intervention are examined in turn below. 
Pay television and media policy offered early opportunities for the Prime 
Minister's willingness to intervene in specific policy areas to be observed. In 
724 Interview with John Button, 25 June 2002. 
725 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
726 Interviews with Brian Howe (12 June 2002) and Michael Lavarch (26 June 2002). 
727 Geoff Kitney, 'Hands-Off PM Curbs Those Holding Levers of Power', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 23 April 1993, p 11. 
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relation to the granting of pay TV licenses, Fred Brenchley wrote in the Age 
that the 'thrust of the policy comes straight out of Mr Keating 's office. Given 
his obsession with media and its power, there was never any chance he would 
allow it through without his personal stamp'729. Similarly with foreign media 
ownership laws, the Keating view triumphed over the minister who had 
carriage of the issue, then-Treasurer John Dawkins. Prime Ministerial 
intervention altered dramatically the final policy, and Dawkins and the rest of 
the cabinet bowed to Keating's will73o. 
Industrial relations policy, and the management of the Accord negotiations, 
was another policy domain claimed by Keating, though Minister Brereton and 
his office had significant input. Bruce Chapman expounded at some length, in 
an interview for this thesis, the process by which industrial relations initiatives 
were negotiated. He described a process undertaken one-on-one between 
Keating and ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty. For less important issues Chapman 
himself drove the process from the PMO, involving Brereton, his adviser Ashley 
Mason, and the Department of Industrial Relations only when circumstances 
demanded it. 
The development of budgets is a more contested area when it comes to 
determining whether the Prime Minister encroached on the Treasurer's key 
responsibilities. It seems that the detail of the 1992 budget was, in the end, 
left largely to senior ministers, with Keating surprisingly leaving Canberra with 
the budget not quite nearing completion. This led Grattan to write that, 
with the Budget only a fortnight away next Tuesday, Paul Keating this 
week absented himself from the cloisters of Canberra after his statement 
on youth unemployment. Unlike his senior colleagues, the PM did not 
spend his days poring over the figures in Cabinet's expenditure review 
committee. He went off to campaign in Queensland. At first blush it was 
rather surprising when, at the start of the Budget process, Keating 
handed over the chairmanship of Cabinet's expenditure review 
committee - which puts the Budget together - to Treasurer Dawkins731. 
728 Ibid. 
729 Fred Brenchley, 'Keating's Pay-TV Policy - What's Good for the NSW Right', Age, 15 
October 1992, p 19. 
730 Geoff Kitney, 'Hands-Off PM Curbs Those Holding Levers of Power', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 23 April 1993, p 11. 
731 Michelle Grattan, 'PM Tries the Hustings As Dawkins Trims the Bacon', Age, 1 August 
1992, p 2. 
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Bruce Chapman, himself involved heavily in budget development in the latter 
years, recalls Keating playing a more significant and hands-on role in the 
process. In more detail: 
When it got close to the time when you really had to have a budget put 
together there'd be tonnes of material floating around and he'd pull it all 
together. He'd get Willis in, he got Beazley in, a couple of economic 
advisers from his office - me and Ric Simes - and he says OK what's 
this budget look like? When people didn't have a clear framework he'd 
say right, this is what it will look like. He loved the detail of 
economics. And after four hours you've got something that looks like a 
budget. And he was running it732 . 
This latter account, not withstanding the approach taken in 1992, appears 
consistent with Keating's willingness to involve himself heavily in economic 
policy, an area in which he had accumulated much interest and expertise. 
The Labor Government's policy on the establishment of an Australian Republic 
was initiated, developed, debated, announced and sold by Prime Minister 
Keating. The process was run from the PMO, with Departmental assistance, 
from start to finish. There was little consultation with other ministers, and the 
Attorney-General's Department played an insignificant role733. A similarly 
centralised process was utilised for the development of the defence treaty 
with Indonesia. Michael Keating identifies this as a time when 'he was way 
down the presidential end of the spectrum' and 'wouldn't even tell ministers 
what he was up to'734. Foreign policy was a general area in which Keating 
exercised significant influence, including, for example, in the negotiations over 
the establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. 
The most significant policy, for this study of prime ministerial power under 
Paul Keating, came with the extensive negotiations over the policy response to 
the High Court's Mabo judgement. A detailed Mabo case study is provided 
below, because it illustrates not only the advisory aspect of governing from the 
centre, but also sheds light on Australian federalism and power sharing with 
states and other stakeholders. 
732 Bruce Chapman interview, 4 December 2002. 
733 For a detailed analysis of the republican debate and Keating's role, see Malcolm Turnbull, 
The Reluctant Republic, (Melbourne, William Heinemann, 1993). 
734 Interview with Michael Keating, 26 November 2002. 
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Steering States and Stakeholders 
Because the Commonwealth of Australia is a federation of six states and two 
territories, power is necessarily shared between the central, federal 
government and the governments of the states and territories735. It is difficult 
to overstate the importance of federalism to Australia's system of government, 
indeed, according to the highly respected Sir Ninian Stephen, federalism is 
'the foundation upon which rests our whole Australian polity, our system of 
government'736. The commonwealth government is generally considered 
responsible for macro economic policy, foreign affairs, trade and defence, and 
the states in charge of service delivery and local law making, but the reality is 
that the demarcations are nowhere near so simple or so clear cut737. While 
the formal structures of Australian federalism are rooted in the 
Commonwealth Constitution, now more than one hundred years old, and the 
forum for interaction is the Council of Australian Governments (COAG)738, 
these provide only the basic frameworks for evolving and ever-altering 
relationships of power between the nine governments and the personalities, 
often from opposing political parties, who lead and run them739. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the most important aspect of federalism 
is the extent to which state and territory governments impinge on the power 
exercised by Australian prime ministers over the governance of the country. 
Because much of the prime ministerial power literature has its origins in 
Britain, which lacks a federal structure, this aspect of prime ministerial 
735 For detailed analyses and histories of the Australian federation see the collection edited by 
Gregory Craven titled Australian Federation: Towards the Second Century, (Melbourne, 
Melbourne University Press, 1992); and see also Brian Galligan and Cliff Walsh, Australian 
federalism: yes or no, (Canberra, Federalism Research Centre, 1991). 
736 Quoted in Brian Galligan, 'Australian Federalism: Perceptions and Issues' in Brian Galligan 
(ed), Australian Federalism, (Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1989), p 2. 
737 Ibid, p 11. 
738 Fort a detailed and useful discussion of the structure and role of COAG see Meredith 
Edwards and Allan Henderson, 'COAG - A Vehicle for Reform', in Peter Carroll and Martin 
Painter (eds), Microeconomic Reform and Federalism, (Canberra, Federalism Research 
Centre, 1995). 
739 See John Summers, 'Federalism and Commonwealth-State Relations' in John Summers, 
Dennis Woodward and Andrew Parkin (eds), Government, Politics, Power and Policy in 
Australia, (Sydney, Longman, 2002), p 89. 
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relationships is often unfortunately overlooked740. But any interactionist 
analysis of power relationships in Australia and alternative sources of 
influence must take into the states and territories and their premiers and 
chief ministers, all of whom possess significant power resources and scope for 
political influence. Federalism creates the potential for much 
intergovernmental conflict741. In short, despite an observable long term trend 
towards the centralisation of governmental functions such as taxation, leaders 
of provincial governments within a federation have the ability to make life 
difficult for a federal nation's prime minister. 
Federal and state and territory governments, prime ministers, premiers and 
chief ministers, clash over countless issues including taxation and financial 
relations742, specific purpose grants from the commonwealth government to 
the states743, microeconomic reform744, and other related issues. Prime 
Minister Keating pursued an active federalist agenda, establishing the Council 
of Australian Governments in 1992, a twice-yearly gathering which comprised 
the PM, premiers and chief ministers, and the president of the Australian 
Local Government Association745 . Under Keating, major disagreements with 
the states related to the commonwealth's technical and further education 
(TAFE) policy, high school curricula, company regulation746, and National 
Competition Policy (NCP). Though there is not room enough to discuss each of 
these disputes, they do, however, shed further light on Australian federal -
state relations, and provide worthwhile lessons for analyses of prime 
ministerial power. Here, a more detailed examination of one example, the 
Mabo case - a key policy issue of the Keating Government - is undertaken in 
this context, and some conclusions regarding federalism and Paul Keating's 
stores of authority and influence drawn. 
740 The Australian literature does not always overlook the states as an alternative source of 
power. See, for example, Patrick Weller 1989, op cit. 
741 See John Summers 2002, op cit, pp106-11. 
742 Ibid, pp 93-4. 
743 Ibid, p 97. 
744 Peter Carroll and Martin Painter (eds), Microeconomic Reform and Federalism, (Canberra, 
Federalism Research Centre, 1995). 
745 Ibid, p 109. 
746 John Summers 2002, op cit, p 110. 
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On 3 June 1992 the High Court's Mabo decision ended the premise of terra 
nullius - that Europeans settled in an unoccupied Australia - and placed 
aboriginal land rights firmly on the national political agenda747. It was an 
issue forced on the Labor Government by an external and independent 
institution, in this case the High Court748, and one which created overnight 
significant disputes with some states. In Keating's words, the ruling provided 
the opportunity for white Australia to reconstruct 'the fundamental 
relationship between the nation and its indigenous people' on 'just 
foundations'749. The issue was enormously important, in terms of federal -
state relations, national significance and also with respect to the Prime 
Minister's own standing. Because Keating had an 'intense personal interest' 
in the development of a just and workable legislative response to the ruling, 
failure would have important ramifications for his leadership750. From this 
brief case study of the Mabo issue some lessons relating to prime ministerial 
power can be isolated. 
The Parliamentary Library's detailed Mabo chronology illustrates in some 
detail the heated debate that followed the High Court judgement751. 
Aboriginal groups, mining and other business associations, state and territory 
governments, pressure groups and lobbyists, and the Opposition all joined the 
fray, creating a frenzied and very public debate over an appropriate 
Government policy which could placate and reconcile competing interests and 
stakeholders including, of course, the state and territory leaders, some of 
whom held views diametrically and fundamentally opposed to the Prime 
Minister's. 
747 For a detailed chronology of the Mabo debate and excellent explanatory notes see 
Department of the Parliamentary Library, The Mabo debate: a chronology, (Canberra, 1993). 
For useful analyses see: Peter Butt, Robert Eagleson and Patricia Lane, Mabo, Wik and Native 
Title, (Sydney, Federation Press, 2001); and Murray Goot and Tim Rowse (eds), Make a Better 
Offer: The Politics of Mabo, Sydney, Pluto Press, 1994). 
748 Greg Turnbull commented on the fact that an external and independent institution, not the 
ALP, put Mabo on the agenda, in an interview conducted 20 July 2002: 'There were all these 
people who'd say it's a Labor Party, left wing, apologist sop to aborigines, it's all a political 
thing, the Mabo thing. He'd say, 'look, there I was minding my own business being a Labor 
prime minister, and some characters across the road hand down this judgement ... and they 
reckon somehow it's a political thing on my part'. 
749 Paul Keating quoted in Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 271. 
750 Innes Willox, 'Crucial Move for Keating', Age, 12 June 1993, p 2. 
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The negotiating process that Keating undertook in his attempts to provide a 
legislative response to Mabo was extensive and exhaustive. In essence, the 
Prime Minister was pursuing an issue on which some in the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party and many in State Governments around the country 
held a view opposed to that of the PM. The State Governments were a 
particular problem for Keating, as were, more specifically, Premiers Wayne 
Goss (Labor) in Queensland and Richard Court (Liberal) in Western Australia -
states with significant mining interests and conservative constituencies. The 
Prime Minister and the States both held power resources: Commonwealth 
legislation could override that of the States; but the 'political reality', was 'that 
the States can create mayhem by trying to resist a federally imposed system 
and plunging the issue of determining land ownership into a legal morass with 
potentially damaging consequences for the investment climate and for social 
cohesion' 752. In the initial stages of the negotiations it appeared that an 
agreement couldn't be reached, and that Keating's introduction to negotiated 
politics would be a failed one; 'the premiers and the Prime Minister might as 
well have been speaking different languages'753. 
Opponents of the legislation the Prime Minister was proposing came from 
many quarters. Alan Ramsey wrote 
You shouldn't think Paul Keating is fighting only Wayne Goss over Mabo. 
There's Jeff Kennett in Melbourne, and Richard Court in Perth, and Hugh 
Morgan at Western Mining, and John Ralph at CRA, and John Hewson in 
Canberra, and Tim Fischer in the bush, and the mining industry generally, 
and Aboriginal extremists on the fringes, and bureaucrats everywhere, 
and an ugly and ignorant slice of public opinion, and God knows who 
else. Even within his own Government there are those who oppose what 
he is trying to achieve, including some within his Cabinet754. 
Nonetheless, the battle with Queensland Premier Wayne Goss was an intense 
confrontation filled with personal animosity755 as well as policy differences. In 
his battle with the Prime Minister, Wayne Goss utilised the tools at his 
751 Department of the Parliamentary Library 1993, op cit. 
752 Geoff Kitney, 'PM Offers Solution on Mabo', Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 1993, p 11. 
753 Geoff Kitney, 'PM's New Australia Vision Hits a Wall at Mabo Brawl', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 11 June 1993, p 11. 
754 Alan Ramsey, 'Mama Takes a Strap to Young Wayne', Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 
1993, p 29. 
755 Goss' dominant faction in Queensland had, for example, backed Hawke in the leadership 
struggle. 
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disposal to resist the introduction of the Commonwealth's legislation. The 
power resources he called upon included a high media profile and the 
standing afforded him because of his leadership of a large state allowed him 
to lobby directly key Federal Government ministers756. 
By confronting State Premiers and significant businesses and lobby groups, 
Paul Keating was placing his Prime Ministerial authority on the line. Perhaps 
in recognition of this, he drove himself to the point of exhaustion to try and 
reach an acceptable agreement. Kitney wrote at the time that 
Keating had sat in the middle of all the competing interests and set out 
to build a consensus, layer by layer, starting with the bits on which all the 
parties agreed and then exhaustively working through to those on which 
there was greatest disagreement. Keating has probably never worked so 
hard on any policy issue. Certainly, no issue since he became Prime 
Minister has so tested his political skills and his stamina or involved such 
big political risks757. 
That the Prime Minister ultimately triumphed over significant political 
obstacles was seen as a personal political triumph, a gamble that had 
ultimately paid off, and an illustration of the power resources held by a skilful 
prime minister. 
The ramifications for Keating's leadership were immediately observable. 
Because he was 'able to broker a deal after hours of talks which no group is 
totally happy with, but which virtually all can live with', his 'leadership 
strengthened and his prestige increased'758. Another commentator opined 
that the Prime Minister's 'standing in the Caucus has soared because of the 
deal he painstakingly brokered on Mabo, an issue which has become an 
article of faith for the Labor Party'759. A temporarily adoring caucus even 
passed a resolution of congratulations for a leader who had 'given Labor a 
sense of unity, new energy and a firmer sense of its direction'76o. 
756 Alan Ramsey, 'Mama Takes a Strap to Young Wayne', Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 
1993, p 29. 
757 Geoff Kitney, 'PJK Back From the Dead on Mabo', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 October 
1993, p 11. 
758 Innes Willox, 'Deal Strengthens PM's Leadership', Age, 20 October 1993, p 6. 
759 Geoff Kitney, '24 Hours to a New Keating', Sydney Morning Herald, 20 October 1993, p 1. 
760 Shaun Carney, Innes Willox, 'A Week is a Long Time in Politics', Age, 23 October 1993, p 
15. 
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Despite subsequent criticism during the Howard Government's tenure, the 
Mabo legislation stands as a significant legacy of Paul Keating and his Labor 
Government. That Keating took such a personal interest in the Government's 
response, and staked so much of his authority and influence on a successful 
outcome, tells us much about the nature of prime ministerial power in this 
country. In this context Don Watson's analysis is particularly perceptive: 
Keating was the essential player: not because he had all the ideas, which 
he didn't; or because he was the supreme advocate and negotiator, 
which he was. It was because of the authority he brought to all 
negotiations. It was the prerogative of his office, but more important was 
the use he made of it. It came from what he called 'weighr1e1. 
Faced with resistance from parts of his own caucus and cabinet, State 
Governments and their leaders, business and large slices of the general 
community, Prime Minister Keating's Mabo response ultimately prevailed. It 
was a political victory that could not have occurred without the institutional 
'weight' of the nation's highest elected office and without the political skill and 
determination of Paul Keating PM. Australian federalism provides an 
institutional and personal battleground for influence over policy. Skilful actors 
from the various Australian governments all impinge upon and affect greatly 
the power of the prime minister, and there is no guarantee that the PM will 
always prevail as he did in this instance. 
Governing from the Centre 
In addition to the above brief analysis of federalism and the legislative 
response to the Mabo judgement, this chapter has analysed in detail two key 
areas relating to Prime Minister Keating's ability to 'govern from the centre'. 
The first aspect of this analysis is of the advisory arrangements made 
available to Prime Minister Keating and how they were utilised. In this area it 
has been demonstrated that Keating relied on a small circle of trusted 
advisers, mostly in the Prime Minister's Office but also to a more limited 
extent in the bureaucracy and private sector. The arrangements were ad hoc 
rather than considered and coordinated, and relied heavily on Prime 
Ministerial whim and policy interests. Therefore the advisory structures were 
761 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 434. 
191 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
somehow heavily centralised without being coordinated and top-down. Key 
advisers exercised enormous authority and influence over the decisions of the 
Labor Government, without significantly interfering, in an institutional sense, 
with the other advisory bodies. 
The second component of this chapter's analysis involved the Prime Minister's 
involvement in policy development. In this respect we know that Keating was 
an active and interventionist leader in relation to a number of key policy areas 
such as the economy, international relations, the Accord, native title, the 
republic and media policy. In other policy domains ministers were given 
latitude to develop and implement policy without excessive Prime Ministerial 
intervention. From the Mabo case study we learn further that, even when the 
Prime Minister staked his authority and influence on a policy outcome, the 
triumph of his view was not guaranteed. When coming up against alternative 
sources of power - in this case largely the states and business interests -
success depends on the skilful wielding of the power that the highest elected 
office brings. 
The most significant conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter's analysis 
is that, under Keating, the Office of the Prime Minister became the key 
institution of the Government, exercising more power than even the cabinet. 
Support for this argument is not difficult to find. Senior journalist Paul Kelly 
told this author that 'the PMO became absolutely the key decision-making 
unit'762. Bruce Chapman recalled how the PMO 'struck me as very powerful, 
in ways that surprised me. I thought that was partly a diminution of the power 
of cabinet, and the nature of Paul Keating ... Cabinet didn't seem to be to be 
that important'763. 
For more expanded views we can turn to senior PMO advisers Don Russell and 
Mark Ryan. The former justified the Office's power by arguing: 
I guess it's true that the Prime Minister's Office, and the Prime Minister, 
ended up having the dominant role in terms of strategy. Because what 
762 Interview with Paul Kelly, 4 November 2002; see also David McKenzie and Jane 
Hutchinson, 'Key Influences Behind the Power in Canberra', Age, 28 April 1993, p 25. 
763 Interview with Bruce Chapman, 4 December 2002. 
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tended to happen was the Prime Minister and his Office are picking off a 
menu of policy choices, strategic choices, political choices and they 
breathe life into some and blow death onto others. It's really setting 
priorities and strategy and resolving disputes, those sort of things end up 
very much the prerogative of the prime minister and his office7e4. 
Mark Ryan attributes the authority and influence of the Office to the speed 
with which decisions were required. He explained in an interview that 
there was a real sense that everything was being done, not on the run, 
but we needed to be nimble of foot and moving quickly. The times did 
not lend themselves to a lot of deliberative debate and considered 
discussion behind the cabinet doors. In that sense I guess the political 
imperative required us to move quickly and seize opportunities and act 
on them as they came along, without necessarily calling together a 
cabinet meeting and debating it765. 
A colleague of Russell and Ryan's, however, still saw the cabinet as the chief 
forum of the Government. Press Secretary Greg Turnbull warned against 
underestimating the importance of the cabinet, and argued that the PMO was 
'not as powerful as the cabinet but it meets more regularly; every day, all day, 
and half the night. So it's the nucleus of the Government's power and thought 
and so forth'766. Other views come from those who were operating outside the 
PMO during the Keating Prime Ministership. Brian Howe remembers that 
'Keating took very much his own counsel, I think his own office was where 
most of the discussions took place'767 . Alan Ramsey wrote that it is 'this inner 
group - more than Cabinet, the Caucus or the bureaucracy -that Keating most 
relies on for political strategy and policy advice'768. 
The centralisation of decision making under Paul Keating, albeit only in terms 
of strategy and a selection of policy areas, differs markedly from the 
experience under Malcolm Fraser as analysed by Patrick Weller769 . Fraser 
was a Prime Minister who was incredibly well-briefed right across all aspects 
of his Government's activities, and relied heavily on advisory structures and 
government agencies. He mastered information and used this superiority as 
the basis for his power over colleagues. In this respect Weller wrote that 
764 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
765 Interview with Mark Ryan, 12 September 2002. 
766 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
767 Interview with Brian Howe, 12 June 2002. 
768 Alan Ramsey, 'Poll Focuses PM's Mind Ever So Sharply', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 
1992, p 25. 
769 See Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, pp 22-34. 
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Fraser's 'authority and his capacity to win arguments about policy were based 
not just on his position, but also on his access to and mastery of information. 
He knew as much, and often more, about important policy areas as the 
responsible ministers•no. 
A more useful comparison, in this case, is between the Keating and Hawke 
offices. One who worked in both, Geoff Walsh, believes 'Hawke's office was 
run more conventionally and Paul's office was a bit more open, and was an 
evident contest of ideas ... because [Keating's] office didn't look and feel like 
Bob's office, it was [seen as] somehow less effective and less efficient'771. 
Aside from these perceptions, there were also significantly varied approaches 
to the Australian Public Service. Hawke's widespread reforms in 1987, 
creating 'mega departments' among other changes, were not matched by his 
successor112. Hawke, though, like Keating, retained a loyal and centralised 
staff. Keating himself once memorably described Hawke's staff as the 
Manchu Court, who 'had never been elected to anything' but 'thought they 
had'773. Though Hawke was less demanding of staff than either Fraser or 
Keating, he and his office nonetheless gave the Government a central focus 
and direction. Hawke was willing to provide other ministers and their 
departments much more latitude, only imposing some coherence at the 
cabinet stage774. He read enormous amounts of briefing material, and was 
across the detail of all facets of policy, but unlike Fraser this didn't mean he 
used that information to impose himself on his colleagues. 
Paul Keating's advisory mechanisms and policy interventions represent a 
different approach to governing from the centre. He enjoyed the power over 
colleagues that allowed him to intervene when desired, but used this power 
sporadically. This returns us to the notion that Keating was reluctant to 
spread himself over all facets of the Government, unlike Fraser and Hawke, 
because of a fear he would spread himself too thin. His advisory 
arrangements, ad hoc and personally oriented, reflected his desire to be 
770 Ibid, p 21. 
771 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
772 Department of the Parliamentary library 1995, op cit. 
773 Australian Labor Party, Labor Herald, December 2003. 
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active and interventionist without interfering in all of his minister's activities. 
Prime Minister Keating governed the country from the PMO, with the 
assistance of a few trusted advisers, only on issues he deemed important 
enough to warrant personal attention. That he could freely choose when and 
where this would occur is an important lesson for this study of prime 
ministerial power. 
774 Colin Campbell and John Halligan 1992, op cit, pp 17-18. 
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Throwing Grenades 
I'm in the grenade throwing business. Occasionally I drop one beside my 
foot, but I get many direct hits775. 
The answer is, mate, because I want to do you slowly. There has to be a 
bit of sport in this for all of us. In the psychological battle stakes, we are 
stripped down and ready to go. I want to see those ashen-faced 
performances. I want more of them. I want to be encouraged. I want to 
see you squirm out of this load of rubbish over a number of months. 
There will be no easy execution for you ... If you think I am going to put 
you out of your misery quickly, you can think again776. 
Prime ministers rarely play significant roles in the debating of legislation, they 
attend the House of Representatives infrequently, and their executive is held 
only weakly accountable by parliamentary procedure777. The seemingly minor 
importance of parliament to prime ministerial leadership, coupled with an 
apparent decline in the utility of the legislature in deliberating national policy 
and administration, would make it tempting, though ultimately misleading, to 
conclude that prime ministers should look elsewhere for potential arenas of 
dominance. The parliamentary aspect of the leadership position remains vital 
to the continued political health of the prime minister. They are called upon to 
dominate the Opposition parties and personalities in parliament. In essence, 
'every occasion is a performance, with backbenchers needing to be 
impressed, and with the leader on display'778. 
The formal tasks of leadership in the House of Representatives are few, but 
the potential for maximising authority, influence and the support of colleagues 
and the media is great. The prime minister is asked only to face questions 
from the Opposition and her or his own party - even this form of attendance 
775 Paul Keating, quoted in Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p xvii. 
776 Paul Keating responding to John Hewson's question in parliament about why he would not 
call an early election, House of Representatives Debates, 1992, pp 1002-3. 
777 For a discussion of the functions and roles of parliament, and of the institution in general, 
see John Uhr and John Wanna, 'The Future Roles of Parliament' in Michael Keating, John 
Wanna and Patrick Weller (eds), Institutions on the Edge? Capacity for Governance (Sydney, 
Allen and Unwin, 2000). 
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can be limited and questions largely avoided - and attend ceremonial events. 
The forum is supposed to provide an avenue for the executive, including the 
leader, to be held accountable for their actions. A skilful prime minister will 
not only make a good account of themselves, they will also use parliament to 
define the political agenda, attack opponents, impress caucus colleagues, and 
reach out into the living rooms of the electorate. A not so skilful leader can be 
exposed in parliament as not up to the job, and may convince colleagues of 
the need for a replacement. So, despite parliament's perceived decline into 
irrelevance779, in leadership terms it remains central. A prime minister's 
'performance there is consistently being assessed'78o. 
Parliament also offers prime ministerial aspirants the opportunity to display 
their wares. Indeed, this was one factor in the leadership transition from 
Hawke to Keating. George Jones, in this context, expresses the view that the 
reduction of formal prime-ministerial involvement in parliament provides 
useful opportunities for other ministers to shine. He writes: 
the prime minister's cabinet colleagues perform more in parliament and 
have more opportunities to enhance their reputations through a display 
of parliamentary expertise. They are able to win support from their 
backbenchers and build up their own followings, which enable them 
more securely to resist the prime minister's policy preferences, and even 
to appear to challenge the prime minister's leadership1a1. 
This is yet another compelling reason for prime ministers to put effort into 
dominating the House. 
The prime ministerial power thesis, introduced in Chapter Two of this study, is 
relatively quiet on parliamentary leadership, concentrating more heavily on 
other institutions such as cabinet, caucus and the media. However, 
continuing a theme of the personalisation of leadership, it is argued that 
prime ministers are decreasingly answerable to parliament and are allowed to 
778 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 178. 
779 A significant body of academic literature attributes increasing executive dominance of the 
parliament with the latter's declining influence. For example, see Jim Chalmers and Glyn 
Davis, Founders' Folly: Parliament, the Executive and the Constitution (Canberra, Department 
of the Parliamentary Library, 2001); see also John Summers, 'Parliament and Responsible 
Government' in John Summers, Dennis Woodward and Andrew Parkin (eds), Government, 
Politics, Power and Policy in Australia, (Sydney, Longman, 2002); and Ken Turner, 
'Parliament' in Rodney Smith (ed), Politics in Australia (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1993). 
780 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 166. 
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ride roughshod over the standing orders, the Opposition, and traditional 
concepts of executive accountability. This is seen to be evidence of the 
growing power of prime ministers and their increasing scope to dominate the 
institution1s2. Making the executive accountable to the legislature by 
compelling ministers to come from parliamentary ranks, the argument goes, 
has not evolved as intended when the executive dominates the legislature7s3. 
In Riddell's words, 'a separation of powers is developing' because though 'the 
executive may still merge out of the legislature', 'the two are now increasingly 
distinct'784. Prime ministerial power is evidenced in, and is contributed to by, 
the decreasing relevance of the parliament, presenting significant 
opportunities for the exercise and display of prime ministerial power and 
personal leadership. 
Paul Keating was the most dominant parliamentary performer of his time, and 
arguably the most devastating debater in Australian political history. In this 
respect his primal, aggressive and taunting approach to parliamentary combat 
marks him out as an Australian prime minister without equal. As one 
respected political commentator has written, 'Keating is a natural 
parliamentarian ... [He] loves the forum and turns it to advantage•1ss. 
Similarly: 'one enormous Keating advantage is his rhetorical punch, and his 
ability to turn a stunning phrase'786. His dominance in the House of 
Representatives led another journalist to write that 'the Opposition is only 
there in the capacity of straight persons so the star - and there is really only 
one - can look witty at their expense'787. According to Stephen Mills, 
'Parliament was the perfect forum for his brand of brilliant and aggressive 
verbal skills - the brutal rejoinder, the ruthless verbal battery, the almost 
lyrical command of vernacular idiom'7ss. 
78 1 George Jones 1991, op cit, p 124. 
782 Ibid, p 112. 
783 See Jim Chalmers and Glyn Davis 2001, op cit. 
784 In Michael Foley 2000, op cit, p 309. 
785 Michelle Grattan, 'Keating and Whitlam - Progression on a Theme', Age, 23 March 1992, 
p 13. 
786 Michelle Grattan, 'Keating's Year At The Top', Age, 18 December 1992, p 9. 
787 Mike Seccombe, 'Almost Dubbed Hubbub and a Star', Sydney Morning Herald, 26 March 
1992, p 2. 
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Like many aspects of Paul Keating's prime ministerial style, the origins of his 
parliamentary leadership can be found in his time as Treasurer and partially 
traced to the nature of the leadership challenge. As the chief head kicker in 
the Hawke Government, he could always be relied upon to take the fight up to 
the conservatives in parliament. When caucus installed Keating as leader in 
December 1991, Keating became, in effect, his own enforcer in the 
parliament. Indeed one compelling reason for supporting him over Hawke 
was his ability to dominate in the parliament, and the likelihood that he could 
defeat Hewson and fightback! in that forum, in contrast with the floundering 
Hawke. Even former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam was driven to describe 
Keating as 'the parliamentary star which Labor had to enlist in order to stuff 
the stuffed shirts of the Opposition'789. Parliament became a powerful 
instrument for Keating to win over caucus79o and establish a dominance over 
the Opposition that continued until the return of John Howard to the 
leadership early in 1995. 
Prime Minister Keating's parliamentary language was delivered without 
restraint; witness his use of words such as harlot, sleazebag, clot, perfumed 
gigolo, scumbag, boxhead, stupid foul-mouthed grub, piece of criminal 
garbage, thug, gutless spiv, vermin, unrepresentative swill, pissant, dummy 
and dog returning to its own vomit791. However, despite this, there was a 
depth to his use of parliament, a sophisticated recognition of its utility as a 
forum to motivate his colleagues, differentiate Labor from the Liberals, and 
wage an intense winner-takes-all psychological battle with leaders and 
prospective leaders from the other side of the aisle. For Keating, prime 
ministerial power was a resource that could be mined within the walls of the 
House of Representatives. 
788 Stephen Mills 1993, op cit, p 203. 
789 Peter Hartcher, 'Whitlam is Glad That Keating's in the Club', Sydney Morning Herald, 11 
March 1992, p 2. 
790 One conversation is recounted between Laurie Brereton and Frank Walker in which the 
latter concedes he has been won over to Keating by his early, dominant performances in 
parliament; see Sally Loane, 'Keating's Left-Hand Man', Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August 
1993, p 39. 
791 See David Jenkins, 'Political Odd Couple', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 November 1993, p 10 
and Bruce Jones, 'Keating V Downer: The Sparks Will Fly', Sun Herald, 29 May 1994, p 39. 
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Paul Keating knew well the potential, and possessed the skills and abilities to 
make parliament work for him and maximise his power. He was expected to 
dominate the parliament, and he delivered on this expectation. Relying on 
Keating's own metaphor, he got many direct hits. But at what cost? The 
grenades that landed beside his foot were products of his personal, combative 
style and the electoral turn-off this brought about, leading him to further limit 
prime ministerial appearances at Question Time792. His dominance of the 
House of Representatives and contempt for the political opponents who 
questioned his leadership were simultaneously great strengths and ultimate 
weaknesses. 
In parliament Keating was predominantly the brawler, rarely the statesman, 
but ever the performer. This chapter analyses in detail the parliamentary 
aspect of the Keating prime ministership, and the 'unparliamentary' though 
sometimes entertaining, sometimes devastating, words and phrases he used 
to motivate his own troops and establish a psychological dominance over, 
successively, John Hewson and Alexander Downer. Here an analysis of 
Keating's views on parliament, debating style, questions asked of him, battles 
with Opposition leaders, and tactics designed to unsettle him is undertaken. 
The argument is that parliamentary dominance was vital in ensuring the 
continued support of the caucus and the ongoing psychological hold over 
Hewson and Downer. However, his aggressive demeanour and combative 
style was unappealing to the broader electorate. This led him to limit his 
parliamentary appearances, thus blunting one of Labor's most important 
weapons and nullifying the positive effects of his parliamentary dominance. 
The Keating View of Parliament 
From published and anecdotal sources, and from Paul Keating's own recorded 
impressions, we can get a sense of the way the Prime Minister attempted to 
utilise parliament as a source of prime ministerial power. John O'Callaghan, 
senior adviser to Kim Beazley as Manager of Government Business in the 
House and an adviser to Keating on parliamentary strategy, recounted how 
792 See below. 
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Keating had 'this general view that if you could dominate in the parliament, 
you could dominate the political agenda of the country. To him parliament 
was the forum for explaining policy outcomes. Keating clearly understood 
getting his message out by dominating parliament'793. 
In the early days of the Keating Government, 'getting his message out' meant 
first winning the broader support from caucus and arresting the momentum 
John Hewson had established over Hawke. In this context 'he saw an urgent 
need to restore the government's ascendancy in the parliament, observing 
that when it started losing in the House of Representatives in the second half 
of 1991, it began to lose everywhere'794. Parliament became the vehicle for 
the rejuvenation of the Labor Government. 
With the goodwill characteristic of a special Christmas adjournment speech, 
Keating outlined a positive view of the parliament in December 1992. The 
speech read, in part: 
I think this is one of the great chambers of the world. We debate and 
settle national issues here at great speed in comparison with other 
countries. Our debate is robust, and the nation knows what we think 
about things. It knows how the debate changes, how the issues are put, 
and how the weighting is made. It results in a lot of conflict, but I would 
like to think that we do not take the conflict beyond these doors - that is 
in a personal sense, although we certainly do in a policy sense795. 
This view followed from a speech Keating had given one month earlier, in what 
was essentially an apologia for the robustness of Australian parliamentary 
debate. In a speech at the Walkley Awards in Melbourne in November 1992 
he argued: 
so long as Question Time is the televised spectacle of questions without 
notice being fired at ministers in the hope of getting them to publicly slip 
up, there will be severe pressures on nicety and decorum. And so long 
as it is also the forum in which the great questions of the day are fought 
out, it will be more than a game of croquet. It will be very often verbal 
war - and no-one prepared to go to war should fight it with less than total 
commitment796. 
793 John O'Callaghan interview, 20 March 2002. 
194 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 186. 
795 Paul Keating, A Christmas thanksgiving, Special Adjournment Speech, 17 December 
1992, in Ryan 1995, op cit, pp 19-20. 
796 Paul Keating, Political Life, Walkley Awards, Melbourne, 27 November 1992, in Ryan 
1995, op cit, p 14. 
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The last sentence, in particular, is indicative of the Keating approach. For 
prime ministers, parliament is a winner takes all pursuit, with power and 
position at stake. 
While the Keating approach to parliament was boots and all, his commitment 
to the House did not go unquestioned by political adversaries. Predictably, 
Hewson charged in 1992 that the House, under Keating, had become an 
'absolute shambles'797. Keating had, according to Hewson, by 1994, 
'attacked the Senate as unrepresentative swill and said that it should be 
abolished', 'said that question time is a courtesy extended to the House by the 
executive branch of government' and 'walked out of question time when it got 
too torrid for him'798. Later in 1994, during the furore over the contents of the 
Hawke Memoirs and as a result of Keating's reluctance to answer questions 
on charges laid by the former prime minister, new Opposition Leader 
Alexander Downer told parliament that Keating 'is too self-important, too 
grand and too imperial to bother coming into the parliament'799. He added, 
'the Prime Minister is drunk with power' and 'has a swaggering arrogance•soo. 
Given Keating's susceptibility to charges of arrogance it is unsurprising that 
the media picked up on this theme. 
The usual Keating response to such charges, characteristically, was to belittle 
Opposition attempts to scrutinise the Government. One example of this came 
later in 1994 in response to a long list of charges made by John Hewson. 
Keating's reply was sarcastic and dismissive of the Opposition Leader: 'as far 
as parliamentary scrutiny goes, in 1993 the Leader of the Opposition asked 
me 13 questions - we actually sat for 12 sitting weeks - so his batting 
average was just about one a week. That is the sort of scrutiny I am supposed 
to be running away from•so1. 
Keating's decision to limit his appearances at Question Time is addressed in 
more detail later in this chapter. For now it will suffice to say that the 
797 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 1734. 
798 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 616. 
799 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 1803. 
800 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 1804. 
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Opposition, with some success, was able to paint the Prime Minister's attitude 
to parliament as one of detached arrogance. This was a negative view 
exacerbated by Keating's response to such charges, the media's perpetuation 
of allegations of arrogance, and his now well known and less than charitable 
or tolerant opinion of the 'unrepresentative swill' sitting in the Australian 
Senate. 
The Senate acts as a significant brake on Australian executive government 
and on prime ministerial power. At no stage during the Paul Keating prime 
ministership did Labor control the numbers in the upper house, which meant 
legislation required the support of minor parties such as the Australian 
Democrats, a position that did not sit easily with Keating. His view of the 
Senate is neatly summed up by part of an answer he provided Peter Reith in 
the first year of his prime ministership. Keating said: 'the Senate has no right 
to obstruct the principal policies of the Government in the lower House; that is 
our view'802 . This coincided with a number of opinions the prime minister 
provided subsequently. Michelle Grattan, then of the Age, quoted Keating in 
1992 as saying the Senate was 'an impediment to the smooth operation of 
the parliamentary system'803. Grattan added, in a later piece, that 'Keating 
also brings to his attitude on the Senate the thinking of the House of 
Representatives, where if you're in government you're in control. Of course, he 
knows in his head that the Government lacks the upper house numbers and 
so can't ride roughshod over the Opposition and the Democrats, but he 
doesn't quite accept the reality•so4. 
Tensions between the Prime Minister and the Upper House reached boiling 
point over the passing of the 1993 budget805 . Faced with the prospect of the 
Senate refusing to pass his Government's budget, Keating was 
counterproductively savage in response. 'His approach to the problem of 
801 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 617. 
802 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 2736. 
803 Michelle Grattan, 'PM Weighs In and Self-Destructs', Age, 5 November 1992, p 3. 
804 Michelle Grattan, 'Can Keating Make a Silk Purse from a Senate's Ear?', Age, 7 November 
1992, p 2. 
805 See Liz Young 1999, op cit, for a discussion of the Senate's role in the negotiation of the 
1993 budget. 
203 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
Senate muscle-flexing over the Government's legislative program was to kick 
it in the groin'B06. Keating's response to this particular challenge to his 
authority was characteristically brutal. The need to deal with the 
'unrepresentative swill' in the Upper House, while unpalatable for Prime 
Minister Keating, was nonetheless a useful example of an institutional limit to 
prime ministerial influence. 
Prime ministerial power resides in the House of Representatives and is limited 
by a non-compliant Senate. Keating's opinion of both houses is coloured by 
this fact. He saw the former as an opportunity for psychological dominance 
and a forum to rally his troops; the latter as a hindrance to good governance. 
Realising the potential, he made much use of the House of Representatives 
as a vehicle for caucus motivation and dominance of Opposition leaders 
lacking his parliamentary skill. 
Question Time 
Question Time - or Questions Without Notice as it is formally known - is the 
key event for prime ministers in parliament. For an hour or slightly more each 
afternoon the executive must face the probing of the Opposition's questions. 
John Uhr wrote that 'Question Time has often been described as Parliament's 
greatest piece of theatre, full of rehearsed set-piece confrontations 
interspersed with fiery improvisations•so7 _ The stakes are high for all 
ministers, but the prime minister is especially responsible for instilling 
confidence in the caucus and making the most of opportunities to pound the 
Opposition. Keating was at his best in Question Time though also, commonly, 
at his nastiest. Here his performances at the dispatch box are analysed in the 
context of his attempts to motivate Labor backbenchers and demoralise the 
Liberal and National Parties. 
806 Geoff Kitney, 'Shaping Up For 1975', Sydney Morning Herald, 20 August 1993, p 11. 
80 7 John Uhr, Questions without answers: an analysis of question time in the Australian House 
of Representatives, (Canberra, Australasian Political Studies Association and the Parliament 
of Australia, 1982), p 7. See also GR Reid and Martyn Forrest, 'Parliamentary Control of the 
Executive' in Australia's Commonwealth Parliament 1901-1988: Ten Perspectives, 
(Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1989). 
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Preparation 
Keating's preparation for Question Time was sombre and quiet, reflecting the 
seriousness of the task and an inner confidence. One adviser who observed 
the PM up close at these times, recounting a story he'd heard about Don 
Brad man quietly and broodingly eating lunch before going out to slaughter the 
bowlers, likened the approach to that of Prime Minister Keating. The same 
source remembered how Keating would 'generally just be sitting there with a 
pile of briefs beside him, and a group of key advisers, going through the briefs 
and just rehearsing what he was going to say. He was almost eerily cold, 
quiet, focusing on the issues·sos. Don Watson recounts how Keating would sit 
'at his desk which was in places half a metre deep in unsorted files' and 'ate 
his lunch and drank the tea Guy brought to him'. His preparation was cool, 
sometimes comical809 , giving little impression of the aggression that was to 
follow. 
The relaxed attitude Keating took to preparing for parliamentary combat was 
recognised by a senior cabinet colleague. John Button, Minister for Industry 
and Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, remembers (laughing): 
He had an extraordinary coolness about him. I remember once flying 
from Melbourne to Canberra with him, and the Government was in a bit 
of trouble - we always used to cop it at Question Time, you know, about 
8°8 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
809 This is the story recounted by John Edwards 1996, op cit, pp 475-7: 'Twenty minutes 
before Question Time on one sitting day, light flooded the little grey courtyard outside the 
office. Inside, the Prime Minister sat behind his desk. He was eating his lunch on a tray. 
Despite our good intentions and his, the desk and benches behind him were now loaded with 
different piles of paper of uncertain pertinence ... Four of us sat in chairs in front of the desk, 
which was again piled high with various sets of folders. Behind him on a shelf were two large 
red vases, a radio, a water jug and a row of books. Two more assistants sat on the couches in 
the centre of the office. We were drinking coffee from Styrofoam cups. The Prime Minister 
pushed his tray to one side and read one of our prepared question with its answer ... The 
Prime Minister began rummaging among his piles of paper on the desk, frowning. 'Where is 
that small stapler?' he moaned. He turned over the papers on his desk, piling them into new 
heaps. We looked concerned. Ashton turned over some papers near him. He found a green 
plastic pen, but not a small stapler. 'Where the fuck is it?' Keating demanded of no one in 
particular. He pressed a button on a bank of telephones. 'Linda, get me a small stapler, 
love.' He picked up the sheets of paper with the questions. 'This is good,' he said. 'I'll say, 
"the Honourable Member ... ".' He laughed brightly, looked up at our grinning faces, then he 
frowned. 'Where's the yellow highlighter?' he asked. 'Jesus, what happens to them?' He 
began moving the piles of paper again. 'Where is it?' We craned forward a little in a display 
of sympathetic interest, although the novelty of this daily hunt had long worn off. We knew it 
would be found. In the stationery room Linda kept a crate of yellow highlighters and another 
of small staplers. One of us left to get a yellow highlighter .. .' 
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the pig farm and everything - I was sitting there looking at Question Time 
briefs and he sat there reading a motor sports magazine, all the way up. 
I thought shit, you don't give a stuff!s10 
This was misleading. For Keating, preparation for Question Time was the calm 
before the storm. 
Accounts from interviews for this thesis vary in their emphasis on the degree 
to which Paul Keating could 'get across' a written Question Time brief, though 
nobody suggested he was ill prepared for whatever was thrown at him by the 
Liberals and Nationals. Indeed, one Member of Parliament from the Keating 
era - a Liberal Party Member, David Juli - remembers Keating using a simple 
brief to devastating effect. Jull told this author that: 
The thing that I always thought was quite interesting was that when 
Keating came into the House, along with his folders and manuals of 
questions and answers, there was a usually a single sheet of paper which 
was laid to the side of it. They were the lines for the day. They were 
obviously pre-prepared. It was alleged at the time that Max Gillies used 
to write some of them. To watch the performance was always pretty 
theatrical. It usually started off with a line, and a pretty devastating line, 
that was followed by general destruction•s11. 
Labor advisers recall the 'theatrical' and 'devastating' lines being rehearsed in 
the pre-Question Time meetingss12. 
Questions Asked 
The Opposition parties were also well prepared for Question Time in the House 
of Representatives; their questioning followed predetermined strategic lines of 
attack. The questions asked of Keating depended on the political 
environment, perceptions of ministerial incompetence or inappropriate 
behaviour, economic conditions, and the stages of the electoral cycle. Table 
6.1, below, sets out in detail the types of questions asked of Keating by both 
the Government and the Opposition. Keating's ability to respond to attacks on 
the propriety of his colleagues and defend his Government's policy record was 
an important weapon in his prime ministerial repertoire. 
810 Interview with John Button, 25 June 2002. 
811 Interview with David Juli, 19 September 2002. 
812 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002, for example. 
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Table 6.1: Questions Without Notice to Prime Minister Keating 
Aboriginal Affairs 1992 1 0 1 
1993 9 9 18 
1994 3 0 3 
1995 0 0 0 
Total 13 9 22 
Communications and 1992 5 5 10 
Transport 1993 1 8 9 
1994 0 10 10 
1995 4 4 8 
Total 10 27 37 
Economy 1992 25 47 72 
1993 18 5 23 
1994 6 34 40 
1995 7 40 47 
Total 56 126 182 
Education 1992 2 0 2 
1993 0 0 0 
1994 4 1 5 
1995 0 0 0 
Total 6 1 7 
Electoral Politics 1992 0 7 7 
1993 0 0 0 
1994 1 1 2 
1995 3 5 8 
Total 4 13 17 
Employment 1992 3 25 28 
1993 4 1 5 
1994 4 5 9 
1995 0 3 3 
Total 11 34 45 
Environment 1992 0 5 5 
1993 0 0 0 
1994 1 3 4 
1995 0 2 2 
Total 1 10 11 
Foreign Affairs, Trade, 1992 14 7 21 
Immigration 1993 6 3 9 
1994 11 12 23 
1995 3 17 20 
Total 34 39 73 
Health 1992 3 0 3 
1993 0 1 1 
1994 0 2 2 
1995 1 0 1 
Total 4 3 7 
Industrial Relations 1992 14 6 20 
1993 1 0 1 
1994 3 3 6 
1995 9 6 15 
Total 27 15 42 
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Other Ministerss13 1992 0 21 21 
1993 0 0 0 
1994 0 14 14 
1995 3 11 14 
Total 3 46 49 
Republic, Flag, National 1992 3 12 15 
Identity, Multiculturalism 1993 1 2 3 
1994 0 2 2 
1995 0 7 7 
Total 4 23 27 
Sport 1992 1 0 1 
1993 1 0 1 
1994 0 0 0 
1995 0 0 0 
Total 2 0 2 
State Politics and 1992 2 3 5 
Government 1993 0 1 1 
1994 2 1 3 
1995 2 5 7 
Total 6 10 16 
General Policy, Directions14 1992 11 9 20 
1993 3 0 3 
1994 3 0 3 
1995 3 2 5 
Total 20 11 31 
Others15 1992 2 3 5 
1993 0 8 8 
1994 2 30 32 
1995 2 9 11 
Total 6 50 56 
Total 207 417 624 
Prime Ministers inevitable attract the bulk of the Opposition's questions. Two-
thirds of questions asked of Prime Minister Keating came from the Opposition, 
417 in all out of a total of 624. Many concentrated on Keating's legacy as 
Treasurer. Economic questions from the Opposition, dominated by the topic 
of recession, were easily the most frequently asked (126 times). Employment 
also featured highly, with 39 questions from the Opposition relating to the 
unemployment figures. Other portfolio areas attracting considerable attention 
813 Relating to Graham Richardson's shares in a radio station and his role in the 'Marshall 
Islands Affair'; Ros Kelly and 'sports rorts'; Gareth Evans' possible High Court appointment; 
Laurie Brereton; cabinet reshuffles; Carmen Lawrence and the 'Penny Easton Affair'. 
814 For example the One Nation policy package, which covered many portfolio areas and 
attracted considerable attention within the parliament and outside it; Keating's prime 
ministerial style; Creative Nation; 'national consensus'; Working Nation. 
815 Crime; donations; Keating's piggery; Thai teak table for the Lodge; business associates; 
Senate; ethics; Question Time itself; female genital mutilation; political appointments; Hawke 
Memoirs; casino, arts community, women's policy, constitutional reform; the speakership; 
'national interest'; interest groups; the governor-general; same-sex marriages. 
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from the Liberals and Nationals included: foreign affairs, trade and 
immigration (39 questions); communications and transport (27 questions); 
and the republic, flag, multiculturalism and national identity (23 questions). 
Importantly, Keating was asked 46 questions about other ministers, 
predominantly relating to episodes of ministerial misconduct such as Graham 
Richardson's involvement in the 'Marshall Islands affair', Ros Kelly and 'sports 
rorts', and Carmen Lawrence and the 'Penny Easton affair'. The category in 
Table 6.1 listed as 'Other' (50 questions) includes diverse issues such as 
Keating's interest in his piggery, arts fellowships, business associates and 
various social issues. 
The asking of 'Dorothy Dixers', a question directed to a minister from the 
Government's backbench, is commonplace, and provides an opportunity for 
the prime minister to speak on a matter of her or his choosing. Of all 
questions asked of Keating in the House of Representatives, 207 (33 percent) 
were from Labor MPs. The Labor backbench's priorities were issues such as: 
the economy (56 questions); foreign affairs, trade and immigration (34); 
industrial relations (27); and the Government's general policy direction (20). 
Not surprisingly, the performance of other ministers (3 questions) and 
employment (11 questions) did not feature prominently in this list of Dorothy 
Dixers compiled from the years of Prime Minister Keating's tenure. 
Questions asked from both sides of the aisle reflected pressing political 
necessities and the ebbs and flows of the political cycle. Table 6.1, broken 
down into each year of the Keating prime ministership, shows the varying 
concerns of each year of parliamentary activity. While economic questions 
dominated the Opposition's Question Time plans, it was especially so in 1992 
and 1995; the first year of Keating's prime ministership and the last year 
before the 1996 election. Predictably, questions regarding aboriginal affairs 
were asked only in 1993 because of the Mabo issue; foreign issues 
dominated the later years of the prime ministership; republicanism dominated 
1992; and questions regarding ministerial impropriety were dictated by the 
timing of the issues uncovered. Very few questions were asked of Keating in 
the months following his unexpected 1993 election win. Giving the Prime 
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Minister a platform from which to extol the virtues of his Government's 
winning ways was perhaps too much for the shell-shocked Liberals and 
Nationals to bear. 
However, the Opposition could, on occasion, rattle Keating with their 
questions in the House of Representatives, but only rarely. The most effective 
strategy to counter his dominance was to question the propriety and 
competence of his frontbench colleagues. This, on many occasions, got under 
Keating's skin, and an enraged Keating was not necessarily the image that 
Labor strategists wanted to see on the news broadcasts each evening. The 
scandals involving ministers Richardson, Kelly, Lawrence and Griffith provided 
useful fodder for an Opposition accustomed to being harangued by the Prime 
Minister at Question Time. 
One spectacular example of Keating's lack of tolerance of any questions 
regarding ministerial performance and behaviour came early in his prime 
ministership with Opposition questioning of Graham Richardson over his 
interests in Sydney radio station 2HD. Keating's abrupt ending of Question 
Time and speedy exit from the House led one commentator to write: 
The Federal Opposition finally has found out how to rattle Paul Keating. 
Rattle the mates ... They did it yesterday, by raising allegations about the 
propriety of Keating's most important political mate, the only bloke in 
town who could be described as a smarter and slipperier politician than 
Keating, Senator Graham Richardson ... Hewson's mob had barely 
applied any pressure at all, before Keating spectacularly spat the 
dummy, brought Question Time to an abrupt end and stalked out, leaving 
uproar behinda1s. 
Keating was similarly displeased with the focus on his ministers in subsequent 
yearss11. A related strategy, recounted by Liberal MP David Juli, was to ignore 
Keating and ask questions directly of junior ministers. Juli felt this 'frustrated 
Keating and got him quite worked up', which meant it 'wasn't a bad sort of 
strategy•s1s. Often Keating would respond to this scenario by taking it upon 
himself to answer the questions directed to his junior colleagues. 
816 Mike Seccombe, 'A Rattled Keating Rounds out of Answers', Sydney Morning Herald, 30 
April 1992, p 6. 
817 See Chapter Four of this thesis for a more detailed examination of allegations of 
ministerial impropriety and the Keating response. 
818 Interview with David Juli, 19 September 2002. 
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Batting Them Back 
How Keating responded to the Opposition's questions reflected upon his 
leadership of caucus and the maintenance of Government ascendency in the 
House. The balancing act required of the Prime Minister was to dominate the 
Opposition without appearing arrogant. The first aspect of this task was 
usually performed by Keating with aplomb, the second less so. 
Prime ministers' parliamentary strategy is heavily dependent on personal style 
and individual strengths. Keating employed numerous strategies in 
parliament. He sought to differentiate Labor from the Liberals and discredit 
the Opposition with slick put-downs and by listing the achievements of the 
Keating (and Hawke) Government. He sometimes threw in diversions such as 
the Australian flag and republican debates if under pressure or requiring a 
circuit breaker. He sought to paint the Liberals and Nationals as out of touch 
and not up to the task, highlighted internal dissension in the Opposition and 
pointed out the limited capacity of senior shadow ministers. Keating relied on 
these strategies, examined in more detail below, throughout his prime 
ministership, with varying success. His tone varied from sarcasm to contempt 
to enthusiasm for new initiatives, but the intensity of the attacks and the 
disdain for what he saw as an Opposition incapable of leading the country was 
consistently evident throughout. 
A well-worn response from Keating to various Opposition charges was to turn 
the attention back to the Liberals and Nationals, and accuse them of lacking 
the political will to tackle the big issues. In pursuing this strategy, Keating was 
differentiating Government and Opposition on the grounds of political courage 
and policy ability. The following exchanges, all after questions from John 
Hewson, are illustrative of this approach: 
We will go back to giving them growth and employment, which you never 
regarded as a priority and which you were never able, either with wit or 
the intelligence, to produces19. 
819 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 16. 
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This is how we will govern Australia - as we did in the 1980s - to get the 
growth back and with it a continuing growth in manufactured exports, a 
continuing change in the current account - all of the things you could 
have only dreamt about but never really hoped for. You come back here 
now with a package of miserable accountancy and you think that passes 
for real policy. You have got to be crackingjokess20. 
That is the thing about the Liberal Party. It has had to be dragged to 
every progressive reform in this country by the Labor Party, by the only 
vehicle of social change, by us - it had to be dragged screaming ... We all 
know about you. You are basically unable; you are basically 
incapacitated; and you have always been the sames21. 
Each of these quotes represent Keating in full flight, self-righteous about the 
achievements of the Government and dominating the Parliament with forceful 
answers to questions from the Opposition. 
Characteristically, Keating often treated the personalities on the Opposition 
frontbench with contempt, doing little for his advisers' attempts to encourage 
him to appear more humble. An extension of his contemptuous approach was 
his propensity to let the House in on his strategy, and to extol his wares as the 
dominant performer in the parliament. During an answer to a Peter Costello 
question regarding interest rates Keating, addressing Tim Fischer, said 
'Timmy, old son, by the time the election is on, this issue will be nailed nicely 
into the ground. I always like to limber up on these things - a bit of limbering 
- I like to limber up on them·s22. 
Interjections rarely bothered Keating, indeed he often used them to warm to 
his theme. One Labor backbencher remembered, in particular, Keating taking 
interjections and 'turning them around, back to the interjector, to his 
advantage'823. Re-reading Hansard today it would appear that, rather than 
unsettling Keating, it focused his mind on the contempt he felt for the 
Opposition. On occasion, he would mock the interjector with a comment such 
as that made in 1992: 'I know it hurts you; why should it not hurt you? You 
elitist'824. 
820 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 18. 
821 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 1967. 
822 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 1580. 
823 Interview with Les Scott, 4 April 2002. 
824 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 475. 
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In addition, of course, Keating was not averse to some bare-knuckled name-
calling. Faced with constant interjections from Bruce Goodluck during an 
answer to a Dorothy Dixer from Janice Crosio, Keating snapped: 'you 
chattering little clown, why do you not shut up?'825. On a separate occasion, 
responding to a question from John Hewson, Keating retorted with: 'you asked 
the question; listen to the answer, you babbling fools'826. Words such as 
'scumbag', 'pissant', 'foul-mouthed grub' and others became infamous 
through Keating's use of them in parliament. The steady stream of invective 
flowing from his mouth prompted John Howard to declare, in 1995, that 
Keating 'really is addicted to vitriol', 'he is absolutely hooked on the habit'827. 
The Keating brand of invective, offensive to some in the broader community, 
was essentially an extension of the Prime Minister's approach to 
parliamentary combat. 
Keating's stance on issues such as national identity, the flag, and the 
Australian republic tempted his political opponents to charge him with 
employing controversial diversions to deflect attention from the economic 
main game. A Matter of Public Importance motion moved by John Hewson in 
1992, for example, makes this accusation: 
The only reason why this Prime Minister is today trying to raise the issue 
of the flag and use it as a major political issue on a day-to-day basis is 
that he has lost the policy debate in this country ... He knew that we were 
about to respond on that statement [the One Nation package] in the 
Parliament, so that afternoon he went out and belted our British heritage 
as a mechanism for diverting attention from the failure - his incapacity, if 
you like - to develop an effective response to Fightback ... The attack on 
the flag is to be seen as nothing more than a deliberate distraction from 
the main game, trying to keep attention away from the fact that this man 
is the architect of the recessions2s_ 
It is unfair to argue that Keating's pursuit of these 'big picture' issues was 
merely a response to parliamentary pressure. However, Keating was 
nonetheless skilful at using these issues to unite Labor and prevent the 
recession being the only topic of debate in the House and of political 
conversation outside it. 
825 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 3532. 
826 House of Representatives Debates, 1993, p 310. 
827 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 3065. 
828 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, pp 1841-5. 
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The next weapon in the Prime Minister's parliamentary artillery was to belittle 
the questions asked by the Opposition, sarcastically encouraging them to do 
better. A related approach was the general criticism of Liberal-National policy 
and their efforts to promote it. One excellent example of this came in 1992, in 
response to a Tim Fischer question about mining, when Keating boomed: 
the fact is that the heyday, the salad days, of easy riding after the 
presentation of Fightback over the last couple of months during the 
parliamentary summer interregnum - those good days - are finished. 
Basically Fightback, as an economic strategy, is as dead as a doornail. 
You could not defend it; the Government blew it to bits; and the Treasury 
demolished what was left of it thereafter. Fightback is finished, and you 
are now asking me about Coronation Hill! Old son, you will need more -
much more - than Coronation Hill to save you.s29 
On other occasions he was more direct, for example when he declared to John 
Hewson in 1992 'I have seen a lot of you off the course, and I will see many 
more'830• 
Throughout his prime ministership, Paul Keating started many questions with 
a general mocking of the question asked by what he regarded as the lesser 
lights on the Opposition front bench. Some illustrative, and typically 
aggressive, answers included: 
What we see is a question that would not go a round or two at a Labor 
Party youth conference, that would not cut the mustard at a Young 
Liberal Party barbecues31. 
There is one thing about those opposite in Question Time - once the 
script is written in the office nothing changes. It does not matter what 
the answers are and whether those opposite have been knocked into a 
cocked hats32. 
frankly, one is battling to think up a pithy reply because the questions are 
just so bad833. 
Intuitively, in the high professionalism of public life, you know that you 
are in front when you get a question such as thisB34. 
These comments were generally met with laughter from the Labor backbench. 
829 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 839. 
830 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 3092. 
831 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 3958. 
832 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 1395. 
833 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 1396. 
834 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 390. 
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A related theme of Paul Keating's answers to Opposition questions was his 
obvious glee at having his hands on the levers of government. With 
undisguised pleasure Keating has said, in this context: 
You see, they can ask their questions, but they cannot take and do not 
like the answers. But I can tell you that much as it disdains you taking it, 
it gives me more pleasure giving it to yous35. 
You are so easily amused. One of the things I like about you is that you 
are so easily entertained over there and you are so easily amused. 
Keeping you there in this happy state of suspended political animation 
pleases me greatly. The fact that we can keep you there with a 
consummately low level of effort in a state of eternal happiness cheers 
me up no end836. 
Another oft-used Keating strategy in parliament was to highlight the divisions 
in the Liberal Party over policy and leadership. These answers struck right to 
the core of that Party's problems throughout the Hawke and Keating years. 
With brimming confidence, Keating would lecture the Liberal Party frontbench 
on the virtues of political unity. Ironic, indeed, given the nature of Keating's 
own ascent to the leadership. Regardless, tirades such as the following were 
not uncommon: 
With an increasing number of them beginning to think that travelling with 
the consumption tax is like travelling with a ticket on the Hindenburg 
heading towards a disaster - a Hewson berg disasterS37 . 
It is the young and the old against the dry and the cold in the Liberal 
Partys3s. 
The Liberals cannot afford another leadership crisis, yet they cannot 
afford to stay with the leader they have. The fact is that the Leader of the 
Opposition has taken the Howard-Peacock virus and infected all the 
younger generation of parliamentarianss39. 
835 A response to a question from Sharp about waterfront reform; House of Representatives 
Debates, 1992, p 2259. 
836 In response to a Hewson question about interest rates; House of Representatives 
Debates, p 452. 
837 Responding to a Bevis question about tariffs; House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 
1068. 
838 Ibid. 
839 An answer to a question from Grace about international treaties; House of Representatives 
Debates, 1994, p 517. 
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Peter Costello was a particular target for Keating's leadership-related attacks. 
Mocking him for twice declining to lead the Liberal Party, Keating was 
scathing: 
Don't be too noisy over there. You are so macho! Twice you have had a 
chance to take the Opposition leadership. The first time you rang your 
friend next to you and offered it to him. This time you sat overseas while 
John got it from Hawks Nest. When I told our caucus last year that you 
were a low altitude flier I was right, wasn't I? ... Underneath that barrel 
chest of yours is a caraway seed for a tickers40. 
while our mate here from Hawks Nest was on the telephone, where is 
he? He is in London with Staley having scones at Claridgess41_ 
It is difficult to gauge the psychological effect these comments had on the 
Opposition at the time, though, given ongoing leadership tensions in the 
Liberal Party, and coupled with the supreme confidence of a leader in full 
flight, they are unlikely to have been easily dismissed by the then-disunited 
Coalition parties. 
The final significant and observable Keating Question Time strategy was to 
play up the alleged incompetence and limited ability of specific individuals on 
the Liberal-National frontbench. Peter Reith, Tim Fischer and Bronwyn Bishop 
are singled out in these examples for some rough treatment: 
I understand, given the limited cerebral capacities of the Deputy Leader 
of the Opposition [Reith], that one subject at a time is about all he can 
comprehends42. 
such a question could only come from a crude simpletons43. 
As for the taker of the point of order [Sharp], if he is up here trying to 
outshine the Leader of the National Party [Fischer] he has only to be on 
his feet and dressed to do thatS44. 
she [Bishop] is more to be pitied than despised; just leave her gos45. 
These direct attacks on the capability of opponents also took place in the 
context of the one-on-one battle for the prime ministership. The questioning 
of Hewson, then Downer, then Howard's capacity to lead the Australian nation 
340 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 4 77. 
841 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 1013. 
842 To Peter Reith, after a question about unemployment; House of Representatives Debates, 
1992, p 1969. 
843 Responding to a Tim Fischer question about the Kokoda Trail; House of Representatives 
Debates, 1992, p 1831. 
844 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 2263. 
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was a daily occurrence in the House of Representatives. This aspect of 
parliamentary combat is dealt with below, but first we turn to Keating's 
motivation of colleagues. 
Us and Them 
This chapter argues prime ministerial power in the Australian parliament can 
be accumulated by proving your wares to colleagues and by demoralising the 
Opposition. Keating was a master of motivating his own backbench. He did 
this, periodically, painting the contest in the House, for Government, and in 
the wider community, as 'us' against 'them'. His language was passionate 
and unmistakably working class and anti-elites. In parliament, Keating led 
Labor from the front, and basked in the approval of his caucus. 
The starkest example of Keating's ability to rally the Parliamentary Labor Party 
behind him in parliament came in the early weeks of his prime ministership. 
He used the Opposition's passionate response to a controversial Keating 
speech to the Queen as an opportunity to paint the Liberals and Nationals as 
the people of yesterday, forelock tuggers to Britain. With a remarkable 
viciousness, the Prime Minister rose and, in detail, boomed: 
They started off with the Leader of the Opposition, with his back turned 
as usual, talking about, 'I never learned respect at school'. You see, I 
should never have said in front of Her Majesty the Queen of Australia 
that Australia was now trading with the Asia-Pacific area. I should never 
have said that we have independence from Britain and Europe ... I should 
never have made that remark about independence to the Queen of this 
continent. I should have had more respect ... That was the golden age 
when vast numbers of Australians never got a look in; when women did 
not get a look in and had no equal rights and no equal pay; when 
migrants were factory fodder; when Aborigines were excluded from the 
system; when we had these xenophobes running around about Britain 
and bootstraps; and that awful cultural cringe under Menzies which held 
us back for nearly a generation. 
Then, warming to this theme, he began talking about converting Old 
Parliament House into a museum and how the Government could 
put some of the cultural icons of the 1950s down there ... The Morphy 
Richards toaster, the Qualcast mower, a pair of heavily protected 
slippers, the Astor TV, the AWA radiogram. And, of course, the 
845 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 1553. 
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honourable member for Wentworth [Hewson] and the honourable 
member for Bennelong [Howard] could go there as well ... I was told I did 
not learn respect at school. I learned one thing: I learned about self-
respect and self-regard for Australia - not about some cultural cringe to a 
country which decided not to defend the Malayan peninsula, not to worry 
about Singapore and not to give us our troops back to keep ourselves 
free from Japanese domination. This was the country that you people 
wedded yourselves to, and even as it walked out on you and joined the 
Common Market, you were still looking for your MBEs and your 
knighthoods, and all the rest of the regalia that comes with it. You would 
take Australia right back down the time tunnel to the cultural cringe 
where you have always come from ... These are the same old fogies who 
doffed their lids and tugged the forelock to the British establishment ... 
You can go back to the fifties to your nostalgia, your Menzies, the Caseys 
and the whole lot. They were not aggressively Australian, they were not 
aggressively proud of our culture, and we will have no bar of you or your 
sterile ideologys46. 
The response from a Labor backbench demoralised by the recent leadership 
challenge was described as 'the most visceral roar' heard for years847. 
The effect of Keating's passionate denunciation of the traditionalists on the 
other side of the House of Representatives and their 'sterile ideology' had an 
immediate and lasting impact on the caucus and parliamentary observers in 
the media. Alan Ramsey, an opinion leader within the Press Gallery, wrote 
that 'Keating has been able to use it [the response to the Queen speech] with 
enormous effect to stamp his presence on an inherited Government and to 
distance Labor from a Hewson Coalition in terms everyone understands and 
many support'. Ramsey judged the episode as 'a wonderful distraction to 
unite behind Keating's leadership a Labor Party still uneasy about the change 
from Hawke'848. To David Day, Keating's aggressive strategy worked; 'by the 
end of the first week in Parliament, Keating was judged by one journalist as 
'absolutely dominant", 'his Labor colleagues were heartened by his aggressive 
leadership'849. The episode led journalist and Kim Beazley biographer, Peter 
Fitzsimons, to comment that 'the best news for the Labor Party was that there 
were some signs that the switch from Hawke to Keating as Prime Minister was 
846 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, pp 372-4. 
847 Quoted in Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 121. Watson also writes that from other quarters 
Keating's speech produced 'astonishing yelps'! 
84s Quoted in David Adams 1997, op cit, p 14. 
8 49 David Day 2000, op cit, p 423. 
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actually working - on the parliamentary floor, if not necessarily in the wider 
electorate's5o. 
Keating's performance did not escape the attention of Hawke backers like 
Jeanette McHugh, who said afterwards that 'the Labor Party's been looking for 
that spark it needs. If it hasn't got it now, it'll never get it'851. Jim Snow 
remembered the speech had a 'very positive effect' because the new Prime 
Minister's 'use of history and the way he lampooned the Opposition was 
tremendous, inspiring'852. All this contributed to what became 'a dream end 
to the first Parliamentary week for Keating as Prime Minister'853. 
The practise of rousing his colleagues, demonstrated early in the Keating 
Prime Ministership, was one that continued throughout the remainder of the 
Labor Government. John O'Callaghan, an adviser with responsibility for 
parliamentary strategy, recalls how Keating 'used to try and get the 
backbench, when they were going out of Canberra after a fortnight's sitting, 
feeling good about the Government'. 'That would happen if Paul was on song; 
if Paul put on a good performance it would leave everyone feeling pretty good'. 
According to O'Callaghan, this was especially so when the Government was in 
trouble. The PM's advisers would 'have strategies to get Paul to lead the 
charge when we were in trouble, which was incredibly effective'854 . 
The other way for Keating to rally the Labor caucus behind his parliamentary 
leadership was to employ class warfare to talk up the differences between the 
Government's defence of the workers and the Opposition's approach. 
Favourite targets were 'class traitors' such as John Hewson and John Howard, 
whom Keating considered to have betrayed their humble origins. Answering a 
Howard question about compulsory unionism, for example, Keating expressed 
the opinion to Hewson, Howard and the parliament that: 'having both come 
850 Peter Fitzsimons 1998, op cit, p 375. 
851 Mike Seccombe, 'Paul's Winning Friends and Influencing Enemies', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 28 February 1992, p 4. 
852 Interview with Jim Snow, 26 February 2002. 
853Mike Seccombe, 'Paul's Winning Friends and Influencing Enemies', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 28 February 1992, p 4. 
854 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
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from the wrong side of the tracks, you are so committed to proving to the blue 
bloods that your blood is bluer than theirs, that you have to sink the boot into 
ordinary people, that you will tear away at the guts of Australian unionism'. He 
then called them 'a couple of scrubbers from western Sydney who basically 
have taken out Liberal Party tickets and have said, 'Right, we are now in the 
establishment and we have been fitted up for the pinstripe suits; lets get our 
boots out into the ordinary people"855. 
Part of this differentiation strategy was to portray the Opposition as economic 
zealots who were mean and out of touch. An illustrative example is provided 
by Keating's musings on Liberal Party economic policy; 'the hard-headed sorts 
of policies which the Opposition is about - the Gordon Gecko school of 
thought that greed is good, devil take the hindmost and the survival of the 
fittest policies'856. 
The Prime Minister also often attacked the Opposition as elitists. In this vein, 
he talked about Liberals 'at the Bridgewater Tennis Club over cucumber 
sandwiches ... with their BMWs and their Porches lined up out the front' 857. 
Downer's elitism - 'born with a silver cutlery set in his mouth' - was almost 
excused because it meant he had 'always held working people in contempt', 
whereas John Howard was attacked on this front with much more vigour. 
Keating, commenting on Howard's background, told the parliament that the 
'member for Bennelong was a bowser boy at Canterbury. What a bowser boy 
has against working people and what he can gain by trying to grind their 
wages down has got me beat'. Later in the same speech, now addressing the 
entire Opposition, Keating cried: 'look at you ... You are mostly scrubbers. 
Most of you have not got any ability or two zacks to your name, but you still 
want to hop into working people, as if you were some sort of landed gentry. 
You are the remnants of Australia's failed upper class, the bunyip aristocracy 
hopping into working people and trying to cut their wages'858. 
8 55 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, pp 2910. 
856 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, pp 776. 
857 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, pp 900. 
858 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, pp 2153-4. 
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Prime Minister Keating often roused himself to a rage that the Liberal and 
National Parties, people he held in such low regard, considered themselves 
worthy of governing, of usurping Labor. Keating directed his contempt toward 
the Opposition and motivated his own colleagues with spirited invective and 
outrage at his opponents' claims to the throne. In this context Keating 
declared in parliament in 1995 that 'they [the Opposition] think they are the 
born to rule squad who will put working people back in their place. As I have 
said on many occasions, there is one little hang-up over here we have always 
had: we thought most of us in public life were born to rule them, and so far we 
have been going pretty well at it'859. At a personal level, this approach 
translated to brutal engagements with Opposition leaders from Hewson to 
Howard. 
The Psychological Battle 
The conflict between prime minister and leader of the opposition is the macro 
aspect of parliamentary performance. The two leaders, directly engaged face 
to face, are locked in a battle with the highest stakes. Reading Hansard and 
watching footage from the parliament during the Keating prime ministership 
the researcher is struck by the depth of feeling between the Prime Minister 
and the three opponents he faced down over the dispatch box. It is almost as 
if their very presence across the aisle riled Keating to the point where all of his 
aggression and, almost, hate, was funnelled in his opponents' direction. The 
psychological battles between Keating and, successively, Hewson, Downer 
and Howard were a spectacle in themselves; primal conflicts between a PM 
who never questioned his own ability and Opposition leaders whose 
leadership capacity he constantly challenged. 
Hewson 
John Hewson was widely touted as a political 'cleanskin', though the flip-side 
of these perceptions was that he was relatively weak and not politically 
859 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, pp 2003. 
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experienced or savvy, traits Keating sought desperately to exploit86o. Without 
exception, the commentary on the Keating - Hewson parliamentary conflicts 
highlighted the primal, intense, emotional aspects. One who was close to 
Keating has been quoted as saying that 'sometimes you watch Question Time 
and the hatred between those two blokes is just awful. I find it difficult to 
watch. It's discomforting. It's primitive'861. Don Watson, in his heralded 
biography, concurs. Keating and Hewson were fighting in 'a visceral, savage, 
exhausting brawl. They were like two brothers locked in mutual loathing which 
no-one, least of all the antagonists, could properly understand'862• The same 
author opined that 'an observer could be forgiven for thinking the two men 
provoked in each other the memories of childhood battlefields where all the 
most indelible lessons are learned'863. 
True to form, Keating relied on a selection of taunts and labels through 
Hewson's leadership tenure. When implying Hewson was an elitist or out of 
touch he would call him 'Professor'. When painting him as mean and 
uncaring, he would call him 'Gordon Gecko', after the unethical 'greed is good' 
character from the movie Wall Street. Some Hewson policies, for example 
tariff reduction, led to nicknames such as 'Captain Zero' (referring to zero 
percent tariffs). When Hewson took offence to something Keating said, the 
latter would call the former 'old glass jaw'B64. Responding to a Dorothy Dixer 
from Janice Crosio about the cost of health care, Keating declared Hewson to 
be 'the most spiteful and cold-blooded leader that the Federal Liberal Party 
has ever presented to the Australian public'865. More simple and predictable 
were Keating's retorts to Hewson interjections: when the Opposition Leader 
asked about bracket creep Keating replied "you are the only creep around 
here, brother'866. 
86° For profiles of John Hewson, see Norman Abjorensen, John Hewson: A Biography, 
(Melbourne, Lothian, 1993); and Christine Wallace, Hewson: A Portrait, (Sydney, Pan 
Macmillan, 1993). 
861 Quoted in Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 208. 
862 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 141. 
863 Ibid, p 20. 
864 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 223. 
865 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 3216. 
866 For some reason Keating often called Hewson 'brother'. 
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The Hewson style attracted a significant portion of Keating's attention in his 
Question Time answers. He seemed particularly horrified that Hewson was 
receiving kudos for being an outsider, a non-politician. Rhetorically, Keating 
tried to bring an end to this perception. Two examples are illustrative of this. 
The first came in 1992 when Keating argued: 'you thought you had a dream 
run - you know, down the slope, one ski, no hands - for two or three months, 
until finally you ran into a small forest'867. Later that year, after a Hewson 
motion of censure against Keating he continued in a similar vein: 'Gone now 
are the images of the cool, urbane person of yesterday. Gone now is the little 
golf putt on a Sunday or doing something else; the charming little doorstop, 
the understated language. The slightest bit of pressure and, bingo, out jumps 
a jittery, jumpy, cat-calling person'86s. 
The Liberal Party's key policy plank - fightback! - also attracted considerable 
prime ministerial attention, mostly directed towards the man who would be 
held ultimately responsible for its political and electoral fate. Spectacularly, 
Keating boomed in parliament in 1993, after retrieving his copy of the 
Opposition's policy from his drawer: 'Here it is, Fightback - Acme Fightback, 
the old Acme Fightback. Wiley C. Coyote blew it up. He got the Acme 
Fightback, opened it up and - boom! - away he went. Boom! T-woo! Away he 
went'869. After Hewson lost the 1993 election, due at least in part to the GST 
component of fightback!, Keating mocked his return to the source of the 
Opposition's electoral disaster. The Prime Minister said in 1994 that 'it is like 
Bonaparte going back to Waterloo. Not content to lose everything, he would 
go back and try to lose a bit mores10: 
Hewson's Question Time performances and priorities also attracted the Prime 
Minister's attention. In 1992 he accused the Opposition Leader of running 
'straight back to the office' to 'tap out a little statement as an apologia for his 
performance at Question Time•s11. A multi-pronged prime ministerial attack 
followed from a Hewson question about a new expensive, foreign piece of 
867 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 4 7 4. 
868 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 579. 
869 House of Representatives Debates, 1993, p 519. 
870 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 809. 
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furniture for the Lodge. Keating's response began with a question of his own 
about Hewson's priorities: 'there are three national issues this week - Mabo, 
APEC and industrial relations. What has this guy to say about it? He is onto 
dining room tables at the Lodge. He is on the really big issues'. Next he 
played up leadership tensions with the observation that 'he really is in trouble 
over there. Is it any wonder that Bronwyn Bishop is after him?' The typically 
blunt Keating-esque crescendo was 'do you want to hear the answer, dummy, 
or not?'872 
On occasion, the psychological challenge was made by Keating even more 
directly. The most famous and illustrative example of this was when the Prime 
Minister declared to the parliament his wish, reproduced at the outset of this 
chapter, to 'do Hewson slowly'. These were the direct declarations of war that 
usually elicited loud roars of approval from the Labor side of the House. 
Keating knew the value of these remarks, and sometimes returned to the 
more devastating ones: 
The Leader of the Opposition has been thinking about that remark -
about doing him slowly. I have no doubt that when he is into brekkie in 
the morning or running around the lake he is thinking about it. It really 
got up his nose. He keeps coming back to it. He would like to be 
relieved of the pressure by me saying to him, 'Look, don't worry, I will 
take you out of this minefield, this hazy area, this twilight zone of 
contempt for you within your Party - ... of this questioning about you 
within your Party; I will give you your shot at history now'B73. 
In words just as intense and direct, Keating also stepped up the pressure on 
Hewson with devastating lines such as: 'let me make it quite clear: there will 
be no slithering, sliding, backsliding and hiding by the leader of the 
Opposition. When he lifts a rock, I will either be under it or I will have been 
there. I will be there, chasing him down, wherever he tries to go'874. 
Sometimes the psychological challenges were more subtle, even whispered 
across the table. John Edwards, Keating staffer and biographer, recounts one 
conversation between the two key protagonists. According to Edwards, at the 
end of Question time on a September day, Keating 'leaned over to Hewson. 
871 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 568. 
872 House of Representatives Debates, 1993, pp 2866-7. 
873 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 3272. 
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'You're white,' he said. 'Your face is white. You can't take it.' 'I can take care 
of you' Hewson said. 'No, you can't,' Keating replied, leaving. 'Your face is 
white'875. Other times Keating's declaration of dominance were louder and 
more public. After the 1993 election win Keating lectured Hewson by saying 
'let me tell you this, brother: I will round you up like a sheepdog come the next 
poll just like I did last time'876. 
Hewson employed some simple, but largely ineffective, tactics to try and derail 
Keating's torrents of parliamentary abuse. He would either turn his back on 
Keating or deliver whispered taunts across the table. David Jull, Liberal MP for 
Fadden and a frontbencher under Hewson, remembers how 'when Keating 
was raving you'd just start chatting among yourselves, obviously taking no 
notice of him'. According to Jull, this used to infuriate Keating' because 'he'd 
rather see the whites of the eyes and see what effect the devastation has'. 
The second ploy involved Hewson 'back-chatting him'. However, 'some of it 
was pretty ordinary sort of stuff'. Hewson would call the PM a 'loser' and a 
'grub'. 'That was the standard of it. And that was the problem, it wasn't very 
effective. It was just a constant chatter all the time•s11. 
What did Keating's performances look like from Hewson's own side of the 
parliament? Jull recalls: 'it could be quite devastating at times'. He continued: 
'Hewson was an interesting character within himself. He was a deep thinker 
but he wasn't terribly political, as such. So in that respect quite often it 
became a bit unbalanced, in terms of the capacity to retaliate. Keating at his 
best was very much in command'. Jull's final judgement was that, though 
'Hewson had a fairly tough skin', 'it was obvious that sometimes it was fairly 
d evastati ng•s1s. 
Probably the best description of Keating - Hewson parliamentary conflict 
comes from Don Watson who, in Recollections, wrote: 
874 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 27 42. 
875 John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 496. 
876 House of Representatives Debates, 1993, p 512. 
877 Interview with David Juli, 19 September 2002. 
878 Ibid. 
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Politics is a game of the emotions, it is psychological war and is therefore 
very difficult to keep the child from stepping up on behalf of the man. 
Again and again Hewson would ruin his argument by lurching into the 
invective he learnt at school. In the House he took to sledging. In a voice 
loud enough for Keating to hear, but not the House microphone, he 
called him 'loser'. He turned his back and spoke to his colleagues, or at 
least pretended to, when Keating had the floor. It was worth reminding 
the Prime Minister as he left for Question Time that his opponent might 
have such a hatred of him, an outward show of calm, or humour, a big 
smile - anything that suggested Keating was at home in the Prime 
Minister's job - and Dr Hewson's hatred might, for all political purposes, 
consume him. 'That's right,' Keating would say as he went out the door, 
'and you know I don't hate him. He's just a poor dumb bastard, that's all 
he is'B79. 
If Keating didn't hate Hewson then he did an admirable job of convincing 
public observers of the contrary. 
John Hewson was largely unsuited to the daily barrages of psychological 
abuse in the House of Representatives. At the end of Hewson's tenure as 
Leader of the Opposition, Barry Jones, then President of the ALP, called 
Hewson 'a technocrat who did not know how to use Parliament effectively. He 
was a man over whom Paul Keating assumed a crushing psychological 
ascendancy'880 . Partisanship aside, this seems an apt judgment. While 
Hewson's performance outside the House could, at times, be impressive, in 
parliament Keating well and truly owned the Opposition Leader. We know this 
because of the body language Hewson showed during Keating tirades and the 
strategies he employed to combat them. Hewson often had his back turned, or 
wouldn't ask Keating questions (especially after 1993), or kept himself busy 
by talking with colleagues. Keating alluded to this in 1992 when he said of 
Hewson: 'he asked the question and now, as always, he has a little 
conference, a little conversation. He is psychologically unsuited to rep1y·ss1. 
He never seemed to fully engage the Prime Minister across the floor, never 
operating on the same psychological level. Keating knew this and played on 
it, taunting Hewson. While Hewson was beating Keating in the polls, Keating 
was thrashing Hewson in the parliament, establishing a psychological 
dominance that continued right through until Hewson's fall from the 
leadership in 1994. 
s19 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 129. 
880 Geoffrey Barker, 'Downer Ends the Paul Keating One-man Show', Age, 4 June 1994, p 21. 
881 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 373. 
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Downer 
Parliamentary exchanges between Paul Keating and Alexander Downer lacked 
the passion of the earlier Keating - Hewson clashes, but the pursuit of 
parliamentary dominance nonetheless produced some sparks. The 
consensus among those interviewed for this thesis appears to be that Downer 
did himself no favours and, though Keating did him untold damage in the 
parliament, his demise was all but assured in the course of Downer's broader 
activities. One of Downer's colleagues articulated the situation thus: 'Downer 
wasn't there terribly long' and his 'problem was that some of his own 
comments didn't help him out. Keating then took over and the whole thing 
was an absolute disaster. Thankfully it didn't last too long•ss2. 
Given Downer's disastrous leadership of the Opposition, one comment from 
Geoffrey Barker is interesting and now almost comical. Barker declared that 
'Paul Keating's virtually unchallenged domination of national politics is over'. 
He continued: 'In a crucial achievement, Alexander Downer demonstrated in 
his first week as Opposition Leader that he is as effective and as tough as the 
Prime Minister on and off the floor of Parliament'. By striking Keating on 'two 
issues at the centre of Labor's ideological agenda: the distribution of income 
between poor and rich and the design of the Australian flag' Downer was able 
to elicit 'ill-judged and unconvincing' responses from the Prime Ministerss3. 
The reality, over time, diverged greatly from this premature judgement of 
Downer's parliamentary prowess. 
Though Alexander Downer's leadership of the Liberal Party was short, Paul 
Keating still had some opportunities to develop clear lines of parliamentary 
attack. Don Watson saw the task as 'hot-riveting the Melbourne Club to 
Alexander Downer's arse once and for all'884, which meant making much of 
the Opposition Leader's privileged and moneyed background. This is what led 
Keating to state that Downer was 'born with a silver cutlery service in his 
882 Interview with David Jul!, 19 September 2002. 
883 Geoffrey Barker, 'Downer Ends the Paul Keating One-man Show', Age, 4 June 1994, p 21. 
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mouth'885. In this context Watson differentiated Downer from his predecessor 
by writing: 'Hewson was Keating's natural enemy; Downer was his natural 
prey'886. Downer was easy meat for a re-elected Prime Minister on the prowl. 
It would be making too much of Keating's parliamentary prowess to argue that 
he was solely responsible for Downer's descent into the depths of public 
opinion. Having said that, Keating - Downer parliamentary exchanges 
nonetheless appear devastating. Jim Snow, Labor backbencher, expressed 
the view to this author that, once Keating saw that Downer was on the way out 
and couldn't be propped up, he figured he may as well collect some of the 
credit for the Opposition Leader's destructionss7 • Mark Latham, inheritor of 
Keating's attack-dog persona in parliament, concurs. He believes Downer 
'fizzled out under the weight of his own stupidity' and 'Keating was just getting 
his rhythm going when Downer departed'. Latham's conclusion was that 'if 
Downer had stayed it would have been the greatest massacre ever in the 
parliament'. 'Downer was falling apart and Paul was trying to work out how to 
dismantle him completely'sss. 
Keating's attacks on Downer centred on weakness and elitism. He used again 
a name for the Opposition Leader - 'Shirley Temple'ssg - that he'd used 
earlier, in 1993, and called him 'a mean-spirited, bitchy little Opposition 
leader'890. Keating also labelled Downer the 'most foolish political leader of 
this country since Billy McMahon'891. Later in the year, Keating returned to 
this charge in parliament. Answering a Peter Costello question about the 
Hawke Memoirs, he turned on the Opposition Leader, declaring: 'the other day 
I said that he is the most foolish political leader since Bill McMahon. I now 
apologise to the McMahon family. This fellow is, by a long margin, the silliest 
person ever to have occupied that seat'S92. 
884 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 493. 
885 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 2006. 
886 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 494. 
887 Interview with Jim Snow, 26 February 2002. 
888 Interview with Mark Latham, 3 June 2002. 
889 House of Representatives Debates, 1993, p 781. 
890 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 2522. 
891 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 926. 
892 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 2001. 
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The gathering contempt for Alexander Downer became more and more 
obvious as time wore on. One article by the Age's Mark Baker, ominously 
titled 'Keating Attacks and Downer Doubts Rise' describes in detail a Prime 
Minister going for the jugular. Baker recounts how 'in Parliament, Mr Keating 
launched a withering personal attack that left the Opposition Leader 
blustering'. The article continues: 'If all this were not bad enough for Mr 
Downer, Mr Keating - seizing upon the fallout from the central Australian trip -
yesterday climbed all over the Opposition Leader during his first appearance 
in Parliament after the winter recess ... Moving into sarcastic overdrive, Mr 
Keating pilloried Mr Downer as a "sook" who had enjoyed "the greatest sleigh 
ride and honeymoon in the history of politics in the country" but had gone into 
hiding after his stocks plunged in the polls'893. Keating bullied and 
intimidated Downer increasingly until the latter's fall. 
As time wore on, and Downer appeared increasingly ridiculous as an 
alternative prime minister, Keating became more and more dismissive of his 
counterpart's wares. On the ABC's Lateline program he boasted that dealing 
with Downer was like 'like hitting balls coming in slow motion'894. For the 
Liberals, relief, in the form of the general deterioration of the Keating 
Government and the resurrection of John Howard, was at hand. 
Howard 
John Howard returned to the Liberal leadership early in 1995, giving Paul 
Keating the third parliamentary opponent of his prime ministership. While 
Keating drew upon similar reserves of confidence, arrogance and contempt in 
his bid to defeat Howard in the House, the Government's standing in the polls 
was declining to the point where the new Opposition Leader could afford to 
withstand parliamentary attacks from the Prime Minister without desperately 
trying to answer every charge or respond in kind to Keating's aggression. In 
short, the boundaries of the battle between Howard and Keating differed 
893 Mark Baker, 'Keating Attacks and Downer Doubts Rise', Age, 26 August 1994, p 4. 
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greatly from the conflicts immediately past. For Howard, a parliamentary draw 
counted as a win. Howard knew the electorate was decreasingly enamoured 
of the Prime Minister, and could afford to absorb the invective coming at him 
across the dispatch box. 
Looking at the Hansard record of proceedings in the House of Representatives 
it appears that Keating always regarded Howard as a figure likely to return to 
the Liberal leadership. Indeed, even during John Hewson's tenure, Keating 
taunted Howard (and Hewson) with: 
John, I have to admire this about you: you have been here 20 years, but 
you always have the General's baton unsheathed in the knapsack. It is 
always there. You are always ready to be dragooned into service. The 
fact is that hope springs eternal within the honourable member for 
Bennelong. He has a sneaking idea in his heart of hearts that he is 
better at the business of politics than the Leader of the Opposition isS95. 
Later, while Alexander Downer was Leader of the Opposition, he returned to 
the theme of a Howard return. Keating warned the Liberals that, 'if they put 
the member for Bennelong up, we will come after him so damned hard. If you 
think I was white-hot in 1986-87, you ain't seen nothing yef896_ Once Howard 
returned to the leadership Keating took the credit for keeping the new leader 
in the wilderness for so long. Menacingly, Keating told the parliament that 
'one thing about the professionalism of public life is that you know when you 
have been hurt and you know who hurt you'. Howard, he added, 'knows who 
hurt him, who kept him over there'897. 
The Prime Minister's parliamentary strategy for establishing an ascendency 
over John Howard involved painting the Opposition Leader as old and tired, 
and simply another to be disposed of by the Prime Minister. The Keating 
estimation of Howard is neatly summed up by the Age's Innes Willox, who 
wrote early in 1995: 
Mr Keating 's views of Mr Howard are blunt: he is a recycled yesterday's 
man; a representative of a bygone era, of the tariff wall; slavish support 
for Britain; universal two-parent families and white picket fences. Mr 
894 Bruce Jones, 'Can Keating Still Float Like a Butterfly, Sting Like A Bee', Sun Herald, 26 
June 1994, p 35. 
895 House of Representatives Debates, 1992, p 3271. 
896 House of Representatives Debates, 1994, p 3870. 
897 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 3697. 
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Howard, he says with a dismissive wave, would take Australians on an 
unwanted trip down the time tunnel to the 1950s of Sir Robert 
Menziess9s. 
These were the lines Keating pursued in the parliament, with a delivery as 
strong and as contemptuous as ever. 
An intensely pursued theme of Keating's parliamentary attacks on John 
Howard related to Howard's traditional and conservative social views. His 
approach led the Prime Minister to label the Liberal leader as 'out of your age 
and out of your depth' and 'a remnant from days gone by'899. This followed an 
earlier attack, along similar lines, where Keating sledged the Opposition 
Leader with the comment that 'the thing about John Howard is that Australia 
has passed him by. His defence and foreign policy speech last week could 
have been given by Harold Holt. It was a disgrace for a modern Australian 
politician•goo. 
A second key theme was Keating's view that Howard was simply the next in a 
line of Opposition Leaders to be toyed with and disposed of by the PM. In this 
context, for example, responding to a Howard censure motion, Keating 
declared: 
It was not by accident that the Liberal Party passed over John Howard 
when John Hewson lost the last election. It was not by accident they 
passed over John Howard to go to Alexander Downer after John Hewson 
was removed. He is the Liberal Party's third preference but in his 
arrogance he wants himself to be Australia's first preference901. 
A similarly contemptuous diatribe came later that year when Keating told 
parliament: 'I have had to knock over two of them in this parliament. Now I 
am on to my third. Dare I say: I think that is something of a record, banging 
over two Opposition leaders in one parliament and working on the third. He is 
ageing very nicely'9°2 . On another occasion Keating informed Howard: 'you 
are running out of puff faster than your curly-headed young mate behind you. 
898 Innes Willox, "Honest John' Widens His View On Compromise', Age, 16 January 1995, p 
13. 
899 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 2161. 
900 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 2669. 
901 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 385. 
902 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 3696-7. 
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You are running out of puff in a couple of weeks; it took him at least a couple 
of months'903. 
John Howard was tougher in the parliament than his immediate predecessors, 
and the political environment suited his style. With the deterioration of 
Labor's standing in the opinion polls came a comfort level for Howard and a 
preparedness to withstand Keating's attacks. The Opposition Leader knew 
well that all that was required of him was to present a small target and 
attempt from time to time to get under the Prime Minister's skin. He did this 
effectively, for example when he asked Keating after the disastrous 1995 
Canberra by-election loss: 'is the member for McMillan, who holds his seat by 
573 votes, right in criticising you for failing to consult colleagues when your 
politically disgraced colleague, Ros Kelly, decided to jump ship?904'. Another 
Howard question asked the absent Keating 'why will Australia's part-time 
Prime Minister not stop hiding in his office and come in here now, provide 
answers for the mess he has created and end his contemptible arrogance 
towards the elected representatives of the Australian people?905'. Apparently 
this elicited 'thunderous applause from the public galleries'906. 
When asked by the author why Howard's experience in parliament differed 
from that of his defeated and replaced colleagues, David Juli expressed the 
view that Howard was simply 'a different kettle of fish' because 'he had a hide 
as thick as a rhinoceros' and Keating's barbs 'just had no effect'. This 'used 
to infuriate Keating as well, that he couldn't get the bite out of Howard that he 
got out of the others'. Juli's final analysis of Keating versus Howard in the 
1995 parliament? 'In terms of pure parliamentary entertainment, Keating's 
effort on Howard wasn't as amusing as on the others. Maybe because of the 
nature of John Howard, he's more bland and doesn't have the quirkiness of 
the other two'. Also, 'Howard didn't bite, he held his ground, maintained his 
dignity, came in with a bit of policy, but nothing too much to allow another 
903 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 1461. 
904 House of Representatives Debates, 1995, p 2131. 
905 Mike Seccombe, 'Back to the Bearpit', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 February 1995, p 5. 
906 Ibid. 
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onslaught'907 • The lay-low approach served Howard well right up until 
parliament's adjournment late in 1995. 
The more Howard could provoke Keating, and the nastier that the latter 
appeared on nightly television news snippets of Question Time, the greater the 
chances of the Prime Minister self-destructing. Keating rarely got under 
Howard's skin because the resurrected leader was more experienced and 
knew he could coast into government on the back of popular discontent. 
Howard could quietly taunt Keating, leaving the PM with two unappealing 
options: either attack Howard and risk a popular backlash or back off from the 
style of parliamentary conflict he had perfected. The outcome, according to 
Mark Latham, was that, though 'Paul always had it psychologically on Howard', 
'it was just a matter of getting the traction'. 'You could almost see at the end 
of every Question Time that Howard was relieved that he hadn't been mauled 
as badly as he could have been - that Paul wasn't right at him'9os. 
The Down Side 
Though Keating successfully motivated colleagues, raised morale on the 
Labor backbenches, and scored many psychological points off, especially, 
Hewson and Downer, there were significant costs associated with his 
parliamentary style. Few commentators or those interviewed for this thesis 
questioned the Prime Minister's parliamentary dominance, though some are 
quick to point to the down side of his approach. A former senior member of 
the Opposition, Ian Sinclair, said, in this respect: 'I certainly respect his 
parliamentary capabilities, although I totally oppose some of the ways in which 
he uses his parliamentary skill. I think he belittles himself and the institution 
by personalising the debate unnecessarily'909. Day argues Keating 'was the 
despair of advisers who were unable to soften his streetfighting persona 
which, after all, allowed him to exert dominance on the floor of the Parliament. 
907 Interview with David Juli, 19 September 2002. 
908 Interview with Mark Latham, 3 June 2002. 
909 In Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 66. 
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Unfortunately, Keating's pungent language and aggressive demeanour had a 
negative effect on many voters'91o. 
Keating could be undisciplined in the parliament, which fed a public 
perception of the Prime Minister as aggressive and arrogant. The incident in 
1995 where Keating threw a document at the Liberals across the table is 
unlikely to have been met with much approval in the electorate. Nor could 
regular footage of a ranting Prime Minister on the parliamentary warpath. This 
view led Alan Ramsey to observe that Keating's real problem was himself, 
because, for example, 'there was a front page picture in the Melbourne Age 
yesterday which showed a wild-eyed Paul Keating ranting and raving at the 
Opposition in Parliament on Thursday afternoon. It said all that needs saying 
about the Prime Minister's often ugly behaviour these days'. Ramsey 
continued, referring to news film from the same day: 'I don't know what the 
tens of thousands of viewers who watch the highest rating television news in 
the country must have thought of their Prime Minister, but it wouldn't have 
been friendly, I'm sure'911. On another occasion the same commentator, while 
praising Keating's role in the Mabo and budget debates ('Keating at his best'), 
called 'his bullying arrogance towards Parliament' 'Keating at his worst'912. 
John O'Callaghan again offers a perceptive analysis of the costs and benefits 
of Keating's grenade-throwing approach to the House of Representatives. He 
believes 'any personal attack by him on Howard or Hewson or Downer or 
Bishop, yes it would make the backbench happy but it used to have a fairly 
negative impact in terms of perception of people out in the electorate'. 'A 30 
second grab of Keating', according to O'Callaghan, could be 'quite a turn-off. 
It was not a good perception and, over time, it wore away at his credibility. He 
dominated the parliament but in the process he gave the wrong message out 
910 See Chapter Eight of this thesis for analysis of Keating's opinion poll figures and, most 
notably, the average percentage of respondents who considered Keating arrogant, a 
perception no doubt exacerbated by his parliamentary performances. See also David Day 
2000, op cit, pp 429-30; and Peter Walsh 1995, op cit, p 286. 
911 Alan Ramsey, 'Deals, Not Elections, In The Air', Sydney Morning Herald, 21 August 1993, p 
31. 
912 Alan Ramsey, 'Comeback Kid Puts His Stamp on Things', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 
October 1993, p 35. 
234 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
to the community. In the main the community doesn't like people being 
vicious at other people'913. 
In recognition of the costs of his combative parliamentary style, the Prime 
Minister began early in 1994 to limit his appearances in Question Time to only 
twice a week. Keating and some of his advisers thought it more effective for 
the PM to utilise daytime television and radio as his outlet to the electorate 
rather than have them see him only through the lens of parliamentary conflict. 
According to one commentator, Keating 'sees it as going on the offensive, 
giving him more time to muster his support in the community by appearing at 
lunchtime functions and smiling warmly through television spots during the 
blue-rinse hours'914. 
This strategy was not without detractors. Geoff Kitney reported on one 
meeting in which 
most of his Cabinet colleagues were dismayed when Keating told them 
on Monday of his plan to drastically reduce the amount of time he was 
required to be in Parliament. The Deputy Prime Minister, Brian Howe, 
said Keating was Labor's weapon against the conservatives and 
sheathing it would be a very serious mistake. Graham Richardson said 
Keating had John Hewson completely at his mercy in Question Time and 
it would be stupid politics to give up that advantage915. 
Mark Riley concurred with the cabinet ministers, writing in February 1994 that 
'it is clear it is not the Government that stands to profit from his absence, 
given Keating 'hits the Opposition targets so much more than anyone else'916. 
Apart from missing opportunities to attack the Opposition, there was also 
another negative effect of the Prime Minister's decision to limit appearances. 
According to David Day, 'it simply confirmed the aloof and autocratic image 
that many people had of him'917. 
913 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
914 Mark Riley, 'Keating Makes A Meal Out of A Coalition Stew', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 
February 1994, p 6. 
915 Geoff Kitney, 'Keating Will Be Quiet But No-One Will Sleep', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 
February 1994, p 11. 
916 Mark Riley, 'Keating Makes A Meal Out of A Coalition Stew', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 
February 1994, p 6. 
911 David Day 2000, op cit, pp 430. 
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Some staffers have since commented that Keating's office should have voiced 
their concerns over the strategy from the start91s. The decision, nonetheless, 
was made because of the very real concern that Keating's combative 
parliamentary style was costing the Government votes. The counter-argument 
can be made that putting Keating on a leash was counter-productive, and 
allowed the Opposition a free ride in the parliament. Either way, the downside 
of Keating's prime ministerial style in parliament led to a conflict between the 
benefits of establishing psychological dominance over leaders and motivating 
colleagues, and the electoral costs that coverage of the House of 
Representatives likely entailed. 
Throwing Grenades 
Prime ministers can accumulate power and authority within their own party 
and over the Opposition by appearing dominant in the House of 
Representatives. While the prime ministerial power thesis is reasonably quiet 
on the role of parliament, particularly in comparison with the media, cabinet 
and party, its role is nonetheless central to the job of PM. The spotlight is 
increasingly on the prime minister, who must perform in that forum to secure 
and maintain caucus approval and Party advantage. 
Unsurprisingly, given the contrasts already drawn between the two men, Prime 
Minister Hawke's approach to parliament differed markedly from Keating's. 
Stephen Bradbury, for example, described, under Hawke, a 'somewhat mixed 
and distant relationship with the parliament... parliament was very often 
relegated from its traditional role at the epicentre of the political process in 
favour of Hawke's presidential and consensus-based leadership style'919. 
Keating, on the other hand, attempted to use parliament to maximise his 
power, rejecting Hawke's extra-parliamentary and somewhat populist 
approach to leadership which transcended the institution. 
918 See, for example, John Edwards 1996, op cit, pp 515-16. 
919 Stephen Bradbury 2003, op cit, p 389. 
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The argument of this chapter has been that Paul Keating was an excellent 
parliamentary performer, but one who suffered from bouts of indiscipline. If 
Keating's parliamentary performance is analysed purely in the context of 
activity in the House of Representatives, we can see a positive effect. His 
ability to rouse the Labor backbench with spirited invective and, at times, 
differentiating 'us' and 'them' rhetoric, coupled with his demoralisation of 
successive Opposition Leaders was a valuable weapon in his leadership. The 
down side was that he was unable to tone down his aggression and the 
nastier side of his parliamentary persona, with negative consequences for his 
popularity in the electorate. 
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Painting the Big Picture 
[H]is language blessedly free of the social sciences, and being also free 
of the law, it was almost completely unrestrained. In its natural 
environment it served as the raw instrument of his intelligence, a 
shillelagh or a paint brush as circumstances demanded. With it he could 
sell an idea better than anybody else in the government. He painted 
word pictures, created images and moods at a stroke. He could turn 
ideas into icons, make phrases that stuck.920 
The term 'conviction politics' describes individualised leadership and a 
forcefully presented and argued agenda. This, according to Patricia Lee 
Sykes, means that conviction politicians are often at odds with their party, or 
dominate it completely. This is similarly true of the other institutions of 
executive government; a conviction leader can, according to Sykes, 
circumvent the collective restraints placed on them by using the media to 
promote their agenda publicly921. For prime ministers, conviction politics is 
about developing an agenda and then forcefully selling that vision. How the 
vision is sold, through the media, by delivering speeches, and by acting on the 
international stage, goes a long way to determining the relative power of prime 
ministers and their ability to implement their agenda. 
Paul Keating was an archetypical conviction politician. His public persona and 
speech, his media style and his salesmanship all reflected this approach to 
leadership'. The 'big picture' Keating painted for the Australian public included 
important and courageous reforms such as Mabo, Asian integration, and steps 
toward the establishment of an Australian republic. The pursuit of these 
policies required Keating to convince, cajole and spruik in public forums 
including the media and on the international stage, and maximise speech 
making opportunities. Efforts of this magnitude called for steadfast 
conviction, and a belief that each reform was fundamentally right for the 
country. In this context Michael Gordon remarked that Keating was 'a brilliant 
920 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 24. 
238 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
political salesman, but his brilliance is underpinned by the conviction that the 
line he is selling is right'922. David Adams argues that 'perhaps he sold things 
so well because he believed what he was saying'923 . When it came to 
articulating the big picture, the Prime Minister 'was sincere, he was 
passionate, he connected with his audience on an emotional level'924. 
Prime Minister Keating maintained a passionate but largely combative 
relationship with the Australian media, particularly the print component of the 
parliamentary Press Gallery. His prepared speeches were historically 
noteworthy but delivered without fire; his off the cuff speeches were 
sometimes amusing, other times they were sarcastic or hilarious or moving or 
admirable or emotional, but generally memorable. He strode the international 
stage with a growing confidence that drew plaudits and increased his prestige 
at home and abroad. Indeed his speech making and international 
statesmanship were two aspects of Keating's prime ministership that 
attracted the most public praise. Unfortunately, and with significant 
consequences, the same cannot be said for the fraught relationship between 
the PM and the Australian media. 
Paul Keating was a born political salesman who could, when roused, fight with 
a passionate commitment to a proposal for reform, and act as a convincing 
advocate. Alan Ramsey, hardly an admirer of the PM, was moved to write in 
1994 that Keating's great strength was that he 
can make bad news seem good news, villains appear heroes. He can put 
a credible gloss on just about any conjunction of events you care to 
name. He can persuade almost any group of people, high or low, into 
accepting black is or could be white, or at least pale grey. He is the 
shrewdest, most effective political advocate you'll probably ever come 
across in the basest, most manipulative business of them all925. 
921 Patricia Lee Sykes 2000, op cit. 
922 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 193. 
923 David Adams 1997, op cit, p 12. 
924 Brett Evans 2001, op cit, p 9. 
925 Alan Ramsey, 'Keating's Mailed Fist in a Velvet Glove', Sydney Morning Herald, 17 
December 1994, p 23. 
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Another journalist wrote that there was 'no better practitioner of the 
performance art of politics than Mr Keating'926. His speech writer, Don 
Watson, has written that when the Prime Minister was 'on a roll with it he 
could remind you of what language can be and what it can do'927 . Public 
salesmanship was thus an important component of the prime ministerial 
repertoire of Paul Keating. 
What prime ministers do and say is subject to more scrutiny than the public 
utterances of any other political figure. In this way, according to Colin 
Seymour-Ure, public communication can be seen as a power resource. Prime 
ministers have at their disposal a heavily resourced 'media machine', and they 
have greater and more direct access to the media and are more newsworthy. 
These factors allow the PM to manage their personal image and use it as a 
tool of public power92s. 
Recalling Foley's notion of leadership stretch929; a prime minister attracts 
significantly more attention and opportunities to speak to the electorate. They 
are called upon to articulate publicly their own views and the direction of the 
Government. According to Patrick Weller, prime ministers 
are very public people. Whatever they say is newsworthy and liable to 
detailed scrutiny. Whatever they do is publicly assessed for wisdom and 
consistency. Domestically and internationally they speak for their nation, 
their government and their party. They appear frequently on the media, 
explaining and defending their actions, attacking their opponents and 
appealing to the voters for support. They must be articulate and effective 
public performers93o. 
Keating's Press Secretary, Greg Turnbull, concurs with this view of an 
emphasis on the PM. In an interview for this thesis, Turnbull argued that 
when 'a prime minister thinks aloud it sets off a chain reaction of talk and 
chatter and musing at all levels of the Australian community from the depths 
of talkback radio to the heights of bureaucratic, departmental consideration of 
926 Mike Seccombe, 'Keating's Banquet Offers Plenty to Chew On', Sydney Morning Herald, 10 
February 1993, p 7. 
9 27 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 24. 
928 Colin Seymour-Ure 2003, op cit, p 34. 
929 Michael Foley 2000, op cit; see also Chapter Two 'Prime Ministerial Leadership'. 
930 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 180. 
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policy initiatives'931 . Michelle Grattan, in this vein, has also written that 'there 
is a great power to the role of Prime Minister that's beyond the power of sitting 
at the head of the Cabinet ... a power to articulate what a nation thinks about 
itself'932. 
Prime ministerial rhetoric is an under-analysed facet of Australian political 
leadership, but is an important concern of this examination of Paul Keating 
PM. John Uhr has also recognised the value of prime ministerial rhetorical 
analysis, designating it as the 'medium of public persuasion for democratic 
politics'933. It's function is to 'institutionalise political leadership; through their 
rhetoric, leaders cultivate and consolidate their followers'934. Public speech 
becomes an important aspect of personal leadership; it is exercised unfiltered 
by formal institutions and can be provided to the public straight from the 
leader's mouth or via the media935. 
This chapter examines in detail the public salesmanship of Paul Keating, 
Prime Minister. It deals first with the various aspects of his relationship with 
the media before analysing his speech making and international role. The 
argument is that the positive effect of his captivating speeches and 
international statesmanship were more than nullified by his poisonous and 
rapidly deteriorating relationship with the fourth estate. This important 
relationship was not effectively utilised by Keating as PM, despite the 
importance he attached to it as Treasurer and before. The Prime Minister 
treated journalists with contempt, questioning what they regarded as 
newsworthy, and then refused to forgive them for writing off his chances in the 
1993 election. A relationship that was characterised by prime ministerial 
punishment and reward, and by an 'us and them' mentality, became 
increasingly sour over time. Prime Ministerial neglect of this important 
institution was a costly, counter-productive and petulant act that had a 
931 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
932 Michelle Grattan, 'Keating's Year at the Top', Age, 18 December 1992, p 9. 
933 John Uhr, 'Rhetoric as an Institution of Leadership', in Geoff Brennan and Francis Castles 
(eds), Australia Reshaped: Essays on 200 Years of Institutional Transformation (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
934 Ibid. 
935 Ibid. 
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detrimental effect on public perceptions of Paul Keating and his electoral 
prospects in 1996. 
The High Grade Drip 
Prime ministers and their press secretaries deal with all forms of media in 
every corner of the nation, but their principal contact is with journalists 
working in the Parliamentary Press Gallery. In Australia, the Gallery is uniquely 
situated within the Parliament building itself, giving journalists the opportunity 
to work in the same confines occupied by key decision makers and leaders936 • 
The Gallery is physically located on the top floor of the Senate side of 
Parliament House, and is essentially a long hallway of offices occupied by 
media organisations of print, radio, and television orientations. The result of 
'sharing the same kennel', according to senior journalist Michelle Grattan, is a 
'high level of access and interaction between groups'937, including journalists, 
elected representatives, and staffers. 
The plethora of literature that has been written about the Australian 
Parliamentary Press Gallery places much more emphasis on the personalities 
and activities of the Gallery rather than on its location and formal output. 
Clem Lloyd, for example, provides us with a valuable historical perspective938, 
while Margaret Simons' colourful account939 and contributions by Mike 
Steketee94o, Derek Parker941 and Michelle Grattan942 offer interesting 
descriptions of the contemporary Gallery at work. From these sources we 
know that the Gallery is much more than a physical place where journalists 
936 See Mike Steketee, 'The Press Gallery at Work' in Julian Disney and JR Nethercote (eds), 
The House on Capital Hill: Parliament, Politics and Power in the National Capital, (Sydney, 
Federation Press, 1996). 
937 Michelle Grattan, 'Sharing the Same Kennel: The Press in Parliament House' in Julian 
Disney and JR Nethercote (eds), The House on Capital Hill: Parliament, Politics and Power in 
the National Capital, (Sydney, Federation Press, 1996), p 217. 
938 Clem Lloyd, Parliament and the Press: The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery 1901-88, 
(Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1988). 
939 Margaret Simons, Fit to Print: Inside the Canberra Press Gallery, (Sydney, UNSW Press, 
1999). 
940 Mike Steketee 1996, op cit. 
941 Derek Parker, The courtesans: the press gallery in the Hawke era, (Sydney, Allen and 
Unwin, 1991). 
94 2 Michelle Grattan 1996, op cit. 
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pump out political news. It is a complex society of political reporters and 
commentators which adheres to long-held traditions, norms, hierarchies and 
structures that are not easily understood by outsiders. There are the 
acknowledged Gallery leaders - for example Laurie Oakes or Michelle Grattan 
- and many making their way up the journalistic ladder. Often there is a 
common Gallery line, where journalists follow the lead of the major players. 
That may be one reason why political operatives refer to the Gallery as one 
entity, rather than as disparate and individual outlets. A leader's relationship 
with this institution is a valuable determinant of political success. 
The Press Gallery, and indeed the broader media, regard prime ministers as 
the primary source of political news. Michael Foley's conclusions about 
leadership stretch, in the British context, apply equally to the Australian 
experience when it comes to an analysis of this relationship between the PM 
and the media. To recap, Foley wrote that what 'were once media 
opportunities to reach a wider audience have now been turned into overriding 
media obligations to publicise political positions through the effective 
projection of party leaders as national figures'943. That some bemoan the 
individualisation of British political leadership, Foley argues, 'is a reflection of 
the unprecedented public projection and general salience of contemporary 
party leaders and, in particular, the prime minister'944_ 
An Australian prime minister is similarly afforded much greater opportunities 
for media exposure then even their senior colleagues, and thus enjoys the 
same preconditions for leadership stretch945. A useful component of Foley's 
British analysis is his breakdown of media attention paid to the prime minister 
in relation to senior colleagues946. In conducting this analysis he uncovers a 
substantial gap between the coverage afforded the leader and that provided 
943 Michael Foley 2000, op cit, p 205. 
944 Ibid, p 236. 
945 One influential journalist, Mike Steketee, argued the increasing prevalence of television, in 
particular, has further contributed to this trend towards individualisation. He told this author 
that 'TV in particular has increased the focus on the prime minister, as the focal point of the 
government ... it's really just the prime minister or the opposition leader that get a look in ... 
Other ministers go through the motions but all the focus is really on the leaders'; interview 
with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
946 Michael Foley 2000, op cit. 
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to other cabinet ministers. A more limited, but nonetheless illuminating, 
investigation uncovers a similar phenomenon in Australia. Leadership stretch 
in Australia can be illustrated, for example, by examining the media coverage 
of key Labor figures during the lead-up to the 1996 poll. A search of the 
archives of Australia's major national newspaper - The Australian - reveals a 
strong emphasis on the leader in comparison to senior colleagues. Prime 
Minister Keating featured in 311 articles during the five week campaign, while 
Deputy Prime Minister Beazley featured in just 43. Senior ministers such as 
Simon Crean (16 articles) and Gareth Evans (24 articles) were similarly 
shunned in favour of the Labor leader. Leadership stretch can also be 
illustrated drawing on data from the electronic media. A database of current 
affairs programs on both television and radio maintained by the Australian 
Parliamentary Library counts 105 segments in which Paul Keating was 
mentioned, compared with coverage of Beazley (38), Crean (43) and Evans 
(25). Therefore, of the electronic and print coverage of Labor's four most 
senior contributors to the 1996 election campaign, the Prime Minister 
garnered 68.8 percent compared with Beazley's 13.4 percent, Crean's 9.8 
percent and Evans' 8.1 percent. 
Though care should be taken drawing conclusions from this fairly limited data, 
it is clear that the phenomenon described by Foley and labelled leadership 
stretch, illustrated by media analysis undertaken in Britain, is replicated in the 
Australian context. But how much of leadership stretch can be contributed to 
a consciously planned strategy, on behalf of parties and leaders, to 
presidentialise the presentation of party leaders and to keep other senior 
colleagues in the background? On the other side of the coin, can leadership 
stretch in the media be attributed to pressures from the fourth estate, and to 
a market and political environment increasingly driven by personality? 
Because of this uncertainty regarding cause and effect, it is important that 
leadership stretch in the public domain be taken to mean two things: first, that 
parties pursue the 'great man' theory of leadership by promoting leaders as a 
visible captain of a team of ministerial foot soldiers; and second, that the 
media is similarly interested in presenting a 'one-man band' to the public. 
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Thus, both trends are mutually reinforcing, and provide one element of the 
leadership stretch that Foley aptly describes. 
With the increasing media attention afforded prime ministers comes an 
enhanced responsibility to cultivate an effective working relationship with the 
media. Though the extent to which media affects election outcomes and 
popular perceptions is contested, there are, nonetheless, political costs 
associated with a poor prime ministerial relationship with opinion makers. 
Media effect is now largely gauged through the prism of the rise of television 
as a conduit for political news947, but influential print and radio journalists 
have their own impact on the media climate. The effects, according to the 
literature, may be cognitive (affecting political knowledge), attitudinal 
(impacting on political opinions), or behavioural (affecting people's votes)948. 
Leaders must portray themselves favourably over all media, whether it be 
television, radio or print, to maximise these aspects of political decision 
making and opinion forming. As will now be demonstrated, Prime Minister 
Keating largely turned his back on this task of leadership at some cost. 
Are You With Me or Against Me? 
Prime Minister Keating maintained an uneasy, love-hate relationship with the 
media throughout his tenure. One senior journalist, Glenn Milne, remembers 
a relationship that 'varied between [journalists] being hypnotised by Keating 
and in a state of open warfare with him'949. This media relationship is central 
to any understanding of this Prime Ministership because of how it evolved and 
the costs associated with its decline. What makes it fascinating, too, is the 
passionate intensity of the relationship - flowing both ways between 
journalists and the PM - and the feelings of betrayal and disappointment that 
we can associate with the deterioration of what was once an extremely close 
alliance. This is excellently described by Mike Seccombe, who wrote that 
947 Holli A Semetko, 'The Media' in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G Niemi, and Pippa Norris (eds), 
Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective, (London, Sage 
Publications, 1996), pp 271-2. 
948 Ibid, p 272. 
949 Interview with Glenn Milne, 9 September 2002. 
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No politician has had a more passionate relationship with the Canberra 
press gallery than Keating. He has made more appearances at the press 
club - 18 - than any other person. His press conferences in Parliament 
House during his tenure as Treasurer were the longest and most detailed 
anyone ever held. No-one has been more vocal in his approbation of the 
gallery when he thought we got it right, or in his vitriol when he thought 
we got it wrong. No-one was so prepared to argue his case in the 
corridors and offices or on the phone whenever he thought he had an 
important point to make. It was a love-hate symbiosis. At the bottom of it 
was an apparently genuine belief on Keating's part that he had to carry 
the argument with the people whose job it was to be informed, and know 
the detail of what government was about95o. 
That the relationship was passionate, emotional and cerebral, rather than 
detached and professional, made its deterioration even more significant and 
less rational. 
We learn much from Prime Minister Keating's own public and private 
utterances on the media. Publicly, in a speech at the 1992 Walkley Awards, 
he told the assembled journalists: 
I don't share this Nixonian - you won't have me to kick around any more 
- attitude. I like engagement. The Garboesque has no attraction for me. 
I don't want to be alone. I ask myself these days, does this make me 
peculiar? That I like to talk to the press? That, wrong-headed or 
inconvenient as they sometimes are, I like journalists? That I like 
politics? Am I wrong to believe that, for all the inevitable imperfections, 
this is one of the world's better democracies, and Australian journalists 
are a powerful reason why this is so? ... I see the press down the back of 
the plane on overseas trips - fierce and hungry, like grizzly bears on a 
package tour of the Orient. There are members of my staff who are too 
frightened to walk down the aisle between them to go to the toilet. They 
wait till nightfall and tiptoe down when they're asleep - little knowing 
that journalists are at their most dangerous after dark ... Yet I can't resist 
going down for a yarn951. 
However, this professed willingness to engage with journalists probably more 
closely applies to Keating's pre-Prime Ministerial political life, rather than the 
reality of his unfolding leadership. 
At other times the more private utterances of the Prime Minister give us an 
alternative view of Keating's perceptions of journalists, perceptions that 
became increasingly contemptuous over time. In 1992 he refused to do 'bird 
950 Mike Seccombe, 'PM's Genuine Passion Diluted by Plea for Help', Sydney Morning Herald, 
13 March 1993, p 9. 
951 Paul Keating, 'Political Life', speech to the 1992 Walkley Awards in Melbourne, 27 
November, quoted in Mark Ryan 1995, op cit, p 13. 
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calls' for journalists over the Christmas break because while 'journos are 
looking for a story a week', 'they can't have one'952 . Another account has 
Keating once remarking that 'while politicians made history, journalists 
contributed greatly to fish-and-chips wrapping'953. Margo Kingston wrote in 
1992 that Keating seemed to be claiming that 'he had programmed 
journalists to do his bidding so well that they had gone too far and done him 
harm' over the issue of tariff reform954. Two other journalists interviewed for 
this thesis remember over-hearing the Prime Minister, in a conversation with 
his staff, refer to the assembled journalists as 'our little monkeys'955. 
Because of the contradictory nature of Paul Keating's own public and private 
comments on the media, it is more useful for us to look elsewhere for 
effective prisms through which to view the relationship between the PM and 
the media. There are three ways to explain this fraught association; as one 
where you were either for Keating or against him; as a relationship of 
punishment and reward; and as one where the priorities and assessments of 
the journalists and their subject varied greatly. Crudely put, if you knew where 
the 'weight' was you would be placed on the 'high grade drip', if you did not 
you were subject to a Prime Ministerial freeze and, potentially, even ridicule 
and abuse. 
The high grade drip was a Keating expression that referred to his preference 
for selected journalists who were 'on side'. It was 'a typical Keating phrase to 
describe the mix of information, opinion, gossip and outright distortion which 
flows via non-attributable briefings from himself, his staff and selected public 
servants'956. Further, journalists who didn't 'like what's on offer from the 
Prime Ministerial "drip" run the risk of getting a very different sort of 
952 Paul Keating on the Sunday program, quoted in Alan Ramsey, 'It's Too Soon For Hewson to 
Scoff', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 February 1992, p 21. 
953 Lindsay Murdoch, 'Letter from Asia', Age, 25 April 1992, p 12. 
954 Margo Kingston, 'Doubts for the True Believers', Age, 31 March 1992, p 6. 
955 Private conversations with two senior journalists. 
956 Brian Toohey, 'No Happy Medium For Keating', Sun Herald, 19 February 1995, p 36. It 
should be noted that the drip referred not to the leaking of documents or policy initiatives, 
which was not a significant part of the Keating media relationship according to Mike Steketee 
and Greg Turnbull. 
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treatment'957. His relationship with the media, in this way, can be seen as one 
characterised by reward and punishment; carrots and sticks958. He would 
'bestow favours and threaten retribution'959, such as the time he called in a 
senior correspondent, offered him access to the high grade drip and then 
threatened to cut him off at the knees if he caused any trouble!960 The Prime 
Minister was frank about his willingness to trade favours with journalists, and 
he kept a file of 'stories, particularly those which attracted his ire, and he 
would use them to make clear his displeasure and point out later 
inconsistencies or contradictions'961. 
A similar approach taken by Keating to his relationship with the media was 
one where journalists were either for or against him and his Government. One 
journalist even kept on her desk in the Canberra Press Gallery a photo of 
Keating, on which he had written 'are you for me or against me' above his 
signature962. In more detail 
Keating often behaves like a fascist when it comes to the media. It isn't 
so much that he's sensitive, which he is - very sensitive - but that he finds 
it almost impossible to accept that journalists who don't view any given 
issue or incident in exactly the same way he does aren't either fools or 
lazy or personally motivated. Or all three. He can be extremely intolerant 
of differing opinion. That is why it's easy to understand why those close to 
him don't very often tell him to his face that which he doesn't like to hear 
or won't accept. And they don't, I'm sure. You're either in the Keating cart 
or you're out of it, and if you're in it, you keep your mouth shut and your 
opinions and your advice to yourself, unless asked963. 
Mike Steketee also remarked that 'typical Keating is that you're either for him 
or against him, there's no middle course964. 
An important related factor in the Prime Minister's determination of whether a 
journalist was for or against him was an assessment of where the 'weight' -
that is, what was important in public life - was. Keating increasingly thought 
the media was preoccupied with the minor issues such as furnishings for the 
957 Brian Toohey, 'Telling Tales on Bully-Boy Keating', Sun Herald, 7 November 1993, p 34. 
958 See Peter Walsh 1995, op cit, p 286. 
959 Mike Steketee 1996, op cit, p 198. 
960 Private conversation with senior journalist. 
961 Mike Steketee 1996, op cit, p 198. 
962 Private conversation with senior journalist. 
963 Alan Ramsey, 'Big Pictures Have Sharp Corners', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 December 
1993, p 29. 
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Lodge and his own interests in a piggery in rural New South Wales, which 
prevented them from attaching importance to the big ticket items such as 
Mabo, the republic and Asian integration. This led Geoff Kitney to write, mid-
1995, that 'Keating is feeling intensely frustrated about politics and the 
media. He believes he has just put in some of the best work of his prime 
ministership - the Budget, the republic, the Accord. But he's getting little return 
for it. Major decisions and political initiatives by the Government are making 
minor impact'965. Also illustrative of this view is the comment, delivered with 
typical Keating flourish, that if 'Abraham Lincoln gave the Gettysburg Address 
in 1992, the chances are the journalists wouldn't report the speech but the 
so-called "doorstop" interview that followed it. And the first question they'd 
ask is: "How come you're talking about democracy and freedom when there's 
a war on?"'966. 
These approaches to understanding Keating's perceptions of the media are 
valuable ways to understand how and why the relationship deteriorated from 
the time of the leadership challenge until March 1996. The relationship, 
passionate and emotional, became contemptuous as the Prime Minister's 
publicly stated enjoyment of engagement gave way to his privately uttered low 
opinion of journalists and their assessments of the important issues in public 
life. Increasingly, in Keating's estimation, more journalists were 'against' him, 
fewer were 'for' him or knew where the weight was as time wore on. 
While it would be simplistic to describe the Press Gallery's view of the Prime 
Minister as shared by all journalists, there nonetheless appears to be some 
agreement that Paul Keating was highly regarded because he always seemed 
to be newsworthy. Part of this sprung from his occupation of the highest 
elected office, but a significant part of journalistic interest arose from the 
Prime Minister's compelling rhetoric and pursuit of reform. Quick to point out 
his shortcomings, journalists interviewed for this thesis were nonetheless 
964 Interview with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
965 Geoff Kitney, 'No Calm Before This Storm', Sydney Morning Herald, 30 June 1995, p 15. 
966 Paul Keating quoted in Michael Millett, 'No Point Panicking - The PM is Back', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 11 July 1992, p 6. 
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eager to describe Keating's instinctive newsworthiness. Glenn Milne, for 
example, recounted how 
you never got sick of writing about Keating, things just happened. You 
never knew where you'd end up (laughs). He was a good story, always a 
good story. In Australian political terms he was an epic figure, and he did 
it with an enormous amount of flair. Even in decline he was a dark and 
brooding character worthy of writing about. A great story beautifully 
told967. 
Pamela Williams adds 'journalists are always drawn to a larger than life 
character - the man who needs little embellishment to make him a figure of 
fascination'968. Mike Steketee argues the Gallery admired Keating 'because 
he was an activist, he was reforming things, giving journalists plenty to write 
about' and his ability to sell things, dramatise them'969. In short, they 
'admired him because he made news'97o. Though Keating's decreasing 
estimation of the Australian media in turn coloured the media's view of the 
PM, the relationship was nonetheless affected by the Gallery's admiration of 
his ability to create stories. This meant that, though the relationship soured, 
the onus was on journalists to keep covering the Prime Minister, often 
positively, when circumstances demanded it. 
Relations with individual journalists and media outlets varied markedly. 
Though Greg Turnbull, the Prime Minister's Press Secretary, remembers 
Keating having an up and down relationship with all journalists and 'scar 
tissue from them all'971, some enjoyed greater access and friendlier relations. 
Laurie Oakes was one who had amicable dealings with the PM, at least until 
Keating turned on Kerry Packer and the Nine Network for which Oakes 
worked. Paul Kelly, whose eldest son was the Prime Minister's godson, was 
seen to be close to Keating, despite the latter declaring at a going away party 
for Geoff Walsh that Kelly, as a political commentator, 'couldn't pick his 
nose'972. Michelle Grattan had an amicable relationship with the PM, as did 
Michael Gordon and economics writers such as Laura Tingle. John Laws was 
967 Interview with Glenn Milne, 9 September 2002. 
968 Pamela Williams 1997, 'Behind the Victory', op cit, p 100. 
969 Interview with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
970 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
971 Ibid. 
972 Alan Ramsey, 'PM Boils Over As Labor Feels The Heat', Sydney Morning Herald, 18 
February 1995, p 29. 
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a Prime Ministerial favourite973, ABC radio and television was favoured, as 
was Sydney's Telegraph-Mirror after it editorialised in Labor's favour in 
1993974. Mike Steketee's relationship was more variable, depending on the 
tone of Steketee's latest piece. Senior journalists were also given derogatory 
nicknames by Prime Minister Keating, demonstrating his growing contempt for 
their craft. Oakes became a 'cane toad', Glenn Milne was 'poison dwarf', and 
the bearded Mike Steketee became 'creeping Jesus'975. These three should 
count themselves lucky; Geoff Kitney's nickname was less creative, more 
insulting, and unprintable here976. 
Prime Minister Keating reserved particular contempt for a handful of 
journalists, outlets and proprietors; in particular Kerry Packer and the Nine 
Network; the Sydney Morning Herald; the Western Australian; the Melbourne 
Sun; and individuals such as Seven's Glenn Milne; 2UE's Alan Jones; and, 
more explosively, the Sun's Nikki Savva977. In Milne's case, the Prime 
Minister went to some trouble to try and have him fired from the Seven 
Network978. The Sydney Morning Herald drew Prime Ministerial ire throughout 
the life of the Government, and even for some time after. In a speech in 2000 
Keating called the 'Glebe Point Gulag at the Sydney Morning Herald - Marian 
Wilkinson, Kate McClymont, Toohey and so on - the group of former lefties 
who had believed for 15 years with the monomaniacal certainty of the Manson 
family, that I, along with most members of the New South Wales ALP, was 
corrupt'979. Nikki Savva drew explosive tirades, and was referred to by 
Keating as that 'Tory bitch'98o. 
973 See below and Margo Kingston, 'How Keating Runs The Pack', Sydney Morning Herald, 7 
August 1995, p 6. 
974 Margo Kingston, 'How Keating Runs The Pack', Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August 1995, p 
6. 
975 Mike Seccombe, 'It Looks Like We're Forgiven', Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 1992, p 
6; confirmed in interview with Margo Kingston, 21 August 2002. 
976 Private conversation with senior journalist. 
977 Margo Kingston, 'How Keating Runs The Pack', Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August 1995, p 
6. 
978 Interview with Glenn Milne, 9 September 2002. 
979 Paul Keating, The Australian media', Sydney Papers, vol 12, no 3, Winter 2000, p 73; see 
also Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 185. 
980 Savva was married to a Liberal and went on to work for Liberal Treasurer Peter Costello; 
see David Adams 1997, op cit, p 15 and Mike Seccombe, 'Kookaburra', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 4 November 1995, p 36. 
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Journalists close to Keating, by his standards, and those regarded as 
enemies, could all be subject to a personal phone call from the Prime Minister 
when their jottings met with his displeasure981. Geoff Walsh, an experienced 
media operative and former Keating adviser, commented that 'Paul had been 
around longer than most of them, and he wasn't shy of expressing his view 
directly to them when they differed'982 . According to Steketee, 'Keating's 
telephone calls to proprietors, editors and Gallery journalists, normally when 
feeling aggrieved about the treatment of an issue, became legendary'983. The 
wife of one senior journalist, when answering the home telephone and finding 
the Prime Minister on the other end calling from a mobile or car phone, would 
ask him who was speaking so that Keating, now identified, would tone down 
his abuse in case the conversation was scanned and taped!984 Greg Turnbull, 
a witness to a number of such calls, recounts that they would 'start with a 
symphonic crescendo but always end with a conciliatory melody'985. Some 
journalists saw value in these lectures, and endured the abuse in order to get 
to the inevitable discussion that followed. Kitney told this author that 'you'd 
put up with the abuse so you could have a talk to him afterwards'986, and 
Milne remembers 'extremely valuable' phone calls where 'when he finished 
venting his spleen on you, you would inevitably end up having a valuable 
discussion, he would explain to you his thinking'. Afterwards Milne would 
come 'away from those conversations battered but enriched987. Steketee, in a 
similar vein, spoke of how the Prime Minister would 'get something off his 
chest but then he go back to selling a story. He had an extraordinary ability to 
flatter, disarm, and intimidate at the same time. All in the space of a couple of 
minutes'988. Others were not so accommodating when it came to Prime 
Ministerial phone calls. Brian Toohey, firmly in the anti-Keating camp, wrote in 
1993 that, for 'someone who does not put in long hours at the office, he 
spends a remarkable amount of time on the phone berating people who've 
981 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 183. 
982 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
983 Mike Steketee 1998, op cit, p 198. 
984 Private conversation with senior Canberra Press Gallery journalist. 
985 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
986 Interview with Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
987 Interview with Glenn Milne, 9 September 2002. 
988 Interview with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
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upset him'989. On a superficial level these spiteful and eventually public 
denunciations did little for his relationship with the media but, more 
importantly, it was the grudges that the Prime Minister accumulated that 
became more numerous and counter-productive for a leader who struggled to 
regain approval in the lead-up to the 1996 election. 
The above discussion of Keating's relations with the fourth estate represent 
the worst of the association, but there could, at times, be high points in the 
relationship. Margo Kingston remembers the Prime Minister sparring with the 
media at rare press conferences before 1993, admiring the combat and his 
ability to bat back the questions99o. Mike Steketee believes the Prime 
Minister was at his best when 'he was selling things, selling budgets, selling 
economic news, the national accounts'991 . Keating's relations with the media 
could also soften considerably on international trips992. The Prime Minister 
drew plaudits when he granted interviews or photo opportunities outside the 
mainstream of political journalism. Interviews with TV personality and 
comedian Andrew Denton, and with musician Sir Bob Geldoff, are examples of 
this. Another came when the Prime Minister posed in dark black sunglasses 
for the cover of Rolling Stone magazine993. Shaun Carney from Melbourne's 
Age remembers being 'amazed that he, simply by putting on a pair of bloody 
sunglasses ... the way they all fell over themselves saying how contemporary it 
made him, how groovy he was'994. The effect of these occasions was to soften 
the hard edges of the Keating image, and take him away from a combative 
approach with Canberra Press Gallery journalists. As Greg Turnbull explained 
in an interview, when 'people did get to see another side of him it was always 
a plus for us. For instance, dare I say it, Bourke's Backyard at the Lodge with 
Annita and the kids was terrific995. 
989 Brian Toohey, 'Telling Tales on Bully-Boy Keating', Sun Herald, 7 November 1993, p 34. 
990 Interview with Margo Kingston, 21 August 2002. 
991 Interview with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
992 See, for example, Michelle Grattan, 'Keating on a High, But Forget an Early Election', Age, 
28 September 1992, p 13. 
993 Rolling Stone Magazine (cover photo), Issue 481, March 1993. 
994 Interview with Shaun Carney, 28 August 2002. 
995 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
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Prime Minister Keating, nonetheless, preferred not to engage in media 'stunts' 
that he described as 'tricked up', or fake. The Placido Domingo speech, 
quoted at length in this thesis' first chapter, contained a swipe at his 
predecessor and expressed disdain for 'walking through shopping centres 
tripping over TV crews' cords'. He was reluctant to 'spend endless time with 
newspaper photographers doing whatever ridiculous things they want him to 
do, some sort of pose to do the story'996. His preference was, in the main, for 
unfiltered salesmanship conducted over the radio airwaves. 
Paul Keating's partiality for radio, in particular John Laws' nationally 
syndicated program reaching 2 million listeners, and the ABC's AM and PM 
programs, was illustrative of his rapidly souring relationship with the print 
media and television. He turned to live radio because his message could go 
out unfiltered to the public, and would not be distorted or manipulated by 
what he saw as a hostile Press Gallery997. In this way Keating 'wanted the ear 
of the electorate and was prepared to go to considerable lengths to prevent 
his words being filtered or distorted by the "serious" political media, especially 
the newspapers', according to Pamela Williams998. He apparently thought 
that the print media filtered 'his thoughts, that between him saying something 
and its appearance in print it goes through an editing process which either 
inadequately communicates his message or distorts it'999. This is the essence 
of what the Prime Minister himself told John Laws in a radio exchange 
chronicled by Alan Ramsey: 
Keating: 'Thank you, John. I appreciate the opportunity (to be here). And 
the opportunity, can I say, particularly to talk directly to people, and not 
have it sort of filtered, cut, you know, shredded to opinion, you know, by 
the sort of sub-editors and the rest. The fact of the matter is, on your 
program, as you say, dial-in democracy .. .' Laws: 'You like that, don't 
you?' Keating : 'I like that line, dial-in democracy. It's also dial-out 
conversation about the things that really matter. And I hope your 
listeners have found it as valuable as I have. Thanks, John'1000. 
The numbers back up this observation of Keating's increasing reliance on 
radio and selected television outlets. In the first half of 1995 the Prime 
996 Interview with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
997 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
998 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, p 81. 
999 Geoff Kitney, 'PM Changes Tack on Howard', Sydney Morning Herald, 28 July 1995, p 11. 
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Minister gave 45 radio interviews and 10 to television, 29 media appearances 
were quick doorstop interviews, leaving only 12 occasions for other types of 
interviews, including those exclusively for the print media1001. When 
questioned about this trend by print journalists on an international trip 
Keating apparently told them 'he'd always bypass the press gallery if he had 
something to say unfiltered to someone like John Laws who could give him a 
live audience of two million listeners. He'd be a mug if he didn 1t'1002. 
A Deteriorating Relationship 
The venomous relationship maintained by Prime Minister Keating and the 
Australian media is a surprising development, given the history of the 
association and the closeness between them while he was Treasurer and 
before. Greg Turnbull explained to this author that 
Paul was always obsessed with the media. He was a creature of the 
media. But there were two clear phases of his relationship with the 
media. He was in love with the media, then he was out of love with the 
media... His love affair with the media was basically the 1980s. When 
he was an evangelical reformer of the Australian economy and he 
wanted to take the media and the public with him. And that's well 
documented. As a journalist I've seen Paul Keating sit in an aircraft 
drawing graphs of our economy on the back of an airline sick bag. So, 
intent was he on communicating his views and his understanding - his 
lay understanding, his street-smart, Bankstown, fibro understanding of 
the economy1003. 
Mike Steketee also went to some length to stress the relationship was once 
extremely beneficial for both parties. He recalls: 
From the very start, when he came into parliament, he was quite 
assiduous at cultivating the media. He used to sort of almost go and sit 
at the feet of Alan Reid, people like that, Max Walsh. Almost in a similar 
way to how he did with Jack Lang. He wanted to soak up the history of 
the place. But he was also cultivating influence, of course. All the way 
up to the period where he became prime minister, really, his relationship 
with the press gallery was a very active, a very close one. When I was in 
the press gallery, which covered most of the period he was treasurer, 
1000 Alan Ramsey, 'The PM Who Doesn't Like To Be Told "No"', Sydney Morning Herald, 13 
May 1995, p 35. 
1001 Alan Ramsey, 'Keating Turns Camera-shy, Selectively', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 
1995, p 35. 
1002 Alan Ramsey, 'All Aboard the Travelling Circus', Sydney Morning Herald, 26 June 1993, p 
27. 
1003 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
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you'd see him up in the gallery more than just about any other 
government member1004. 
More colourfully, Margo Kingston recalls 'days when a tough-as-nails News 
Limited reporter confessed she had a picture of Keating above her bed', when 
'some journalists" kitchens featured posters of PJK, autographed by the great 
man' and when 'senior female journalists jostled each other (politely) to dance 
with Keating at Gallery dinners•1005. The heights of the relationship prior to 
1991 and the depths it reached after Keating became Prime Minister led the 
same commentator to describe two phases of the association; the first phase, 
she argues, was 'seductive', while it deteriorated to become 'contemptuous' 
by the time Keating was PM10o6. Greg Turnbull's comments back this up: 'by 
the time he became Prime Minister he'd done all that and the weight and the 
responsibility of the job and the imperatives of the job and the drag on his own 
psyche meant there was less and less time in his life and his mind for what he 
came to despise as the trivia of the media and the knuckleheadedness of the 
media•1001. 
A number of factors account for this decline from media darling to a two-way 
relationship of antipathy. First, the turnover of journalists from the Treasury 
days meant that a number of those who had been carefully cultivated by 
Keating had moved on and were replaced by those never subjected to the 
charming and passionately media conscious figure1oos. Mike Steketee felt 
that there was a perception among journalists that Keating, having been 
openly supported by the media in his stoushes with Hawke, felt he had little 
use for them now he was Prime Minister. In this context, apparently there 
'was some talk around the lines of "he's got what he needs out of us and now 
he's ignoring us'"1009. Another factor was the Prime Minister's exhaustion, 
and reluctance to spend time assiduously cultivating and maintaining an 
1004 Interview with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
1005 Margo Kingston, 'How Keating Runs The Pack', Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August 1995, p 
6. 
1005 Interview with Margo Kingston, 21 August 2002. 
1001 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
1oos Interview with Glenn Milne, 9 September 2002. 
1009 Interview with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
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effective relationship with the media1010. In this context, Keating appeared to 
be pacing himself, as observed by Geoff Kitney in the middle of 1994: 
Paul Keating, now nearing the end of a quarter century in politics, is 
trying to play the game like a veteran champion footballer. He is trying to 
preserve his energy and his enthusiasm - thinking and acting strategically 
instead of rushing to be in every contest. He says his interest in the game 
now is kicking the big goals, not having a part in every play. One 
consequence of this is a much more strategic approach to dealing with 
the media. Once the media junky, relentlessly working the corridors of 
the gallery and courting the correspondents, Keating now keeps his 
distance. He almost never makes himself available for extended press 
conferences and only rarely does print media interviews1011. 
The situation became such that when requests for interviews were presented 
to Greg Turnbull and then to Keating, the PM 'would dismiss them - not only 
over the boundary but often out of the stadium pretty quickly'1012. 
The most prominent factor contributing to the deterioration of Keating's 
relationship with the media, however, was the Prime Minister's petulant 
reaction to being written off by pundits during the 1993 election campaign. In 
essence, 'he held a grudge but more accurately he felt vindicated and that we 
were an irrelevance - he'd defied all our predictions and therefore our 
judgement or opinion or reporting wasn't to be taken seriously', recounts 
Glenn Milne1013. Milne's journalistic colleague, Shaun Carney, agrees, telling 
this author that 'when Keating won in 93 they were shocked and 
embarrassed, and Keating, rather than say "oh well, these things happen, you 
guys got it wrong, doesn't matter", he couldn't forgive. How dare they not 
believe in him the way he believed in himself? Therefore he wanted to make 
them pay, and he basically wrote the gallery off1014 _ This is further confirmed 
by insider Don Watson, who wrote in his Recollections that in 'the last ~eek of 
the [1993] campaign' the media put a 'poison in Keating's soul' which 'never 
lett•1015: 
They thundered so righteously; they wrote him off and tagged around for 
the last two weeks without listening or seeing. Keating saw this not only 
1010 Interview with Michael Gordon, 19 September 2002. 
1011 Geoff Kitney, 'Keating and Bank Need to Rethink Their Relations', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 24 June 1994, p 15. 
1012 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
1013 Interview with Glenn Milne, 9 September 2002. 
1014 Interview with Shaun Carney, 28 August 2002. 
1015 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 350. 
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as professional failure, but as betrayal. If politicians had done as badly 
as the media, the media would be 'baying for their blood', he told a press 
conference soon after the election .... Nothing in his nature, including a 
streak of sadism, it sometimes seemed, would allow him to forgive; even 
when it was clear that his contempt only made their spite and revenge 
more certain101a. 
Steketee adds Keating 'did resent the fact that a lot of journalists wrote him 
off after the 93 election. The vast majority of the Press Gallery either said he 
wouldn't win, or doubted he'd win ... He came to believe his own propaganda 
about true believers and how he won despite everyone writing him off, due to 
his own extraordinary efforts•1011. Keating's attitude saw the media 
'ostracised as grubs•101s. 
Paul Keating's treatment of the media after they had written him off during 
the 1993 election campaign was a counter-productive, churlish and ultimately 
costly act that failed to recognise the agenda-setting and commentating role 
of the media, and its ability to influence public opinion and, consequently, 
prime ministerial power. Respected columnist Paul Kelly, of the Australian, 
argued in an interview that Keating's behaviour was 'counter-productive. He 
won the election. He then acted as though he almost lost the election. It was 
a strange reaction after the election. I suppose it would seem to me to be a 
more logical reaction to be generous to people whose judgements you had 
disproved'1019. Geoff Kitney described it as a 'totally irrational' strategy1020, 
and Beazley staffer John O'Callaghan described it as 'unwise' of the Prime 
Minister1021. Margo Kingston opined that if Keating 'was going to have any 
show in 96 he had to maintain good relations and be accessible, and he 
wasn·r1022. There appears, therefore, to be a consensus among 
commentators and a reluctant acceptance among partisans that the Prime 
Minister's grudge against the media post-March 1993 was a self indulgent 
and costly act. 
1016 Ibid, p 360. 
1017 Interview with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
1018 Alan Ramsey, 'Keating Leaves Questions Unasked', Sydney Morning Herald, 16 July 
1994, p 33. 
1019 Interview with Paul Kelly, 4 November 2002. 
1020 Interview with Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
1021 Interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
1022 Interview with Margo Kingston, 21August2002. 
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The analysis of media relations has so far concentrated on those aspects of 
the association which Prime Minister Keating could himself control. An 
important point that must also be made is that Keating, as a 'story', was, after 
a long tenure on the Labor frontbench prior to his election to the leadership, 
approaching exhaustion. In short, journalists were becoming sick of the Prime 
Minister; tired of his style and of writing about his exploits. There's 'always a 
predilection for journalists to look for something new and different'1023, but 
the Keating and Labor 'story had sort of exhausted itself'1024 . The Prime 
Minister himself sometimes alluded to this in caucus meetings where, 
reportedly, he told assembled MPs and Senators that 'we're bringing out the 
big statements, we're doing things but the Press Gallery have seen us for 12, 
13 years, they're lifting the high-jump bar, they want us to do triple 
somersaults with pike, solid policy statements are being marked down as just 
another policy plan that Keating's brought out'1°25. Even the inept Alexander 
Downer was given favourable coverage in relation to the PM, according to 
Shaun Carney, because journalists were 'keen for Keating to cop it in the 
neck'1026. He had, at least by 1996, exhausted the 'patience and goodwill' of 
the media; Keating had 'probably shit-bagged too many of them with the 
roaring loud phone calls and complaints about them to their editors and it had 
stopped being amusing•1021. Journalists 'loved the down hill, one ski, no poles 
stuff but they'd decided probably that his time had come and gone', adds 
Press Secretary Turnbu11102s. This was made explicit in a conversation 
between the Prime Minister and Alan Ramsey late in 1996, where the latter 
reportedly told the former that he was 'sick of' him and, indeed, the media 
was 'all sick of' him and wanted to see him go1029. A relationship that was 
once so productive, and held so much promise in the early days of the Paul 
Keating Prime Ministership, reached its lowest point in the lead-up to the poll 
that would ultimately see the PM dumped by the electorate. 
1023 Interview with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
10 24 Interview with Shaun Carney 28 August 2002. 
1025 Interview with Mark Latham, 3 June 2002. 
1026 Interview with Shaun Carney, 28 August 2002. 
1021 Ibid. 
10 2s Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
1029 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 701. 
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What, then, are the costs for a Prime Minister who neglects this enormously 
important relationship with the fourth estate? If they exist, they are difficult to 
quantify, though some scholarly literature has analysed media effect on public 
perceptions of leaders and the outcomes of elections1o3o. Some credible 
commentators, such as Paul Kelly and Mike Steketee1o31, play down the direct 
electoral effect of the media on the outcome of the 1996 election, one that 
was partially lost by Labor as a result of being in office so long. Geoff Walsh 
also downplays the role of the media in Keating's defeat1032. 
However, the media did have a role in perpetuating perceptions of the Prime 
Minister as arrogant and out of touch. In this respect 'media commentary 
would have reinforced people's opinions and had an effect'1033; it influences 
'the way that prime ministers are viewed by the public'1034. It became a kind 
of media shibboleth to proclaim the Prime Minister was 'out of touch' with the 
electorate, but this largely described the association with the media. A poor 
media relationship was translated to wider constituencies. As Greg Turnbull 
told this author, 'when you stop communicating with the media they're 
inclined to say you're out of touch and when an Australian politician is 
declared out of touch it's really a death sentence'1035 . Glenn Milne believes 
Keating's disengagement made him a 'more vulnerable target' for journalists 
to declare him arrogant or not interested in the public1036. The media, 
infuriated with a Prime Minister they helped create for his reluctance to 
continue playing the media game, reacted with vigour. One journalist was 
quoted as saying that, 'If you treat the press like dogs, in the end they act like 
dogs and bite the hand that feeds them•1o37, What was once such a strength 
of Keating's repertoire can only be regarded, in the years this thesis is 
analysing, as a fundamental weakness and a missed opportunity. The Prime 
1030 Holli A Semetko 1996, op cit, pp 271-2. 
1031 Interviews conducted 4 November 2002 and 20 August 2002 respectively. 
1032 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
1033 Interview with Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
1034 Interview with Shaun Carney, 28 August 2002. 
1035 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
1036 Interview with Glenn Milne, 9 September 2002. 
1037 Margo Kingston, 'How Keating Runs The Pack', Sydney Morning Herald, 7 August 1995, p 
6. 
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Minister's relationship with the Australian media thus constituted a key 
blemish on Keating's leadership scorecard, in contrast with his impressive 
speech making delivery. 
The Rhetorical Prime Minister 
Prime Ministers can choose to give speeches simply because it is expected of 
them, and many go through the motions to satisfy this requirement. Others 
use speech making opportunities to set the agenda, leave a historical mark, 
and define the direction and objectives of the government. Paul Keating fits 
snugly into this second category. Comparable only to Gough Whitlam and, 
perhaps, Robert Menzies, in the importance attached to speeches, Keating's 
efforts were significant events and, read even now, some constitute 
compelling historical pieces, others satirical material. The speeches of the 
Prime Minister thus offer a valuable insight into the leader and his Labor 
Government. They place a personal stamp on the politics of the period. 
Paul Keating was a story-telling, rhetorical Prime Minister who painted 
pictures with words, tore down enemies with them, and placed great value on 
public expression. As Brett Evans recently opined, Keating 'has been around 
for a long time, he knows a lot of stories, and he knows how to tell them'1038 . 
The Prime Minister's nemesis, Alan Ramsey, even found much value in 
Keating the orator. He wrote in 1995 that 
It is the larrikin language, the brutal language, that delights or horrifies. 
That's the language that makes the news. So do his creative word 
pictures. They can be as wounding as they can be illuminating and 
people admire or detest him for it. Less well understood is Keating 's 
ability, when the mood takes him, to deliver some of the clearest, most 
simple, yet impressive speeches to be heard in politics ... such speeches 
are, variously, very moving, very funny, very real, even thrilling at times. 
The common thread is the utterly right note they strike1039. 
103s Brett Evans 2001, op cit, p 8. 
1039 Alan Ramsey, 'Friend or Foe, PM Pays Out In Full', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April 1995, p 
39. 
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Keating himself described his words as 'hammers', but 'not profane words. 
They're just words, arranged properly'104o. The Prime Minister used speeches 
to hammer opponents, and to hammer out a theme. 
Speech writing for the Prime Minister and Keating's own role in their 
production was a creative process1041. The key players were speechwriter 
Don Watson, the relevant Department, key advisers in the PMO and, of 
course, the Prime Minister himself. Generally the process began with a 
preliminary draft or extensive notes from the Department with responsibility 
for the speech topic, followed by input from the staff of the appropriate 
minister and an adviser in the Prime Minister's Office, and then the crafting of 
a draft speech by Watson1042. The task here was to take the draft and do 
'what speech writers are paid to do - which is to make a speech of it. A 
coherent, incisive, eloquent, informative, politically astute speech1043. Watson 
would then circulate a draft 'among other advisers for the purpose of checking 
facts, the policy direction and the political focus'1044. If the speech was an 
important one the Prime Minister would be shown a draft while others 'he 
would read in the car on the way to deliver them'1045. Landmark speeches 
such as that which set in train the substantial debate over an Australian 
republic1046 were carefully workshopped and painstakingly constructed. Tony 
Wright provides a valuable insight into the process that led to this particular 
speech, which is indicative of the Keating approach: 
So possessed was Paul Keating with the idea that everything should be 
perfect, he made the final change to his speech on the republic just five 
minutes before he revealed the details to his Labor Caucus at 6 pm on 
Wednesday. He had spent much of the day at The Lodge, reading drafts 
of the speech, grabbing the telephone to discuss with his principal 
speechwriter, Don Watson, the removal of a word or the addition of a 
phrase, then re-reading, speaking it out loud, striving for rhythm and 
cadence. When it was done and Keating had been driven to Parliament 
House, the speech was still too long. It had to be precisely 30 minutes. It 
was more than a minute over. With the stroke of a pen, five paragraphs 
disappeared. It was tough. By then, the Keating team thought no word 
was superfluous. The speech had been four days in the writing; longer in 
1040 Quoted in Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 45. 
1041 See Don Watson, Michelle Grattan, 'Keating Speaking', Age, 23 November 1995, p 13. 
1042 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 57. 
1043 Don Watson, Michelle Grattan, 'Keating Speaking', Age, 23 November 1995, p 13. 
1044 Ibid, p 58. 
1045 Ibid. 
104s In Mark Ryan 1995, op cit, pp 173-86. 
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the making. A deputy secretary in Keating 's department, Greg Wood, had 
fed in the raw data, other staff had checked the detail, trying to make it 
bullet-proof, and Keating had spent hours with Watson, poring over the 
words1047. 
On other occasions time did not permit such a thorough process, such as 
when the Prime Minister addressed the National Press Club on the subject of 
One Nation armed only with a 'half-written speech and scraps of notes, many 
of them in answer to the morning press'1048. Some were given without notes 
at all - 'off the cuff' - after some practice and testing in the Office1049. Others 
from scribbled notes on the back of a drinks coaster at a function, where 
boxes and arrows and underlines are added by the PM to remind him where 
emphasis and forward momentum are required1o5o. Still other speeches were 
completely spontaneous and delivered without notes. 
Whether the speech was to be made from notes or off the cuff was the key 
determinant in the type of speech the Prime Minister was able to deliver. The 
simple rule was that speeches written by Don Watson and read like a script 
were those created for the historical record but which were delivered 
dispassionately. Such speeches included the Redfern, Unknown Soldier, and 
republic speeches. The spontaneous speeches were largely partisan, satirical 
and passionately delivered. We find examples of the latter group in his 
'fireworks' and 'true believers' speeches. 
Keating's delivery of set-piece speeches was average at best. The Prime 
Minister was 'far less comfortable delivering a prepared speech and often 
seems to treat them as chores'1051. Shaun Carney wrote that, when Keating 
delivered a prepared speech, he 'hunches over the podium, dons his specs, 
and surmounts each word printed on the page in front of him in the tired 
retiree-style of the Barry Humphries character, Sandy Stone•1052. Similarly, in 
1994 Tony Wright wrote that 'when the Prime Minister rose to speak to the 
faithful at the conference yesterday, those familiar with his style just knew this 
1047 Tony Wright, 'The Story Behind That Speech', Sydney Morning Herald, 9 June 1995, p 1. 
1048 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p19. 
1049 See Bruce Jones, 'Voice of a Listening Leader', Sun Herald, 11 September 1994, p 29. 
1050 See Brett Evans 2001, op cit, p 9. 
1051 Geoffrey Barker, 'A Juggler in Full Flight', Age, 4 June 1993, p 17. 
1052 Shaun Carney, 'Your Funeral, My Speech', Age, 3 February 1996, p 2. 
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was going to fall short of greatness. The eyes went down to the paper and the 
monotone began. Mr Keating, at the flight of free-form passion, is a riveting 
speaker, but he reads like an automaton'1053. His speech writer believes 
Keating's poor delivery of scripted speeches can be attributed to his ability to 
'only perform from conviction', because, lacking 'conviction he lost credibility, 
and without credibility he was done for'1054. John O'Callaghan believes the 
Prime Minister continued delivering these speeches because 'he wanted to 
leave a structured legacy of his contribution'1055. This is a notion alluded to by 
Sam Lipski, who wrote that while 'Keating never seems quite comfortable with 
reading from a text and making the words his own', 'it is the content of the 
Keating/Watson speeches that ultimately matters' to historians, journalists 
and commentators alike1056. On those occasions he was essentially telling 
the nation a story about itself; Keating 'had the fashionable kind of 
detachment which saw the world as stories and story making: looking for 
constitutional change, a new flag, closer links with Asia and so on, he told 
Australians they held to tell themselves new stories'1057. 
Off the cuff speeches were the Prime Minister's forte. Though lacking the 
historical importance of the Redfern and Unknown Soldier speeches, for 
example, the spontaneous addresses by Keating are memorable for their 
passion and for their expert delivery. Margo Kingston offered the opinion that 
it was the 'spontaneity of the wit and the intensity of the language' that made 
him effective as an orator1058. He also could employ a larrikin humour to 
which the audience would react favourably. His delivery could be engaging 
also, when speaking off the cuff; Clarissa Bye observed that the Prime 
Minister had 'an uncanny ability to know when he's being looked at, during 
speeches he turns and returns the eye contact of those looking directly at him. 
Occasionally slipping his hand out of his pocket to point for emphasis, his self 
contained demeanour belied the intensity of the insults•105e. 
1053 Tony Wright, 'Flat Delivery But PM Scores', Sydney Morning Herald, 27 September 1994, 
p 10. 
1054 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 144. 
1055 Interview with Jon O'Callaghan, 20 March 2002. 
1056 Sam Lipski, 'Keating's Voice Fails to Strike the Right Note', Age, 29 May 1995, p 13. 
1057 Graham Little 1997, 'The Two Narcissisms: Comparing Hawke and Keating', op cit, p 20. 
1058 Interview with Margo Kingston, 21 August 2002. 
1059 Clarissa Bye, 'Keating Sets the Agenda', Sun Herald, 1October1995, p 31. 
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Simple, working class language was central to the effectiveness of the Prime 
Minister's off the cuff speeches, as was his ability to paint pictures with words 
and reduce complex concepts down into everyday parlance that could be 
understood. Michael Lavarch told this author in an interview that he 'loved 
Paul's turn of phrase. In a way he'd be right at home in a 1950s waterside 
hotel or something. He had a lovely sort of language, it was so evocative and 
marvellously descriptive. It had such pull and capture. Brilliantly able to paint 
pictures, both when he was tearing something apart in the parliament or 
building up and explaining something1060. John Button also had a high 
appreciation for the simplicity of Keating's language and ability to get to the 
essence of an argument1061. His language could also be typically blunt, which 
is why Graham Little refers to his 'user's knowledge of the richest language of 
the street'1062 . 
The divergence between the speech making style of the scripted versus the off 
the cuff Paul Keating reflected separate objectives the Prime Minister was 
trying to achieve. Prepared speeches were delivered with an eye to the 
historical record while spontaneity was directed towards humour, 
partisanship, or emotion, and the present day. Lipski takes this analysis to an 
extreme, describing two Paul Keatings. The first is 'the Bankstown politician 
(K1), who speaks with his own voice in unmistakable Keatingese and comes 
on like 76 trombones' and the second, 'K2', 'also speaks to the nation and 
the world with his own voice. But the words, ideas and rhetoric are 
increasingly those articulated by speechwriter and historian Don Watson, 
whose style is more the string or jazz quartet1°63. Both 'Keatings' are 
observable in the topics he chose and the speeches now recorded by history. 
A brief analysis of some of the speeches delivered by Prime Minister Keating 
throws up some now-familiar themes. The scripted speeches largely dealt 
with subjects such as nationalism, reform, change, new ideas, and the history 
1060 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
1061 Interview with John Button, 25 June 2002. 
1062 Graham Little 1997, 'The Two Narcissisms: Comparing Hawke and Keating', op cit, p 20. 
1063 Sam Lipski, 'Keating's Voice Fails to Strike the Right Note', Age, 29 May 1995, p 13. 
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and future of the Australia that the Prime Minister saw and tried to articulate. 
The PM offered listeners 'some intellectual muscle, a touch of self-
justification, a bit of history, a bit of sentimentality, plus, of course, a dash of 
venom' 1064. 
There are many noteworthy speeches from the Keating Prime Ministership 
through which a scholar can trawl for insights into the Labor Government and 
its leader. Many of these speeches are available at the web site 
www.keating.org.au and in Mark Ryan's collection; Advancing Australia1065. 
Here excerpts of a selection of the Prime Minister's speeches - notably the 
Redfern Speech, the Dedication of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and An 
Australian Republic: The Way Forward are reproduced in order to provide a 
flavour of Paul Keating's oratory and the power and imagination behind his 
words. 
The first stop in any tour of Prime Minister Keating's notable speeches is 10 
December 1992 and the speech which launched the International Year for the 
World's Indigenous People, commonly referred to as the Redfern Speech. 
Keating called the Mabo decision an historic one which represented 'the basis 
of a new relationship between indigenous and non-Aboriginal Australians' and 
comprised 'a fundamental test of our social goals and our national will: our 
ability to say to ourselves and the rest of the world that Australia is a first rate 
social democracy, that we are what we should be - truly the land of the fair go 
and the better chance'1066. Rising to a crescendo, he implored the Australian 
people with these words: 
We cannot imagine that the descendants of people whose genius and 
resilience maintained a culture here through fifty thousand years or 
more, through cataclysmic changes to the climate and environment, and 
who then survived two centuries of dispossession and abuse, will be 
denied their place in the modern Australian nation. We cannot imagine 
that. We cannot imagine that we will fail. And with the spirit that is here 
today I am confident that we won't. I am confident that we will succeed 
in this decade1067 . 
1054 Brett Evans 2001, op cit, p 10. 
105s Mark Ryan 1995, op cit. 
1066 Ibid, p 227. 
1067 Ibid, p 231. 
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This speech drew rave reviews from the media. An Age editorial praised the 
PM for acknowledging, 'more honestly and explicitly than any previous 
Australian leader had dared to do, white Australia's responsibility for the 
dispossession and misery of the descendants of this continent's first 
inhabitants•106s. 
A similarly positive response from the commentariat followed Prime Minister 
Keating's dedication of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, at Canberra's War 
Memorial on 11 November 1993. The stirring speech began with the 
memorable words 
We do not know this Australian's name and we never will. We do not 
know his rank or his battalion. We do not know where he was born, or 
precisely how and when he died. We do not know where in Australia he 
had made his home or when he left it for the battlefields of Europe. We 
do not know his age or his circumstances: whether he was from the city 
or the bush; what occupation he left to become a soldier; what religion, if 
he had a religion; if he was married or single. We do not know who loved 
him or whom he loved. If he had children we do not know who they are. 
His family is lost to us as he was lost to them. We will never know who 
this Australian was1oeg. 
After reciting the numbers of Australians who have died in foreign conflicts the 
Prime Minister declared: 'He is all of them. And he is one of us'. The soldier 
might 'enshrine a nation's love of peace and remind us that, in the sacrifice of 
the men and women whose names are recorded here, there is faith enough 
for all of us•1010. In this speech the high point of the Keating-Watson alliance 
appears to have been reached. 
A number of the themes of Keating's Prime Ministerial oratory - nationalism, 
reform, change, Australian history - can also be detected in the 7 June 1995 
delivery of a speech outlining the 'way forward' to an Australian republic1011. 
Typically, the PM spoke of seizing an opportunity when he declared that 
'Governments can wait for opinion to force their hand, or they can lead. They 
can wait for the world to change and respond as necessity demands, or they 
can see the way the world is going and point the way'. It was up to the 
1068 'Atoning for a Black Past', Age, 12 December 1992, p 13. 
106e Mark Ryan 1995, op cit, p 287. 
1070 Ibid, pp 287-8. 
1011 Ibid, pp 173-84. 
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Australian people to make the most of this opportunity; 'Our destiny is in no-
one else's hands but our own: we alone bear the responsibility for deciding 
what the nature of our government and society will be, what advantage we will 
take of our human and material resources, what kind of place our children will 
inherit'. He declared proudly that 'The right Head of State for Australia is one 
of us, embodying the things for which we stand, reminding us of those things 
at home and representing them abroad. We number among those things 
fairness, tolerance and love of this country. It is a role only an Australian can 
fill'. Then, moving on to theme of independence from Britain: 'We are not a 
political or cultural appendage to another country's past. We are simply and 
unambiguously Australian'. . With the confidence of a conviction politician 
certain of the robustness of the argument he finished simply with: 'We share a 
continent. We share a past, a present and a future. And our Head of State 
should be one of us'. So ended another foray into Australian history, culture 
and reform which marked all of Paul Keating's significant written speeches 
delivered for the record. 
Of the off the cuff utterances or less prepared speeches many are notable, 
including the true believers victory speech in March 1993. One particularly 
humorous address was delivered to a Labor Party dinner in Brisbane on May 
16 19941012. This was the fireworks speech, where Keating belittled the 
major players on the Liberal Party frontbench. He called John Hewson a 
skyrocket; 'first a shower of sparks, and then a dead stick falls to earth'. John 
Howard was a 'Flower Pot', which 'always promised a dazzling performance' 
but then 'there was a bit of a show, and then there'd be a bit more, and a bit 
more, then, finally, it fell away to nothing'. Warming to the theme, he then 
described Bronwyn Bishop as a 'Catherine Wheel' which people used to 'nail 
to the fence and they'd take off, spreadeagle the kids, burn the dog, run up a 
tree and then fizzle out going round in circles'. Listening to the audio tape of 
the night some weeks later, an ALP official remarked to this author how, when 
the Prime Minister was speaking, you could slowly hear the noise of the 
cutlery at the dinner quieten down until there was a dead silence punctuated 
1012 Mark Ryan 1985, op cit, pp 28-9. 
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only by uproarious laughter1073. The assembled Labor faithful, veterans of 
boring speech nights and fundraisers, had locked in to hear their Prime 
Minister fire rockets at the hated Liberals. As the audio record1074 of the night 
demonstrates, you could hear a pin drop. 
Like many aspects of Paul Keating's Prime Ministerial tenure, there were up 
and down sides to his speech making; light and the inevitable and familiar 
shade. The prepared speeches were rarely criticised for their tone or 
seriousness, though of course the subject matter led to significant debate. Off 
the cuff speeches were more subject to criticism. The true believers speech of 
March 1993 drew a considerably adverse reaction for its tone and exclusivity, 
and the Prime Minister's blunt language in parliamentary addresses and 
during less guarded moments was also criticised from time to time. Graham 
Little, for example, considered Keating's language not 'reassuring for the 
people who are struggling to hold their jobs - for whom words are meant to 
have gravitas, should be used sparingly, be sincere and give clear 
direction•1015. Nonetheless, speech making was one aspect of the prime 
ministerial job description that Paul Keating performed admirably and 
effectively. This analysis of his oratorical style and subject matter has 
uncovered some coherent, serious themes pursued by Prime Minister Keating 
and placed on the public, historical record. Keating's big picture was outlined 
with words and then filled in with policies. As a rhetorical advocate for the 
things upon which the Prime Minister attached importance, he was a forceful 
and significant leader. 
Striding the International Stage 
Prime ministers take their task of persuasion to the international stage with 
great potential for domestic reward and similarly significant opportunities to 
fail. They represent Australian interests abroad on matters deemed too 
important for the foreign minister to alone negotiate. They deal personally 
with foreign leaders of all persuasions and from right around the globe. If the 
1013 Conversation with Linus Power, 2002. 
1074 The audio record is a private taping maintained by the Queensland Branch of the ALP. 
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prime minister's brand of diplomacy is effective, or if significant international 
deals are struck or crises averted, she or he reaps domestic political rewards. 
If the process turns sour, however, the prime minister may face the wrath of 
the electorate for failing to achieve Australian objectives, for offending a 
foreign leader or damaging an international relationship. Regardless, how 
engaged in diplomacy a prime minister becomes is a decision she or he can 
make, with foreign and defence ministers always willing to fill the vacuum left 
by a leader focussed more on the domestic political scene. 
International relations offer a valuable opportunity to maximise prime 
ministerial power, the focus of the brief analysis below. It should be noted at 
this point that a more complete analysis of Keating's international diplomacy 
must necessarily wait for subsequent studies, given space constraints and 
this thesis' concentration largely on domestic prime ministerial leadership. 
Therefore, rather than explore in detail the foreign policy of the Keating 
Government, or his relationships with other world leaders, or the demarcation 
of duties with his foreign minister Gareth Evans, instead the political and 
media impact of his forays into international affairs will be gauged1°76. From 
earlier analysis and from Chapter Two's discussion of the leadership principle 
of 'going public', we know that prime ministers can benefit from a public stage 
from which to espouse their personal views. In this way, international 
relations provide an even broader forum for influence, and greater capacity for 
the exercise of prime ministerial conviction. In this way going international 
can be seen as another worthwhile strategy for leaders to maximise their 
prime ministerial power. 
Keating strode the international stage with increasing confidence1077, and had 
much success in this arena. He visited many places, including: Indonesia, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Japan, Singapore, Cambodia, Republic 
of Korea, China, Nauru, United State of America, United Kingdom, Ireland, 
1075 Graham Little 1997, 'Leading Change', op cit, p 15. 
1076 For summary analysis of Keating's foreign policy see James L Richardson, The Foreign 
Policy of the Hawke-Keating Governments, (Canberra, ANU, 1997); see also Paul Keating 
2000, op cit. 
1077 Appendix Four demonstrates the increasing regularity with which Keating visited overseas 
countries to discuss trade and security issues. 
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France, Monaco, Cyprus, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, France, Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand, Israel and Malaysia101a. At times he 
could be brilliant - witness the Indonesian defence treaty and his role in the 
establishment and maintenance of APEC - at other times lacklustre, as was 
the case when he labeled Malaysian leader Mahathir 'recalcitrant'1079. Peter 
Smark described the Prime Minister abroad as 'like a Stealth bomber fitted 
with two missiles. One is filled with high explosive and the other with flower 
petals. You never know which button he'll press•1oao. Criticism also came from 
those who had determined Keating cared only for the high politics of foreign 
affairs and was neglecting domestic concerns such as unemployment. 
Despite this, international activity strengthened Keating's position on the 
domestic scene, drew supportive commentary from the usually hostile media, 
built useful relationships with international leaders, and saw some significant 
policy objectives achieved. 
Typically of the big picture-focussed Prime Minister Keating, his international 
exploits concentrated exclusively on large-scale policies such as the 
establishment of a leader's summit under the banner of APEC and the signing 
of a defence treaty with Indonesia's President Suharto. Keating himself wrote 
this in his book Engagement; he 'was determined to focus on those things 
that only a prime minister could do'1oa1. There was a risk associated with a 
heavy investment in objectives which were as brash and internationally 
significant as these. Geoffrey Barker wrote in the Age in 1993 that Keating 
was investing 'his prestige and reputation in clearing the path to a summit 
meeting of APEC leaders'1082• But gambles like these, in the international 
arena, often paid off for the PM. An example of a typical media response to a 
Keating success abroad can be found after he played an important role on the 
Bogor declaration on free trade, signed in November 1994. The event led one 
1018 For a detailed list of international visits by Prime Minister Keating see Appendix Four. 
1079 See Eric Loo and Martin Hirst, 'Recalcitrant or keras kepala? A cross cultural study of 
how Malaysian and Australian press covered the Keating/Mahathir spat', Media International 
Australia, no 77, August 1995, pp 107-119; and Paul Keating 2000, op cit, pp 169-80. 
1080 Peter Smark, 'Time To Shake Off This Provincial Attitude', Sydney Morning Herald, 9 
March 1995, p 13. 
1081 Paul Keating 2000, Engagement, op cit, p 10. 
1082 Geoffrey Barker, 'New Paul Keating Treads World Stage', Age, 24 June 1993, p 15; ; see 
also Paul Keating 2000, Engagement, op cit, pp 76-97. 
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journalist to write that the 'deal struck with scripted ceremony to remove 
barriers to regional free trade within the next 25 years is, by Mr Keating 's 
account, the most important feat of his political career. It is also probably the 
most significant achievement of post-War Australian diplomacy. ... For that, 
Paul Keating is entitled to take a bow•1os3. That a fundamentally hostile press 
could applaud such achievements so lavishly is indicative of the power that 
international statesmanship can bring a diplomatically successful Prime 
Minister. 
An important part of this success was Keating's ability to strike up close 
rapport with the leaders of other nations. His relationship with Suharto of 
Indonesia was particularly tight and, though criticised because of that 
country's human rights abuses, the personal alliance did much for Australian-
Indonesia relations and was credited as such. One article described at length 
Keating's ability to develop close individual ties with foreign leaders: 
Does this sound familiar? 'He said in the end that it was one of the most 
pleasant and interesting encounters he'd had in many years',' said a 
source close the Prime Minister. 'It was clear from the beginning that he 
really warmed to the Prime Minister's knowledge of the country's history 
and culture ... it was well beyond the normal thing'. Was this the 
meeting with Mitterrand in Paris last May? Or Do Moui in Hanoi last April. 
Or Suharto in Jakarta in November? No, it was Tuesday, so it must be 
Bonn and Chancellor Helmut Kohl. What is the special magic about Paul 
Keating that whenever he hits the diplomatic trail, foreign leaders seem 
to be bowled over by his charisma? No sooner do they shut the door for 
those ritualistic one-on-one talks, than our Prime Minister we are told has 
some of the world's most wily and wizened statesmen almost eating out 
of his hand'1os4. 
This is by no means an isolated example of the commentary that followed 
Keating's international sojourns. He was an effective international networker 
who used personal conversations with European, Asian and American leaders 
to advance his own agenda and win praise from the Australian media. 
Positive reactions to Keating's international efforts went part of the way to 
rectifying the poor light in which the Prime Minister was seen domestically, as 
illustrated by flagging opinion polls and generally poor media coverage. An 
Asian visit in September 1992, for example, was said to give Keating some 
1083 Mark Baker, 'For Keating, Grinners Are Winners', Age, 16 November 1994, p 1. 
272 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
political momentum and a 'morale boost•1os5. The trip was seen as 'a stroke of 
extreme good fortune' which was 'likely to assist the Keating resuscitation' 
because 'it gives him an opportunity to play statesman' and the 'nature of the 
trip falls into happy alignment with Keating's domestic political agenda·1os6. 
Similarly, after ten days in Europe in June 1994, and confronted with criticism 
from the Leader of the Opposition, the Prime Minister was able to tell Ray 
Martin on Channel Nine that 'well, that's what they all say, Ray. I mean, as you 
know, on my European trip I met a lot of the leaders of Western Europe. I 
mean, nobody there had 5 percent growth, 1 per cent inflation and 3.5 
percent employment growth. When they hear those numbers, they say: 'Well, 
gee, if only we could have that.' That is the sort of problem I'm quite sure 
Alexander Downer would love to be wrestling with'1os1. International 
statesmanship had again afforded the Prime Minister an opportunity to deflect 
domestic criticism and act on a larger stage. 
Paul Keating's pre-Prime Ministerial interest in foreign affairs in general, and 
Asian integration specifically, was either non-existent or well-hidden from the 
public. That he was able to become a significant international player and key 
negotiator of agreements such as those relating to APEC was a triumph of his 
tenure. One balanced commentator, when interviewed for this thesis, called 
him, 'in terms of his overseas style', a 'great symbol of the Australian people'. 
Keating had the 'suggestion of a swagger', a 'confidence', and the 'willingness 
to try and lead·1oss. Though Keating's diplomatic style and international 
achievements could be studied at length, it will suffice to say in this study that 
the Prime Minister came to recognise the potential of international 
statesmanship and tapped it when required in the interests of his big picture 
and for domestic political gain. 
1084 Mark Baker, 'An Operator Abroad', Age, 11 March 1995, p 19. 
1085 Michelle Grattan, 'Keating on a High, But Forget an Early Election', Age, 28 September 
1992, p 13. 
1086 Peter Hartcher, 'Hewson Can't Beat the Feeling', Sydney Morning Herald, 18 September 
1992, p 11. 
1087 Alan Ramsey, 'Gallic on the Breath as Sheep Follows Form', Sydney Morning Herald, 18 
June 1994, p 39. 
1088 Interview with Margo Kingston, 21 August 2002. 
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Painting the Big Picture 
Prime ministers are salespeople afforded significant opportunities to promote 
themselves and the actions of their government. The media is the most 
obvious and most powerful of these platforms, and is populated by journalists 
and proprietors that must be massaged and cultivated and kept on side if an 
effective relationship is to be maintained. Speeches afford another 
opportunity for prime ministerial salespersonship, and can be used, if so 
desired, to set the agenda, define the actions of friends and enemies, or place 
substantial issues on the historical record. Prime ministers must also act as 
salespeople on the international stage; persuading and cajoling foreign 
leaders with their own constituencies to appease and impress and using the 
benefits of 'going international' to maximise their domestic political stocks. 
The media relationship remains the most important of all of these prime 
ministerial platforms, however, because it has the power to influence how all 
acts of advocacy are viewed by the public and determines in large part the 
ultimate success or failure of the PM to lead public debates over the nation's 
future. Prime ministers are newsworthy and must be reported, but how they 
are reported is the prerogative of the media. 
Prime Minister Keating was a conviction politician with a well-developed 
agenda, who used rhetoric and international diplomacy to painstakingly paint 
his big picture. His prepared speeches carried great weight, and set the 
nation on a course of reform that included international integration, 
particularly with the country's Asian neighbours, Australian republicanism and 
much else. His forays into international relationships brought gains in the 
form of APEC and the defence treaty with Indonesia. Judged on these aspects 
of salesmanship alone, Keating's Prime Ministership was a roaring success. 
Unfortunately, these gains were largely nullified by the poor relationship the 
PM maintained with the mainstream political media in Australia. What was 
once a source of great strength for an advocate such as Keating became a 
significant and costly factor in his public fall from grace. His refusal to engage 
with the media, particularly after his decision to 'punish' journalists after they 
wrote him off after the 1993 election victory, was a self-defeating act that 
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coloured media perceptions of the Prime Minister and turned commentary 
against him. A big picture without a compliant media became too difficult to 
paint, and the public were denied a proper viewing of the gains which Paul 
Keating worked so assiduously to cultivate in the international arena and 
about which he spoke so eloquently. 
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Pressing the Flesh 
I don't want their love, I want their votes1os9. 
The theory in the Labor Party was that Hawke always wanted to have an 
election because he knew it gave him a chance to front the electorate, 
while Keating never wanted to have an election because he knew it gave 
the electorate a chance to front him109o. 
In the end, the moment of truth comes out when they get to those stubby 
pencils and the ballot box1091. 
Public opinion is the lifeblood of Prime Ministers whose job depends on 
electoral success. Their peers also judge them on the prospect of electoral 
success1oe2, as indicated by regular polls. Favourable public ratings are an 
important tool for leaders because they bestow on leaders more authority 
when dealing with alternate power bases1oe3. More importantly, like the 
parliamentary party, the electorate can determine whether or not a prime 
minister remains in the position. This means there are few more significant 
and pressing tasks for the leader than to court favourable public opinion and 
maintain a positive relationship with the people. Failure to do so can invite 
electoral defeat or an adverse judgement from the caucus. 
Increasingly, prime ministers are held accountable for the standing of the 
government, making the pursuit of favourable public opinion an individual, 
and perhaps somewhat 'presidential', activity. Between elections, according 
to Patrick Weller, 'prime ministers have greater responsibility for "selling" 
governments than anyone else'. They are 'recognisable, the subject of 
continual assessment by opinion polls' and 'the spokesperson on television 
1089 Paul Keating, quoted in Tony Stephens, 'In the Pokies Palace, Luck Goes the Way of the 
True Believers', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 March 1993, p 7 (emphasis added). 
1090 Peter FitzSimons 1998, op cit, p 366. 
1091 Paul Keating, 26 October 1995. 
1092 See Chapter Three 'Leading Labor'. 
1093 Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 197. 
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and other media'1094. At campaign time, electioneering 'appears to be the 
most presidential' of prime ministerial tasks, because 
The focus is on the leader, from the time that the calling of an election is 
contemplated until the results are known. Prime ministerial popularity is 
continually assessed, prime ministerial statements are examined, prime 
ministerial composure is analysed. Credit for victory or blame for defeat 
is given, in part at least, to the leader - after all, leaders are expected to 
win elections1095. 
If they can't win an election they can't continue as PM; if they can't appear 
likely to succeed there is a greater likelihood that their colleagues will look 
elsewhere for leadership. 
Prime ministers are becoming more important to the decisions voters make in 
the privacy of the polling booth, gradually catching up with the party as a key 
determinant in voter choice. In this context, Anthony Mughan's analysis of 
leaders' roles in contemporary election campaigns, introduced in Chapter Two, 
is worth revisiting. He uncovers a trend towards increasing 'leader effects' on 
election results, a phenomenon that has become more prominent since the 
1960s and 1970s1096. Ian McAllister has also analysed this trend and 
concluded that as, 'partisanship in the electorate has weakened and the 
electronic media have become more dominant, leaders have become more 
important electoral cues to guide the choices of voters'1097 • Further, in the 
'absence of partisan and social ties anchoring them to specific parties, voters 
are more politically volatile and, as a result, more susceptible to the influence 
of a political leader with whom they can identify'109s. This has important 
ramifications for leadership and for the authority of Westminster prime 
ministers, who accumulate 'much of the accountability functions once 
exercised by the party'1099. 
Much, therefore, is expected from the prime minister in the public sphere. 
They must be effective campaigners and consistently popular between 
1094 Patrick Weller 1989, op cit, p 175. 
1095 Ibid, pp 185-6. 
109s Anthony Mughan 2000, op cit, p 49. 
1097 Ian McAllister Prime Ministers, Opposition Leaders and Government Popularity in 
Australia, paper delivered to the Australasian Political Studies Association conference, 23-26 
September 2001, p 18. 
109s Ibid, p 1. 
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election times. The costs for an unpopular prime minister are significant, and 
the mission is difficult. As Don Watson notes 
We expect him to listen to us and yet to lead us; to obey our will and yet 
be leader enough to have a will of his own; to reflect our view and yet 
project his vision. It's a tall order, but one a prime minister had better be 
seen to obey. If he doesn't, they'll say he's out of touch - and to be told 
you're out of touch in the modern political environment is like being told 
the sentence is death1100. 
Watson's view is, of course, coloured by his experiences working for Prime 
Minister Keating, a leader whose relationship with the Australian people was a 
difficult and suspicious one. Indeed the Keating tenure provides us with an 
excellent prism through which to analyse the power the electorate has over 
the PM, the influence of public opinion, and the extent to which prime 
ministers are expected to maintain favourable terms with their employers. 
Paul Keating was an unpopular leader with a mixed electoral record, who 
cared little for the trivialities of electoral politics and was not prepared to 
sacrifice the time taken to cultivate and court public opinion. Rod Cameron, 
with three decades of experience observing political leaders as the proprietor 
of Australian National Opinion Polls, saw in Keating a uniqueness when 
compared with all of the other state and federal political leaders of recent 
Australian history. The Prime Minister, according to Cameron, 'couldn't care 
less about popularity ... he could do a song and dance, and he had a wonderful 
ability to charm a percentage of the electorate but he was never highly 
popular. And popularity was never his goa1•1101. 
Large sections of the Australian public saw in Paul Keating an arrogance and 
an aloofness that contributed greatly to his poor showings in opinion polls. 
Others admired his energy, intelligence and strength. Whether for him or 
against him, after so many years in public life, he was either loved or loathed; 
few had neutral feelings about their Prime Minister. Unfortunately for him, 'he 
had two thirds of the population disliking him intensely and one third the 
reverse·1102• A monumental Keating effort in 1993 saw Labor triumph in the 
1099 Ibid, p 19. 
1100 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 9. 
1101 Interview with Rod Cameron, 10 September 2002. 
1102 Ibid. 
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elections held that year, but voters lay in wait for a Prime Minister who, by 
March 1996, had fallen drastically out of favour with the Australian people. 
They deemed him out of touch, excessively preoccupied with his big picture, 
and removed from the realities of domestic life and the aspirations of middle 
Australia. 
This chapter explores in detail the fraught relationship between Prime Minister 
Keating and the Australian public as illustrated by opinion polls and federal 
elections. It turns first to the characteristics attributed to Keating in available 
polling, and his relative unpopularity throughout the period of his leadership. 
Next a discussion of the 1993 and 1996 election campaigns and their results 
is undertaken to draw lessons from Keating's role in the surprising win and 
the devastating loss. An exploration of the 'hollow centre' of the prime 
ministership, and Keating's reluctance to participate in what he considered 
trivial and superficial public aspects of the job follows, before some 
conclusions are made about the nature of his relationship with the electorate 
and why the people were willing to reject the Prime Minister so 
unceremoniously in March 1996. 
Paul Keating and Public Opinion 
Prime Minister Keating never reached the dizzying heights of public approval 
achieved by his predecessor Bob Hawke, as recorded in regular opinion polls. 
Indeed Keating's average ratings over the course of his tenure were the 
lowest in three decades; in one type of poll quoted by Ian McAllister his 32.3 
percent average compared to Hawke's average of 53.1 percent. Even the 
bumbling Bill McMahon's average of 34.6 percent exceeded Keating's 
average approval ratings11o3. Though his popularity went through peaks and 
troughs, often only a third of the electorate approved or expressed satisfaction 
with their Prime Minister. McAllister argues 'almost all prime ministers decline 
in popularity after they gain office', whereas the 'only exception to this pattern 
1103 Ian McAllister 2001, op cit, p 10; see below for a more comprehensive comparison of the 
poll numbers garnered by Keating, Hawke and Howard. 
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is Paul Keating, who started from a low base and remained at that level for 
the period of his prime ministership'1104. 
Public opinion polls generally record two groups of data on prime ministers. 
The first gives an indication of the attributes that people associate with their 
leader, for example trustworthiness, intelligence or compassion. This data is 
illustrative of how the leader's traits are perceived in the electorate, and how 
relative strengths and weaknesses are observed. The second group of data 
includes relative judgements of 'satisfaction' and 'dissatisfaction' with the 
leader, and the related answers to the 'preferred prime minister' question. 
Both sets of data are provided and analysed below in the context of the Paul 
Keating Prime Ministership. Newspoll data is used primarily because of the 
respect it has garnered among political commentators and strategists for its 
accuracy and consistency with internal party polling, and, where possible, it 
has been backed up by Australian Election Studies material below. The result 
is a comprehensive portrait of public perceptions of Keating and the 
significant electoral problems he encountered throughout his prime ministerial 
tenure. 
Attributes 
The traits commonly associated with Prime Minister Keating were strength, 
decisiveness, conviction and arrogance11o5. Supporters saw in him a 'strong, 
resolute, principled, unyielding, genuine leader', while his many detractors 
perceived him as 'arrogant, out of touch with middle Australia', and having 'a 
different value system to their own'11°6• Polls conducted by Australian 
Community Research found 'Those who liked Keating believed he was 
capable, more honest and genuine and a better communicator than his 
opponent', while 'Those who disliked him said they distrusted him, thought 
him arrogant and disapproved of the way he obtained the prime 
1104 Ibid. 
1105 See Mike Seccombe, 'Why We Love To Hate This Man', Sydney Morning Herald, 30 July 
1994, p 5. 
11os Interview with Rod Cameron, 10 September 2002. 
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ministership•1101. His poor initial standing among women, only partially 
rectified as time wore on, was attributed to his 'bullying' sty1e11os. But of all 
the traits commonly associated with the PM, arrogance stands out, often 
hovering around the 80 percent mark in published polls. This perception 
more than any other, according to a comprehensive analysis undertaken by 
Mike Seccombe in 1994, was why 'Australians love to hate Paul Keating·1109. 
Relying on data provided by Newspoll, and backed up by figures from the 
1993 and 1996 Australian Election Studies, Tables 8.1 to 8.6 and Figure 8.1 
illustrate in more detail the extent to which Australians viewed Prime Minister 
Keating as arrogant; decisive and strong; compassionate; inflexible; likeable; 
and trustworthy. The picture painted by this data is largely unfavorable to 
Keating, who is demonstrably seen as arrogant and inflexible, though decisive 
and strong. The last box in each table shows the average rating for each 
attribute over the course of the Prime Ministership. 
Table 8.1: Arrogant 
Total Agree that Prime Minister Keating is Arrogant (percent) 
Sep Feb Feb Sep Mar Jul Nov Apr Jul Nov Jan 
92 93 93 93 94 94 94 95 95 95 96 
(1) (2) 
79 81 81 86 81 84 81 84 85 87 84 
Source: Newspoll - www.newspoll.com.au 
Table 8.2: Decisive and Strong 
Total Agree that Prime Minister Keating is Decisive and Strong (percent) 
Sep 
92 
Feb Feb Sep Mar Jul Nov Apr Jul Nov Jan 
93 93 93 94 94 94 95 95 95 96 
(1) (2) 
68 74 73 67 72 74 79 77 75 80 78 
Source: Newspoll - www.newspoll.com.au 
1101 Quoted in Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 221. 
Mean 
Mean 
1108 See, for example, Jim McClelland, 'Women and the Way Women Vote', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 3 March 1993, p 16. 
1109 Mike Seccombe, 'Why We Love To Hate This Man', Sydney Morning Herald, 30 July 1994, 
p 5; see also Mark Baker, 'Free Kick to Mr 84pc So He Digs In The Boots', Age, 28 July 1994, 
p 3. 
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Table 8.3: Inflexible 
Sep 
92 
60 
Feb 
93 
(1) 
62 
Total Agree that Prime Minister Keating is Inflexible (percent) 
Feb Sep Mar Jul Nov Apr Jul Nov Jan 
93 93 94 94 94 95 95 95 96 
(2) 
60 62 60 67 64 68 69 68 68 
Source: Newspoll - www.newspoll.com.au 
Table 8.4: Cares for People 
Sep 
92 
43 
Total Agree that Prime Minister Keating Cares for People (percent) 
Feb Feb Sep Mar Jul Nov Apr Jul Nov Jan 
93 93 93 94 94 94 95 95 95 96 
(1) (2) 
48 53 37 48 44 48 48 45 48 50 
Source: Newspo/1- www.newspoll.com.au 
Table 8.5: Likeable 
Sep 
92 
32 
Feb 
93 
(1) 
38 
Total Agree that Prime Minister Keating is Likeable (percent) 
Feb Sep Mar Jul Nov Apr Jul Nov Jan 
93 93 94 94 94 95 95 95 96 
(2) 
43 32 43 36 44 40 35 42 41 
Source: Newspoll - www.newspoll.com.au 
Table 8.6: Trustworthy 
Sep Feb 
92 93 
(1) 
35 35 
Total Agree that Prime Minister Keating is Trustworthy (percent) 
Feb Sep Mar Jul Nov Apr Jul Nov Jan 
93 93 94 94 94 95 95 95 96 
(2) 
37 26 38 34 37 35 35 34 36 
Source: Newspol/ - www.newspoll.com.au 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
Mean 
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Figure 8.1: Public Perceptions of Prime Minister Keating 
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The data presented in Figure 8.1, above, illustrates overwhelmingly that 
arrogance is the dominant perception of the Prime Minister, with an average 
of 83 percent of respondents agreeing with that description of the leader. 
This high number is backed up by the Australian Election Studies of 19961110, 
where 54. 7 percent of respondents thought the PM was 'extremely' arrogant 
and 19.9 percent described him as 'quite' arrogant; a total of 7 4.6 percent. A 
favourable characteristic - 'decisive and strong' - came in second on the list 
of Prime Ministerial attributes with a high average score of 7 4.3 percent. 
Again this is corroborated by the AES. When respondents were asked in 1993 
and 1996 if Paul Keating 'provides strong leadership' they overwhelmingly 
agreed; 43.4 percent thought this 'extremely' so and 37.7 percent answered 
that this was 'quite' so, a total of 81.1 percent. Next in descending order, with 
an average of 64.4 percent, is the perception that Prime Minister Keating was 
'inflexible'. Rounding out the picture were three positive perceptions which 
garnered less than majority support. Only 46.5 percent of respondents 
described the PM as compassionate ('cares for people'); 38.7 percent 
deemed him 'likeable' ; and just 34.7 percent associated Keating with 
trustworthiness. 
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These numbers take on additional meaning when you compare them with 
those garnered by Keating's prime ministerial successor, John Howard1111. 
The available Newspoll data provides telling contrasts between perceptions of 
the two men. Howard's average scores are as follows: arrogance 39.3 
percent (compared with Keating's 83 percent); decisive and strong 62.3 
percent (compared with 7 4.3 percent for Keating); cares for people 65.8 
percent (Keating received an average of 46.5 percent); inflexible 52.3 percent 
(Keating's average on this question was 64.4 percent); likeable 58.9 percent 
(compared with Keating's 38.7 percent); and trustworthy 55 percent (Keating 
received an average of 34. 7 percent on this question). From these 
comparisons we can conclude that perceptions of Keating as arrogant, 
decisive and strong, and inflexible are not necessarily traits associated with all 
prime ministers, but rather characteristics which the Australian people 
associated specifically with him. Similarly, his low scores on positive traits 
such as likeable, trustworthy and cares for people do not appear to be the 
norm for Australian leaders, making them of particular significance, and 
negative consequence, for Prime Minister Keating. 
Given this data, and that analysed below, it is noteworthy that Paul Keating 
was able to win an election in 1993. No Prime Minister since the growing 
sophistication of modern public opinion polling techniques has endured such 
long periods of association with negative attributes. According to the figures 
above, that Keating was deemed 'decisive and strong' appears to have been 
his only saving grace. 
Waves of Public (Un)Popularity 
Prime Minister Keating inherited a Labor Party flagging in the opinion polls 
and apparently heading for defeat after the knife-edge result of the 1990 
election. His own personal popularity did little to restore Labor's fortunes, with 
low 'satisfaction' ratings dominating his entire prime ministerial tenure. 
Though he enjoyed periods where poll respondents preferred him as PM to the 
1110 The AES did not test 'arrogance' in their 1993 survey. 
1111 Analysis of the Howard data includes all polls conducted up until July 2003. 
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alternatives - successively John Hewson, Alexander Downer and John Howard 
- this may have reflected the benefits of incumbency and the periodic 
inadequacies of at least the first two Liberal leaders Keating faced. Labor 
also found itself in front at times, though not for extended periods. Here two 
concerns of polling - satisfaction and preferred prime minister - are graphed 
and analysed to provide an insight into the up and down but generally 
unfavourable poll numbers maintained by Prime Minister Keating. The data 
provided below gives a valuable insight into perceptions of the PM between 
elections, and the poor relationship with the electorate endured throughout. 
Figure 8.2 maps out relative satisfaction with the Prime Minister as gauged at 
fortnightly intervals by Newspoll. We see from the graph that Keating never 
attained a majority satisfaction rating; the nearest he got was a score of 42 
percent around the time of the 1993 election. His worst score for satisfaction 
fell to 17 percent, garnered only a few months after that election, in a poll 
conducted August 1993. On the other side of the coin, the numbers for 
dissatisfaction never went below 42 percent, the number garnered in the first 
poll of his Prime Ministership, conducted January 1992. The low point in 
terms of dissatisfaction came in September 1993 when the figure rose to 75 
percent of respondents expressing dissatisfaction with the way Keating was 
performing. The average satisfaction rating throughout the period was just 
32.5 percent, while dissatisfaction averaged 56.9 percent. This means only 
one-third of Australians were usually satisfied with Prime Minister Keating's 
performance. 
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Figure 8.2: Satisfaction With Prime Minister Keating 
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These numbers take on particular significance when compared with the 
available data on Bob Hawke and John Howard, Keating's predecessor and 
successor respective1y1112. Hawke's average satisfaction rating was 45.2 
percent, higher than Keating's 3 2 .5 percent but just lower than the average 
Howard rating of 46.9 percent. On average, 4 7 .3 percent of Newspoll 
respondents were dissatisfied with Prime Minister Hawke's performance, 
compared with Howard's average of 41.5 percent. Both leaders returned 
significantly better results on this question than Keating's average 
dissatisfaction rating of 56.9 percent. Figure 8.3, below, illustrates just how 
unpopular Prime Minister Keating was in comparison with Hawke and Howard. 
1112 The available Newspol/ data for Hawke runs from November 1985 to December 1991, 
and, for Howard, from August 1996 to July 2003. 
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Figure 8.3: Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction With Hawke, Keating, Howard 
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The preferred prime minister data te lls a somewhat different story to that 
provided by the satisfaction measure. Figure 8.4, below, is produced again 
with the assistance of Newspo/I. It shows an inconsistent trend, which 
depends as much on the performance of the Liberal leader as Keating's own. 
For example, when Downer was floundering towards the end of 1994 the 
Prime Minister's ratings were predictably higher, as was the case when John 
Hewson was being destabilised in mid-1994 as a prelude to his own demise. 
Keating was, on average, preferred as Prime Minister by 38.6 percent of pol l 
respondents; with a high of 53 percent and a low of 27 percent1113. The best 
a Liberal leader rated during this period was 48 percent and the lowest 21 
percent, in both cases garnered by Alexander Downer. There are also some 
other surprising numbers here; for example Paul Keating was preferred as PM 
over John Howard in the final five polls before the 1996 election, yet Howard 
still rode significant anti-Keating sentiment all the way to a resounding victory 
in March of that year. The inconsistency of the data and the effect of the 
Opposition Leader's performance makes this gauge of public opinion 
somewhat less reliable than the data relating to satisfaction levels, but in a 
longitudina l sense we gain from this graph an appreciation of the ups and 
1113 Hawke's average Preferred PM score was 48.6 percent, and Howard's is 46.7 percent at 
the time of writing. 
287 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
downs of the Keating Prime Ministership. Despite consistently low levels of 
satisfaction with the leader, poll respondents still, at times, preferred the 
incumbent PM to his Liberal rivals. 
Figure 8.4: Preferred Prime Minister 1992 - February 1996 
- Keating - Liberal Leader 
60 
50 
40 
20 
10 
0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---' 
1992 1995 
Year 
Source: Newspoll - www.newspoll.com.au 
The data provided in this brief exploration of public opin ions of Paul Keating is 
a useful way to conduct a quantitative analysis of the Prime Minister's 
relationship with the Australian people. We learn from Newspoll and the 
Australian Election Studies that the electorate thought little of Keating 
personally, remained largely dissatisfied with his work, but preferred him at 
times to struggling leaders of the opposition. Percept ions of arrogance and 
inflexibility were partially offset by assessments of strength and decisiveness, 
but remained dominant. At no stage were a majority of poll respondents 
satisfied with Prime Minister Keating, which puts the 1993 and 1996 
elections in an interesting light. Given the growing importance of leaders to 
electoral choice1114, how could such an unpopular man win in 1993 and a 
1114 See Anthony Mughan 2000, op cit. 
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'preferred PM' lose in 1996? The extraordinary campaigns and results of the 
two elections Keating fought as Prime Minister are the subjects to which we 
now turn. 
Campaigning 
Periodic elections are the primary ways in which citizens are given the 
opportunity to hold their elected representatives accountable. Elections 
'select decision makers, shape policy, distribute power, and provide venues 
for debate', according to Mancini and Swanson1115. Campaigns have become 
increasingly centred on television, with 'prepackaged sound bites of 
candidates, relentlessly aired political television commercials, repeated 
narrow campaign messages and scripted camera-ready events'1116 becoming 
more and more prevalent in democracies around the globe. Australian 
campaigns are not immune to these worldwide trends; parties and their 
leaders engage each other largely on the television airwaves and in other 
media, and the contest can essentially be reduced to one between the prime 
minister and a prime ministerial aspirant1111. 
Paul Keating was a reluctant campaigner who saw little value in the trivial 
aspects of his job111s. As Michelle Grattan once wrote, he 'comes to the on-
the-ground grind of the campaign trail - with its street walks, morning teas, 
factories, small children and small talk - without the enthusiasm of a Bob 
Hawke. He is not the sort of politician for whom a row of schoolchildren waving 
flags is one of life's high points•1119. But, when roused, the Prime Minister 
could adopt the combative stance of a streetfighter, and aggressively take on 
his opponents. In the 1993 election Keating faced John Hewson, and in 1996 
his opponent was John Howard. The first campaign Keating fought as PM saw 
1115 Paolo Mancini and David L Swanson, 'Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: 
Introduction' in David L Swanson and Paolo Mancini (eds), Politics, Media, and Modern 
Democracy, (Connecticut, Praeger, 1996), p 1. 
1116 Fritz Plasser with Gunda Plasser, Global Political Campaigning: A Worldwide Analysis of 
Campaign Professionals and Their Practices, (Connecticut, Praeger, 2002), p 1. 
1117 For an examination of the effects of campaigns on election outcomes, see Thomas M 
Holbrook, Do Campaigns Matter? (London, Sage Publications, 1996). 
111s See 'The Hollow Centre', below. 
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him increase Labor's majority in what was almost universally regarded as the 
'unwinnable' election, delivering him Government in his own right and drawing 
plaudits for his individual role in the campaign and his dismantling of Hewson 
and his main policy, the Goods and Services Tax (GST). The 1996 campaign 
was almost exclusively a referendum on the Prime Minister himself. Labor's 
enormous loss saw Keating's legacy tarnished, and much blame was placed 
at the feet of the resigning leader. 
The 1993 election 
The 1993 federal election was held Saturday 13 March, and pitted a Labor 
Party struggling in the polls with an ascendant Coalition led by John Hewson 
and carrying a radical policy blueprint - fightback! - including an unpopular 
GST. At first Keating considered calling the poll for late 1992, before political 
circumstances in the states1120 and advice from Bob Hogg and Graham 
Richardson1121, among others, dissuaded him from that course of action. The 
Prime Minister eventually settled on 13 March 1993, though again this was 
met with some resistance because of the pending release of dire economic 
figures during the campaign period1122. In the end the Prime Minister 
consulted senior ministerial colleagues and the National Secretary of the ALP, 
Bob Hogg, but his mind was made up1123. That the Keating view prevailed is, 
itself, illustrative of prime ministerial prerogative when it comes to calling 
elections. Once the date was set few gave the PM and Labor any chance of 
victory1124. Pollster Gary Morgan opined that if Keating could win the election 
he would be 'the greatest salesman ever•112s. 
1119 Michelle Grattan, 'PM Hits the Campaign Trail of Children and Radio Chats', Age, 12 
February 1993, p 10. 
112° For a comprehensive analysis of the political situation in each of the states see Peter 
Smark, 'Hairshirts and Sin Offer Hard Choices', Sydney Morning Herald, 18 November 1992, 
p 19. 
1121 See Bruce Jones, 'Keating's Roll at GST's Expense', Sun Herald, 13 December 1992, p 
27; and Graham Richardson 1994, op cit, p 349. 
1122 See Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, pp 233-4. 
1123 See Michelle Grattan, 'Only One Prize as Poll Draws Closer', Age, 8 February 1993, p 15. 
1124 See, for example, Michelle Grattan, 'Keating 's Conundrum - How To Induce Mass 
Amnesia', Age, 13 February 1993, p 13. 
1125 Quoted in Michael Magazanik, 'Stick to Economic Issues, Pollster Tells PM', Age, 10 
February 1993, p 20. 
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As Clive Bean noted in his post-election analysis, drawing on sophisticated 
data from the Australian Election Studies, the principal parties contesting the 
election promoted unusually polarised and clearly differentiated sets of 
policies which registered with the electorate as such1126. That policies played 
such a prominent role in the campaign is partially due to the Coalition's 
unorthodox decision to release such detailed proposals. Bean highlighted 
unemployment, the GST, industrial relations, health, family support and child 
care as the policy battlegrounds staked out by Labor and the Coalition1127. 
How these issues played out, and the relative success of the parties in 
promoting their agendas, can be attributed to the strategies of the parties and 
the performance of the two leaders; Keating and Hewson. 
The Liberal Party strategy relied on policy detail, in the form of fightback!, and 
on casting John Hewson as a non-politician and an economist who could 
rectify the country's substantial economic woes. They conducted rallies 
around the country where Hewson, somewhat uncomfortably and out of 
character, would sometimes lead chants of 'Labor has got to go'. The Liberals 
and Nationals attempted to associate the recession with Prime Minister 
Keating, and offered a Coalition Government as the only group able to make 
difficult decisions in the national economic interest. 
Keating and Labor, on the one hand, focussed heavily on the radical nature of 
fightback! and relied on a scare campaign against the GST. Central to this 
was the theme that the GST would have no positive effect on high 
unemployment. More broadly, according to key ALP strategist Bob Hogg, the 
1993 campaign sought to make prominent Hewson's policies on health and 
Medicare, industrial relations and the role of the unions112s. In this respect 
Labor campaigned, almost as if they were in Opposition, against a detailed set 
of policies. It was largely a negative campaign which took the focus off 
Keating's own unpopularity and the extended life of the Government. As Hogg 
1126 Clive Bean, 'Issues in the 1993 Election', Australian Journal of Political Science, vol 29, 
special issue, 1994, pp 134-57. 
1127 Clive Bean, 'Introduction: The 1993 Election and Australian Electoral Studies in the 
1990s', Australian Journal of Political Science, vol 29, special issue, 1994, p 2. 
1128 Interview with Bob Hogg, 5 September 2002. 
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recalls, 'we couldn't afford the spotlight to come on Paul and the ALP, it had to 
remain on Hewson to the end'1129_ 
Paul Keating started the 1993 campaign sluggishly, unable to stick to a clear 
message and struggling to land any significant hits on the Opposition Leader. 
Bob Hogg remembers it 'was ten days in before we had Paul concentrating on 
the campaign•1130. At this point in the campaign Keating himself was heard to 
concede privately that the campaign was 'going down like a turd in a well' 1131. 
An urgent meeting was called at Kirribilli House where staff and officials 
reminded the Prime Minister of the potency of the GST as an issue. Keating 
'was on song after that meeting, he stuck to the brief'1132_ He adopted a 
combative approach and zeroed in on the enemy - Hewson - and the means 
by which to destroy him - a negative campaign based on the GST - and 
pursued both single-mindedly. 
As the campaign progressed the Prime Minister made up much ground on 
Hewson, which encouraged Keating to spend more and more time attacking 
the GST and broader economic agenda of the Liberals. For example, visiting a 
Toyota factory in Port Melbourne, the PM discarded a written speech on 
Labor's industry policy to focus on the GST, unveiling the potent line: 
'whenever you put your hand in your pocket, Dr Hewson's hand will be in 
there, too'1133. The Prime Minister also pursued these lines of attack in 
debates and television appearances with the Opposition Leader, trading some 
prime ministerial prestige for the gains garnered by more combative attacks 
on Hewson and his policies, with varying success1134 . Even a lacklustre Labor 
policy launch was rescued by the resignation of Canada's Brian Mulroney after 
a backlash over the bungled implementation of a similar consumption tax to 
the GST, lending 'credibility to Mr Keating's claims that a GST would push the 
1129 Ibid. 
1130 Interview with Bob Hogg, 4 September 2002. 
1131 Quoted in David Day 2000, op cit, p 427. 
1132 Interview with Bob Hogg, 4 September 2002. 
1133 Michael Millett, 'Enough of "Mr Nice Guy'", Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February 1993, p 
6. 
1134 See Geoffrey Barker, 'Heat, But Little Light Amid Sound And Fury', Age, 19 February 1993, 
p 8; Geoffrey Barker, 'Dog-eat-dog For The Calm And The Angry', Age, 8 March 1993, p 4; and 
Michelle Grattan, 'PM Pays for GST Airing', Age, 19 February 1993, p 8. 
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economy back into recession'1135 . Polls steadily improved for Keating and 
Labor, which buoyed the PM and saw him deliver lines such as 'If you don't 
understand the GST, don't vote for it. And if you do understand it, you won't 
vote for it anyway'1136. In the campaign's final week the Sun Herald's Andrew 
Clark wrote that 'In the past two weeks there have been signs that Keating 
has clawed back some of the lead from the Coalition. But he and other Labor 
insiders know a major surge is needed in the next week for the ALP to win its 
fifth election in a row. As it is Keating leads a decade-old Government, 
dragged down by one million unemployed, and struggling against the political 
gravity of change'1137 . Labor was still unlikely to win, the polls indicated, but 
the Prime Minister's pursuit of Hewson and the GST had put Labor in with a 
chance of victory. 
When the results came in on the evening of 13 March it became rapidly 
apparent that not only would Labor win the election, but with a slightly 
increased majority. In the end Labor would win 44.9 percent of the primary 
vote in the House of Representatives113s, a surprisingly large swing of +5.5 
percent, and 80 seats out of 14 7, up from 78 seats (out of 148) after the 
1990 poll. Bob Hogg believes 'fear' of the GST 'beat loathing' of the Prime 
Minister1139. The 'true believers' victory speech delivered by Keating on 
election night was received with rapturous admiration by the assembled Party 
faithful, but was regarded over time as an exclusive and petulant response to 
the unexpected win. Don Watson, for example, recently wrote that 'Later it 
was hard not to think that just as they were going to put the axe back in the 
woodheap the people of Australia heard him say on the television, "This is a 
victory for the true believers," and they decided to leave it at the back door 
ready for next time'114o. 
1135 Bernard Lagan, 'Keating's Week: Thunder, Lost and Regained', Sydney Morning Herald, 
27 February 1993, p 11. 
1136 Geoff Kitney and Tony Wright, 'Harder Than Expected, But Cause for Joy', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 6 March 1993, p 9. 
1137 Andrew Clark, 'Still Fire in the Belly', Sun Herald, 7 March 1993, p 15. 
113s And 43.5 percent in the Senate. 
1139 Interview with Bob Hogg, 4 September 2002. 
1140 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 354; see also Rodney Cavalier, 'An insider on the outside: A 
personal view of why Labor was always going to lose the 1996 federal election', in Clive Bean, 
Marian Simms, Scott Bennett and John Warhurst (eds), The Politics of Retribution: The 1996 
Federal Election, (St Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp 23-7. 
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Regardless, the come from behind effort in 1993 ranked as one of the more 
astounding campaign feats in modern Australian political history1141. The 
Age's Robyn Dixon explained two days after the election that 
His victory was extraordinary because he must have known in his heart 
that he could not win, unless all the normal rules of politics were turned 
on their head. Almost every newspaper editorial in the country had 
written him off and called for change. During a recession, with a million 
unemployed and dogged by calls that he should not merely accept 
responsibility for the economic errors but apologise to the people, he 
should have lost1142. 
The credit for Labor's victory was placed almost exclusively at the feet of 
Prime Minister Keating, who executed the attacks on Hewson and the GST 
with a single-mindedness of purpose that allowed Labor to claw back to a 
winning position. The Liberals' radical policy approach led to some 
commentary about them having lost the campaign rather than Labor winning 
it, an argument which also has merit, though the prosecution of the case can 
again be partially attributed to the performance of the PM. According to 
pollster Rod Cameron, the 'fact that the GST or Hewson and the GST were 
such a plus for Labor was because Keating made it such a plus. It was 
Keating's capitalising on it that was the key factor1143. The Australian Election 
Studies data quoted by Clive Bean concurs, demonstrating the importance of 
the Labor campaign to the result1144. 
At the outset of the 1993 campaign Keating had told staff that 'This is the 
start of our own mini-presidential campaign'1145, and this was the approach 
that endured throughout the weeks leading up to the poll. The focus was on 
the Prime Minister and his ability to discredit and dismantle the GST. Michelle 
Grattan wrote, in this context, 
1141 Liberal MP David Juli was confident enough to plan a victory party to celebrate the return 
to Government. He confided to this author that he 'had a couple of cartons of champagne in 
the garage at home for the celebration in 93. I was reasonably confident we were going to win 
it. They sat there until 96 (laughs). It was a devastating night'. Interview with David Juli, 19 
September 2002. 
1142 Robyn Dixon, 'Paul Keating', Age, 15 March 1993, p 13. 
1143 Interview with Rod Cameron, 10 September 2002. 
1144 Clive Bean, 1994, 'Issues in the 1993 Election', op cit, p 155. 
1145 Quoted in John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 503. 
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Paul Keating has completely dominated Labor's campaign. In every way: 
its timing, its tactics, its presentation. The strengths of the ALP campaign 
were Mr Keating 's strong points - vigor and toughness. Its faults were his 
too - a certain inflexibility and insistence on doing what he wanted, in 
some instances limiting what he did. Ironically, Mr Keating emerged as a 
more presidential leader and campaigner than his predecessor, Bob 
Hawke, whose style was characterised as presidential. The Keating office 
was dominant; the Keating word went1146. 
The late Ian Henderson, then a senior Party official at the ALP's National 
Secretariat, concurs, telling this author that 'There's no doubt that Keating 
was the most powerful weapon in Labor's campaign in 93. There's no doubt 
in my mind whatsoever about that. Keating was a great campaigner. If you 
were to pick one element of the campaign which was the strongest you'd pick 
Keating's own performance, his role was immense'1147. The presidential 
campaign of 1993 was replicated, with more emphasis on the Prime 
Minister's own personal leadership skills, in 1996. Sadly for Paul Keating and 
the Australian Labor Party, the result was not. 
The 1996 election 
The 1996 federal election was called 27 January and held 2 March, providing 
for a 34 day campaign. Characteristically, few were informed of the Prime 
Minister's preference for the election date until the night before it was called. 
Even ministers were kept out of the loop; reportedly 'Keating didn't give his 
ministers the slightest hint of when it would be'1148, and a cabinet meeting 
within a week of the day the election was called 'was told nothing' and 
'nobody was indelicate enough to ask'1149. Labor's campaign director, 
National Secretary Gary Gray, had been busily preparing for an election since 
December 1995, knowing well that the Prime Minister would not consult 
widely on the date and not wanting to be caught out by a snap 
announcement115o_ In the end the decision was made the night before 27 
January, a small number of calls were made to senior colleagues and officials, 
1146 Michelle Grattan, 'Keating - Bold, Brazen and a Big Ask', Age, 13 March 1993, p 12. 
1147 Interview with Ian Henderson, 19 June 2002. 
1148 Geoff Kitney, 'Keating and His DIY Election', Sydney Morning Herald, 26 January 1996, p 
13. 
1149 Alan Ramsey, 'And the Election Date Is ... ', Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 1996, p 
33. 
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and the race was on1151. Few expected Labor to win or counted on Keating to 
reproduce the heroics of 1993. 
Both major parties relied heavily on Prime Minister Keating as the central 
issue of the 1996 campaign, more important than any policy or ideological 
differences between Labor and the conservatives1152. Anecdotal evidence 
illustrates the depth of feeling against Keating in the electorate. Liberal MP 
David Jull remembers 'You'd go out into your electorate and, if you wanted a 
good chat to make you fell good, you'd just drop the name Paul Keating'1153. 
Labor apparatchik Anthony Chisholm, then a volunteer for Wayne Swan's 
campaign for the Labor-held suburban Brisbane seat of Lilley, recalls how he 
would wear an ALP campaign T-shirt 'over to my good mates' houses and their 
parents would tell me to fuck off', such was their opinion of the Labor 
leader1154. 
As early as mid-1995 the Coalition dedicated themselves to pursuing Keating 
as a way of beating Labor. As Geoff Kitney wrote, 'The dominant 
consideration in the Coalition's strategic plan has been to make Keating the 
issue and to turn the loathing for him into votes for the Coalition' 1155. The 
same commentator had also written, back in May 1995, that 
The Liberal Party, both from the political intelligence it gets from its own 
polling and the feedback from direct contact between party workers and 
voters, is convinced that Paul Keating is their biggest electoral asset. 
They believe voters don't believe Keating any more. They are convinced 
Keating's credibility is shopworn, so stained and drained by the 
accumulated scars of 25 years of political battle and 12 years of hard 
governance, that voters simply won't buy the Keating product next time 
round1156. 
1150 See Geoff Kitney, 'No-Policy Strategy May Backfire on Liberals', Sydney Morning Herald, 3 
November 1995, p 13. 
1151 Michael Gordon 1996, op cit, p 318; see also Geoff Kitney, 'Why Keating Had to Fire the 
Last Shot In His Locker', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 January 1996, p 1. 
1152 See John Warhurst, 'Promises and personalities: The House of Representatives election in 
1996', in Clive Bean, Marian Simms, Scott Bennett and John Warhurst (eds), The Politics of 
Retribution: The 1996 Federal Election, (St Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1997), p 9. 
1153 Interview with David Juli, 19 September 2002. 
1154 Interview with Anthony Chisholm, 23 March 2002. 
1155 Geoff Kitney, 'High-Risk Deal is Vintage Keating', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 December 
1995, p 13. 
1156 Geoff Kitney, 'Beware the Anti-Keating Factor', Sydney Morning Herald, 26 May 1995, p 
13. 
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The Coalition's slogans reflected this. The positive 'For All of Us' was an 
attempt to contrast them with the perceived exclusivity of Labor; and the 
negative 'Enough is Enough' was a not so subtle swipe at the Labor leader1157 
and thirteen years of ALP Government. John Howard and the Liberal and 
National Parties rode anti-Keating feeling all the way to victory, declining to 
release new and detailed policies and relying instead on the poor image of 
their opponent1158. 
Labor also relied heavily on perceptions of the Prime Minister, in their case 
the electorate's association of Keating with decisive and strong leadership. 
So 'Leadership' became the Party's campaign slogan. As Don Watson 
explains, 'Whatever else people thought about our man, they thought he was a 
strong leader'1159. Senior campaign strategist Seamus Dawes conceded it 
was no use going around 'pretending that someone else was the prime 
minister•11eo. Grattan wrote, at the time, that 'Labor has no equivocation 
about leaning heavily on its leader ... He's simultaneously one of Labor's 
negatives and its biggest hope•11e1. The Leadership slogan was part of a 
'presidential campaign - Keating against Howard': 
Keating will be the focus of everything Labor does. He will also be the 
focus of much that the Coalition does because it believes he is its best 
asset. Who is right about this will depend on how Keating campaigns. 
Keating's advocacy skills are a potent political weapon for Labor. There is 
no-one in politics who can simply encapsulate and sell arguments the 
way Keating can. But his strength is also his weakness. His capacity for 
the brilliantly simple is equalled by his capacity for stupid and self-
flagellating outbursts of scorn or anger. The former is what voters like 
about Keating . That latter makes them loathe him. Keating can barely 
afford one slip from the brilliant to the bad if Labor is to succeed in the 
electoral tasks it faces1162. 
1157 See Adele Horin, 'Winning The Way Into A Woman's Vote', Sydney Morning Herald, 3 
FebruarY 1996, p 2. 
1158 For a detailed breakdown of the Liberal Party's campaign strategy by a key strategist, see 
Andrew Robb, The Liberal Party campaign' in Clive Bean, Marian Simms, Scott Bennett and 
John Warhurst (eds), The Politics of Retribution: The 1996 Federal Election, (St Leonards, 
Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp 34-41. 
1159 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 681. 
1160 Pamela Williams 1997, The Victory, op cit, pp 225-6. 
1161 Michelle Grattan, 'ALP Gambles on Keating Factor Being a Plus', Age, 29 JanuarY 1996, p 
9. 
1162 Geoff Kitney, 'Keating and His DIV Election', Sydney Morning Herald, 26 JanuarY 1996, p 
13. 
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The Labor campaign was thus built upon the recognition that the Prime 
Minister was Labor's only hope, and upon a gamble that he could bring Labor 
out of the mire once again. With Keating not highly regarded by a majority of 
the electorate1163, this was a strategy unlikely to bring victory to the ALP. 
The 1996 federal election campaign attracted little interest and changed few 
votes1164. For Paul Keating, it was essentially a month-long funeral 
procession, with no headway made in the polls and a series of mistakes such 
as the forged letters affair1155 preventing any clawing back of lost votes. As 
John Warhurst noted, 'the coalition parties began and finished the campaign 
for the House of Representatives well in front'1166. The media commentary 
throughout the campaign stressed the inevitability of Labor's impending 
defeat. Take, for example, this comment by Alan Ramsey: 'Just three days 
into a five-week campaign and already Paul Keating looks and behaves like a 
politician staring defeat full in the face. While John Howard campaigns in a 
cocoon, without detailed policies and carefully insulated from the risks of 
talking himself into trouble, the Prime Minister is floundering and cannot hide 
it'1167. The policy launch was low key116s and, until the final two weeks, the 
Prime Minister campaigned largely without passion. The high point was 
probably when a crowd of cheering Sydney private school girls greeted Keating 
in the manner of a rock star, transforming him 'For a strange and memorable 
moment yesterday' into 'a Bob Hawke' - The bloke the mob want to 
touch'1169. Largely, however, Keating campaign was 'one of fits and starts1110. 
1153 But, paradoxically, preferred as PM over John Howard. See above. 
1164 Clive Bean and Ian McAllister, 'Short-term influences on voting behaviour in the 1996 
election' in Clive Bean, Marian Simms, Scott Bennett and John Warhurst (eds), The Politics of 
Retribution: The 1996 Federal Election, (St Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp 190-1. 
1165 Treasurer Ralph Willis had received what turned out to be forged letters outlining Shadow 
Treasurer Peter Costello's plans for a state tax hike, and announced the 'leak' to the media. 
This cost Labor momentum in the closing days of the campaign. See John Warhurst, 
'Promises and personalities: The House of Representatives election in 1996', in Clive Bean, 
Marian Simms, Scott Bennett and John Warhurst (eds), The Politics of Retribution: The 1996 
Federal Election, (St Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1997), p 9. 
1166 Ibid, p 3. See also p 5 of this chapter for a useful chronology of the campaign. 
1167 Alan Ramsey, 'PM Can't Hide It He's Looking Like a Loser', Sydney Morning Herald, 31 
January 1996, p 1. 
1168 Sally Loane, 'Clean-Cut Leader Keeps It Simple', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 February 
1996, p 8. 
1169 Michelle Grattan, 'Paulmania Hits, And PM Walks on Mortar', Age, 23 February 1996, p 1. 
1170 Innes Willox, 'An Easy Keating Leads a Campaign of Fits and Starts', Age, 1 March 1996, 
p 11. 
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One commentator described the phases of the Prime Minister's campaign 
thus: 
Phase one was the now traditional bad start, with the Prime Minister 
struggling to get into any sort of rhythm and the ALP machine badly out of 
synch with its own candidate. By the second week, discipline had been 
restored, with Keating and other senior Government ministers sniping 
away effectively at flaws in just released Coalition policies. A good 
performance in the first debate, a measured policy launch and some 
ineptly targeted cuts in the Coalition's costings document, enabled Labor 
to maintain its momentum in the third week .... But it was not enough to 
sustain Labor through the critical third phase of the campaign, and 
Keating knew it. While the Government had made some dent on 
Howard's lead, Labor was still trailing - according to its own research and 
the published polls - by a margin of between five and eight points1111. 
Little could be done to rectify Labor's poor position in the polls, it seemed 
voters had made up their mind to install Howard and the Coalition in Keating 
and the ALP's place. 
The result was devastating for the Prime Minister and the Labor Party, whose 
primary vote in the House of Representatives dropped 6.2 percent to only 
38.8 percent1112. Only 49 MPs remained, a loss of 31 seats since the 1993 
poll, and eight Government ministers lost their seats1173. Reasons for the 
massive repudiation of the Government include long-term incumbency and the 
swing of the electoral pendulum, though with a campaign based so heavily on 
Paul Keating, by both sides, it is difficult not to conclude that the Prime 
Minister's own unpopularity was a significant factor1114. Don Watson 
attempted a Keating-centric explanation for the loss when he wrote that 
'leadership' tied his hands. Many things beat him in the election, 
including some he inflicted on himself before and during the campaign, 
but he had always wrestled his way over the obstacles, just as he had 
overcome the contradictions in himself. Some people said he fought the 
campaign as if half asleep, that he seemed not to be able to raise any 
passion; not even to chase down the old enemy, the man who stood for 
everything he despised and from whose small, mean grasp he reckoned 
he had saved the country. He wasn't half asleep as much as half out of 
1171 Michael Millett, 'Keating's Final Hope Rests In Last-Ditch Manoeuvres', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 1 March 1996, p 27; see also Innes Willox, 'An Easy Keating Leads a Campaign of Fits 
and Starts', Age, 1 March 1996, p 11. 
1172 36.2 percent in the Senate, down 7.4 percent on 1993 figures. 
1173 John Warhurst 1997, op cit, p 13; for a detailed breakdown of seats and swings see also 
Malcolm Mackerras, 'Statistical analysis of the results' in Clive Bean, Marian Simms, Scott 
Bennett and John Warhurst (eds), The Politics of Retribution: The 1996 Federal Election, (St 
Leonards, Allen and Unwin, 1997), pp 207-27. 
1174 Clive Bean and Ian McAllister 1997, op cit, p 206. 
299 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
character. He was our Achilles and we had sent him out to fight like 
Paris1115. 
Whatever the explanation, Keating could not rouse himself for this final battle, 
and he resigned, ending a four and a quarter year tenure in the prime 
ministership. By 1996 public opinion had caught up with Paul Keating, and 
unceremoniously removed him from office. The lesson is that ultimate power 
of tenure is held, and periodically exercised, by the demos, in this case the 
Australian electorate. 
The Hollow Centre 
Campaigning was a chore for Keating because he eschewed what he 
considered to be the trivial aspects of public life. Arguably, 'Keating was an 
unusual prime minister in no stranger way than this: he seemed not to 
understand that he would make himself more popular and trusted if he played 
sometimes to the hollow centre of the job - to the ceremonial, sentimental, 
cliched dimension of it'1176. Don Watson further describes this aspect of the 
Prime Minister's persona. He believes Keating 'would have been happy if 
someone had said, "Paul, you can be prime minister, but we won't tell 
anybody"' 1177. Watson concludes that, 'Keating recoiled from the pursuit of 
popularity and trust, which is to say from the essence of politics'1178 which 
meant 'that by the time of his prime ministership Paul Keating was in some 
fundamental ways unsuited to political life'1179. Public opinion was, therefore, 
an untapped resource throughout the Keating Prime Ministership; he did little 
to cultivate a following when that involved superficiality or fake forays into the 
garnering of popularity. This meant, 'of all the things the public at all levels 
want the prime minister to be, he wasn't prepared to be quite a few of 
them•11so. 
1175 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 692. 
1176 Ibid, p 4 70. 
1177 Ibid, p 349. 
1178 Ibid, p 470. 
1179 Ibid, p 631. 
1180 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
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The political 'stunt' and the 'meet and greet' or 'grip and grin' are the staples 
of modern electoral politics, but Prime Minister Keating largely shunned them 
in favour of policy development and public advocacy. On the few occasions 
where the PM was lured out among 'the people' his performance was 
impressive11s1. Geoff Walsh, a key aide who had also advised Bob Hawke, 
remembers Keating, on a trip to south western Queensland to speak with 
farmers about the drought, as very much at ease with ordinary Australians. 
Walsh believes 'if times had been different in terms of his family 
responsibilities, he'd have done more' of those grass roots engagements1182. 
Another example of Keating's occasional effectiveness in public forums came 
in September 1992 with a Prime Ministerial visit to a Holeproof underwear 
factory. A relaxed and jovial PM told the assembled workers: "'As you know, 
I've always been bagged for my suits; you know that ... It's not often that I walk 
around with the product of the factory that I'm in, but I have the Holeproof 
undies on today." He expanded on the matter, outliningjust what kind of pants 
he preferred. "I like the full ones, I like a bit of room," he said, jabbing at his 
waistline•11s3. Despite comical and 'every-man' performances like this one, 
staff still struggled to get him out for the occasional media stunt. Press 
Secretary Greg Turnbull recalls that 'if you went to him in his office and said 
let's go to an underwear factory and crack some gags, he'd send you to a 
psychiatristr11s4 _ Watson adds that 'tell him he had to traipse around some 
shopping mall for the sake of the cameras and his good nature would be 
replaced by the bad'1185. 
After he left office Paul Keating reflected on the superficial aspects of the 
prime ministership. He believed that 'The twenty second grabs and the photo 
opportunities are what you have to put up with to convince people about the 
ideas, but they are not what it is all about'1186. Turnbull remembers, in a 
1181 Interview with Shaun Carney, 28 August 2002. 
1182 Interview with Geoff Walsh, 5 August 2003. 
1183 Julie Lewis, 'Keating Drops His Druthers: "I Like the Full Ones"', Sydney Morning Herald, 
30 September 1992, p 3. 
1184 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
1185 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 631. 
1186 Paul Keating, The Labor Government 1983-1996, Speech Delivered 19 March 1999, 
www .keating.org.au. 
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similar way, the PM treating trivial campaign activities as just 'something he 
had to do'1187 • As time wore on, he became decreasingly willing to perform 
the trivial aspects of the job publicly, perhaps, as Turnbull argues, because 
'he'd had so many years of doing the hard yards for publicity and column 
space, and he was over it'1188. Without greater attention to aspects of 
maintaining positive public opinion it is unsurprising that the Prime Minister's 
poll numbers remained so low throughout. 
Pressing the Flesh 
Populist prime ministers such as Bob Hawke are often described as 'of the 
people'; they have a relationship with electors built upon a two-way 
relationship of admiration and trust. Paul Keating was never credibly 
described as a man of the people or as a populist; he was a more 
authoritarian leader who thought his best service to the people would come 
from policy outcomes and by steering the nation into the future11s9. This 
approach inevitably led to charges of arrogance and authoritarianism. 
If we believe the opinion polls and take note of debates over the Keating 
legacy that have raged since his demise in 1996, we can see that people had 
and still have strong opinions about him. He is loved, it seems, or he is hated. 
His relationship with the Australian voting public is a complex one, but few are 
left without strong opinions of the man who led Australia in the early to mid 
1990s. Within the ALP too, a Party that cherishes its history and its leaders, 
there are strong opinions. Some blame him for relegating Labor to the 
wilderness post-1996, but he still elicits the loudest cheer from Labor faithful 
when they gather to honour the icons of the movement such as Whitlam, Wran 
and Hawke. 
1181 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
1188 Ibid. Keating's disinterest in public events could also, allegedly, extent to Party functions. 
Graham Richardson alleged in an interview, for example, 'one little incident when I went to 
him four or five months after the election in 93 and said to him, mate give me your diary and 
I'll put in two Labor Party functions a month. And they'll all love you and they'll clap you but of 
course they will tell you where we're going wrong. Because that's what happens at Labor 
Party functions they are fairly representative of working class Australians and you'll find out 
what they think. And he said 'mate, if I had to do that it wouldn't be worth being prime 
minister'. 
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A useful prism through which to view Prime Minister Keating's fraught 
relationship with the Australian people is provided by Don Watson's 
Recollections and Les Carlyon's review of the book. Responding to a 
sentiment contained in Watson's work, that constituents thought 'not that he 
was bad or mad, or brought harm to the country, but he wouldn't speak to 
them and they could not speak to him'119o, Carlyon, wrote in the Bulletin that 
'Paul Keating was always going to be difficult as prime minister' because 'He 
thought he was an artist and the people thought he was a politician. He 
wanted to tidy up the cultural life of the nation and the people wanted him to 
do something about the recession. He wanted the people to see him in all his 
genius. The people wanted him to see them, to acknowledge that they were 
actually out there and hurting, partly because about 1 million of them were out 
of work'1191. The people wanted their leader to explain to them why his ideas 
about Asian engagement, indigenous affairs, and the republic were in their 
interests, according to Carlyon 1192. In the end 'It was like two people shouting 
at each other from mountaintops during a windstorm. Keating hectored the 
people for four years and they shouted back. One never heard the other' 1193. 
Part of the difficulty was that Prime Minister Keating was pursuing the 'big 
picture', encompassing, for example, republicanism1194 , at the cost of being 
seen to be out of touch with the domestic concerns of middle Australia. Mark 
Latham, Member for Werriwa, explained this situation thus: 
Paul was probably a victim of the electorate's disengagement from big 
issues. They were obviously reasonably well-engaged throughout the 80s 
but then after he won in 93, the feedback I was getting in my electorate 
was that people were looking for the little nuggets of progress, the little 
things that could make a positive difference in their own life but Paul was 
off on his big picture. It was a great, exciting agenda but there was a 
communications gap - people were looking for smaller picture and he 
was on a bigger canvas ... There was a disconnection there that made 
11s9 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 210. 
1190 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 394. 
1191 Les Carlyon, 'The Paul Guy', Bulletin, 4 June 2002, pp 28-30. 
1192 Ibid. 
1193 Ibid. 
1194 Don Watson 2002, op cit, pp 429-30. For a comprehensive analysis of Keating's effect 
on support for a republic, and the republic issue more broadly, see Christian Leithner, 
'Popular Support for "Mr Keating's Republic'", Australian Journal of Political Science, vol 29, 
no 2, 1994, pp 354-60. 
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the relationship with the electorate awkward. The people who 
understood the big picture absolutely loved it, but the challenge was 
getting more Australians to understand it1195. 
Graham Richardson puts a more critical spin on this aspect of the 
relationship, arguing that the 1993 election made Keating more aloof and 
remote from everyday concerns, and he got more and more interested in the 
Asian connection and a whole lot of stuff that the electorate weren't 
interested in'1196. His agenda was, in Richardson's words, 'fairly alien to the 
mob'1197. 
Though the relationship could deteriorate into mutual disdain - Keating, when 
asked 'what he would do if he lost the election' in 1993 allegedly said 'he 
would tell the Australian people that they were idiots and resign'1198 - it was 
largely one characterised by missed opportunities for the Prime Minister. He 
could charm small groups of people but could not charm a populace into 
signing up to his agenda. Watson argues1199 
The story of his prime ministership was in part about persuading the 
people that he used his strength in their interests. Keating was never 
more than a couple of breaths away from earning the country's respect: a 
word, a gesture, a gummy smile away from overcoming their distaste. 
But it may as well have been a hundred miles dividing them so long as 
they thought what he did was for his satisfaction rather than theirs'1200 . 
The problem was one of communication, where the electorate 'wanted to tell 
their story' and Keating 'wanted to tell his'1201. Unfortunately for Keating, the 
'difference was that the people had time on their side, and they held the 
gun•1202. 
Prime Minister Paul Keating never enthusiastically pursued popularity, and he 
never achieved it. The electorate considered him arrogant, inflexible and out 
of touch as well as decisive and strong. When roused and focussed, as in 
March 1993, he could campaign effectively, but more as a warrior for the 
cause rather than as a populist harnesser of votes. When the issue became 
1195 Interview with Mark Latham, 3 June 2002. 
1196 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
1197 Ibid. 
119s Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 303. 
1199 Ibid, p 401. 
1200 Ibid, p 244. 
1201 Ibid, p 616. 
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the Prime Minister himself, in 1996, the electorate was sufficiently tired of 
Keating and Labor, and convinced their interests and priorities diverged, that 
they could throw him out and install John Howard as PM in Keating's place. 
Modern political campaigning and media pressures place prime ministers and 
opposition leaders front and centre in election campaigns. At the same time, 
and likely contributing to this trend as well as being the result of it, leadership 
is an increasingly important determinant of voter choice1203. Campaigns have 
become more and more individualised and focussed on alternative leaders. In 
1996 this trend reached a new Australian peak, with both parties relying 
heavily on the theme in their alternative campaigns. 
Electoral defeat is one of a handful of ways by which prime ministers can be 
removed from office. The opportunity mostly comes only every three years, 
but the power is exercised periodically. The demise of Prime Minister Keating 
came at the ballot box. Though he dominated his subservient Party caucus, 
an equally acquiescent cabinet, and the parliament, the insufficient attention 
paid to public opinion, and its chief conduit the media, had dire, indeed fatal, 
consequences for his leadership. 
1202 Ibid. 
1203 See Ian McAllister 2004/forthcoming, op cit. 
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In the broad electorate Keating did not seem to understand the meaning 
of primus inter pares. It was as if the idea was foreign to him. Of course 
we are all equal - we are born equal, we die equal and are equal in the 
eyes of God. But primus inter pares is a principle of leadership, and 
Keating understood leadership to mean doing something, not being 
something1204. 
He handpicked his ministry, governed by cronyism and the dictates of 
presidential fiat, ignored his Caucus in the same way he ignored 
Parliament, forgot all about normal prudent political management in his 
obsessive pursuit of his 'big picture', and was utterly contemptuous of 
criticism. And what did the Labor Party do? Nothing! It let Keating do as 
he liked. His party rolled over in the same way his Cabinet and his 
Caucus rolled over1205. 
Virtually the whole Government seemed to be seated at the banquet 
tables of the National Press Club yesterday. But it was an erroneous 
impression, based solely on the weight of numbers. In fact, virtually the 
whole Government was standing behind the lectern. The Government's 
name is Paul Keating12oe. 
When Paul Keating fronted the National Press Club in December 1990 to 
deliver the Placido Domingo speech he spoke at length about the virtues of 
political leadership and the opportunities it brings to those willing to use the 
substantial power that resides in high office. Not knowing for certain that the 
Australian Prime Ministership lay waiting for him in a year's time, we can still 
nonetheless evaluate Keating's leadership against the backdrop of such an 
important speech. Though few would equate him with the historical figures 
whose virtues he extolled, the notion that leaders are there to point the way 
for their countries and aggressively pursue reform is something that Keating 
delivered upon. Even the many critics of his Prime Ministership would 
1204 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 210. 
1205 Alan Ramsey, 'No-one To Blame Except Himself', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 March 1996, 
p35. 
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concede that Keating's tenure from 1991 to 1996 was marked by an 
ambitious reform program which altered dramatically the very nature of 
Australian political debate. His promise, on wresting the leadership from Bob 
Hawke on that December day in 1991, to provide 'direction, strategy, esprit de 
corps, enthusiasm and, dare I say it, where necessary, a touch of 
excitement•1201 was fulfilled. He exited the stage in 1996 as he had entered 
it; as a reformer and an intriguing political figure. 
Any analysis of Prime Minister Keating confronts extreme and divergent views; 
between the positive and the negative, the strengths and weaknesses, the 
combative and the intellectual, the energised and the detached, the listener 
and the lecturer, the articulate and the foul-mouthed, the decisive and the 
divisive12os, the painter of big pictures and the destroyer of opponents, the 
Bankstown boy and the antique collector, the brilliant and the mad1209, the 
brawler and the statesman. The Prime Ministership, too, was far from 
consistent, it endured many troughs and enjoyed some peaks. Borrowing one 
commentator's description, it was a 'surreal exercise in self-destruction 
punctuated by some utterly magic moments•1210. Participants and 
commentators were true believers or they were enemies, there was no middle 
ground. You were for Keating or against him, an admirer of the big picture or 
a troglodyte lacking vision. 
Paul Keating, like all Australian prime ministers, contended with competing 
sources of power and influence residing in institutions such as the party, 
cabinet and the outer ministry, alternative sources of advice, both houses of 
the Commonwealth Parliament, the media and the electorate. How leaders 
navigate these is the key determinant of their own authority. Paul Keating 
was a skilful Prime Minister when it came to dominating the ALP Caucus, his 
ministry and the House of Representatives. Compliant colleagues increasingly 
1206 Mike Seccombe, 'Keating's Banquet Offers Plenty to Chew On', Sydney Morning Herald, 
10 February 1993, p 7. 
1207 Paul Keating quoted in Edna Carew 1992, op cit, p 292. 
1208 Michelle Grattan, 'Decisive and Divisive - The Keating Years', Age, 23 December 1995, p 
8. 
1209 Interview with Mike Steketee, 20 August 2002. 
1210 Interview with Margo Kingston, 21August2002. 
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deferred to the PM, especially after the improbable 1993 election win. 
Parliament was the forum utilised for the dismantling of opponents and 
motivation of colleagues. The substantial resource of the Prime Minister's 
Office was drawn upon, as were other sources of advice within and outside of 
the Government, though not in a coordinated or consistent way. Ad hoc 
advisory arrangements prevailed, as did a reliance on a small band of trusted 
advisers. With dire consequences, important relationships with the Australian 
electorate and their key conduit of information on their leader - the media -
lay neglected and atrophied. Prime Minister Keating's unwillingness to 
engage the media, their abandonment of him, and the electorate's 
disenchantment with a leader increasingly perceived as out of touch, 
represents the failure of his tenure. The people possessed a power over the 
Prime Minister that could not be nullified by his dominance of the Federal 
Parliamentary Labor Party, the Commonwealth Parliament, or the cabinet 
system. 
Two Prime Ministerships 
The Paul Keating Prime Ministership is most appropriately viewed as two 
separate periods punctuated by the 1993 federal election1211. In the first 
period - December 1991 to March 1993 - we observe an engaged but not 
yet legitimised PM working desperately hard to heal the wounds of the 
leadership challenges, revive Labor's lagging fortunes and turn back what was 
then seen as the inevitable electoral tidal wave about to break over the 
Government. The second period - March 1993 to March 1996 - represents a 
period of growing isolation from the demands of domestic political 
management, an estrangement from the media, an almost total dominance of 
subservient colleagues, prime ministerial fatigue, and electoral 
disengagement. 
That Keating was able to steer the Labor Government clear of electoral defeat 
in 1993 is a key reason Keating was afforded the power to isolate himself 
1211 See Michelle Grattan, 'Decisive and Divisive - The Keating Years', Age, 23 December 
1995, p 8; interview with Ian Henderson, 19 June 2002. 
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from some of the demands of effective political leadership. Graham 
Richardson, for example, felt 
93 was in a personal sense the best thing and the worst thing that ever 
happened to him. It made him an elected prime minister which is pretty 
special, but it also enabled him to convince himself that he had done it, 
and that inevitably meant that the press were banned and so were a lot 
of people he didn't like very much. And he became much more 
insular1212. 
Another colleague, Neal Blewett, felt the 1993 win led to 'a triumphant sense 
of his [Keating's] own vindication and the temptations to a presidential style 
were much greater1213. An indication of the Prime Minister's own thinking is 
provided by one close aide who recounted that 'Paul came out of the 93 
election thinking he'd done a pretty good, combative, rescue mission behind 
enemy lines and his attitude was "fuck the lot of you, I'm going to attend the 
priorities I perceive" .... He felt that he had single-handedly dragged himself, 
the Labor Party, the Labor Government across the line•1214. This attitude 
contributed to an aloofness on the part of the Prime Minister which 
colleagues, the media and the electorate found disheartening, especially after 
such a close election in 1993 and the granting of another chance for 
Labor1215 _ From then on, though, it is hard not to conclude, as Ramsey did, 
that 'Keating ignored his reprieve and took his victory as business as 
usua1•1216. 
Another explanation for Prime Ministerial neglect of some of the key duties, 
constituencies and institutions of leadership was that, perhaps by December 
1991 and certainly by March 1993, Keating had run out of steam, was 
sapped of energy and losing interest in Australian domestic politics, and had 
convinced himself that he reached the Prime Ministership too late in his 
career1217. Keating confidante, Mark Ryan, believes 'the fight with Bob 
[Hawke] sapped Paul of a lot of the energy and the inner well spring of 
1212 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
1213 Interview with Neal Blewett, 28 July 2002. 
1214 Interview with senior Keating aide. 
1215 See Mike Seccombe and Bernard Lagan, 'Alone', Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September 
1993, p 1; Tony Wright, 'The Liberals Dilemma: When To Dump Downer?', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 12 September 1994, p 15. 
1216 Alan Ramsey, 'No-one To Blame Except Himself', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 March 1996, 
p35. 
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motivation and enthusiasm that might have been there if he had got the job a 
bit earlier when he was younger, fitter, and feeling that he got the job at the 
right time•121s. This analysis points to the conclusion that Keating was 
running out of steam over the course of his Prime Ministership and lacked the 
physical stamina to deal with some aspects of the job. As he told one adviser, 
it was the responsibility of the job, rather than the hours necessarily, which 
sapped him of his vitality1219. 
Boredom is another factor which seems to have afflicted Prime Minister 
Keating and attracted the attention of the media. Don Watson wrote that 
'Boredom was the feeling he could not conceal He had grown tired of 
politics' magic lantern show years before•1220. The PM had tired of the 
everyday aspects of the job and 'could not get excited until the stakes were 
very high, preferably a matter of life and death'1221. Keating himself declared 
in mid-1994 that he was 'sick to death of day-to-day politics', 'sick to death of 
the Opposition' and 'sick to death' of the Press Gallery1222. This led to the 
Prime Minister being more selective with the tasks he performed; for example 
limiting Question Time appearances and cutting back on media 
commitments1223. This, inevitably, led to some perceptions that 'he 
sometimes did not seem to want the job he had always coveted'1224. Turnbull 
attributes this simply to 'human nature, weariness, exhaustion, and low-level 
depression•1225, but the manifestations of his periodic lack of interest in the 
position could almost reach a serious climax, as was the case in the winter of 
1994 when the PM reportedly considered resigning as a result of his 
exhaustion and poor health, was advised to do so by senior advisers, but 
changed his mind1226. 
1217 See Don Watson 2002, op cit, pp 29-30; Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 
2002; Interview with Paul Kelly, 4 November 2002. 
121s Interview with Mark Ryan, 12 September 2002. 
1219 Interview with senior Keating aide. 
1220 Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 94. 
1221 Ibid, pp 225-6. 
1222 Quoted in Tony Wright, 'The Devil in Keating's Tongue', Sydney Morning Herald, 25 June 
1994, p 33. 
1223 See Geoff Kitney, 'First Hints of Caesar's Abdication', Sydney Morning Herald, 21 October 
1994, p 13. 
1224 Ibid, p 196. 
1225 Interview with Greg Turnbull, 20 July 2002. 
122s Don Watson 2002, op cit, pp 502-3. 
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Paul Keating's work habits reflected all of these factors; boredom, tiredness 
and disenchantment. He confessed to Watson 'that he stayed away from 
meetings and the office when he could and, when he couldn't, switched 
himself off'1221. Rumours circulated that the Prime Minister would often stay 
in bed until midday, taking only selected phone calls and conserving his 
energy. John Edwards recalls the PM arriving at work, on an average day, 
between 10 and 11 am122s. Regardless of the time Keating arrived for work, 
there is a general, chronicled agreement among interviewees and published 
commentary that the Prime Minister worked shorter and shorter hours, and 
spent more and more time at the Lodge. A quarter century in the Parliament 
and more than a decade in cabinet had taken their toll, with implications for 
the Keating Prime Ministership and the performance of the Labor 
Government. 
Some of the ups and downs of the Keating Prime Ministership can be 
attributed to alternating periods of engagement and isolation, while others 
can be tied to the personal style of the PM. Michael Lavarch recounted in an 
interview how Keating 
really was fits and starts. He would be incredibly engaged for periods, 
and there would be enormous personal energy displayed by him and then 
for other periods there would seem to be quite a hiatus, he was quite 
detached really ... He was patchy, he could be quite inspiring at the 
peaks, and then there were quite a few troughs where he seemed to be a 
bit detached from it a111229. 
Even when engaged, however, the Keating style could create problems for the 
Government. The best example of this came with the long and drawn-out saga 
involving Carmen Lawrence and the Royal Commission. This left the ALP 
floundering for months, and has been labelled one of the more significant 
issues leading to the scale of the 1996 election result by figures including the 
Liberal Party's then campaign director, Andrew Robb1230. That Keating stood 
1227 Ibid. 
122s John Edwards 1996, op cit, p 16. 
1229 Interview with Michael Lavarch, 26 June 2002. 
1230 Graham Richardson: 'Well it was a really silly decision to stick with Lawrence. Because 
Lawrence really hurt him badly. I remember I did an interview on the Sunday program with 
Andrew Robb, who nominated that as the single most important thing that happened to them 
in the lead-up. It meant that they didn't have to produce policies or anything because the 
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by Lawrence is evidence of the Prime Minister's remarkable loyalty at some 
cost to his own standing1231. Other key moments for the Labor Government 
during Keating's tenure can similarly be attributed to aspects of his personal 
style. The 1993 budget fiasco reflected stubbornness and a failure to consult. 
The significant achievements - winning in 1993; the passage of Mabo 
legislation; setting in train the next stage of the republican program; and 
APEC, for example demonstrated the Prime Minister's dogged 
determination; policy vision; advocacy skills; and rhetorical abilities. 
The Keating legacy is a mixed one, comprising significant achievements as 
well as missed opportunities and some failures. On the positive side, the 
Prime Minister's remarkable effort in 1993 to wrest the election away from 
John Hewson will be remembered fondly by Labor Party operatives and 
supporters. Michelle Grattan believes that 'If Paul Keating had been hit by the 
proverbial bus in April 1993 he would have gone into history a hero. The man 
who did the impossible'1232. Don Russell argues Keating will be remembered 
for a time when Labor was the natural Party of government, and adding that 
the 'amazing thing is that Hawke and Keating won all those elections, not that 
Keating lost the last one'1233. Paul Kelly also highlights the legacy of the 1993 
win, calling it a 'huge political achievement'1234. Shaun Carney labels that win 
'the most remarkable victory in the history of the Labor Party'1235. 
But it is the policy achievements, the articulation of a new national identity 
and the bold directions in which Keating pointed that constitute the most 
important aspects of his Prime Ministerial legacy. Though the following quote 
comes from someone with a stake in the Keating legacy, it is nonetheless 
illustrative. Don Russell believes Keating 'made the country feel good about 
itself. He lifted horizons. Made people think about what was possible. I think 
the country was different, and people will associate that with him rather than 
spectre of her was hanging over the Government. It paralysed the Government for a very long 
time'; interview conducted 24 June 2002. 
1231 See Don Watson 2002, op cit, p 621; and interview with John O'Callaghan, 20 March 
2002. 
1232 Michelle Grattan, 'Sometimes Keating Must Long For a Miracle', Age, 29 July 1995, p 17. 
1233 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
1234 Interview with Paul Kelly, 4 November 2002. 
1235 Interview with Shaun Carney, 28 August 2002. 
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just a change in the world. It was a sort of time when the country was taller 
and braver'1236. Mark Latham argues Keating will be seen as a prime minister 
who started some very important reforms - the republic, native title' and who 
'was a great political combatant and a good parliamentarian'1237 . In more 
glowing terms, journalist Michael Gawenda penned a portrait of Paul 
Keating's Prime Ministerial legacy. Soon after the 1996 election he wrote that 
Keating 
is, on any reckoning, the most significant Labor politician of the post-war 
period, eclipsing both Whitlam and Hawke in terms of the lasting impact 
he has had on both the Labor Party and on the country. In fact, it could 
be argued that Keating has had a greater impact on the shape of 
Australia than any post-war Australian politician, an impact on a par with 
that of Menzies, whose place in history is assured not least on the basis 
of his longevity. So profound has been Keating 's influence on the 
political landscape during the past 13 years that the nature of political 
discourse, the language, tactics, spirit of political debate, will change with 
his passing. He brought a passion and an intensity to politics that was 
startling. There are of course many people who will think his passing is 
no bad thing - there were certainly a huge number of them on Saturday 
who decided it was time to end his political career - but even they would 
probably concede that Keating 's legacy is a substantial one123a. 
Asked to evaluate this legacy, Margo Kingston told this author that she 
believed Keating's place in history is safe; 'in the end he might become loved, 
and he'll hate that more than anything else'1239. 
Others, even some who were intimately involved in the Labor Government 
under Keating, have a more mixed view of his legacy. Ian Henderson, for 
example, a senior ALP official until 1994, believes Prime Minister Keating 'will 
be remembered as mixed and flawed' in the sense that, though he won the 
1993 election, he could not capitalise and set Labor up for more victories124o_ 
The notion that Labor under Keating missed opportunities is a common 
criticism of the Prime Minister. Carney's opinion is that Keating 'was perhaps 
a person who didn't fulfil his potential as Prime Minister'1241 and Michael 
Gordon believes 'any objective assessment has to say that the Keating prime 
1236 Interview with Don Russell, 25 November 2002. 
1237 Interview with Mark Latham, 3 June 2002. 
1238 Michael Gawenda, 'A True Believer', Age, 4 March 1996, p 12. 
1239 Interview with Margo Kingston, 21 August 2002. 
1240 Interview with Ian Henderson, 19 June 2002. 
1241 Interview with Shaun Carney, 28 August 2002. 
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ministership failed to deliver on the promise'1242. More critically, Geoff Kitney 
offers the following judgement, saying the Keating Prime Ministership was 
'disappointing' because 
It promised a huge amount. It could have changed Australia. It could 
have created the contemporary liberal Australia that we could have been. 
But he threw it all way and gave the future to the conservatives he 
despised. I think a lot of people in the Party will never forgive him for 
that. There was tremendous regard for him in the Party because he was 
a true Labor warrior who was prepared to stand at the front and take the 
shots and be absolutely courageous for the cause. The wilful way that he 
handed it over to Howard, the unwillingness to recognise fault on his 
part, to recognise the loss of touch with ordinary people out in the 
suburbs1243 • 
Alan Ramsey also criticised Keating for wasting the opportunity provided by 
the 1993 election victory, writing bluntly that the PM had 'simply pissed it up 
against the wa11•1244. John Button told this author that Keating 'had so much 
ability, but he let it go·124s, and Glenn Milne believes 'there was a terrible gap 
between what he promised and what he delivered'1246. Paul Kelly criticises 
the Prime Minister for failing to capitalise on the 1993 win and for failing to 
more effectively market the big picture1247, whereas Graham Richardson 
remarked in an interview that Keating 'squandered 'the potential for 
greatness which he had'124s. That each of these criticisms relate to missed 
opportunities is an indication of the hope that participants and commentators 
held for Prime Minister Keating after he was legitimised by the 1993 election 
win. 
Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
An Australian prime minister's tenure can end only six ways. They can die in 
office (John Curtin in 1945, for example), be rejected in the party room (Bob 
Hawke in 1991), lose the support of the parliament (Robert Menzies, 1941), 
be dismissed by the governor-general (Gough Whitlam in 1975) lose their 
1242 Interview with Michael Gordon, 19 September 2002. 
1243 Interview with Geoff Kitney, 4 November 2002. 
1244 Alan Ramsey, 'No-one To Blame Except Himself', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 March 1996, 
p 35. 
124s Interview with John Button, 25 June 2002. 
1246 Interview with Glenn Milne, 9 September 2002. 
124 7 Interview with Paul Kelly, 4 November 2002. 
1248 Interview with Graham Richardson, 24 June 2002. 
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party's majority at a federal election and therefore be voted out of office 
(Malcolm Fraser in 1983, for example), or retire (Robert Menzies in 1966)1249. 
There is not a lot that can be done about the first of these options (death), and 
even, arguably, the fourth (dismissal). The third, arising out of a shift in 
allegiances on the floor of the parliament, is unlikely to be repeated because 
of stricter party discipline and the presence of few independents or cross-
benchers in the House of Representatives. Retirement is a decision rarely 
made. This leaves the loss of party and electoral support as the two removal 
mechanisms which are most important to this analysis of prime ministerial 
power. In Paul Keating's case, he paid insufficient attention to the voters, 
thinking policy and the inadequacies of the opposition would get him through. 
And he dominated the Party and cabinet to the extent that there was little 
resistance, no alternative leader, and no challenge or likelihood of one. 
Prime ministerial power resides in those institutions which have an impact on 
the political management of a prime minister and their ability to maintain the 
position. It can be found in the caucus, where party colleagues can simply 
look to an alternative for leadership. It resides in the cabinet and the broader 
ministry; these people are senior colleagues of the PM and have their own 
power bases, media profiles and political clout. Power can be found in the 
bureaucratic and advisory institutions, which have significant policy input and 
turf to defend. There is power for prime minsters to mine in the parliament; a 
competent performance is required there to maintain an ascendency over the 
opposition and continually display leadership credentials. The media is 
powerful because it reports and comments on the PM and colours how she or 
he is judged, so must be kept on side. The electorate has the power, 
periodically at least, to fire or re-hire prime ministers, and public opinion in 
between times can put pressure on the party room to act against a poorly 
performing incumbent, so the task of maintaining support needs constant 
attention. 
The cultivation of prime ministerial power is, therefore, an interactionist 
process between a PM and these institutions which determine, or contribute 
1249 See Patrick Weller 1985, op cit, p 46. 
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to, continued tenure and political success. This is an approach well-
articulated by Robert Elgie12so, who maintains a leader's interactions with the 
institutional environment is the key analytical point for scholars of political 
leadership. For the purposes of this thesis, the leadership environment 
comprises prime ministerial institutions like the caucus, cabinet, parliament 
and media. How the PM, in this case Paul Keating, deals with these 
alternative power sources goes a long way towards determining how powerful 
prime ministers are and how much influence others have on the position. 
What sets this dissertation apart from the available prime ministerial power 
literature is this emphasis on interactions, and the conclusion that while 
leaders have the tools for dominance, they can only truly act unilaterally if 
their colleagues allow them to. 
Crudely, we know that prime ministers are powerful when their wishes prevail 
over alternative views pushed by the other institutions and individuals with 
which they share power. Prime ministers interact with these institutions, so 
there is necessarily a relationship and a dialogue between them which 
provides an opportunity for both sides of the relationship to exercise power. 
Some of these other power sources - caucus, cabinet, electorate - determine 
directly whether or not the PM prevails. Others, such as the media, parliament 
and sources of advice, help or hinder prime ministers in their pursuit of power 
over these other institutions. How they are utilised impacts on whether or not 
the prime minister gets her or his way. 
As discussed at length from the outset of this dissertation, proponents of the 
prime ministerial power thesis maintain that PMs are increasingly 
authoritative in relation to their colleagues and the broader institutions of the 
political system. Their influence over the caucus, cabinet, and parliament is 
said to have grown to the point where leadership is more and more individual; 
indeed some problematically employ the term 'presidential'. The leader is no 
longer primus inter pares, the argument goes, they are simply primus. 
Colleagues comprise a decreasingly influential group. The media 
concentrates almost exclusively on the PM, the campaign load is borne largely 
1250 Robert Elgie 1995, op cit. 
316 
, i 
i 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
by the leader, and credit or blame for the government's performance rests 
with its head. 
The Paul Keating Prime Ministership has great value as a case study in the 
evolving debate over the individualisation of prime ministerial power in 
Australia. The common, simplistic view is that Keating was an authoritative 
leader, dominating prime ministerial institutions and operating almost as a 
one-man government, free from the restraint of colleagues and willing and 
able to announce and develop policy unilaterally. The reality, of course, is 
more complicated. Any evaluation of the power resources utilised by Prime 
Minister Keating must necessarily treat each institutional domain separately. 
How power is exercised in caucus, for example, will differ from how it is 
exercised in the media. How parliament is used to maximise authority can, in 
the same way, differ from how the cabinet is navigated. 
Paul Keating's relationship with the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party - the 
caucus - was one marked by prime ministerial dominance and backbench 
subservience. On few occasions did caucus challenge the PM. They were, on 
the whole, prepared to defer to their leader, especially after March 1993. The 
FPLP's one significant power resource - the removal mechanism - was never 
seriously threatened. This meant the leadership bargain, discussed at length 
in Chapter Three, was skewed dramatically in favour of the Prime Minister. 
These two factors; the unwillingness on the part of caucus to consider or 
threaten to consider an alternative, and their general subservience, meant 
that Keating was extremely powerful in this domain. His authority went 
unchecked in the Labor caucus. 
A similar story emerges from Chapter Four's analysis of Prime Minister 
Keating in cabinet, and his relationship with ministers. Cabinet was 
essentially a rubber stamp for those initiatives preferred by the PM. He 
surrounded himself after 1993 with a hand-picked ministry who interfered 
little with Keating's plans. Prime ministerial intervention into policy areas was 
common in selected areas, whereas those domains of little interest to the PM 
were left to relevant ministers. Keating could pick and choose from a menu of 
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portfolios and be certain that any intervention would bring the desired result. 
He dominated cabinet because it came to be filled with supporters, factional 
colleagues and acquiescent ministers. If cabinet is the key test of prime 
ministerial power, then Keating's ability to get his own way in that forum 
marks him out as an extremely authoritative and dominant leader. 
Keating's leadership tenure can also be seen as individually powerful with 
respect to his ability to govern from the centre, the subject of Chapter Five. In 
the policy areas Keating deemed important enough to steer himself, decisions 
were debated and taken in the Prime Minister's Office, with the benefit of the 
advice from a small coterie of loyal, trusted advisers. Thus the PMO became 
an extremely powerful institution, perhaps secretive and, at times, 
inaccessible to others. Decisions taken there effectively became decisions of 
the Government, such was the Prime Minister's dominance of cabinet and the 
policy clout accumulated by senior PMO advisers. Again, then, we can mark 
this domain down as another in which Prime Minister Keating performed 
authoritatively. His private office afforded him scope for power, and he 
utilised it as a way of governing from the centre and dominating his Labor 
Government. The caveat to this, however, is that Australia's federal system 
and the demands placed on the federal government by the High Court create 
situations, such as the Mabo case, where governing from the centre is made 
more difficult by powerful state governments. 
The House of Representatives also had an important influence over Prime 
Minister Keating's stores of authority. There is little doubt he dominated the 
institution, but this had positive and negative impacts on his stores of prime 
ministerial power. On the positive side, his skilful use of parliament to 
motivate colleagues and dominate the opposition and its leaders was 
important. One cost of his combative approach, however, was that the 
language and debating style he used was not necessarily appealing in the 
broader electorate who adjudged his performances perhaps less than prime 
ministerial. This meant parliament allowed Keating to build authority in the 
Party room but spend it in the electorate. In this domain, then, the Prime 
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Minister was individually powerful, but the net effect of his performances was 
probably a neutral one. 
The media relationship was the most problematic of Paul Keating's prime 
ministerial tenure. It deteriorated throughout, and the relationship became so 
poor that it could descend into open warfare. The media were effectively 
banned by Keating in the aftermath of the 1993 election because they had 
written off his chances for victory. Because prime ministers are covered so 
prominently by the media and their performance equated with that of their 
government, the poor Keating-media relationship meant the Government 
suffered greatly. In the media context, then, we witness the leadership stretch 
to which Foley refers, as well as a failure to utilise such an important prime 
ministerial resource. Keating's poor relationship with the mainstream 
Australian media cost him much power, a problem that his skilful 
speech making and international diplomacy could not reverse. 
The media passed on to the Australian voting public the perception that Prime 
Minister Keating was out of touch with their concerns and aspirations. This 
fed an already prominent dislike of the PM among the Australian people, as 
measured by opinion polls which regularly demonstrated dissatisfaction with 
the leader and an opinion of him as arrogant and inflexible. Keating was also 
not prepared to play to the 'hollow centre' of the prime ministership; the 
seemingly superficial but nonetheless important acts which court public 
opinion and seek support. Even in a campaign sense his remarkable victory in 
1993 was based more on a combative and methodical dismantling of Hewson 
and the GST rather than on a groundswell of public popularity. Thus, in a 
similar way to the media relationship, Prime Minister Keating's reluctance to 
pursue a more effective alliance with the Australian people cost him dearly. 
That he could dominate his Party, cabinet and parliament mattered little to the 
Australian electorate in 1996. They threw him out regardless, stripping him of 
any and all prime ministerial power he previously enjoyed. 
The analysis of each of these prime ministerial relationships, carried out in 
some detail in previous chapters and summarised here, points to an 
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inconsistent picture. In the context of his Government there is little doubt that 
he was immensely powerful, certainly, as Graham Richardson once opined, 
the most powerful Labor leader ever12s1. His dominance of caucus and 
cabinet was complete, especially after the unexpected 1993 election victory. 
As Alan Ramsey wrote, in a typically critical but also illustrative article penned 
in 1994, Keating 
thinks he's Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Marco Polo and Genghis 
Khan all wrapped in one sleek feline package. Since last March, the 
power of the emperor is complete, and he now administers it, often 
creatively, just as often willfully, with all the overtones of the street thug 
that Keating, beneath all that style and clever language and political 
brilliance, cannot stop himself from being. It is the instinctive nature of 
the beast. Politics, at its most basic, is the art of what you can get away 
with, and Keating, when he sets his mind to it, behaves as though he 
thinks he can get away with pretty much anything - in his party, in his 
Government, in the Parliament and out there in the electorate1252 • 
The available evidence supports this conclusion that Keating was a leader 
unhindered by caucus or cabinet. He was allowed to announce policy without 
consulting colleagues, and could then drive it through cabinet with little fear of 
defeat. He garnered for himself, in 1993, the authority to select a ministry 
that would have been different if it had been chosen by caucus and the 
factions, as was previous practice. It is these observations that make the 
case for Keating as an individually powerful Australian Prime Minister. 
We can also observe Foley's leadership stretch in the prime ministerial tenure 
of Paul Keating, though in a public and media context this advantage went 
largely unutilised. Another Ramsey article makes the point: 
everybody, but everybody, makes the Prime Minister the political focus of 
all that goes on in the Government (unless one of his ministers gets into 
trouble). For instance, on the two days a week (Mondays and Thursdays) 
that Keating goes to Question Time in Parliament, you get a full House. 
The public galleries are full, with people still queuing outside; the gallery 
for the press is full; all the MPs on both sides are there. Everyone goes to 
see Keating . They're there to watch him, to bait him, to support him, or 
to report him. Nobody else really, just him .... Keating attracts all the focus 
and all the pressure. Radio talkback hosts can queue for a year to have 
him on their program. They have scant interest in others. Neither do the 
1251 Graham Richardson, quoted in Labor in Power (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 
1993). 
1252 Alan Ramsey, 'Emperor Paul Naked But For Noise', Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 
1994, p 33. 
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TV current affairs programs .... The others behind him are mostly grey 
faces, mere talking heads nobody is interested in1253. 
That Keating was the sole focus of media and public attention afforded 
opportunities for him to sell his big picture, but it also had costs for the 
Government when the Prime Minister fell out of favour with the media and the 
electorate. 
Significant lessons for Australian prime ministerial leadership arise out of the 
Keating prime ministership and this dissertation's analysis of the period and 
reliance on the interactionist model. The Keating experience tells us that the 
media and the electorate are two powerful domains which must be carefully 
nurtured, for both are willing and able to turn on a prime minister, with dire 
consequences. The second lesson is that there are two sides to prime 
ministerial dominance of colleagues in the caucus and cabinet. Personal style 
accounts for some of this ability to dominate, but the leadership bargain and 
the removal mechanism means party colleagues must also cede some of their 
power to allow room for prime ministerial manoeuvre. In this respect, 
Australian prime ministers are only ever as powerful as the party allows them 
to be. That Keating so dominated the Labor Party is a reflection of the fact 
that caucus never seemed willing to replace him, and there was never a viable 
threat that this would occur. Unhindered, it is not surprising that he often 
acted unilaterally. 
An additional lesson is provided by a comparison of the Keating, Malcolm 
Fraser and Bob Hawke prime ministerships, which demonstrates that more 
than one path to dominance is available to an Australian Prime Minister. 
Fraser, Patrick Weller tells us, was an authoritative party leader and PM who 
relied on a breadth of information and a dogged determination to be across all 
aspects of his Government's activities. He worked long hours, sought much 
advice, and manipulated the cabinet system through extensive consultation, 
persuasion and exhaustively long meetings. He was an uncomfortable 
parliamentarian and a steady media performer. 
1253 Alan Ramsey, 'Hate the Man, But Love to Watch Him', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April 
321 
Brawler Statesman: Paul Keating and Prime Ministerial Leadership in Australia 
Bob Hawke, too, offers a valuable and marked distinction from the Keating 
experience. Hawke was an effective cabinet chair who gave his talented 
ministers much latitude and offered the Government a popular leader, 
detached from policy making and heavily reliant on others. He was an 
impressive public figure who enjoyed the electoral aspect of the job and 
employed a consensus style of leadership. Hawke was a talented 
administrator who made sure he was across every brief. Importantly, he 
maintained a much analysed love affair with the Australian people which saw 
him leave office having won four consecutive elections and losing none, a 
remarkable feat in the contemporary Australian political climate. 
Paul Keating's approach to the position was vastly different from both Fraser's 
and Hawke's. He injected himself into only those policy areas which 
interested him, and dominated them, but left the minutiae of other 
Government initiatives to his other ministers. He rarely consulted, instead 
trusting a select few advisers in his office, the Department, and former 
advisers in the private sector. He conserved his energy and refused to spread 
himself too thinly over all of the issues. He dominated parliament with his 
rhetorical power, and caucus and cabinet with intellectual force and a skilful 
employment of patronage. In short, though Fraser, Hawke and Keating can all 
be described as dominant prime ministers, their paths to prime ministerial 
power differed greatly. 
At the outset of this thesis one of the stated objectives was to account for 
these differences in experiences from Fraser to Keating. Party difference was 
offered as one potential avenue for diversion, but the analysis contained in 
Chapter Three of this thesis would make the case that there is little difference, 
in relation to prime ministerial power, between the ALP and Fraser's Liberals. 
Indeed Labor under Keating was even more subservient to the leader; 
democratic traditions and external policy making and control were not factors 
in his leadership. The structures of power in the ALP were largely ignored by 
Keating once he appeared safe from challenge. The removal mechanism is 
again key here. Malcolm Fraser had to contend with an alternative leadership 
1995, p 39. 
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aspirant with some support - Andrew Peacock - whereas Keating did not. 
This meant, somewhat paradoxically, that Fraser was given less leeway from 
his party room than Keating was. Party difference was irrelevant; the 
leadership bargain and the removal mechanism remained primarily important. 
This leaves personal style as the final explanatory difference between how the 
opportunities of leadership stretch and for institutional dominance were 
utilised by recent leaders. Because there is more than one path to prime 
ministerial power, the attributes of the leader and the strategic decisions they 
make about how to maximise their power are paramount. For example, 
Keating had the psychological and rhetorical ability to use parliament more 
effectively than Fraser or Hawke could. Fraser and Hawke were more 
prepared to consult colleagues, and tolerated more access from 
backbenchers. Keating was a more combative, street-fighting variety of 
leader. Hawke's electoral appeal dwarfed that of his predecessor and 
successor. The differences abound, but all exercised an extraordinary 
dominance over their respective governments. The Keating tenure confirms 
the trend towards individual leadership, but throws up a combination of new 
and interesting factors impacting on prime ministerial power. 
Prime Minister Keating was colossally dominant over the Labor caucus and 
cabinet but this could not ensure his survival once judged the second time by 
the Australian electorate. His colleagues were subservient and submissive, 
but the electorate was, after an early reprieve in 1993, not. There are 
numerous reasons for Keating and Labor's loss in 1996, among them the 
personal style and unpopularity of the Prime Minister and the weight of long 
term incumbency. Whatever the reason for the landslide defeat, however, 
that Keating was beaten by Howard is evidence that prime ministerial power 
springs first from the voting public. The demos, in Don Watson's words, 'held 
the gun', aimed it at their PM and his Party, and fired. 
No prime minister operates free from constraint because the job is one that 
exists on the basis of party and electoral support. They fight on two fronts, 
though Keating only maintained a dominant ascendency over one. Prime 
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ministers who don't retire or die, or who aren't dismissed, are subject to two 
significant and periodically unsheathed removal mechanisms; the electorate 
and the party room. The first relies on the tides of public opinion and support, 
the second on a leadership bargain which trades the prospects of electoral 
success for security of tenure. 
Thus prime ministers are only as powerful as they are allowed to be. Their 
colleagues determine whether or not they continue to lead the party, and the 
electorate decides whether or not they continue to lead a government. This is 
the key point about prime ministerial power, and the primary lesson of this 
dissertation. Because they are subject to these constraints they can never be 
completely dominant; their job is too reliant on the support of others. The 
leadership bargain struck with caucus can remain intact when a skilful and/or 
dominant prime minister cultivates the relationship or when there is little 
chance of an alternative wresting the leadership from the PM. When there is 
an alternative, or when the relationship breaks down, so too does the bargain. 
Electorally, a poor relationship with the voting public has similarly dire 
consequences for a prime minister not ready to relinquish power. 
Within the constraints provided by the removal mechanisms of party and 
public, Australian prime ministers can nonetheless be individually powerful or 
presidential. Because of the constraints, this power can never be complete, 
but as the Paul Keating Prime Ministership demonstrates, a leader can 
nonetheless dominate the government. That Keating could announce policies 
unilaterally, hand pick his cabinet, ride roughshod over caucus and cabinet 
misgivings over policy, and dominate Labor's two election campaigns is 
evidence enough that the office has become an individualised one. There is 
scope for the wielding of massive power, that Keating drew upon throughout 
the course of his Prime Ministership. His tenure demonstrates both the 
possibilities of the office, and the electoral limits of prime ministerial power. 
One contributor to the debate over prime ministerial power describes the 
office as a rubber band, which can stretch to accommodate a dominant prime 
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minister but contracts for a more submissive one1254• This is only partly an 
apt description of the office. It is true, from the evidence provided here and in 
Patrick Weller's study of Malcolm Fraser, that personal style and ability 
determines how powerful a prime minister is, and how they utilise the powers 
of the office to dominate the government. An active prime minister clearly 
stretches the rubber band. But the flaw in this analysis is its failure to 
recognise that the band never returns back to the old conception. Australian 
prime ministers will never again be like the chairpersons of company boards. 
They will never again be primus inter pares. The evolution of the office has 
taken on a trajectory which means the scope for the individual exercise of 
prime ministerial power is greater as time goes on. The speed of these 
developments depends on personal style - and Fraser and Keating both 
served to accelerate the trend - but the expectations on successive prime 
ministers and the demands of leadership stretch create a situation where the 
traditional prime ministership and cabinet government are but things of the 
past. 
This thesis has argued that prime ministers are not and will never be like 
presidents because their colleagues determine their ongoing tenure. When 
these colleagues are compliant or subservient, as was the case under Prime 
Minister Keating, the prime minister is provided scope for dominant, even 
dictatorial, leadership encumbered only by the electoral process. Because 
leadership is interactional it depends on the strategy and talents of the leader 
but also, importantly in democratic polities like Australia, on the willingness of 
others to be led. 
1254 George Jones 1991, op cit. 
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Appendix One: The Federal Parliamentary Labor Party 
1991-1996 
FPLP- First Keating Government December 1991 to March 1993 
Aulich, Terrence Gordon Senator for Tasmania 
Baldwin, Hon Peter Jeremy MP for Sydney (NSW) 
Beahan, Michael Eamon Senator for Western Australia 
Beazley, Hon Kim Christian MP for Swan (WA) 
Beddall, Hon Peter David MP for Rankin (QLD) 
Bevis, Archibald Ronald MP for Brisbane (QLD) 
Bilney, Hon Gordon Neil MP for Kingston (SA) 
Blewett, Hon Neal MP for Bonython (SA) 
Balkus, Hon Nick Senator for South Australia 
Brereton, Hon Laurence John MP for Kingsford Smith (NSW) 
Brown, Hon Robert James MP for Charlton (NSW) 
Burns, Bryant Robert Senator for Queensland 
Button, Hon John Norman Senator for Victoria 
Campbell, Graeme MP for Kalgoorlie (WA) 
Gatley, Dr Robert MP for Adelaide (SA) 
Charlesworth, Dr Richard Ian MP for Perth (WA) 
Childs, Bruce Kenneth Senator for New South Wales 
Coates, John Senator for Tasmania 
Collins, Robert Lindsay Senator for the Northern Territory 
Colston, Malcolm Arthur Senator for Queensland 
Cook, Hon Peter Francis Salmon Senator for Western Australia 
Cooney, Bernard Cornelius Senator for Victoria 
Courtice, Brian William MP for Hinkler (QLD) 
Crawford, Mary Catherine MP for Forde (QLD) 
Crean, Hon Simon Findlay MP for Hotham (VIC) 
Crosio, Hon Janice Ann, MBE MP for Prospect (NSW) 
Crowley, Rosemary Anne Senator for South Australia 
Darling, Elaine Elizabeth MP for Lilley (QLD) 
Dawkins, Hon John Sydney MP for Fremantle (WA) 
Devereux, John Robert Senator for Tasmania 
Dubois, Stephen Cairfield MP for St George (NSW) 
Duffy, Hon Michael John MP for Holt (VIC) 
Duncan, Hon Peter MP for Makin (SA) 
Edwards, Ronald Frederick MP for Stirling (WA) 
Elliott, Robert Paul MP for Parramatta (NSW) 
Evans, Hon Gareth John, QC Senator for Victoria 
Fatin, Hon Wendy Frances MP for Brand (WA) 
Faulkner, John Phillip Senator for New South Wales 
Ferguson, Laurie Donald Thomas MP for Reid (NSW) 
Fitzgibbon, Eric John MP for Hunter (NSW) 
Foreman, Dominic John Senator for South Australia 
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Free, Ross Vincent MP for Lindsay (NSW) 
Gayler, John MP for Leichhardt (QLD) 
Gear, George MP for Canning (WA) 
Gibson, Garrie David MP for Moreton (QLD) 
Giles, Patricia Jessie Senator for Western Australia 
Gorman, Russell Neville Joseph MP for Greenway (NSW) 
Grace, Edward Laurence MP for Fowler (NSW) 
Griffiths, Hon Alan Gordon MP for Maribyrnong (VIC) 
Hand, Hon Gerard Leslie MP for Melbourne (VIC) 
Hawke, Hon Robert James Lee, AC MP for Wills (VIC) 
Resigned 20 February 1992, seat lost 
to Independent (Cleary) 11 April 1992 
Holding, Hon Allan Clyde MP for Melbourne Ports (VIC) 
Hollis, Colin MP for Throsby (NSW) 
Howe, Hon Brian Leslie MP for Batman (VIC) 
Hulls, Rob Justin MP for Kennedy (QLD) 
Humphreys, Hon Benjamin Charles MP for Griffith (QLD) 
Jakobsen, Carolyn Anne MP for Cowan (WA) 
Jenkins, Henry Alfred MP for Scullin (VIC) 
Johns, Gary Thomas MP for Petrie (QLD) 
Jones, Gerry Norman Senator for Queensland 
Jones, Hon Barry Owen MP for Lalor (VIC) 
Keating, Hon Paul John MP for Blaxland (NSW) 
Kelly, Hon Roslyn Joan MP for Canberra (ACT) 
Kerin, Hon John Charles MP for Werriwa (NSW) 
Kerr, Duncan James MP for Denison (TAS) 
Langmore, John Vance MP for Fraser (ACT) 
Lavarch, Michael Hugh MP for Fisher (QLD) 
Lee, Michael John MP for Dobell (NSW) 
Lindsay, Eamon John, RFD MP for Herbert (QLD) 
Maguire, Graham Ross Senator for South Australia 
Martin, Stephen Paul MP for Macarthur (NSW) 
McHugh, Jeannette MP for Phillip (NSW) 
McKiernan, James Philip Senator for Western Australia 
McLeay, Hon Leo Boyce MP for Grayndler (NSW) 
McMullan, Hon Robert Francis Senator for the Australian Capital 
Territory 
Melham, Daryl MP for Banks (NSW) 
Morris, Allan Agapitos MP for Newcastle (NSW) 
Morris, Hon Peter Frederick MP for Shortland (NSW) 
Newell, Neville Joseph MP for Richmond (NSW) 
O'Keefe, Neil Patrick MP for Burke (VIC) 
O'Neil, Lloyd Reginald Terrence MP for Grey (SA) 
Price, Leo Roger Spurway MP for Chifley (NSW) 
Punch, Hon Gary Francis MP for Barton (NSW) 
Ray, Hon Robert Francis Senator for Victoria 
Reynolds, Hon Margaret Senator for Queensland 
Richardson, Hon Graham Frederick Senator for New South Wales 
Sawford, Rodney Weston MP for Port Adelaide (SA) 
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Schacht, Christopher Cleland Senator for South Australia 
Scholes, Hon Gordon Glen Denton MP for Corio (VIC) 
Sciacca, Hon Con MP for Bowman (QLD) 
Scott, John Lyden MP for Hindmarsh (SA) 
Scott, Leslie James MP for Oxley (QLD) 
Sibraa, Hon Kerry Walter Senator for New South Wales 
Simmons, Hon David William MP for Ca la re (NSW) 
Snow, James Henry MP for Eden-Monaro (NSW) 
Snowdon, Hon Warren Edward MP for Northern Territory (NT) 
Staples, Hon Peter Richard MP for Jagajaga (VIC) 
Tate, Hon Michael Carter Senator for Tasmania 
Theophanous, Dr Andrew Charles MP for Calwell (VIC) 
Tickner, Hon Robert Edward MP for Hughes (NSW) 
Walker, Francis John, QC MP for Robertson (NSW) 
Walsh, Hon Peter Alexander Senator for Western Australia 
West, Hon Stewart John MP for Cunningham (NSW) 
Willis, Hon Ralph MP for Gellibrand (VIC) 
Woods, Harry Francis MP for Page (NSW) 
Wright, Keith Webb MP for Capricornia (QLD) 
Zakharov, Alice Olive Senator for Victoria 
Source: Hansard. 
FPLP - Second Keating Government March 1993 to March 1996 
Adams, Hon Godfrey Harry MP for Lyons (TAS) 
Baldwin, Hon Peter Jeremy MP for Sydney (NSW) 
Beahan, Michael Eamon Senator for Western Australia 
Beazley, Hon Kim Christian MP for Swan (WA) 
Beddall, Hon Peter David MP for Rankin (QLD) 
Bevis, Archibald Ronald MP for Brisbane (QLD) 
Bilney, Hon Gordon Neil MP for Kingston (SA) 
Blewett, Hon Neal MP for Bonython (SA) 
Resigned 11 February 1994, replaced 
by M Evans 19 March 1994 
Balkus, Hon Nick Senator for South Australia 
Brereton, Hon Laurence John MP for Kingsford Smith (NSW) 
Brown, Hon Robert James MP for Charlton (NSW) 
Burns, Bryant Robert Senator for Queensland 
Campbell, Graeme MP for Kalgoorlie (WA) 
Expelled from FPLP November 1995 
Carr, Kim John Senator for Victoria 
Childs, Bruce Kenneth Senator for New South Wales 
Chynoweth, Robert Leslie MP for Dunkley (VIC) 
Cleeland, Peter Robert MP for McEwen (VIC) 
Coates, John Senator for Tasmania 
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Collins, Hon Robert Lindsay Senator for the Northern Territory 
Collins, Jacinta Mary Ann Senator for Victoria 
Replaced Zakharov 3 May 1995 
Colston, Malcolm Arthur Senator for Queensland 
Cook, Hon Peter Francis Salmon Senator for Western Australia 
Cooney, Bernard Cornelius Senator for Victoria 
Crawford, Mary Catherine MP for Forde (QLD) 
Crean, Hon Simon Findlay 
' 
MP for Hotham (VIC) 
Crosio, Hon Janice Ann, MBE MP for Prospect (NSW) 
Crowley, Hon Rosemary Anne Senator for South Australia 
Cunningham, Barry Thomas MP for McMillan (VIC) 
Dawkins, Hon John Sydney MP for Fremantle (WA) 
Resigned 4 February 1994, replaced by 
Lawrence 12 March 1994 
Deahm, Maggie MP for Macquarie (NSW) 
Denman, Kay Janet Senator for Tasmania 
Replaced Tate 24 August 1993 
Devereux, John Robert Senator for Tasmania 
Dodd, Peter George MP for Leichhardt (QLD) 
Duffy, Hon Michael John MP for Holt (VIC) 
Duncan, Hon Peter MP for Makin (SA) 
Easson, Mary MP for Lowe (NSW) 
Elliott, Robert Paul MP for Parramatta (NSW) 
Evans, Christopher Vaughan Senator for Western Australia 
Evans, Hon Gareth John, QC Senator for Victoria 
Resigned 6 February 1996 (entered 
HoR at 1996 election), replaced in 
Senate by Conroy after 1996 election 
Evans, Martyn John MP for Bonython 
Replaced Blewett 19 March 1994 
Fatin, Hon Wendy Frances MP for Brand (WA) 
Faulkner, Hon John Phillip Senator for New South Wales 
Ferguson, Laurie Donald Thomas MP for Reid (NSW) 
Fitzgibbon, Eric John MP for Hunter (NSW) 
Foreman, Dominic John Senator for South Australia 
Forshaw, Michael George Senator for New South Wales 
Replaced Graham Richardson 10 May 
1994 
Free, Ross Vincent MP for Lindsay (NSW) 
Gayler, John MP for Leichhardt (QLD) 
Gear, Hon George MP for Canning (WA) 
Gibson, Garrie David MP for Moreton (QLD) 
Gorman, Russell Neville Joseph MP for Greenway (NSW) 
Grace, Edward Laurence MP for Fowler (NSW) 
Griffin, Alan Peter MP for Corinella (VIC) 
Griffiths, Hon Alan Gordon MP for Maribyrnong (VIC) 
Haviland, Christopher Douglas MP for Macarthur (NSW) 
Henzel!, Marjorie Madeline MP for Capricornia (QLD) 
Holding, Hon Allan Clyde MP for Melbourne Ports (VIC) 
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Hollis, Colin MP for Throsby (NSW) 
Horne, Robert Hodges MP fort Paterson (NSW) 
Howe, Hon Brian Leslie MP for Batman (VIC) 
Humphreys, Hon Benjamin Charles MP for Griffith (QLD) 
Jenkins, Henry Alfred MP for Scullin (VIC) 
Johns, Gary Thomas MP for Petrie (QLD) 
Jones, Gerry Norman Senator for Queensland 
Jones, Hon Barry Owen MP for Lalor (VIC) 
Keating, Hon Paul John MP for Blaxland (NSW) 
Kelly, Hon Roslyn Joan MP for Canberra (ACT) 
Resigned 30 January 1995, seat lost to 
Liberal Party (Smyth) 25 March 1995 
Kerin, Hon John Charles MP for Werriwa (NSW) 
Resigned 22 December 1993, replaced 
by Latham 29 January 1994 
Kerr, Hon Duncan James MP for Denison (TAS) 
Knott, Peter John MP for Gilmore (NSW) 
Langmore, John Vance MP for Fraser (ACT) 
Latham, Mark MP for Werriwa 
Replaced Kerin 29 January 1994 
Lavarch, Michael Hugh MP for Dickson (QLD) 
Lawrence, Carmen MP for Fremantle 
Replaced Dawkins 12 March 1994 
Lee, Michael John MP for Dobell (NSW) 
Lindsay, Eamon John, RFD MP for Herbert (QLD) 
Loosley, Stephen Senator for New South Wales 
McHugh, Jeannette MP for Grayndler (NSW) 
McKiernan, James Philip Senator for Western Australia 
McLeay, Hon Leo Boyce MP for Watson (NSW) 
Martin, Hon Stephen Paul MP for Cunningham (NSW) 
McMullan, Hon Robert Francis Senator for the Australian Capital 
Territory 
Melham, Daryl MP for Banks (NSW) 
Morris, Allan Agapitos MP for Newcastle (NSW) 
Morris, Hon Peter Frederick MP for Shortland (NSW) 
Murphy, Shayne Michael Senator for Tasmania 
Neal, Belinda Jane Senator for New South Wales 
Replaced Sibraa 8 March 1994 
Newell, Neville Joseph MP for Richmond (NSW) 
O'Connor, Gavan Michael MP for Corio (VIC) 
O'Keefe, Neil Patrick MP for Burke (VIC) 
Price, Hon Leo Roger Spurway MP for Chifley (NSW) 
Punch, Hon Gary Francis MP for Barton (NSW) 
Quick, Harry Vernon MP for Franklin (TAS) 
Ray, Hon Robert Francis Senator for Victoria 
Reynolds, Hon Margaret Senator for Queensland 
Richardson, Hon Graham Frederick Senator for New South Wales 
Resigned 25 March 1994, replaced by 
Forshaw 10 May 1994 
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Sawford, Rodney Weston MP for Port Adelaide (SA) 
Schacht, Christopher Cleland Senator for South Australia 
Sciacca, Hon Con MP for Bowman (QLD) 
Scott, Leslie James MP for Oxley (QLD) 
Sherry, Hon Nicholas John Senator for Tasmania 
Sibraa, Hon Kerry Walter Senator for New South Wales 
Resigned 1 February 1994, replaced by 
Neal 8 March 1994 
Simmons, Hon David William MP for Calare (NSW) 
Smith, Silvia Joy MP for Bass (TAS) 
Smith, Stephen Francis MP for Perth (WA) 
Snow, James Henry MP for Eden-Monaro (NSW) 
Snowdon, Hon Warren Edward MP for Northern Territory (NT) 
Staples, Hon Peter Richard MP for Jagajaga (VIC) 
Swan, Wayne Maxwell MP for Lilley (QLD) 
Tanner, Lindsay James MP for Melbourne (VIC) 
Tate, Hon Michael Carter Senator for Tasmania 
Resigned 5 July 1993, replaced by 
Denman 24 August 1993 
Theophanous, Dr Andrew Charles MP for Calwell (VIC) 
Tickner, Hon Robert Edward MP for Hughes (NSW) 
Walker, Hon Francis John, QC MP for Robertson (NSW) 
West, Suzanne Margaret Senator for New South Wales 
Willis, Hon Ralph MP for Gellibrand (VIC) 
Woods, Harry Francis MP for Page (NSW) 
Wright, Keith Webb MP for Capricornia (QLD) 
Zakharov, Alice Olive Senator for Victoria 
Died 6 March 1995, replaced by J 
Collins 3 May 1995 
Source: Hansard. 
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Appendix Two: The Keating Ministries 
PJ Keating 
BL Howe 
JN Button 
GJ Evans 
JS Dawkins 
R Willis 
MJ Duffy 
KC Beazley 
N Blewett 
GF Richardson 
RL Collins 
RF Ray 
GL Hand 
RJ Kelly 
PFS Cook 
N Bolkus 
SF Crean 
AG Griffiths 
BC Humphreys 
PR Staples 
RV Free 
DP Beddall 
JC Kerin 
Cabinet 
Prime Minister 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Health, Housing and Community 
Services 
Minister for Industry, Technology and 
Commerce 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Treasurer 
Minister for Finance 
Attorney-General 
Minister for Employment, Education 
and Training 
Minister for Social Security 
Minister for Transport and 
Communications (until 18.5.1992) 
Minister for Northern Australia and 
Shipping and Aviation (until 27 .5.92), 
Minister for Transport and 
Communications (from 27.5.1992) 
Minister for Defence 
Minister for Immigration, Local 
Government and Ethnic Affairs 
Minister for the Arts, Sport, the 
Environment, Tourism and Territories 
Minister for Industrial Relations, and 
Minister for Shipping and Aviation 
Support (from 27.5.92) 
Minister for Administrative Services 
Minister for Primary Industries and 
Energy 
Minister for Tourism and Minister for 
Resources 
Minister for Northern Australia (from 
27.5.92) and Veteran's Affairs 
Other Ministers 
Minister for Aged, Family and Health 
Services 
Minister for Science and Technology 
Minister for Small Business, 
Construction and Customs 
Minister for Trade and Overseas 
Development 
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MC Tate 
J McHugh 
PJ Baldwin 
RE Tickner 
DWSimmons 
RJ Brown 
GN Bilney 
WF Fatin 
PJ Keating 
BL Howe 
KC Beazley 
GF Richardson 
CM Lawrence 
GJ Evans 
PFS Cook 
RF McMullan 
Minister for Justice and Consumer 
Affairs (until 27 .5.92), Minister for 
Justice (from 27.5.92) 
Minister for Consumer Affairs (from 
27.5.92) 
Minister for Higher Education and 
Employment Services 
Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs 
Minister for Family Support and 
Minister for Local Government 
Minister for Land Transport 
Minister for Defence Science and 
Personnel 
Minister for the Arts and Territories 
Cabinet 
Prime Minister 
Deputy Prime Minister (until 20.6.95), 
Minister for Housing, Local Government 
and Community Services (until 
23.12.93), Minister for Housing, Local 
Government and Human Services 
(23.12.93 until 25.3.94), Minister for 
Housing and Regional Development 
(from 25.3.94) 
Minister for Employment Education and 
Training (until 23.12.93), Minister for 
Finance (from 23.12.93), Deputy Prime 
Minister (from 20.6.95) 
Minister for Health (until 25.3.94), 
Minister for the Environment, Sport and 
Territories (1.3.94 - 25.3.94) 
Minister for Health (from 25.3.94) 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Minister for Trade (until 30.1.94). 
Minister for Science, Technology and 
Regional Development (30.1.94 -
25.3.94), Minister for Industry, Science 
and Technology (from 25.3.94) 
Minister for the Arts and Administrative 
Services (until 30.1.94), Minister for 
Administrative Services (30.1.94 -
25.3.94), Minister for Trade (from 
30.1.94) 
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RF Ray Minister for Defence 
JS Dawkins Treasurer (until 23.12.93) 
R Willis Minister for Finance (until 23.12.93), 
Treasurer (from 23.12.93) 
SF Crean Minister for Primary Industries and 
Energy (until 23.12.93), Minister for 
Education, Employment and Training 
(from 23.12.93) 
RJ Kelly Minister for the Environment, Sport and 
Territories (until 1.3.94) 
JP Faulkner Minister for Veteran's Affairs and 
Minister for Defence Science and 
Personnel (until 25.3.94), Minister for 
Sport and Territories (1.3.94 -
25.3.94), Minister for the Environment, 
Sport and Territories (from 25.3.94) 
N Bolkus Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs 
RL Collins Minister for Transport and 
Communications (until 23.12.94), 
Minister for Primary Industries and 
Energy (from 23.12.93) 
AG Griffiths Minister for Science, Technology and 
Regional Development (until 23.1.94) 
U Brereton Minister for Industrial Relations, 
Minister for Transport (from 23.12.93) 
MJ Lee Minister for Resources (to 23.12.93). 
Minister for Communications (23.12.93 
- 30.1.94), Minister for 
Communications and the Arts (from 
30.1.94), Minister for Tourism 
PJ Baldwin Minister for Social Security 
MH Lavarch Attorney-General (from 27 .4.93) 
Other Ministers 
FJ Walker Special Minister of State (to 25.3.94), 
Minister for Administrative Services 
(from 25.3.94) 
GT Johns Special Minister of State (from 25.3.94) 
RE Tickner Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs 
RA Crowley Minister for Family Services 
CA Sciacca Minister for Veteran's Affairs (from 
25.3.94) 
GN Bilney Minister for Development Cooperation 
and Pacific Island Affairs 
GF Punch Minister for Defence Science and 
Personnel (from 25.3.94) 
RV Free Minister for Schools, Vocational 
Education and Training 
DP Beddall Minister for Communications (until 
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23.12.93), Minister for Resources (from 
23.12.93) 
CC Schacht Minister for Science and Small 
Business (until 25.3.94), Minister for 
Small Business, Customs and 
Construction (from 25.3.94) 
DJC Kerr Attorney-General (1.4.93 - 27 .4.93), 
Minister for Justice 
J McHugh Minister for Consumer Affairs 
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Appendix Three: Keating Cabinet Committees 
Composition of Cabinet Committees 
First Keating Government December 1991 to March 19931255 
Name1256 Members1251 
Expenditure Review Keating (chair), Howe, Button, Evans, 
Dawkins, Willis, Beazley, Blewett, Brereton, 
Crean, Baldwin 
Parliamentary Business Keating (chair), Howe, Button, Evans, Duffy, 
Beazley, Blewett, Ray, Griffiths, Collins, 
Free, McMullan, Brereton, Lavarch, 
Faulkner, Walker 
Legislation Keating (chair), Evans, Duffy, Griffiths, Tate, 
Simmons, Tickner, Free, McMullan, 
Brereton 
Social Justice Keating (chair), Howe, Dawkins, Willis, 
(Became Social Policy) Blewett, Hand, Cook, Crean, Tate, Staples, 
Simmons, Humphreys, Baldwin, Fatin, 
Tickner, McHugh, Snowdon, Beazley, 
Richardson 
Revenue Keating (chair), Howe, Button, Evans, 
Dawkins 
Structural Adjustment Keating (chair), Howe, Button, Evans, 
(Became Structural Adjustment and Trade) Dawkins, Willis, Beazley, Kelly, Cook, 
Crean, Griffiths, Collins, Kerin, Beddall, 
Bilney, Free, Lee 
Sustainable Development Keating (chair), Howe, Button, Dawkins, 
Willis, Kelly, Bolkus, Crean, Griffiths, 
Collins, Kerin, Brown, Free, Brereton 
Security Keating (chair), Evans, Beazley, Duffy, Ray, 
Kerin, Lavarch 
General Policy Keating (chair), Willis, Kelly, Bolkus, 
McMullan, Brereton, Lavarch, Lee 
Sources: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Annual Reports 1991-1996. 
1255 Note that this information was only provided for the first Keating Government. The 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet ceased publishing this information in their 
Annual Report in 1993-94. This data remains illustrative because it shows that the Prime 
Minister chaired each committee. 
1256 Note that this list is composed of committees that met at any time during the first Keating 
Government. 
1257 Note that this list is composed of all ministers and parliamentary secretaries who were 
members of the listed committee at any time during the first Keating Government. 
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Appendix Four: International Visits 
21-26 April 1992 
7-10 July 1992 
20-27 September 1992 
20-27 June 1993 
8-11August1993 
11-26 September 1993 
20-28 October 1993 
17-23November1993 
5-13 April 1994 
2-12 June 1994 
27-29 June 1994 
4-7 September 1994 
13-16 November 1994 
4-15 March 1995 
24-28 May 1995 
12-18 September 1995 
9-13 November 1995 
16-21 November 1995 
10-13December1995 
17-19 December 1995 
15-18 January 1996 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea 
Honiara (South Pacific Forum) 
Japan, Singapore and Cambodia 
Republic of Korea and China 
Nauru (South Pacific Forum) 
United States of America, United Kingdom, 
Ireland, France and Monaco 
Cyprus (CHOGM) and Indonesia 
United States of America 
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam 
United Kingdom, France and Belgium 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Indonesia (APEC) 
Singapore, Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands 
Japan 
Papua New Guinea (South Pacific Forum) and 
Indonesia 
New Zealand (CHOGM) 
Japan (APEC) 
Israel (State Funeral) 
Indonesia (Security Agreement) 
Malaysia and Singapore 
Sources: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Annual Reports 1991-1996. 
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